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Thesis Abstract 
Contemporary philosophy has a case to answer when it only offers a range of 
accounts on power which implicate violence. An analysis showing that violence 
cannot be legitimate fuels even deeper concern. It would appear that the moral 
agent is left facing two (rather unsatisfactory) choices: either pursue power 
through violent means, or renounce violence and remain powerless. For some, 
this situation will be deeply counter-intuitive requiring an alternative solution. 
As an alternative candidate for power, Western nonviolent action contains some 
useful beginnings for a theoretical account, but its apparent limitations have led to 
a dismissal of the subject by mainstream philosophy. Two contemporary 
examples (the Tibetan community in exile and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa) successfully demonstrate the exercise of power 
through nonviolence. By taking a Western and non-Western philosophical 
approach and bringing the theoretical foundations together we find compelling 
evidence for a new action theory of power based on nonviolence. 
This approach through "fusion philosophy" brings to philosophical discourse new 
definitions of violence and nonviolence and a fresh perspective on the roots of 
violence and the pathway to the antidote. The contemporary application of MK 
Gandhi's satyagraha, or "truth insistence" through the work of Professor 
Samdhong Rinpoche, highlights the important moral issue, that nonviolent action 
is not only descriptive, but also representative, and what it represents is the truth. 
Here we find the context for individual action and accountability, and a 
mechanism for effective social change. 
Contemporary theorists writing on power who make necessary connections 
between power and violence, fail to notice that violence is also representative, 
and fail to ask what it represents. While the change from violent action to 
nonviolent action may not suit some, progress should at least reflect a choice; 
and contemporary philosophy is faced with providing the conceptual scaffolding 
to support the increasing number of individuals, groups and nations moving 
through this important transition. 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: "Is it reasonable for the epistemological 
foundations of power to reflect only violence?" concluding that it is not. I argue 
that violence is too narrowly defined and offer new definitions of violence and 
nonviolence. Further, that violent action represents falsity or error and is morally 
wrong. It also represents the supposed legitimate exercise of power when it is in 
fact illegitimate and unjustifiable. I conclude that nonviolence represents a more 
morally acceptable type of action because it represents the truth in two senses-- 
about the way things are, and about the way things ought to be. 
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People use the word "power" a great deal, so it is obviously thought to represent 
something important. (Morriss 1987:3) 
From the standpoint of a person living a life at the close of the Twentieth Century, 
there is something deeply puzzling about the body of knowledge on power which 
insists on necessary connections to violence. Some would say, that living at the 
close of possibly the most violent century there is nothing surprising or puzzling 
about this at all; and yet, our time has produced a number of examples which defy 
this picture of power and violence. Something extraordinary is going on in the lives 
of two particular groups of people at this point in time which provides compelling 
evidence for, even insists on the urgent need for a new metaphysics of power based 
on nonviolence. 
WJM Mackenzie in Power, Violence, Decision (1975) offers an almost apologetic 
acceptance of the realities of everyday individual and group violence, setting up the 
distinction between "what is technically possible and what is politically possible". 
To spell this out precisely, Mackenzie wants us to be practical. The assumption is 
that we can theorise all we like about power in other than violent terms; but it will 
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do nothing to move us forward in the area of practical application: Quite simply, 
power through violence appears to work in the all important realm of political 
practice. In response to this, I will offer two examples to illustrate the compatibility 
of power and nonviolence which provide a transition from the realm of the 
technically or theoretically possible to the realm of practical application: The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa represents a very 
new approach to managing political change. This example demonstrates nonviolent 
power with a convincing political result. Power is also exercised when individuals 
confront past atrocities (survivors and perpetrators of violence) and replace 
retributive justice with acknowledgment and reconciliation. To complement this, the 
philosophy and practice of the exiled Tibetan community not only reflects a desire 
and sense of duty to adhere to nonviolence in the face of violent oppression, but 
provides a contemporary example of satyagraha (truth insistence). I will argue that 
the struggle of this group (in total comprising about one hundred thousand Tibetan 
refugees) while lacking the firm political results of the post-apartheid South African 
example, can still be seen as an effective example of a quest for power through 
nonviolence for the following reason: 
I will argue for the claim that both violent action and nonviolent action is 
representational, and in this sense, the nonviolent action of the Tibetans in exile 
represents something important. Moreover, when theorists argue for necessary 
connections between power and violence [and, as I will show, this is the view which 
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has informed the philosophical landscape] they are failing to notice this important 
feature of public action. In contrast, we are offered a package of accounts that is 
descriptive. By using examples like coercion, force, control and influence we are 
shown how power can be exercised through violence and told that any alternative 
viewpoint would move outside of a realistic conception of power and operate in the 
fantastic realm of an idealised standpoint where "nothing short of the City of God 
would suffice." (Airaksinen 1988:13) My attack on this position (held totally, or in 
part) by, de Jouvenel (1945), Lukes (1974), Mackenzie (1975), Wrong (1979), 
Mann (1986), Morriss (1987) and Airaksinen (1988) will be motivated by three 
particular conclusions: 
(I) An act of violence is more than just an action, it is also representational and 
what it represents is falsity or error. There are three senses, I will argue, in which 
this is true: 
(a) The agent fails to recognise what violence entails (in committing a violent act 
against another, s/he fails to recognise that this action denies personal agency to the 
other). 
(b) The agent denies the victim personal agency, and doesn't care what the denial 
entails. 
(c) The agent acts violently (again, denying personal agency) and makes an attempt 
at justification and hence is involved in a performative contradiction. 
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In addition, I will argue that violent action is always morally wrong. It is in fact 
illegitimate and unjustifiable. I will argue that such actions re-inscribe illicit power 
structures and in addition involve the claim that implicit or explicit violent actions 
are normal. Many theorists writing on power have failed to recognise that violent 
actions are representational, and consequently, failed to ask what it is they represent. 
The second consideration which motivates my rejoinder to those who argue that 
power can only be exercised through violence, can be formulated in the following 
way: nonviolence represents a more morally acceptable category of action because 
what it represents is true. It does so in two senses: it represents the truth about 
"the way things are" (by confronting violence and asking for the oppressor to 
surrender his wrong views) and the truth of "how things ought to be" (nonviolent 
action demonstrates compassion, an understanding of interdependence, and how 
persons ought to be treated based on a number of inalienable rights). 
Finally I will argue that nonviolence is effective as a means to exercise of power. 
Power is about effecting change (the least contentious definition of power 
introduced by Lukes and modified by Morriss), and some change is effected by other 
than violent means. Contemporary philosophy must reassess its dismissal of 
nonviolence praxis because recent history already records a number of instances 
where power is successfiilly achieved and exercised through nonviolence: The 
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recent South African transition to democracy demonstrates how nonviolent action 
creates moral and social pressure for people to change. 
As a rejoinder to the preconceived notion that nonviolence is an idealistic view taken 
up by a minuscule proportion of the population who aspire to moral sainthood, I will 
argue that this form of action is a practical pathway to the exercise of power 
available to any agent regardless of her background. 
Western philosophers in the past, have largely dismissed nonviolence as a merely 
religious commitment, in the proper domain of political science or media studies. As 
this project unfolds I will explore the reasons for this. I will argue that a 
philosophical analysis of nonviolence is possible only if we move beyond the 
boundaries of Western philosophy and pay serious attention to particular non-
Western philosophical approaches. I refer to this approach as "fusion philosophy." 
The requirement for "fusion" is straightforward: The Western discourse on power 
does not include nonviolence. The Western discourse on nonviolence does not 
address power in any satisfactory way'. 
Professor Gene Sharp does talk about nonviolence as an exercise of power, but it appears different to 
violence only by degree rather than by kind. There is an assumption that violence represents strength, 
and Sharp certainly appears to appropriate the language of violence to add strength to his categories of 
nonviolence: he refers to nonviolent action or noncooperation as both a strategy and weapon to "paralyze 
and disintegrate" oppressive systems through "nonviolent coercion" (Sharp 1994 cover insert and p. vi). . 
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Chapter One will consider how the philosophical landscape has been informed by 
the influential views of de Jouvenel (1945), Foucault (1972), Lukes (1974), Wrong 
(1979), Mann (1986), Morriss (1987), Airaksinen (1988), Wartenberg (1990) and 
Ball (1995). I will argue that competing accounts of the anatomy of power reflect 
interlocutors with vastly different views about what "power" means (hence the 
contested nature of the concept), but that the contest is about the wrong thing. 
While quibbling about whose definition is closer to the truth (something on which 
they may never agree) they have overlooked the most disturbing factor--that all of 
the interpretations link power to violence (either implicitly or explicitly). By 
presenting theories in this way, the exponents are failing to notice that violence is 
representational, and hence, fail to ask what it represents. This leaves them open to 
the charge that what we end up with is a descriptive analysis of the violent exercise 
of power. These theorists not only fail to see important counter examples, but also 
fail to recognise the important role played by a moral description, or how things 
ought to be. It would appear that the individual is left facing two rather 
unsatisfactory choices--either pursue power through violent means, or renounce 
violence and remain powerless. 
In Chapter Two I will take a second look at the metaphysics of power from the 
standpoint of power relations operating within society and their method of control. 
For the moral or political philosopher power is legitimate when the rules governing 
it are justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles. I will ask 
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under what conditions the exercise of power (particularly state power) can be 
legitimate in the first place and settle on conditions of legitimacy for government. I 
will focus on the difficult cases where violent action appears to be legitimate. I will 
argue that a detailed understanding of violence will show that some actions look 
violent but are not, and that other actions appear to be legitimate force when they 
are in fact violent and illegitimate. From this analysis I will show that legitimacy of 
government cannot be used to legitimate violence, and that violence cannot be a 
legitimator of power. 
Chapter Three will consider how nonviolence (as an obvious alternative candidate to 
violence) came to be dismissed by Western philosophy. I will demonstrate a 
particular weakness in the literature when it only offers an account of nonviolent 
action over a 300 year period of North American history, and how it is difficult to 
comprehend a theoretical base for nonviolence when people confuse the "telling of a 
good story" with nonviolence theory. 
Chapters Four and Five will offer the logic of nonviolence as the preferred 
foundation for power and demonstrate how change is possible by this means. I will 
build on the work of Gene Sharp (1973) to demonstrate how a new relationship 
between power and nonviolence can be struck. A developing global trend in the 
application of nonviolent direct action will be analysed offering as examples the 
Dalai Lama, Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche (Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile) 
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and his proposed satyagraha against the Chinese Government; President Nelson 
Mandela and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in post-apartheid 
South Africa; socially engaged Buddhists like Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh in France, 
Sulak Sivaraksa in Thailand and Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma. 
The Final Chapter will offer a "view from the interior," or what it means to be a 
person at a particular point in the power network in terms of nonviolence. I will 
argue that nonviolent action has better prescriptive claims on the agent. Finally, I 
will support the view of a world in which truth and compassion thrive because 
"revenge, hatred and exploitation have no place in a society which seeks 
advancement and progress through human dignity." (Davis 1997) 
Chapter One 
- The Power to Give and to Take Away - 
Those who review the work on power are likely to notice that the literature falls generally 
(but by no means neatly) into three categories: The first is a rather broad category--It 
comprises those analyses which in providing a general account of a meaningful life, discuss 
a range of issues like freedom, justice, social interaction, change, the role of the state, 
structures of control and legitimation to name only a few. Thinkers from Plato to Marx 
provide useful insights for those interested in power. The "top ten" on any social or 
political philosopher's hit list of general or political philosophy would comprise the first 
category of works. 
Work in the second category separates power out as a field of interest in its own right, 
with commentary growing at a rapid pace over the past fifty years. In this group I include 
de Jouvenel (1945), Foucault (1979, 1980a1b), Arendt (1958, 1963a/b), Lukes (1974), 
Mann (1986), Airaksinen (1988), Morriss (1988), Wrong (1979) and Wartenberg (1990) 
(this selection is by no means exhaustive in terms of influential contributions to the body of 
work on power, rather, a typical sample of views which have shaped the landscape). The 
final category comprises the "how to" motivational paperbacks targeted at middle/senior 
management and a general audience seeking personal development [tantalising titles 
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rapidly multiplying on bookshelves over the past 12 months include Kinds of Power: A 
Guide To Its Intelligent Use (Hillman 1995), Thunder in the Sky: Secrets on the 
Acquisition and Exercise of Power (Cleary 1994), How to Gain Power and Lead Your 
Company in 12 days (Benzin 1996), The Little Blue Book on Power (Wood, 1995)]. 
While this project will make passing reference to the work on power of those writers in 
the first category, it is beyond the scope of this project to do justice to their general 
contributions to philosophy. Likewise the third category will be left to those with a 
predilection for such works. There are interesting discussions of power which are also 
outside the scope of this paper, including authors like Judith Butler (1997) on The Psychic 
Life of Power, discussing the relation of power to subjectivity, language, class and gender. 
This dissertation will concentrate primarily on the second category of work on power [in 
my estimation, the most influential over the past fifty years]. The analysis will show 
competing accounts of the anatomy of power, and while the interests of the chosen 
philosophers might appear on the surface to be vastly different (and hence the contested 
nature of the concept) I will demonstrate how they have all contributed to the problem 
which is my central concern--the implication of violence in all of the theories. I begin with 
Bertrand de Jouvenel, who, through his historical analysis, argues for a conclusion which 
sees power explicitly resting on violence; where, through acts of coup or revolution the 
only meaningful change in the expansion of power is that someone else seizes the reins. I 
will introduce Michel Foucault as a counter example, who argues that there are no reins, 
and that power rests on violence which is insidious and implicit. He insists on an historical 
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analysis for an entirely different reason: he goes digging (and the archaeological metaphor 
is deliberate) to unearth the various points of departure which, leading to mechanisms of 
control, produce and perpetuate "truths" which he claims we have readily come to accept 
without question. Timo Airaksinen also shares an interest in structures of control through 
coercion and the nature of power resting on implicit violence, but he focuses on the 
question of whether or not power can be legitimate. This diverse group will also include 
Lukes, Mann, Morriss, Wrong, Wartenberg, Mackenzie, Murvar and Beetham. 
With this analysis in hand, I will argue that violence can never be legitimate, nor can it be a 
legitimator of power. This poses a significant problem for any view of power either 
explicitly or implicitly resting on violence. 
The philosophical discourse on power is unsatisfactory when the moral agent is left with 
two unfortunate choices: Exercise power through violence, or reject violence and remain 
powerless. Because the current literature on power lacks an alternative contender, I will 
build on arguments from this chapter to show how an account of power based on 
nonviolence can fill this role. 
In order to unpack the first part of the my concern with the current literature on power 
implicating violence, I will begin with Bertrand de Jouvenel (1945:13) and his influential 
work On Power: Its Nature and the History of its Growth. Here, de Jouvenel "examines 
the reasons why, and the way in which, Power grows in society." He focuses on the 
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"expansionism of Power at the hands of men of great place," called throughout les 
dirigeants. At the root of power, he argues, is force. Force links with violence and the 
ultimate appeal is to the egoistical side of men'. The first section of the work reviews four 
conceptions of power. Two of them, the theories of sovereignty, explain and justify 
power by a right deriving from acts of the sovereign--either God, or the people--and 
derive legitimation from this origin. The other two, to which he has attached the label of 
organic theories, explain and justify the exercise of power by its function or its end, which 
is to ensure the moral and material cohesion of society; 'Different as they are, there is not 
one of them from which the justification for an absolute form of power cannot be, and at 
some time or other has not been, derived." (de Jouvenel 1945:59) In the following pages, 
I will analyse these theories in turn. 
De Jouvenel foreshadows Foucault in his analysis of command and the state apparatus. 
He announces that the "spectacle presented by modern society is that of an immense state 
apparatus--a veritable complex of moral and material controls by which individual actions 
are conditioned and around which private lives take shape. This apparatus grows with the 
growth of social needs, while its diseases infect both the life of society and the lives of 
individuals." (1945:95) He counsels against the hasty judgement that therefore power is 
fused with the nation and represents the will of the people. But he hows the ease with 
which these may become confused: When we consider the sum of services it renders us, 
the bare idea of its disappearance throws us into such a fright that an apparatus in such 
'1945:21. References like this abound in de Jouvenel's work, and whilst they make it quaintly of its time 
as a piece of writing, we need to remain mindful of the range of interesting insights provided. 
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close communion with society naturally seems to us to have been made for it [providing a 
normative function in the Foucaultian sense]. De Jouvenel argues that "it has a life of its 
own.. it can live as it has shown, as command and nothing more." (1945:96) Approaching 
the middle of his project, De Jouvenel takes power in what he terms this pure state-- 
command that lives for its sake and its fruits--as the basic concept from which he sets out 
to explain the characteristics developed by power in the course of its historical existence. 
De Jouvenel argues that power cannot claim legitimacy while masquerading as the "will of 
the people" because it pursues no just end; rather it pursues the profitable exploitation of 
conquered and submissive subjects (appropriating them for use in the army to serve 
power's increasing expansion). He parades before us rapacious conquerors like Clovis 
and William of Normandy, moves on to display similarities with a national monarchy and 
concludes that every change of regime and, to a lesser extent, every change of government 
is, as it were, a reproduction (on a more or less reduced scale) of a barbarian invasion. 
(1945:99) The newcomers wander about the power house with feelings of curiosity, 
pride, and greed. The credit which they then, for the first time enjoy enables them to make 
full use of the formidable machinery, and even to add to it further controls of their own. 
In time, yet another faction will, by promising to make better use of it, force its way in 
turn, into the City of Command which it will find already embellished by its forerunners. 
So that the hope, always renewed, of stripping from power, all its traces of egoism results 
only in forging ever vaster means of compulsion for the next egoism. 
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De Jouvenel sees in power's make-up an egoistical urge of a few (men) to control and 
dominate the rest, all the while projecting a will to serve society. This strange duality he 
remarks is a fiction (1945:9,19) with the "will to serve society" as nothing more than a 
smokescreen in which power has wrapped itself. This ensures a growth of power to which 
there is no limit, a growth which is fostered by increasingly altruistic rhetoric—liberty, the 
will of the people, the good of society--though the motive-spring is always the wish to 
dominate. He observes that from the Twelfth to the Eighteenth Century, governmental 
authority grew continuously under sovereign rule; those who objected, were stirred, claims 
de Jouvenel, to "incessant protest and violent reaction." (1945:9) 
We must pause at this point and notice a somewhat puzzling aspect of de Jouvenel's 
analysis: The discussion revolves around the exercise of power as acts of violence and 
oppression and thisis presented as unproblematic as long as the way it is organised can be 
clearly recognised and opposed [the exercise of power through violence on this account 
appears to be legitimate as long as someone recognises what the oppressors are up to and 
has something to say about it--a moral perspective which is very unsettling. 
The issue that de Jouvenel finds unacceptable frames the next section of his analysis: The 
operation of power has become increasingly diffuse, its growth has accelerated, and has 
brought with it a corresponding extension of war. Power goes by the name of liberty and 
the general will of the people, who no longer understand the process, no longer protest, 
and no longer react (Ibid). The smokescreen, he claims, has been successful. The 
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exercise of power is conducted behind a socially acceptable veil. Power encounters the 
resistance of all the particular social interests with which it must have social dealings. But 
let it call itself altruistic and give itself out for the executant of an ideal, and it will "acquire 
such an ascendancy over every concrete interest as will enable it to sacrifice them to the 
fulfilment of its mission and crush every obstruction to its triumphal march." (1945:135) 
The reader is left slightly puzzled: De Jouvenel, having uncovered something interesting 
about the contemporary workings of power, fails to advance the analysis. He observes 
that power is apparently insidious, controlling, cloaked in a smokescreen which somehow 
distances and confuses those under its control to the point where they fail to notice its 
effects or its mechanisms of control. This important aspect of power will be developed 
shortly in the work of Michel Foucault, while de Jouvenel's analysis trails off at this point, 
never to develop further. Instead, he spends more time unpacking what will become his 
preferred focus in his project: an analysis of revolution. 
Political revolutions, being violent crises in the careers of institutions, engage closely the 
attention of historians. The sudden blaze of lurking passions, the explosion and the 
incendiary propagation of principles which had been working underground, the rocket-like 
ascent into importance of new men, the play of characters in brutal and violent action, the 
monstrous outbreaks of the mob in which the serious faces of men about their business are 
soon no longer seen but only the terrifying visage of hate and animal cruelty--here indeed is 
matter to inflame the writer and to give the peaceable reader at his fireside the shudders! 
(de Jouvenel 1945:215) 
De Jouvenel claims that though revolutions are the most examined periods of history they 
are the least understood. Reacting against oppressive powers he argues is reasonably 
futile: "He (the oppressed agent) takes the onrush of the wave, which is under his eyes, 
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for the movement of the sea, which demands the faculty of his thought. He holds to the 
cry of 'Liberty:', which goes up in the beginnings of every revolution; he does not perceive 
that there never was a revolution yet which did not result in an accretion of power's 
weight." (Ibid.) De Jouvenel implores us to turn our eyes away from the fascinating 
spectacle of the eruption, and notice how the stream looked before it reached these rapids 
and in how it appears again when events have returned to their even pace. Before the 
rapids there was the rule of a Charles I, a Louis XVI, a Nicholas H. After them, that of a 
Cromwell, a Napoleon, a Stalin. Such are the masters to whom the peoples that rose 
against a Stuart or Bourbon or Romanov "tyranny" next find themselves subject. 
De Jouvenel views the phenomenon as startling; he argues that the usual interpretation of 
it is misconceived: Concluding that the Cromwells and the Stalins are no fortuitous 
consequence, no accidental happening of the revolutionary tempest. Rather they are its 
predestined goal, towards which the entire upheaval was inevitably directed. The cycle 
began with the downfall of an inadequate power only to close with the consolidation of a 
more absolute power.. .thus (1945:218) we see that the true historical function of 
revolutions is to renovate and strengthen power.. .Did the people rise against Louis XIV? 
No, but against the good natured Louis XVI, who had not even the nerve to let his Swiss 
Guards open fire. Against Peter the Great? No, but against the weakling Nicholas II, who 
did not even dare avenge his beloved Rasputin. Against that old Bluebeard Henry VIII? 
No, but against Charles I, who after a few fitful attempts at governing, had resigned 
himself to living in a small way and was no danger to anyone. These kings died• not 
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because of their tyranny, de Jouvenel argues, but because of their weakness. De 
Jouvenel's point here, is that tyrants who exercise power through violence appear 
stronger, and appear to safeguard the trophy of power until it is handed to the next 
oppressor, while leaders who choose not to exercise power in this way invariably fail (and 
the measure of failure is usually an early death on de Jouvenel's account) and are judged 
by him to be weaker. 
To this point, the work has been informative and insightful, but we cannot progress further 
without at least calling attention to the particular way in which he selects out historical 
examples for our consideration. His particular selection of paradigm examples fail to pay 
attention to counter examples (like the American Revolution and the Australian Federation 
of States, or as we will see in chapter 5, the more contemporary context of the overthrow 
of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa). These examples leave de Jouvenel looking 
less plausible and make his conclusions appear bizarre: "The peoples erect scaffolds not as 
moral punishments of despotism, but as the biological penalty for weakness.. .Peoples 
never rebel against a power which squeezes the life out of them and grinds them 
underfoot. The savagery of such power is feared, and it even happens that men find 
something admirable in its scourging of the great." (Ibid) On de Jouvenel's account, 
weakness or softness is detested; strength and tyranny are elevated. This is why, on his 
view people never rebel against a power that squeezes the life out of them. 
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De Jouvenel concludes that a nation may get from a revolution a new strength, as the 
enfeebled France of Louis XVI got from the Revolution the energy to win her natural 
frontiers, and in Russia, which in 1917 met defeat, got from it the will to conquer in 1942; 
but "let a nation never expect liberty from a revolution. In the final analysis revolutions 
are made, not for man, but for Power." (1945:235) 
De Jouvenel observes that while the growth of power is uneven in pace and involves some 
retreats, on the whole, it is one of continuous advance.., evidenced in the stupendous 
growth of its instruments, its revenues, its armed forces, its police forces, and its capacity 
to make laws. We sometimes see the old power cast out. But according to de Jouvenel, 
no revolution has been followed by power's dismemberment; far from it. What perishes 
in each upheaval are precisely the social authorities which obstructed its advance. He 
notes that the spiritual authority too, which once constrained political power and gave it 
rules of behaviour, has suffered a great decline. But the complex of rights and powers it 
comprised has not fallen apart—it has only passed into other hands. He notes that, what is 
called the coming of democracy, is really the conveyance of the established power to new 
owners; the conquest of the City of Command by new tenants and the new power, like the 
old, calls itself the "expression of society," and so arouses less distrust than the old. 
Violence, command, control, subterfuge are all here and all necessarily linked to power. 
De Jouvenel takes a massive step back and presents enthusiastically linked segments of 
history in order for us to observe the growth of power. He then allows the reader to be 
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sucked back into a receding swell of detail, first showing us one aspect of domination, 
then another of revolution, drawing together similarities of what, for him, are the weak 
and a portrait of the strong and how power provides an intoxicating pleasure. 
These pictures reveal the boundaries of de Jouvenel's project. He motivates the metaphor 
of the "tendrils" of power reaching further and further, but these tendrils do not resemble 
the capillary action of Foucault's power (1979:143), existing in power relations on a daily 
basis between all people. Instead on de Jouvenel's account, these tendrils represent the 
extension and outreach of the few decision-makers in society, leaving the remainder of the 
citizens powerless. De Jouvenel's significant contribution to this discussion, includes his 
review of sovereignty; analysis of the origins of power; its expansion; the dialectic of 
command; the state as permanent revolution; belief, law and liberty. But his project 
presents a picture of power as the exercise of force and violence. He acknowledges that 
this entails the impossibility of the legitimation of the exercise of power. His solution to 
this problem is not at all clear but he suggests the requirement for an alternative to bleak, 
violent and illegitimate power. De Jouvenel wants to "return to the acknowledgment of a 
code which is not relative to some contemporary set of interests and pressures... to a 
process. ..which is different in kind," (1945:381) presumably different to the violence and 
domination he describes throughout his work. He leaves us on a note of horror, disbelief 
and disappointment with the society we have made, only to revert "after the firework 
display" (supposedly of violence through revolution) to the "darkness of a formless mass, 
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destined to despotism or anarchy." (1945:378) Call me an optimist, but this seems a bit 
bleak. 
De Jouvenel certainly provides historical examples to support his observation that all 
exercises of power implicate violence. Unfortunately because de Jouvenel fails to progress 
his analysis of how violence is exercised implicitly we are left with his analysis of explicit 
violence only where all change is for the worse, leading to more injustice and more 
coercive, articulated structures of control. Counterexamples like the American revolution 
or the Australian Federation serve to reduce the plausibility of his claim, indicating that 
progress is possible. De Jouvenel calls for a remedy but never articulates what it might 
include--falling prey to pessimism and apparent hopelessness he leaves the analysis of 
power as requiring violence, unchallenged. In chapter three I will begin to develop an 
alternative theory of power through nonviolence, providing counter-examples which 
demonstrate that progress is possible. 
De Jouvenel's embryonic analysis of implicit violence and domination is taken up and 
becomes the major focus in the work of Michel Foucault (1979) Power, Truth, Strategy 
and (1980) Power/Knowledge. The analysis of Foucault's contribution to our 
understanding of power will be approached in a slightly different way because the 
boundaries of Foucault's work are not as narrow as de Jouvenel's. In order to understand 
Foucault's account of power, we must first understand the route he takes to the analysis, 
through his account of truth, knowledge and history. I will begin with an analysis of 
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Foucault's account of what constitutes "the truth" because on his account, the sciences 
perpetuate the idea that there are fundamental truths about the world to be discovered and 
to which rational humans are bound to assent. His work can be taken as a critique of this 
scientific culture, of its account of rationality, and of scientific self-understanding. 
Foucault's pathway to power then, will include a small but useful digression from truth to 
what constitutes knowledge. This is because, for Foucault, modem professionals wield 
considerable power by virtue of their knowledge. He argues that knowledge, on which 
power rests, is manufactured. For this reason my analysis will turn toward his findings on 
the conditions under which knowledge is produced. It is important to bear in mind that 
Foucault wants us to consider power and knowledge as an inseparable pair: Knowledge 
and power are not, for Foucault, different phenomena, but instead, are different ways of 
configuring and understanding the same underlying structure. So in order to look at one, 
on his account, we must also look at the other. Likewise in the History of Sexuality we 
see that each historically constructed self is a function of power/knowledge. As a result, a 
coherent understanding of power will only result if we introduce into the discussion his 
"historical" view (known as his genealogy). 
We will see that from Foucault's perspective, in order to have any insight into power in 
the present we must attend to a sequence of ordered events which have occurred in the 
past. He asserts that by conducting an analytical process akin to an archaeological dig, we 
will discover the most minute, but the most crucial details, "the points of departure" which 
have led people to participate in social mechanisms which are repressive and dominating. 
Foucault looks for power everywhere and finds domination (not simply laws but the whole 
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complex system of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their 
application and it will be important to consider a sample of these). His project highlights 
the manifold forms of domination that can be exercised within society, the multiple forms 
of subjugation. Power is everywhere, and everywhere power rests on implicit violence. 
One caveat is required before I begin. I have selected aspects of Foucault's writing on 
truth, knowledge and power, drawn out examples from Discipline and Punish and the 
History of Sexuality and reflected on his archaeology and genealogy in order to present a 
coherent package. This complex package of items, taken together, illuminate Foucault's 
original contributions on power. However, he did not ever produce his research in this 
way--nothing as neat and tidy as p1 and p.2 with a conclusion regarding power. He 
despised "systematisers" and those who neatly packaged and handed down "the truth" and 
so it is unsurprising that his legacy includes in his own admission work which is at times 
"fragmentary, repetitive and discontinuous" (in Two Lectures, 1976) without a 
"continuous or coherent whole," zig zags from one topic to another resulting in a 
"disorganized muddle" (Ibid). By way of an apology to Foucault then, the following 
compilation of his work, while assisting a coherent discussion for the purposes of my 
project, would not have been presented by him in this fashion. 
I will now begin to unpack the concept of power proposed by Michel Foucault through his 
historical path to "the truth." By introducing the issue of power as a phenomenon to be 
differentiated historically (explained in his Two Lectures, January 1976) he sets himself 
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apart from all other contemporary social theorists. Rather than look at the relationship 
between a sovereign and subjects as many (including de Jouvenel) have done, Foucault 
insists that this analysis allows a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms 
of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures and mask the elements of 
domination inherent in its techniques. Rather, he argues that he can explain contemporary 
society by mapping the network of power relations that have evolved historically; where 
power is connected to a history of ordered procedures which produce what we have come 
to know as the "truth." 
"Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements." "Truth is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of 
power which it induces and which extend it. This network of systems and assertions 
constitutes a 'regime' of truth." (Rabinow 1984:74) Foucault finds truth in the local, 
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge denied by a unitary body of theory 
which he claims would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of some true 
knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects (Rabinow 
1984:204). In a society such as ours, (perhaps in any society) according to Foucault, there 
are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social 
body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a 
discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of 
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discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. Put 
another way, we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot 
exercise power except through the production of truth (Rabinow 1984:210-211). It is 
important at this point to make a distinction between what constitutes the truth on 
Foucault's terms and a truth. 
In many Western societies today, "truth" is seen as the product of science or scientific 
"methods." Knowledge is uncovered by way of empirical, objective methods, subjected to 
cool and calculating analysis and elevated to a platform of importance. During an 
interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino Foucault speaks directly to this 
point: 
Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history 
and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of the free spirits, 
the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in 
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint., each society has its regime of truth, its 
"general politics" of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true. (in Rabinow 1986:51) 
Following Nietzsche, Foucault's pursuit of genealogy led him to be concerned with the 
origin of specific claims to truth, especially the claims, concepts and truths of the human 
sciences. He has no quarrel with the "high sciences" like physics, but wants us to be 
concerned with the way that low sciences like psychiatry masquerade as applied branches 
of the high sciences and appropriate the same claims to truth, thereby gaining authority. 
Foucault wants us to'see that they are different, autonomous; that the way they construct 
the truth is totally different. I will examine in detail at a later date, Foucault's attack on 
29 
the unity of science project, where all applied sciences under his analysis get their 
credentials from the "master sciences." He insists that they be linked instead, to politics. 
Foucault disturbs what is considered immobile, fragments what is thought to be unified 
and in so doing examines the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements.. .what counts as "a truth": "the ensemble of rules according to 
which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the 
true." (Rabinow 1986:51) The sort of thing that would qualify as a ready to hand example 
in contemporary Australian society is the State-run public health care system--a vast 
interlocked network: a system of "truths" we have come to accept without question and 
in whose prescribed practices we readily participate, not at gunpoint but in a totally 
voluntary way. Foucault seeks to alert us to the sinister nature of this seemingly harmless 
process. Stop, he implores.., everybody look at what is going on. (Crosby, Stills & Nash 
1968) 
So we stop and look: on the surface, we see the following: that as citizens, we are 
financially reimbursed by the Federal Government to defray the substantial cost of 
maintaining good health. No problem; we should even say "thank you." Consider the 
following diagrammatic representation of the structure under discussion: 
Government Controlled Health Care System 
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\ Local General Practitioners 
Specialist Doctors 
	 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
Private Hospitals/ ----- 
STORED ON COMPUTER: 
• Specific medical procedures 
• Hospitalisations 
• Cost of service 
• Cost of reimbursement 
INFORMATION REQUIRED TO 
OBTAIN A MEDICARE CARD: 
• Names/birthdates/birthplaces of 
all family members 
• Address/occupation 
• Marital status 
Family Day Care Reimbursement 
Claims: 
• Place of Day Care 
• Type of Work 
• Hours Worked 
Those involved in the medical profession possess expert knowledge about our bodies and 
as citizens, we can access this truth as long as we go about it in a certain way: as long as 
we participate in a system of twenty minute appointments, submit our most intimate details 
to a filing system and seek partial financial reimbursement for cost by submitting further 
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details to the Medicare administration (details like name, birthdate, address and marital 
status of family members). Getting marginally suspicious? Foucault suggests that when 
there are systems of this type, we should be. The system tracks the addition of children to 
the family and any change across the range of details. For reimbursement of family day 
care fees for working parents additional information, forms and procedures are 
orchestrated by the Medicare structure. This allows knowledge of the type of work 
undertaken, change of employment, hours worked and location of day carer. The 
computer file also stores details of all medical procedures, hospitalisations and allotted 
costs incurred by the individual, all of which are available to numerous Government 
officials, as well as to doctors clinics and so on, at call. The Medicare structure links into 
all public hospitals, private hospitals, social security, general practitioners and specialist 
doctors--in effect allowing surveillance of day to day activities of individuals, family 
histories, financial profiles and life expectancies. It links into individual taxation details 
with the mandatory 3% contribution automatically deducted to support the system. A 
recent development by the Australian Liberal Government sees an additional 1% added to 
the Medicare payroll deduction to fund the gun-control initiative (enabling the buy-back of 
illegal weapons from the public). Medicare has proven to be the paradigm structure in the 
Foucaultian sense, to exercise and to maintain power, and the collection and filing of 
information is at its heart. 
While this system at a glance may look like an extract from George Orwell's 1984, it is not 
maintained by explicit coercion, but by compliance and voluntary supply of information by 
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the individual for financial gain--power is exercised by government-run agencies and 
coercive systems in which we freely participate. (All individuals participate in a visible 
structure of control. Once locked into the system the actual exercise of power becomes 
unnecessary--the individuals themselves sustain it. But like Foucault's Panopticism this 
occlusion of the mechanisms of control do not make them any less coercive, only hidden). 
While such a structure was not remotely envisaged as recently as 20 years ago, it is now 
fully accepted; indeed it is an expected part of our day to day routine and a method for 
"normalising" individuals within society. In this example w. e see that all members of 
society have an allotted number corresponding to a plastic card that anchors them inside 
this well orchestrated Government-run grid. Different kinds of authority exist in this 
model and the exercise of power is evident on a number of levels, maintained by record 
keeping, surveillance, legislation and the requirement to supply private details. 
Examples like Medicare demonstrate a much more sinister form of coercion than merely 
explicit coercion found in say, the example of a mugger and his victim. Here we find 
truth, power and domination at the most sophisticated level—disciplinary constraints 
exercised through mechanisms of domination, while at the same time disguising their 
effective exercise of power. Foucault cautions us against accepting "manufactured truth" 
and its insidious forms of power, and seeks to explain how such a thing could come to be 
manufactured in the first place. For such an insight we must turn to his discussion of 
knowledge. 
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Foucault's project, announced in the foreword to the English edition of The Order of 
Things, is to write the history of what Ian Hacking (1986) has called the "immature 
sciences": Those sciences that, in Foucault's words are "considered too tinged with 
empirical thought, too exposed to the vagaries of chance or imagery, to age-old traditions 
and external events, for it to be supposed that their history could be anything other than 
irregular." (Foucault 1970:ix) "From the standpoint of an archaeology of discursive 
practices." (Hoy 1986:274 Foucault made the assumption, perhaps commonplace now, 
but bold and even radical when he first wrote, that this kind of empirical knowledge 
possesses a well-defined regularity, that the history of this knowledge exhibits a system of 
rules, and their transformations which make different kinds of statements possible. 
Foucault suggests that his studies in the 1950's highlight the problem of the political status 
of science and the ideological functions which it could serve, provoking a number of 
interesting questions which can be summed up in two words: power and knowledge. He 
comments on writing Madness and Civilization to some extent within the horizon of 
these questions. 
For me, it was a matter of saying this: if, concerning a science like theoretical 
physics or organic chemistry, one poses the problem of its relations with the 
political and economic structure of society isn't one posing an excessively 
complicated question? Doesn't this set the threshold of possible explanations 
impossibly high? But on the other hand, if one takes a form of knowledge like 
psychiatry, won't the question be much easier to resolve, since the epistemological 
profile of psychiatry is a low one and psychiatric practice is linked with a whole 
range of institutions, economic requirements, and political issues of social 
regulation? Couldn't the interweaving effects of power and knowledge be grasped 
with greater certainty in the case of a science as "dubious" as psychiatry? 
(Foucault 1980:97) 
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The systems of knowledge Foucault scrutinises imply immediate and solid connections to 
social relations: economics, medicine and the "human sciences." Thus the conditions 
required for the production of truth within these knowledges are much less stable and far 
more difficult to control. "Yet, somewhat disturbingly, these are also the knowledges 
most quick to pronounce truths about human nature, human potential, human endeavour 
and the future of the human condition in general." (McHoul & Grace 1993:58.) 
Important realms of science like physics appear high on the approval list of established 
regimes of thought, boasting an empirically verifiable body of knowledge, in which we can 
all have the utmost confidence. But Foucault would have us believe, such sciences also 
mask subjugated knowledges (by ruling them out as "unscientific" or incapable of 
objective, rigorous analysis), by this term we are to understand a set of knowledges that 
have been disqualified as inadequate to their task, or insufficiently elaborated; naive 
knowledges located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or 
scientificity. (Foucault 1976, in Dirks, 1994:203) 
By digging through the archives, we reach some point of struggle, conflict or departure 
from the manufactured truth. We find a flurry of detail that has been masked or 
disqualified or simply forgotten. Through such an investigation, we would most likely 
arrive at a very ignoble beginning to medical discourse, for example procedures of writing 
and registration and mechanisms of examination. Ian Hacking (1986:28) suggests that 
Foucault's genius is to go down to these little dramas, dress them in facts hardly anyone 
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else notices, and turn these stage settings into clues to a hitherto unthought series of 
confrontations out of which, Foucault contends, the orderly structure of society is 
composed. 
But we must remember that he views the "orderly structure," as a mask for the implicitly 
violent and dominating coercive apparatus to which we are all subjected. The orderly 
structure is the end point of selected truths and knowledges and the exclusion of others. 
Foucault argues that all disqualified knowledges are concerned with a "historical 
knowledge of struggle." The archaeology of knowledge unearths a painstaking 
rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. Foucault urges 
us to take this knowledge of struggle and to use it tactically. He entertains the claims to 
attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against "the claims of 
a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of 
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its 
objects." (Hacking 1986:204) He wants us to see that power is derived from the process 
of selecting out objects of knowledge. A hierarchy of power is established from which 
these erstwhile pretenders are excluded. The physical sciences have protected and 
legitimised themselves, and disqualified lower sciences on Foucault's terms, sciences like 
psychiatry; but he insists that his genealogy should be seen as an attempt to emancipate 
historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them capable of opposition and 
struggle against what he sees as the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific 
discourse. 
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Foucault's enterprise is neither epistemological nor ontological, for he is not making 
claims about the ultimate nature of knowledge and power. Rather his project is historical, 
and his construction of the concept of power/knowledge is a device for studying the social 
and scientific practices that underlie and condition the formation of beliefs. He is offering 
an interpretation of how what we count as knowledge and power have historically come to 
be so counted. Foucault thinks he can explain contemporary society by mapping the 
network of power relations that have evolved in this way. His point is to stress that there 
are no necessary or universal forms for the exercise of power to take place: Our society 
bears witness to the production of quite specific practices which characterise the ways in 
which power relations fimction within it. 
Foucault writes with a specific focus on power relations within a present context. At the 
same time, the historical base of Foucault's writing sets up an interesting tension--how can 
one remain focussed on individual action in the present when delving to a significant 
extent into past procedures? It will be shown how Foucault answers this; in his nominalist 
history, writing about the past is a way of criticising the present under the assumption that 
the past still informs the present in ways and with consequences we don't recognise. 
Discipline and Punish (1970)--a work by Foucault which will be examined in more depth 
at several stages throughout this chapter--calls itself a "history of the present." The 
formula assumes a wider application. The "present" refers to those things that are 
constituted in our current proceedings in ways we don't realise are rooted in the past, "and 
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writing a 'history' of it is to lay bare that constitution and its consequences." (Rajchman 
1985:58) 
He further suggests that power is positive and productive, not simply repressive; it is, he 
reminds us not always suffered but sometimes enjoyed. We cannot understand this 
revaluation, Hoy suggests, without recognising the other conceptual revisions he 
introduces. Foucault wants to describe how power is exercised, and he sees that there 
would be no power if it were not exercised by agents (Hoy 1986:33). Foucault denies that 
power is a mysterious substance with a nature, essence and origin. By his own admission, 
he is nominalistic about power--affirming that he is not offering a metaphysics of power-- 
even willing to say that "power does not exist" (Foucault 1979:75) only local exercises of 
power are real). He is concerned to overcome metaphysical notions of power and 
freedom by seeing them as relations rather than properties. This implies that power is not 
a possession or privilege. Unlike de Jouvenel's analysis, power is not simply what the 
dominant class have and the oppressed lack. Power, Foucault prefers to say is a strategy, 
and the dominated are as much a part of the network of power relations and the particular 
social matrix as the dominating. "As a complex strategy spread throughout the social 
system in a capillary fashion, power is never manifested globally, but only at local points as 
"micro-powers." Power is not something located in and symbolised by (de Jouvenel's) 
sovereign, "but permeates society in such a way that taking over the state apparatus 
(through a political revolution or coup) does not in itself change the power network." 
(Ibid) 
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Now this is the same conclusion presented by de Jouvenel, but for totally different reasons. 
For de Jouvenel the power network is not significantly changed when someone else takes 
over the state apparatus, because the nature of power and its exercise is independent of 
specific agents and actions (to the successful, coercion and violence come naturally). On 
his account, resistance is banished to the(4 -ealm of hopelessness. Foucault reaches the 
conclusion that there would be no significant change in taking over the state apparatus 
because the subtle, yet complex network of intrinsic coercion is so entrenched in the 
system and maintained by the capillary-like network of power relations, that changing the 
person at the top of the hierarchy would do nothing to alter an infrastructure so 
constituted. 
To sharpen the distinction, for de Jouvenel change is impossible precisely because all 
leaders in the past and those yet to come hold the same credentials and perform to the 
same position description revolving around self-interested (usually violent) domination. 
On Foucault's account change is difficult, not because of any special properties of those at 
the top, nor of power itself, but because the tightly knit grid of power relations which 
enmesh both oppressors and the oppressed is too complex and stable to be easily disturbed 
or changed. The coercion is implicit, subtle and vicious; the structures to maintain it are 
entrenched and produce mechanisms of control and discipline. Mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements.. .what counts as "a truth." the 
ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects 
of power are attached to the true. This further emphasises the distinction that for de 
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Jouvenel, power is autonomous, whereas for Foucault it is derived from patterns of 
actions. 
A common criticism of Foucault's project at this point, and understandably so, is that such 
an analysis leaves us with no hope for a better, more humane future and no positive 
agenda for change. In fact, I will make a stronger claim later in the project: that a lack of 
any viable alternative for the moral agent to exercise power outside of the framework of 
violence, is a flaw in most of the current theories of power. By the conclusion of this 
project, I seek to demonstrate how power can be exercised by the individual through 
nonviolence, and how this alternative does leave hope for a more humane future, and a 
positive agenda for change. I return the reader to Foucault's project, and the point at 
which he considers the extent to which a "science of the individual is possible": 
One is in no doubt right to pose the Aristotelian problem: is a science of the 
individual possible and legitimate? A great problem needs great solutions perhaps. 
But there is the small historical problem of the emergence, towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, of what might generally be termed the 'clinical sciences', the 
problem of the entry of the individual (and no longer the species) into the field of 
knowledge; the problem of the entry of the individual description, of the cross-
examination, of anamnesis, of the 'file' into the general functioning of scientific 
discourse. (1984:202) 
Foucault argues that to this simple question, one must no doubt give an answer lacking in 
"nobility": analysis must focus on these procedures of writing and registration, the 
mechanisms of examination, into the formation of the mechanisms of discipline, and of a 
new type of power over bodies. Is this the birth of the sciences of man? It is probably to 
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be found in these "ignoble" archives, where the modern play of coercion over bodies, 
gesture and behaviour has its beginning (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 202-3). 
This passage is an example of Foucault's astonishing ability to take a standard 
philosophical problem--how is a science of the individual possible?--to look to its lowly, 
genealogical beginnings (procedures of writing and registration, mechanisms of 
examination, techniques of discipline applied to gestures and behaviour) and, as a result, 
totally transfigures how one might approach the problem in the first place. Davidson 
(1986:225) remarks that "It is the kind of ignobility Nietzsche would have loved"--cutting 
down the systematisers who proclaim the truth of the matter to reveal lowly elements like 
filing and registration at its heart. 
Foucault's preoccupation with genealogy forced him to articulate some general rules for 
the study of power, providing not so much a new theory of power as a new approach to 
the problems of power in modern societies. Some of the most significant of these rules, 
elaborated in Discipline and Punish and in two lectures given in 1976, are the following: 
First, do not study power merely as a form of repression or prohibition, but look at its 
positive effects, at what it produces; analyse power and its techniques in terms of their 
own specificity, and do not reduce it to a consequence of legislation and social structure. 
Second, Foucault advocates that one conduct an ascending analysis of power, "starting 
that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own 
trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power 
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have been--and continue to be--invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, 
displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms." (Foucault 1980:99) That is, 
write a micro physics of power; this will lead one to view power not as the homogenous 
domination of one group or class over another, but as a net-like, circulating organisation. 
Finally, do not analyse power at the level of "conscious intention or decision," do not ask 
what certain people want and why they want to dominate others, but ask instead "how do 
things work at the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous and 
uninterrupted processes, which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our 
behaviours." (Foucault 1980. :97) For it is those processes which constitute us as subjects. 
I would like to conclude this review of Foucault's contribution to the discussion on power 
by bringing together this concern with the individual as a disciplined subject; to look at 
how these implicitly violent and coercive exercises of power are maintained and regulated. 
Through his analysis of discipline and the ensuing discussion of Bentham's panopticon 
Foucault delivers the surprising result that we actually maintain these coercive structures 
ourselves. 
This is the area of Foucault's strongest work. Foucault claims, that the discipline of a 
prison, say, represents a continuation and an intensification of what goes on in more 
ordinary places (like Medicare) - and wouldn't be possible if it didn't. As an extension of 
this, we all live to a time schedule, get up to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in the 
eye of authority, are periodically subject to examination and inspection. No one is entirely 
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free from these new forms of social control. The unique thing about modern society for 
Foucault is that it announces this type of new mechanism of power. "This 'mechanism' is 
a way of consolidating power into ensembles concerned with this management and 
administration of `life'."(/bid) 
The types of instruments and techniques used by the operation of disciplinary power can 
be taken over and used by any institution: penitentiaries, certainly, but also schools, 
hospitals, military centres, psychiatric institutions, administrative apparatuses, bureaucratic 
agencies, police forces and so on. "Modern criminology constitutes an 'apparatus' 
composed of power relations coordinated in relationships with systems of knowledge. 
When considered from any point of view other than the history of power relations, 
Bentham's invention of the Panopticon represents a minor episode in the history of 
technologies, or perhaps of architecture." (Ibid) 
Panopticism is the exemplary mechanism through which disciplinary power is able to 
function, for it relies on surveillance and the internal training this produces to incite states 
of docility; it need not rely on displays of physical force or violence. Direct force 
represents merely frustrated or failed forms of discipline. The subject of surveillance, by 
contrast, disciplines him or herself 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even 
if it is discontinuous in its actions; that the perfection of power should tend to 
render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be 
a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person 
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who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power 
situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (Foucault 1977a:201) 
The Panopticon is a structure designed to carry out procedures for the alteration of 
behaviour and to train or "correct" individuals (our Medicare example aligns neatly with 
Panopticism--ery individual participates in a visible structure of control. Once locked 
into the system, the actual exercise of power becomes unnecessary--the individuals 
themselves sustain it). The modern mode of punishment centres on an attempt to reform 
the criminals soul. This stands in stark contrast to the types of public executions routinely 
practised up to, and sometimes beyond, the Eighteenth Century. Foucault describes this 
earlier and deadly mode of punishment. It was performed directly on the criminal's body, 
as a display of the awesome power of a sovereign authority, in retribution for a crime. 
The shift toward imprisonment as a method of punishment is usually attributed to a 
general "humanisation" which accompanied the transition to modernity. For Foucault, 
however, it represents a stage in the "normalisation" of individuals which is necessary for 
the government of the life processes. 
I have already mentioned Foucault's unearthing of the significant role played by 
Bentham's Panopticon in the operations of disciplinary power. In a similar vein, the 
treatment Foucault provides of the history of another technology, the confessional, 
becomes important for his thesis concerning the relationship between sexuality and power. 
Outside of a consideration of power relations, the confessional would seem to occupy only 
marginal importance as a religious ritual--at least from the perspective of political 
considerations. McHoul & Grace (1993:78) suggest that "the confessional now enjoys a 
position as the privileged means whereby individuals become imbricated in procedures of 
`truth-telling' in those areas of the administration of life which are directed at sexual 
practices. Like the Panopticon, the confessional has become an essential technique in the 
functioning of bio-power." 
The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, 
medicine, education, family relationships and love relations, in the most ordinary 
affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's crimes, 
one's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illnesses and troubles; one goes about 
telling with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses 
in public and in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those 
one loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be 
impossible to tell to anyone else, the things people write books about.. Western 
man has become a confessing animal. (Foucault 1979:59) 
The final example of this truth-telling to which I would like to draw attention, has chilling 
implications for all of us. In practicality, Foucault's confessional is not a disciplinary 
measure unless one further step is taken. For this process to seriously become a threat, 
the confidential nature of the process must somehow be turned inside out so that one's 
innermost secrets and fears are turned under the glare of public scrutiny. The chilling 
aspect of this is that it is not some elaborate fiction, but an efficiently functioning 
mechanism alive and well in our contemporary society. Take for example a worker's 
compensation claim for a stress related disorder 2 . In order to receive payment you are 
required to reveal all in confidence to a trusted member of the medical fraternity (perhaps 
a psychiatrist or a psychologist). During such a session, you may be asked to provide 
2 This example resulted from an energetic discussion with Professor Jay Garfield and I thank him for 
conceptual connections and insights. 
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answers to legitimate questions about your normal activities--your sex life included; you 
most certainly will be asked about your fears and frustrations, your view of your employer 
and so on. Having survived this, you await due process. Foucault's insights highlight the 
sinister, coercive and violent nature of the structures created for due process: structures 
which allow an objection to the claim by the employer, to call the psychiatrist to the public 
stand; structures which require her to give a flill account under public glare of your most 
private revelations. Any prudent agent of course would not undertake this risky business 
in the first place. Successful control in the Orwellian sense, maintained only by the threat 
of the outcome. Very neat., very powerful and something about which Foucault correctly 
wants us to worry. 
Our understanding of power has been extended by moving from de Jouvenel's analysis of 
explicit coercion to Foucault's insights into implicit coercion associated with power 
relations. But there is still a gap to be filled. Foucault is not concerned about how this 
power can 'possibly be legitimated; he is only concerned with its explanation. Any 
complete discussion of power will need to consider the importance of both. We have seen 
during this discussion that the way we come to think about power, and the problems 
which ensue, will depend on our explanation of its origin and how it is maintained in 
society. Foucault offers a meticulous analysis of this aspect, but legitimacy is equally 
important, and on this, he is silent. To concede the legitimacy of government is to accord 
to some number of persons a right that we otherwise reserve to ourselves, the right to 
conduct our own lives and affairs as each of us deems appropriate (Flathman in Goodin & 
46 
Pettit 1996:527). When a number of people transfer their natural authority to a 
government, the latter thereby acquires the legitimacy of the former, but as we shall see in 
the following account of Professor Timo Airaksinen's work, this action has consequences 
which are problematic and require justification. 
Before moving on, it is important to consolidate and to take stock of the investigation thus 
far: We have seen where power comes from and the role it plays in society. Two 
particularly influential accounts present the themes of explicit coercion and domination and 
implicit coercion from the same vantage , point of domination and control. Both attest to 
violence as an element of power. The former view locates power at the top of an 
imaginary societal pyramid while the latter locates countless sites within power relations. 
Neither view offers any chance of escape from an oppressive power structure. Now while 
these views provide a substantial body of work on the source of power and its role, they 
do not provide an account of the conditions of its legitimacy, and we must move beyond a 
description of how society does look, to the more interesting moral position of how 
society ought to be. This can only be accomplished by an examination of the justification 
of power; an examination provided in the work of Professor Timo Airaksinen. 
Airaksinen (1988:112) uses the "practical roots of morality" to explain the existence of 
state-run coercive institutions; how authority is legitimised and maintained and why agents 
would participate in this scheme in the first place. In The Ethics of Coercion and 
Authority, he covers a vast amount of territory dealing with subjects like coercion, 
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deterrence, violence, manipulation, the legitimation of formal state run institutions; an 
analysis of authority and moral epistemology. An analysis of his account of coercion and 
the legitimation of state institutions will provide a deeper understanding of the exercise of 
power and the systems around us which operate to maintain it. Such interpersonal and 
structurally determined forces as threats, coercion, deterrence, violence, manipulation, 
authority and commands reflect some problematic features of social exchange, and appear 
as equally valid power relations. 
The key claims which underpin Airaksinen's work (1988:105, 120) are (1) that: "the basic 
motivation behind power and its exercise is the protection of power bases" and (2) that 
"every citizen is tied to the authoritative demands of the state." His argument is presented 
within the framework of a heirarchic structure of society where those in control [usually 
found in state run institutions] at the top of the pyramid, exercise control over everyone 
else [situated at the bottom of the pyramid]. Within this structure, Airaksinen sets about 
answering the following questions: 
(a) Why does society need to coerce? 
(b) How can a coercive institution guarantee its own efficiency and at the same time grant 
rational status to its own agents? 
(c) What is the social motivation of the coercer? 
(d) What is the nature of authority of the superior coercive agent over the coercer, given 
the legitimate social order? and, 
(e) Why would a rational person stay in the business of legitimised coercion? 
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The answer to these questions will assist us to build a more comprehensive picture of 
power. 
Airaksinen uses the definition of power by Dennis Wrong (1979:2) in Power: It's Forms, 
Bases and Uses: "Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen 
effects on others." He suggests that Wrong's idea is the prevailing one, and it 
incorporates tacitly Max Weber's (1968 v1:224) dictum "even against the opposition of 
others." "It seems true that if we speak about power in general, this is indeed what power 
is." (Airaksinen 1988:22) This definition supports the idea that human beings are agents 
with interests, and interests are the target of exercises of power. 
While recognising significant efforts made by Wrong (1979), Lukes (1974) and Goldman 
(1972), Airaksinen objects to the global notion of power reflected in their work. He 
observes that if we view power as a broad umbrella concept covering all effects of any 
action, then "nothing but a conceptual mess is to be expected." (Airaksinen 1988:23) He 
explains that an analytical theory of the cluster of power-like phenomena, interactions, and 
structures should be provided instead. Structuring his work in this way, Airaksinen wants 
us to see that humans are vulnerable to the exercise of power, that power is often 
downward-flowing from the top of formal institutions to the general public through 
coercive agents, deliberately placed at the bottom of the hierarchy (by those at the top). 
Airaksinen examines in detail typical interactions within legitimate and illegitimate 
structures. Through the examples we will shortly consider, he begins from the simple 
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notion of coercion, introduces the subcategory of deterrence, explains them in terms of 
threats and offers, evaluates them in terms of rights and duties, and proceeds by 
contrasting them to authority. He is particularly interested in how this effects human 
action. We see the exercise of power in the form of one agent over another, where there 
is a cost to all involved in the interaction. 
The topic of coercion, power and violence is not a pleasant one, although it is unavoidable 
in the present world. Airaksinen proposes that there is no excuse for not understanding 
street violence, organised crime, terrorism, guerilla warfare, sectarian vendettas, state 
fascism, war and the legitimate threats issued by lust" states. He sees power as an ever-
present problem, which must not be neglected, but these more negative aspects of power 
catch his attention. He has no time for the more optimistic idealised view proposed by 
others: "If we assume an absolutely rigid and demanding ideal standpoint, nothing short 
of the City of God will emerge as a rationally acceptable place." (Airaksinen 1988:13) His 
pragmatism is refreshing, and certainly reveals a number of insights relating to the way 
individuals conduct themselves in the world. But it is worth a reminder here, that in 
throwing light on power and violence (necessarily so), we are not merely concealing (in 
Heidegger's terms) aspects of power which do not implicate violence, but must surely be 
eliminating them from the field of discussion. 
The paradigm cases chosen by Airaksinen are the mugger and victim, the Mafia and 
protection, police and criminals. He proposes that the judgement of such coercion is easy: 
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The threats represent an inherently wicked form of social interaction, and the coercer, in 
order to gain compliance from the victim, threatens greater disutility to the victim if s/he 
does not comply with the coercer's demands. "A successful coercer managers to arrange 
a plausible threat of sufficient disutility and [one] which will be assigned a sufficiently high 
subjective probability by the victim that the victim maximises his/her expected utility by 
performing the action demanded. The mugging victim judges that he is better off handing 
over the wallet than risking being shot...; the fleeing robber judges that she will suffer less 
if she surrenders than if she resists arrest." (Garfield 1997:3) But what about authority? 
Why should anyone surrender her own judgement in prudently serious cases or follow 
another person's commands in dangerous situations? And if coercion is wrong, what 
about the right claimed by legitimate states to use force? The state is a. power structure 
that may use drastic methods to assert its institutional rights. "Now the ultimate question 
is this: Who are the state agents who wield its power and how can they justify what they 
are doing? If one cannot understand these agents' rational motivation', the state itself 
cannot be just and justified." (Airaksinen, 1988: viii) 
Airaksinen answers this question by saying that it is possible to accept some kind of 
collective authority and its "strong" demands on citizens. Analysis over the following 
pages will show why he believes this is possible. From a bird's-eye perspective, Foucault 
views power on a flat plane, spreading capillary-like through society; Airaksinen in 
complete contrast sees a pyramid of power with those who decide whatever is decided of 
major consequence in the minority, at the apex of the pyramid, with "the most intriguing 
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positions.. .to be found at the bottom of the pyramid of power." (1988:7) We find both 
Foucault and Airaksinen looking for paradigm cases in the same place, but for vastly 
different reasons. 
Airaksinen defends his patronage of "Imperfect Ethics"--his focus on the darker side of 
morality and the subsequent move away from the regular philosophical path: 
Academic philosophy serves the "social life" by saying that theories are 
meaningful, that practical logic works and that human beings can solve 
normative and theoretical problems. "What I mean is this; moral philosophy is 
supposed to support the view that there are positive values, rights, duties and 
virtues, which are somewhat like commodities and available to anyone who earns 
them. We philosophers allegedly show why one should be moral, what our social 
duties and proper rights are, and how we decide on a just social order. The basic 
underlying theme is that the good life can prevail - and there is a definite social 
order presupposed by this philosophy of social optimism"...the prediction is 
obvious: badness won't survive. All of this is myopic. We must admit that the 
negative side of human nature is still there and that it is as real as the good in 
us.. .perhaps what is bad will ultimately disappear, but while it is still with us, let 
us see how it works and how it influences human action. (Airaksinen 1988:9-14) 
Dealing with this negative aspect of power--where the individual is the victim at the hands 
of a coercer--becomes the focus of Professor Airaksinen's project; he argues further, that 
there is a cost incurred by all parties involved in coercion. To find the one exception to 
this rule in Airaksinen's work, we must move away from the coercive agent and look to 
the superior agent at the apex of the pyramid of power. His/her duties certainly do not 
entail violent conflicts with anybody. It would appear that executors of this role have little 
or no direct responsibility for their decisions, and bear no cost for the orders s/he hands 
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down. However Airaksinen doesn't dwell on this point but refocusses on those who must 
fulfil the orders from above and come face to face with the opposition: 
We should ask who could rationally accept the role of such a low-level 
professional executor of commands. It seems to me that in many cases, the 
lowest level positions in a power-wielding structure are personally, almost 
impossibly demanding, if they are described from the standpoint of prudence. 
One of my basic points therefore is that when we study power we can not focus 
only on the superior agents. The most intriguing positions are often to be found 
at the bottom of the pyramid of power. The state power structure cannot be 
efficient if some agents are not both willing and capable of actually realising the 
orders of the upper level authoritative agents. (Airaksinen 1988:14) 
By this, Airaksinen means to introduce us to the central player in his project--the coercer. 
He characterises this role as the lowest level position in the power-wielding structure and 
as impossibly demanding. However, implicit in his work is the idea that the victim 
occupies the lowest level in the power structure. Perhaps it is possible to concede his 
previous point on a technicality; that is, that he appears to attribute no "wielding" capacity 
whatsoever to victims or regular citizens (the majority of the population) involved in 
power relations. This is certainly something to which I must object and further explore in 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation. I will argue in chapters 4-6 that even 
Airaksinen's victims do indeed have the capacity to "wield" power. I will return to 
Airaksinen's work in this area: the murky world of change; a world of muggers and 
mafiosi--the agents that bring about that change by coercive means, supported by both 
legitimate and illegitimate institutions. 
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Airaksinen questions the justification of those agents in the service of the state. Inevitably 
we are led into a detailed discussion of the role of those agents as coercers and the 
resulting power relations with subordinates and victims. I will return to his central 
suggestion: Coercion logically entails that whatever the victim does, he will suffer or lose 
something; but if he does as he is told, his losses will be smaller. The coercer is supposed 
to profit from this compliance. And so there are three main points concerning coercion: 
(1) the victim will lose, whatever he does; and (2) this is because of the coercer's threat; 
but (3) he can minimise his losses by obeying. (1988:31) Airaksinen provides an example 
in the form of an armed hold-up: 
For example: Jack Dilinger threatens a cashier with his gun. She knows that 
Jack will shoot if he does not get money, but he will leave without shooting if 
he gets the money. As a prudent person, she will surrender the money. She has 
avoided the shooting, but all the money has been lost. She minimised her 
expected harm even if she could not avoid all harm. (Ibid.) 
This is the essence of threats. The situation is threatening when one knows that it is 
impossible to leave the situation without suffering some personal harm. To complete this 
part of the investigation, Airaksinen suggests that only one natural candidate offers itself 
to the role of an ideal threat; violence. Most people have deep-seated, almost morbid 
fears whose evaluation is not in line with those ends that are measurable in dollars. 
Violence and cruelty are such things, and we can understand their role as ultimate threats 
on this very basis. He concludes that we cannot understand human motivation without 
taking into account our negative emotions, in the sense of aversions. By pursuing such a 
line of investigation, Airaksinen reinforces his claim that power relations are usually 
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unequal. The coercive agent wants something from the subordinate agent and s/he intends 
to get it at any cost. One of the most expedient techniques is to play on the fear of the 
victim, threatening violence and cruelty if required. George Orwell's 1984, is cited as a 
paradigm case: Airaksinen argues for two claims within this framework: (1) the victim's 
decision to resist at any cost is indeed a decision; but (2) his yielding to the threat is not 
always a decision (highlighting the lack of choice involved in the interaction). He then 
argues that any victim finally yields as the result of his "powerless" position: 
Orwell makes it quite plain that O'Brien's power was absolute; he needed to 
consider no aspects of law and legitimacy nor the traditional morality of his 
position. Neither was he dependent on any personal, management, cost or 
resource problems. He also had access to complete information. He was free 
from all restrictions. O'Brien knew that every victim has his weak point, 
something he fears extremely, and that this constitutes the supreme negative 
element embedded in his belief system. His problem was just to find what it 
was. After that, the victim was helpless. (Airaksinen 1988:42) 
Coercion rests on violence, and Airaksinen clearly states that we have no reason to believe 
that a victim could emerge as a winner from a conflict in which his coercer is both 
powerful enough in the Orwellian sense, and has no contingent limitations working against 
his threats (a claim which looks to be supported by our earlier example of the psychiatrist 
for the prosecution). 
Airaksinen argues that coercion usually involves a deliberate strategy and a successful 
resolution, suggesting that the precautionary nature of coercive social power should be 
clear. Power is not something a person grabs and uses every time he needs it. On the 
contrary, any social power base, or resource advantage, must be typically established well 
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ahead of its actual use, whether this aims at some new positive achievement or merely at 
basic survival; structures and procedures are in place, powers of authority are understood 
and utilised when required. Airaksinen not only claims that the demand for the coercive 
role of state institutions is real, but as we shall see toward the end of the chapter, predicts 
a long and healthy future for them. 
How can we most usefully apply this research to the project at hand? Airaksinen provides 
an important piece of the puzzle when analysing the exercise of power. Our everyday 
observations reinforce the fact that coercive power relations are real, but Airaksinen 
interrogates their legitimacy. Because the issue of legitimacy is important for my project I 
will devote the following chapter to a detailed discussion of this topic. Here I wish only to 
explore Airaksinen's comments on accountability of the superior agents, who are charged 
with the task of justifying coercive action (and who do so from the comfortable position at 
the apex of coercive institutions): 
Airaksinen points out that the superior agents are protected from any backlash that may be 
a direct result of their decision-making. He highlights the fact that making serious 
decisions involving human life (eg in a war command situation) from the somewhat 
comfortable, stable position of the superior agent, results in a decrease of responsibility 
and accountability and a distant attitude to human life: the higher the status, the thinner 
the responsibility (1988:124) (An ethical point, to which I will strongly object in chapter 
4): 
In war, it is a crime to murder children with whom you are face to face. Yet it is not 
a crime to drop a bomb on a hospital full of children, from thirty thousand feet 
above it. Suppose that a person drops napalm bombs on a city knowing that they 
will kill only civilians—but not how many and who they are. He explains that his 
purpose is to terrorise the survivors and their leaders, but not to kill. Killing is only 
a means (in executions it is the goal). It is ironic that the explanation of why this 
bombing is not a war crime is that the bombardier does not know who he kills, or 
that he does not intend to kill them, or that every individual has a random chance to 
survive. In direct shooting, this would not be the case; here, the agent directly 
intends to kill. The relevant fact is apparently that distal killing is different from 
face-to-face killing, because then the agent intends to shoot specific persons. The 
death of merely numerically identified stochastic human beings may be lamentable, 
but it is not unacceptable. The basic presupposition is that we tend to think of 
persons in terms of their perceived individuality and not in terms of their numerical 
identifiability as a member of the human species. Ultimately only such identified 
persons matter. (kid) 
If we really think in this way, it is easy to see why the superior agent's problems are 
different from the coercer's. Because she is not directly involved, it is not necessary for 
her to care either about the coercer or the victim: They are not real persons, merely 
statistics on paper. And the higher she is in the authoritative hierarchy, the less she is 
directly concerned with the sometimes difficult task of motivating the middle line coercer. 
Her motivational problems hardly exist. The moral responsibility for coercion and its 
violent threats tends to disappear into thin air when we seek for the roots of responsibility 
within the uppermost levels of the legitimate institutions. (1988:125 ) 
The hierarchy of these institutions works in the following way: The superior agent or 
most senior agent, (found at the apex of the organisation) makes decisions or issues 
commands to the next level agent. For the purpose of our discussion, suppose that this is 
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the coercive agent. The coercive agent implements these decisions by means of threats, 
coercion or violence. It is important to see how the power relation works here. The 
superior agent is not directly responsible for the threats and their material consequences, 
which may be quite serious. Airaksinen claims that in being so removed, s/he is better able 
to exercise authority and control their area of influence. [Being so removed from the 
recipients of their decisions the superior agents are not bothered by messy emotional 
responses]. Airaksinen claims it is even required that he must not become directly 
involved in proximal threats, even if he so wanted. The judge is never a hangman. 
Abstract principles and general guidelines of control become more and more concrete as 
they (in the form of commands and authoritative obligations) flow toward the proximal 
agent (the coercer), who finally finds himself in a situation where backing out is the only 
prudent alternative. He is, nevertheless expected to stay there. (Ibid.) 
At the beginning of his project, Airaksinen pre-empts this case and asks why an agent 
would stay in such an impossibly difficult position. Two reasons are offered: (1) s/he feels 
obligated and/or (2) s/he is forced to remain (themselves victims of coercive measures). In 
case (1), the coercer realises that the institution is part of a just social order and that the 
survival rights of both members and the institutions must be protected. These rights create 
obligations for her/him. In this way, it becomes increasingly obvious why these agents 
remain in their difficult positions--they are obligated and locked in to what Airaksinen 
terms the "blueprint" provided by coercive institutions. The crucial question concerns 
whether the coercer will be willing to realise his "personally intrinsically disadvantageous 
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threat." (1988:93) In other words, the coercer must be taken to be rigid in his behaviour-- 
he must be supposed to follow a plan without modification. The coercer's rigidity outside 
its rare personally motivating contexts can be understood only if the coercer is backed by a 
formal or informal coercive institution. "A social contract makes power exercise 
possible." (Ibid.) Again the framework is set up in advance - in this case the backing of 
the institution will provide the means to realise the threat. 
Airaksinen argues that the police and army are the paradigm coercers. Their practices 
show us what threats really mean. "Amateurs only imitate them." As an empirical 
hypothesis, he suggests that private coercion emerges only after its formally 
institutionalised counterpart. Examples of such explicitly organised institutions that are 
neither formal nor legitimate are the Mafia and the more recent Italian Red Brigade. Their 
objectives are different; one coerces for private profit, the other for a utopian social order. 
Both examples illustrate institutions that are not formal but are still explicit and structured. 
"They are recognised as illegitimate, actually they are illegal." (1988:94) 
Why the shift to discuss legitimate and illegitimate institutions? Because, for effective 
operations the coercer must bind himself to an institution--after all he requires the 
structural and authoritative backing for the coercive measure he employs. Airaksinen 
argues that the reasons for such commitment form an empirical sociological problem, 
which is beyond the scope of a philosophical study. The coercer may think that the 
institution provides a social revenge; that it fulfils a historical and traditional purpose; 
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that it is a valuable element of popular justice; that it reflects a religious norm; that it is 
useful to all its members; or that it is profitable to him personally. The possible reasons 
are many and varied and seem to range from religious fanaticism and belief in destiny to 
petty self-interest and camouflaged egoism. (1988:96) 
We have briefly addressed the key players in Airaksinen's drama: the superior agent 
[whose decisions are legitimated by the institution, and who maintains arms-length 
responsibility to the direct action resulting from his decisions and commands]; the coercer 
[who is committed and obligated to the institution], engaged directly in power relations 
with both the superior agent and his subordinates or victims; and then the victims or 
targets themselves who suffer losses whatever they do. Airaksinen presents a bleak 
picture of power in contrast to those of Foucault or Wartenberg, but it is not complete 
until we answer questions about the legitimacy of all this. Our world (and the world in 
Airaksinen's account), harbours coercive agents exercising power over regular citizens all 
the time. This forces two questions: How on earth they get away with it?/Why do we let 
them get away with it? 
Quite simply, they get away with it in virtue of the fact that they are backed by coercive 
institutions. In a legitimate political state illegitimate institutions are secret "in the sense 
that implies restrictions even on their internal information flow." (Ibid) He contrasts this 
with the idea of openness: 
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Legitimation need not imply moral acceptability in any objectivist sense but merely the 
simpler idea that the institution in question is open to all. It may also be arranged in a 
certain way within the system we call the state, that is, the institution may be part of the 
state. Let's take an example: the Mafia is an explicit but illegitimate institution (it is 
not and cannot be public and open); a private security agency is a legitimate institution 
(it is public and open); the police force is a state institution (its principles and purposes 
are specified in the law). (Airaksinen 1988:96.) 
The main problem concerns institutions like state intelligence agencies. They are 
legitimised and secret at the same time. Perhaps we can say that they are legitimate, 
because (or if) their code of conduct is written down, their decisions are at least indirectly 
under the public control, and their vacancies are open to talent. Citizens are often afraid 
that this is not the case. It is indeed quite possible that an unjust state may have 
institutions that are illegitimate and live their own camouflaged life, like the South 
American death squads organised perhaps by the local militia (1988:96). Airalcsinen 
moves away from the idea of subtlety and camouflage to give a minimalist account of 
coercive formal institutions in the strongest sense of the term. He gives a set of three 
necessary conditions for their existence, mentioning features which allow us to identify a 
formal coercive institution among a set of its merely explicit variants: 
(1) it is an element of the state, when the state is understood in its normal political 
sense in an international comparative perspective; (2) it is constituted through rules 
and norms that are systemic, public, controlled, and enforced, and moreover, can be 
changed through some special, partly bureaucratic methods; and, finally (3) it has a 
positive normative status for its individual agents, so that they are under the typical 
obligations created by the very existence of the formal institution. (Ibid.) 
These conditions give us a picture of what is meant by a legitimate institution: We 
participate in a society comprising such institutions which are arranged in such a way and 
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embedded in such a context that any individual agent will both know the institution and be 
under an obligation to act in full recognition of its existence and goals. Moreover, in so 
acting (and successfully applying coercive tactics) the institution backs up this coercive 
behaviour by raising the expectation that the coercive threats can and will be realised 
should the victim fail to comply. 
Examples of formal coercive institutions are easy to give, and they can be 
classified immediately in terms of their relations to state power. First of all we 
have a court system, which is an overarching control mechanism with a double 
function: courts both utilise and control the actions of coercive agents. This is to 
say that some formal coercive agents realise the orders of law courts and are 
responsible before the law. (1988:98) 
As a second group of examples, Airaksinen cites the police, the penal system, the 
intelligence service, and the army. These institutions have a primary right to present 
threats in the sense that no coercive institution of the state can exercise physical coercive 
power against them in return. All actual coercive power is located here, so that these 
institutions are responsible for presenting the ultimate threats against victims who might 
escape any situation that does not entail, say, police action. Their threats extend to killing. 
Third, customs and internal revenue services are examples of formal coercive institutions 
that may not have their own resources to realise any serious threats. Still, they are at least 
partly genuine coercive institutions in so far as they present threats against the welfare of 
some individuals who act in unacceptable ways. For instance, a person may believe he is 
taxed unfairly. If he does not pay, he is threatened by the internal revenue service by extra 
taxation. He may take his case to the law court, but if he loses the case he will be faced 
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with police action against him. In this way, the threats of customs and the internal revenue 
service and the like are not immediately serious as to their consequences, mainly because 
those institutions cannot use violence. Yet ultimately, they are able to utilise the power of 
the institutions that do present violent threats. (Ibid.) 
Through the discussion of these examples, Airaksinen reveals how and why legitimate 
coercion has a hierarchic structure. Many threats are indeed serious, and their use is 
restricted to some special agencies, even if other agencies can present threats which in the 
end presuppose violence. And there is no doubt that the police and army are able to maim 
and kill people more or less on a routine basis. (1988:99) It is worth reflecting at this 
point on the volatility of power relations. Power can be thought of as a double headed 
coin (equal value attributed to both sides) with the more enabling aspect of power on one 
side and the more coercive aspect of power on the other. Airaksinen presents a very clear 
picture here of the coercive flipside of the coin--"power-over" even to the extent of 
exercising the power over life itself in order to realise a coercive threat. 
It is self-evident that coercion, while a recognisable aspect of power relations is not 
completely rampant and unchecked within society (although one could be forgiven for 
believing this is so, in the case of some war-torn Eastern European countries). Airaksinen 
investigates the limits of coercion and concludes that these arise in at least five ways. 
First, a rational coercer is supposed to present believable and convincing threats and, 
depending on his less than maximal degree of rigidity, his victim may negotiate a deal or 
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present a counter threat, so that the coercive grip relaxes. Second, a well informed victim 
is bound to realise that a merely prudent agent will not be able to stage a serious threat. 
All parties involved in the exchange must believe that the coercer has justified the idea that 
his social commitments overcome his personal good in such cases where he presents a 
threat. (Ibid) 
Third, an institutional coercive agent can justify his actions only as far as he sees the 
institution he is part of as morally justifiable, fully motivating and worth supporting 
(Airaksinen 1988: 105-6). According to Airaksinen, these two aspects--justification and 
motivation--are indeed mutually independent: a person may well see the reasons for, say, 
strong police action, but it does not follow that he should try to participate, or even admit 
that someone should participate. And it is not clear, why the coercer, as a police officer, 
should accept as just the requirements of his role in all relevant circumstances. He points 
out that the missing link in the argument is the premise that the coercer's personal position 
within the institution is such that he can ground his decision to present a threat on the 
alleged fact that his institution is embedded in an acceptable, good, and just social order. 
(Ibid) 
The fourth limit can now be identified: the coercive institution must check that its power 
does not depend only on each coercer's personally accepted moral ideas concerning his 
own actions and the justice of the institution. This last limit is drawn by the institution's 
ability to motivate the coercer to present threats even in those cases in which he himself 
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fails to see what his own positive reasons are. In other words, the coercive agent's power 
to convince depends on the power the institution exercises over him--presumably as the 
direct exercise of coercion and authority. (Ibid.) 
We arrive at a position where the coercer is expected to exercise coercion even if she 
doesn't know why. Airaksinen explains this apparent puzzle within some rather narrow 
limits, namely, in those cases where the coercer has good reasons to accept the idea that it 
is part of her role to coerce even without seeing why she does it. She may recognise a 
global justification for her role, without being able to derive any local (moral or prudent) 
justification for her case-specific decisions. (1988:197) 
In some crucial survival situations, it may well be necessary to "coerce the coercer to 
coerce." This last functional limit which determines when the coercer will become a 
victim—is certainly problematic in a normative perspective, because we suppose now that, 
even if a rational coercer does not accept coercive policies, the other members of the 
institution might demand it from him.(Ibid.) It seems that this fifth limit is usually built 
into our central coercive agencies, like armies in combat. Survival is one of the basic 
motives for the exercise of power, and in critical situations moral considerations tend to 
become irrelevant, distorted and reinterpreted. When faced with the issue of killing the 
enemy in combat, Airaksinen argues that moral considerations give way to our more 
elementary needs and goals [execute the order of the superior officer or face the same fate 
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yourself] as David Hume for instance was prepared to argue: The coercer himself faces 
something like coercive threats, should he fail to act. (Airaksinen 1988:108) 
Accordingly, it is important to any coercive institution to construct its basic structure in 
such a manner that these five limits can be incorporated into it and their constitution 
explained in an intelligible way. Otherwise social power collapses into naked violence, 
which cannot do the work we expect from power. (Mackey 1980:84) Airaksinen argues 
that by building in what he refers to as "the five limits" coercive institutions reinforce their 
structure and operations with strategies, fall-back positions and maintenance measures to 
ensure that all involved act out predetermined roles, that the coercer carries out orders 
even against his better judgement if required. Without these limits in place, coercion 
would not only be a high-risk strategy, but in the worst case scenario, the possibility of 
anarchy and unchecked violence while undesirable and socially catastrophic, would not 
produce the effects and compliant behaviours expected of the exercise of power. 
But every social structure needs protective institutions whose members will not fail to act 
in the all-important hard cases. It is time to question how far a social system can push the 
limits of efficiency of its coercive institutions and still retain their basic justification. 
Airaksinen's conjecture is that this second-level normative argument is essentially related 
to the basic survival rights of society and its members. The whole structure of a formal 
coercive institution is typically based on the idea that any social order has the right to 
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protect its members and to guarantee its own continued existence as a necessary condition 
of the well being of citizens. 
The last element in the complex structure he is sketching is the global justification, given in 
terms of ascriptions of justice, to the whole social order--and consequently to its elements. 
In general we presuppose that the whole society in question is just and its political order is 
legitimate. Then the coercive institution is also automatically acceptable. The normative 
characteristics of society and the social order are the most necessary general elements of 
the argument a rational coercive agent needs. (Airaksinen 1988: 108) We want to 
stipulate that the society is just and fair. What then is the most general ideology the 
coercer can find to support her decision to accept her role? Of course, it is the double 
thesis that her society is both legitimate and just. (Ibid) 
Taking Foucault and Airaksinen together results in a balanced tension: The former 
deliberately sets down as a "methodological precaution" (Foucault 1976) to concern 
himself not with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, but 
rather, their ultimate destinations: power at the extremities where "power from the centre 
equips itself with.. violent means of intervention." Foucault argues that his analysis 
locates power at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in 
character; where we see its intended effects (this is of course the exact opposite of 
Hobbes' project in Leviathan). This analysis hence provides the counterweight to the 
focus of Airaksinen's project on the more centralised coercive institutions. But the 
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problem we are left with is this: Foucault asks questions about the structure and nature of 
power and the way violence is implicated, but is not at all interested in its legitimacy. 
Airaksinen sees violence in all power and asks questions about legitimacy, but doesn't pay 
attention to how it came to be so constituted. I am interested in the way both authors 
attempt to necessarily connect power and violence because I will argue in subsequent 
chapters that violence is not legitimate, and we had better be interested in the 
shortcomings of these theories if we are to lay plausible claim for new connections 
between power and nonviolence. (This point will be directly taken up in chapters 4 and 5, 
but discussed in detail in chapter 6 where I extract from Foucault's analysis that violence 
not only describes, but represents something important, and charge Airaksinen with failing 
to notice this aspect) 
I will conclude with a brief discussion of the work of Thomas Wartenberg (1990), Michael 
Mann (1986), WJ Mackenzie (1975), David Beetham (1991) and Michael Ball (1995). 
Like many other detailed analyses the major problems and complexities relating to power 
have been raised and addressed during the early stages of this chapter. For the sake of 
brevity, I will only seek to highlight key points in the work of the authors mentioned 
above. In some cases, a few paragraphs while inadequate to do justice to their research, 
will act as examples of the problem concerning me in this project. 
Thomas Wartenberg in writing The Forms of Power (1990), undertakes to develop an 
ontological understanding of power. He avoids the temptation to isolate one or other 
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view of power as the most basic. Instead he sees it as important to view power as a 
general social phenomenon whose more specific instances embody a variety of forms. By 
this he means that more than one type of power can be present in a single action (force and 
coercion as just one example) and• criticises Max Weber's interpretation that there can be 
ideal types of power and that these types of power can be seen as ideal examples of power 
relations. Instead Wartenberg highlights the messiness of empirical reality as opposed to 
the clarity of theoretical analysis--a view supported by Mann (1986). Wartenberg suggests 
that actual power relations between social agents will not exhibit one type of power in 
separation from all others, but will at a minimum consist of an array of these types, 
consolidated into the field that is a concrete power relation. He argues that domination 
represents the most significant use of power within society, which leads him to a category 
of "uses" of power. He focuses on the positive use of power (essentially through 
transformative power) to counterbalance what he sees as a focus on the predominantly 
negative use of power (domination) in society. 
Wartenberg's theory of power acknowledges the diverse forms that power can take in the 
social world, while also treating power as the result of the ongoing interactions of human 
social agents. It is for this reason that he calls it a "field theory of social power." 
(Wartenberg 1990:3) 
By the term social, I also refer to power in all its different forms as a social 
reality. All the more particular forms of social being such as the political, the 
economic, and the familial are encompassed by the idea of the social. A theory of 
social power conceptualises the forms that power takes in intersubjective human 
life, abstracting from the specific character of more particular forms of power 
such as political and economic power. (Ibid.) 
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He qualifies this by arguing that previous theorists of power, particularly political 
----... 
theorists, have failed to recognize that power can be exercised within all of the different 
domains that constitute human social life, and instead have tended to limit their theories of 
power to the sphere of politics. While a decision made by a political leader might certainly 
qualify as a paradigm case of the exercise of power, so too might the decision of a 
corporate executive. By focussing on social power in general, he wants his theory to 
correct the one-sidedness of such views of power and determine by analysis how power 
manifests itself socially. 
Before undertaking the investigation, he distinguishes two different concepts of power 
based upon two phrases in which the term appears: the concept of power-to and the 
concept of power-over. He proposes that each of these concepts has a legitimate use 
within social theory, but that, despite the connection between them, they need to be kept 
distinct by an adequate theory of social power. He argues that a theory of social power 
has, as a first priority, the articulation of the meaning of the concept of power-over 
because social theory employs this concept as a primary means of conceptualising the 
nature of fundamental inequities in society (ie the power of one agent over another). 
(1990:5) His explanation of this, supports Airaksinen's work on coercion, and will not be 
repeated here. However, it will be of interest to the discussion to consider his argument 
for the "dynamic" aspect of power which has temporal as well as static aspects to its 
existence and therefore is always in motion. He claims that questions like "Who has 
power in society?" tend to treat power as something that does not simply exist as a static 
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social presence, but as something that is continually being "reconstituted and/or altered by 
means of the actions and understandings of social agents. A dynamic conception of power 
will acknowledge that power is a particular type of ongoing social process, not simply a 
static social distribution." (Ibid) 
In criticising the views of power articulated by social theorists Wartenberg points out that 
such views tend to focus upon particular interventions as appropriate sorts of places within 
which to locate power as a social reality. Against Foucault, he claims that this is a 
mistake, for power is not simply relational—that is, something that relates human beings to 
one another in particular interventions; power, he argues, exists in relationships—it has a 
primary location in the ongoing, habitual ways in which human beings relate to one 
another. 
I remain unconvinced that Wartenberg's analysis is the improvement on Foucault's that he 
claims it to be. He wants the reader to recognise a strength in his situated conception of 
power when it concludes that power exists primarily in social relationships and not in 
isolated exercises. It posits a particular ontological structure of human social relationships 
as constituting situated power relationships and, in so doing, explicitly posits ongoing 
social relationships as the primary locus of power in society. When relationships rather 
than events become the focus of a theory of power, it becomes clear that power is not a 
property that can simply be physically possessed by its owner, taken away, or conferred on 
someone else. In this way he want power to enable the agent to undertake constructive 
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action, rather than continue to be a victim of a coercive regime, as Foucault would have it. 
In chapter 6, I will build on these ideas, but I remain unconvinced that Wartenberg's 
theoretical account significantly shifts the dialogue of power to a more positive footing. 
Because he acknowledges paradigm cases of power as domination, fails to indicate what 
this violent actions represents, fails to show what is wrong with this, and why his analysis 
constitutes an improvement. I will argue later that by following a similar analytical pattern 
to those he accuses, he stands equally condemned of providing yet another descriptive 
account, when it is what power represents when exercised through violence or 
nonviolence that is the important point. 
In attempting to consider a cluster of alternate views on power, inevitably many of the key 
issues will be raised and analysed early, enabling a more rapid overview of later works. 
Having completed the detailed exposition of coercion, authority, legitimacy, social 
relations and the role of the state through the works of de Jouvenel, Foucault, Airaksinen 
and Wartenberg, the remaining discussion in this chapter will confine itself to summary 
points in response to other authors and my remaining concerns which motivate the project 
on power and nonviolence. 
Michael Mann has produced a two volume history and theory of power relations in human 
societies under the title: The Sources of Social Power (Mann 1986). In this work he 
identifies the four principal sources of power as: control over economic, ideological, 
military and political resources. He examines the interrelations between these in a 
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narrative history of power from Neolithic times, through ancient Near Eastern 
civilisations, the classical Mediterranean age, and medieval Europe to the period of time 
just before the industrial revolution in England. Rejecting the conventional monolithic 
concept of a society as unitary or a totality, Mann's model reflects aspects of Foucault's 
work viewing it instead, as a series of overlapping, intersecting power networks. 
Human beings do not create unitary societies but a diversity of intersecting 
networks of social interaction. The most important of these networks form 
relatively stably around the four power sources in any given social space. But 
underneath human beings are tunnelling ahead to achieve their goals, forming 
new networks, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view with 
rival configurations of one or more of the principal power networks. (Mann 
1986:16) 
What is the basis for this rejection of unitary societies? Mann argues that a theoretical 
assumption lies at the base of the unitary conception: Because people are social animals, 
they have a need to create a society, a bounded and patterned social totality. But, like 
Foucault, he sets out to demonstrate the error in this assumption. Human beings need to 
enter into social power relations, but they do not need social totalities. They are social, 
but not societal animals. This point will be expanded at a later stage in the discussion. 
Mann pays tribute to the debt owed to Weber and his general vision of the relationship 
between society, history and social action and seeks to isolate the most important element 
in human societies--that which is ultimately prime or determinative. "He proposes that 
conceiving of societies as multiple overlapping and intersecting power networks, as 
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seamless webs spun of endless multicausal interactions, gives us the best available entry 
into the issue of what is ultimately primary or determining in societies." (Mann 1986: 2) 
The emergence of social power relations has always been recognised in social theory. 
From Aristotle to Marx the claim has been made that "man" is a social animal, able to 
achieve goals, including mastery over nature, only by cooperation. As there are many 
human goals, there are many forms of social relations and large and small networks of 
interacting persons, involving the family, the economy and the state. 
In its most general sense, Mann sees power as the ability to pursue and attain goals 
through mastery of one's environment." (Ibid.) Social power carries two more specific 
senses. Mann refers to these as collective and distributive power. The first is mastery 
exercised over other people. For example power in this sense is the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance (Weber 1968:1, 53). Such definitions restrict power to its distributive aspect, 
power by A over B. For B to gain power, A must lose some. Their relationship is a 
"zero-sum game" where a fixed amount of power can be distributed among participants. 
(Op. Cit., p.4) Airaksinen would agree. 
Mann refers to a second collective aspect of power, whereby persons in cooperation can 
enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature. In most social relations he 
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concludes, both aspects of power, distributive and collective, exploitative and functional, 
operate simultaneously and are intertwined. 
Like Foucault and Airaksinen, Mann extends his analysis to consider how distributive 
power is achieved, and concludes that the few at the top can keep the masses at the 
bottom compliant, provided their control is institutionalized in the laws and the norms of 
the social group in which both operate. Institutionalization is necessary, he says, to 
achieve routine collective goals; and thus distributive power, that is social stratification, 
also becomes an institutionalized feature of social life. 
There is thus, a simple answer to the question of why the masses do not revolt--a 
perennial problem for social stratification - and it does not concern value 
consensus, or force, or exchange in the usual sense of those conventional 
sociological explanations. The masses comply because they lack the collective 
organisation to do otherwise, because they are embedded within collective and 
distributive power organisations controlled by others. They are organizationally 
outflanked. (Mann 1986:26) 
This can be seen as an interesting footnote to findings of Foucault and Airaksinen, who are 
presenting similar views. Mann adds the twist that the masses are outflanked due to a lack 
of organisation, and it is this "organising" aspect of power in which he is most interested. 
In relation to the exercise of power, Mann has introduced two terms, extensive and 
intensive power. Extensive is the ability to organise large numbers of people over far-
flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation. Intensive power is the 
ability to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from 
, 
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the participants, whether the area and numbers covered are great or small. He argues that 
the primary structures of society combine extensive and intensive power, and so aid human 
beings in extensive and intensive cooperation to fulfil their goals. Mann offers examples of 
each: 
Military power offers examples of authoritative organization. The power of the 
high command over its own troops is concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized. 
It is intensive rather than extensive—the opposite of a militaristic empire, which can 
cover a large territory with its commands but has difficulty mobilizing positive 
commitments from its population or penetrating their everyday lives. Intensivity 
has been much studied by sociologists and political scientists, and I have nothing 
new to add. Power is intensive if much of the subjects life is controlled or if he or 
she can be pushed far without loss of compliance. (1986:27) 
Unsurprisingly, as in any major historical study, investigation of the role of military power 
becomes a focal point and Mann's work is no exception. Where Airaksinen reflects a 
broad base of coercion throughout society, Mann explains how military power 
reorganises existing social life, through the effectiveness of a particular form of 
"concentrated coercion" on the battlefield. Military power enables a reorganizing spurt, a 
regrouping both of the myriad networks of society and of its dominant power 
configurations. 
Military organization is essentially concentrated coercive organization. It mobilizes 
violence, the most concentrated, if bluntest, instrument of human power. This is obvious 
in wartime. Concentration of force forms the keystone of most classic discussions of 
military tactics. It may endure beyond the battlefield and the campaign. Militaristic forms 
of social control attempted in peacetime are also highly concentrated. For example, 
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directly coerced labor, whether slave or corvee, often built city fortifications, monumental 
buildings or main communication roads or channels. Coerced labor appears also in mines, 
on plantations and on other large estates, and in the households of the powerful. But it is 
less suited to normal dispersed agriculture, to industry where discretion and skill are 
required, or to the dispersed activities of commerce and trade. (Mann 1986:26) 
Military power is sociospatially dual: a concentrated core in which positive coerced 
controls can be exercised, surrounded by an extensive outer layer in which terrorised 
populations will not normally step beyond certain niceties of compliance but whose 
behaviour cannot be positively controlled. For this more specific type of control, Mann 
introduces the role of political power. 
Political power derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized 
regulation of many aspects of social relations. He doesn't define it in purely "functional" 
terms, in terms of judicial regulation backed by coercion. Such functions can be possessed 
by any power organization--ideological, economic, military, as well as state. Mann 
restricts it to centrally administered and territorially bounded regulation and coercion; that 
is, to state power. Mann suggests that by concentrating on the state, we can analyze its 
distinctive contribution to social life. Second, military, economic and ideological power 
can be involved in any social relationships, wherever located. Any superordinate or group 
of superordinates can exercise these forms of power against any subordinate or group of 
subordinates. By contrast political relations concern one particular area, the "centre." 
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Political power is located in that centre and exercised outward. It is necessarily centralized 
and territorial, and in these respects, differs from the other power sources. Those who 
control the state, the state elite, can obtain both collective and distributive power and trap 
others within their distinctive "organization chart." (Ibid) But states' territorial 
boundaries--in a world never yet dominated by a single state--also give rise to an area of 
regulated interstate relations. "Geopolitical diplomacy is a second important form of 
political-power organization." (Mann 1986:27) 
Earlier, we considered Mann's view that the following theoretical assumption lies at the 
base of the unitary conception: Because people are social animals, they have a need to 
create a society, a bounded and patterned social totality. But, as we have seen, he claims 
this to be false. "Human beings need to enter into social power relations, but they do not 
need social totalities. They are social, but not societal animals." (1986:6) 
Consider some of their needs. As they desire sexual fulfilment, they seek sexual relations, 
usually with only a few members of the opposite sex; as they desire to reproduce 
themselves, these sexual relations usually combine with relations between adults and 
children. For these (and other purposes) a family emerges, enjoying patterned interaction 
with other family units from which sexual partners might be found. As humans need 
material subsistence they develop economic relationships, cooperating in production and 
exchange with others. There is no necessity that these economic networks be identical to 
family or sexual networks, and in most cases they are not. As humans explore the ultimate 
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meaning of the universe, they discuss beliefs and perhaps participate with others similarly 
inclined in rituals and worship in a church. As humans defend whatever they have 
obtained, and as they pillage others, they form armed bands, probably of younger men, and 
they require relations with non-fighters who feed and equip them. As humans settle 
disputes without constant recourse to force, they set up judicial organisations with a 
specified area of competence. Where is the necessity for all these social requirements to 
generate identical sociospatial interaction networks and form a unitary society? (Ibid) 
While Mann's project adds to this discussion and complements the issues raised by 
Foucault, Airaksinen and Wartenberg, we move beyond his project of the quest for 
ultimate primacy to his more general conclusion--the implementation of change within 
society: "...the social world can certainly be changed in time, and its future is open. The 
question in its own context implicitly insists that we change the world in some better 
direction." (1986:79) 
To do so he stresses the need to move outside the structures of domination which prohibit 
us from utilising the structures and processes for successful change. I will consider in 
Chapter Four, how this might be achieved utilising an alternative metaphysics of power, 
one not dependent on violence. 
Now, the purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of important works on 
power which have influenced the philosophical landscape. My claim in the preface to this 
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dissertation is that the current body of work on power asserts that it inevitably either 
explicitly or implicitly rests on violence. Through all of the works so far this indeed seems 
to be the case. Even the most optimistic of the authors, Michael Mann, stresses the need 
to somehow move outside of the structures of organised coercion, but stops short of 
proposing how. Other contributions in this area over the last twenty year period appear to 
reflect the same problem. Let us take a few cases in point. Mackenzie (1975) in Power, 
Violence, Decision concludes that there is no choice, unless the individual has power to 
see his/her choice executed. In so far as we choose to make choice an end, we must seek 
power as a means. He presents power definitively as dependent on violence, social in 
character, with many guises. This view is supported by Murvar in the Theory of Liberty, 
Legitimacy and Power (1985). Here we see a misery and bleakness hanging over the body 
of work on power. He proposes that from Montesquieu to Weber, to the present, the 
most discerning observers of power structures with their respective legitimacies and 
absence of liberty (while they don't agree on labels, terms and conceptualisations) agree 
on a very general, but seminal notion of the misery and poverty of human experience with 
power and rulership (1985:4-5). This trend continues with Beetham--another of the most 
important theorists writing in this area--who again only picks up the pieces of power 
resting on violence and domination. In The Legitimation of Power (1991) he concentrates 
on the exercise of power by one person over others, or by one group over another. He 
sees this as the basic and recurrent feature of all societies. Those who are subordinate 
experience it as constraining, often humiliating and sometimes life-threatening. Those who 
hold power or seek to do so are frequently at odds with one another over the scope of 
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their power and the control over their subordinates. (Beetham 1991:3). Terence Ball 
(1995), reviews a range of influential contributions; and while recognising a focus on 
violence, flags the need for consideration of moral implications before concluding with his 
response against the essential contestability of power. I agree with Ball on at least one 
point: the consequences of power through violence and the resulting moral implications, 
have not been adequately addressed, a subject to which I will return in later chapters. 
I believe the following argument can be distilled from the research outlined in this chapter: 
1 	Power is about effecting change (there seems to be the least amount of 
disagreement stemming from this influential claim provided by Lukes and modified 
by Morriss). 
2. 	Violence is implicated in the majority of theories of power. 
3. 	If the conception of power as it is presented in philosophical discourse is correct, 
there are two clear outcomes for the individual. Either: 
(a) pursue power through violence 
(b) reject this and remain powerless. 
4. 	There is no connection made between power and nonviolence in the work on 
power. 
So, 
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5. 	Either 
(a) there is no connection between power and nonviolence because it simply 
has nothing to do with nonviolence. 
or 
(b) Documenting a number of instances where violence is implicated in power 
has led (in the same way that the all swans are white claim led) to the building 
blocks of philosophical discourse presenting the two as necessarily linked. 
Convincing evidence is gathered to support this claim across a range of different 
circumstances; theories are constructed making it increasingly difficult to think of 
power in any other way (violence here is not just one case, but represents a number 
of guises as coercion, force, influence, threats and so on). 
6. 	If 5(a) is correct, then effecting change occurs through violent means. This makes 
sense in a broad perspective from physical change (volcanic eruption and so on) to 
human affairs (one agent controlling another by intimidation, threats, coercion, 
force, influence and so on; where there is always a cost to the subordinate agent) 
Many of the theorists writing on power refer to power as the capacity to achieve change 
through violent means, but change is also effected through other than violent means (In 
chapter four and five I will provide a detailed analysis of change through nonviolence with 
particular reference to the exiled Tibetan community and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). This implies that the current body of theories about power 
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must only be revealing part of the story and cannot be considered an adequate view [In 
Heidegger's terms every assertion both conceals and reveals: We judge philosophies on 
the merits of what is revealed against what is concealed. Our criteria for this judgement 
are the philosophical needs of our time and place]. (Kasulis 1981:24) There are clear 
examples from contemporary society that show how some change is effected through 
nonviolent means but the connection to violence is very different--it confronts rather than 
constitutes it (in post-apartheid South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings showcase power and nonviolent solutions mandating that coercers confront the 
moral structure of their coercion along with the power structures they are exploiting. For 
further examples see MK Gandhi, ML King Jr. and the Tibetan Government in Exile). 
This places the individual, by choice, on a completely different moral path to that first 
discussed, requiring a different understanding of power. 
In conclusion, the implications for a moral agent exercising power through nonviolence 
will be vastly different to those of the agent exercising power through violence. If we 
regard violence as the only way to access power and effect change, then as individuals we 
will be fixed in the past, for the present already presents examples of the acquisition and 
the exercise of power through nonviolent means, and offers the opportunity for a different 
path with a very different moral complexity. While this won't suit some individuals, at the 
very least, progress should reflect a choice. This choice, and an alternative metaphysics of 
power will be outlined in the following chapters. 
Chapter Two 
- Can Power Through Violence Ever Be Legitimate? - 
For the moral or political philosopher, power is legitimate when the rules governing it are 
justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles. I will ask under what 
conditions the exercise of power (particularly state power) can be legitimate in the first 
place and settle on conditions of legitimacy for government. I will focus on the difficult 
cases where violent action appears to be legitimate. I will argue that a detailed 
understanding of violence will show that some actions look violent but are not, and that 
other actions appear to be legitimate exercises of force when they are in fact violent and 
illegitimate. 
From this analysis I will show that legitimacy of government cannot be used to legitimate 
violence, and that violence cannot be a legitimator of power. I will further argue that 
those attempting justification for violent action are involved in a performative 
contradiction. I will show why respect for persons is implicated in the discourse on 
legitimacy and why the recourse to violence undermines this action resulting in the 
performative contradiction. I will argue that the agent cannot at the same time, enter into 
a discourse on legitimacy and perpetrate violence. From this follows the conclusion that 
the agent must either give up the cdiscourse on legitimacy--viz simply say "It is in my 
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interests to do this, and your interests just don't matter"--or give up violence. I will argue 
in the following chapter that this is precisely the choice forced by nonviolent action. The 
key element in this chapter will be the development of a representational theory of action. 
I will argue that what violence represents is error or falsity and is morally wrong. 
I will begin the discussion by answering the question, "why does power require 
legitimation in the first place?" 
Flathman (1995:527) warns that legitimacy is a notion which should arouse apprehension 
for the following reason: Governments that are legitimate have the "right to rule"--to 
demand obedience from their citizens or subjects. Flathman argues that it is at least partly 
correct to say that this authority is independent of the content of the laws or commands 
issued by those invested with it (Hart 1961)--that the authority of a law or command is a 
reason for obeying it regardless of its contents or their merits. He argues that the laws or 
commands leave those subject to authority with but two choices: Either obey the 
command, or disassociate from the political association of which authority is a constitutive 
feature. He notes that theories of passive and civil disobedience add the third option of 
disobedience to commands judged to be unjust but on condition of peaceful submission to 
the penalty assigned (King 1964). 
The central plank of Flathman's discussion also appears at the heart of many other theories 
of legitimacy: Where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and 
with evidence of consent, we call it rightful.or legitimate. But to concede the legitimacy 
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of government is to accord to some number of persons a right that we otherwise reserve 
to ourselves, the right to conduct our own lives and affairs as each of us deems 
appropriate. Hence, power is not prima facie legitimate. Flathman claims that much past 
and present political philosophy either subordinates the question of legitimacy or implicitly 
treats its possibility and desirability as philosophically and politically unproblematic. David 
Beetham in The Legitimation of Power (1991) offers reasons for such treatment. 
How far power is legitimate, what makes it so and why it matters are all contentious 
questions that have been the special focus of different groups of professionals—legal 
experts, moral and political philosophers and social scientists, to name only a few. Each 
group has approached the above concerns from a different standpoint, employing different 
definitions of "legitimacy" (Beetham 1991:3). Beetham elucidates the concern raised by 
Flatlunan when he argues that power relations and the issue of legitimacy have been 
treated as unproblematic because they have been thoroughly confused (1991:7). Through 
this confusion we can see the starting point for a failure to conceptualise adequately or to 
offer a coherent account of what makes power legitimate in particular societies. Beetham 
places this burden squarely on the shoulders of Max Weber: 
The source of the confusion lies with the work of Max Weber. It is one of the most 
remarkable features about the study of legitimacy in politics departments, at least in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, that it is suspended between two separate bodies of 
literature that have absolutely no connection with one another. If you are studying 
legitimacy as a subject in political philosophy you will probably start with Thomas 
Hobbes, if not earlier, and proceed through the great tradition which includes 
Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and others. If you are studying it as a subject in political 
science or political sociology you will most likely begin with Max Weber, and may 
not discuss other thinkers at all, but proceed to a series of empirical case studies of 
power relations and theoretical explanations for obedience and disobedience. 
(Beetham 1995:7-8) 
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This is Beetham's starting point in an attempt to clear up the apparently messy subject of 
legitimacy. Following his concern through a number of stages will serve to highlight why 
we might be justified in considering aspects of apparently legitimate government as 
problematic, and why therefore the relative silence of fellow philosophers is deeply 
puzzling (It is not the case that contemporary philosophy fails to pay attention to ethics-- 
after all we can call upon virtue ethics, the theory of war, the theory of justice and ethics 
of care to name only a few from an increasingly extended list; it is amazing though that 
while engaging itself in all of this ethical activity, on the foundational issue of the 
legitimacy and illegitimacy of violence, contemporary ethics is remarkably silent). 
Acknowledging Weber's enormous influence across a range of disciplines, "On the 
subject of legitimacy," (Beetham correctly points out) "Weber's influence has been an 
unqualified disaster." (Ibid.) The problem stems from Weber's definition of legitimacy. 
To say that a given power relation is legitimate, Weber argues, is not to make a moral 
judgement about it, but to make a report (which may be empirically true or false) about 
other people's beliefs. Power is legitimate where those involved in it believe it to be so; 
legitimacy derives from people's belief in legitimacy. So, Weber writes, legitimacy is 
equivalent to "Legitimitatsglaube" (a belief in legitimacy); and legitimate power is power 
"als legitim angesehen" (that it is regarded as legitimate). [Weber 1956:23,157,659; 
1958:493). Taking Weber's idea and tracing it through the writing of his contemporaries, 
will allow us to see how legitimacy has come to be viewed as relatively "unproblematic." 
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S.M Lipset (1958:86), in typically Weberian vein, defines the legitimacy of a political 
system as its capacity "to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society." And R. Merelman (1966:548) 
calls legitimacy "a quality attributed to a regime by a population. That quality is the 
outcome of the government's capacity to engender legitimacy." Beetham points out the 
obvious problem: taken to their logical conclusion, such definitions would imply that the 
reason for the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 lay in a 
deficiency of public relations, rather than in anything actually wrong with the system of 
rule itself. This usage transforms legitimacy from a question about the actual 
characteristics of a system of power into one concerning the beliefs people hold about it. 
Referring to this issue, and the definitions of legitimacy taken from Weber, J.H Schaar 
(1969:284) argues that "The new definitions...all dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion; 
If people hold a belief that existing institutions are 'appropriate' or 'morally proper', then 
those institutions are legitimate. That's all there is to it." Hannah Piticin (1972:283) in 
turn draws attention to the epistemological consequences of such a definition: "In seeking 
to insulate the sociologist from the context of judging and taking a position," she writes, 
"Weber in effect made it incomprehensible that anyone might judge legitimacy and 
illegitimacy according to rational, objective standards." And Robert Grafstein (1981:456) 
points to the abandonment of moral judgement entailed by the Weberian approach: 'The 
concept should properly signify a normative evaluation of a political regime: the 
correctness of its procedures, the justification for its decisions, and the fairness with which 
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it treats its subjects. In Weber's hands however, legitimacy no longer represents an 
evaluation of a regime; indeed it no longer refers directly to the regime itself " These 
criticisms seem to me entirely justified in pointing to the reductionist conclusions that can 
be drawn from the Weberian definition of legitimacy. My intention is to move the 
discussion below from this internalist stance to an externalist viewpoint. Before doing so, 
two small but not insignificant side issues will require explication: first, the subtle shift in 
definitions employed by some governments attempting to legitimise the use of violent 
action; and second, what it is about violent action that withstands any attempt at 
legitimacy. 
The first thing to raise is the cleverly subtle move by governments attempting to justify 
violent action: One specific technique employed, is to define "violence" in such a way that 
the illegitimate use of force is only attached to agents external to the state structure. 
Before exploring this issue a caveat is required: 
The development of a new metaphysics of power through nonviolence will require a 
careful and extensive discussion of current definitions of "violence", the weakness of these 
and proposed alternative definitions of violence and nonviolence. The critical idea is that 
the term violence is used consistently to mean physical force. This detailed discussion sits 
appropriately in chapter four because it leads to a new expansive definition of "violence" 
and "nonviolence" introduced by Professor Samdhong Rinpoche. This set of definitions 
will represent an important part of the theoretical underpinnings for a new metaphysics of 
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power based on nonviolence which is developed in subsequent chapters. I raise the issue 
here as a promissory note that appropriate arguments will unfold, but for this side 
discussion I intend only to note that definitions of violence are simplified to the effects of 
physical force having nothing to say about the agent undertaking the action, or the 
germination of violence (its origination). Moreover, the new definitions will make the 
important distinction between "hurt" and "harm," another issue I will bring forward in 
simplified form when considering police action below. 
Definitions become important to the point in hand because in an attempt to legitimise 
violent actions, paradigm coercers (like state governments and police forces) move the 
goal-posts to a position where violence is still equated with force, but the state team are 
very careful to disassociate from that game. As I will show below, state agents apparently 
exercise legitimate force and people who are not agents of the state exercise illegitimate-
force-which-is-violence. Before examining this point in detail, I will utilise the work of 
Grundy and Weinstein (1974) when they summarise the four major ideological 
justifications of violence: Legitimist, Expansionist, Pluralist and Intrinsic. (I will refer to 
them briefly for clarification and then build explanatory examples around what I consider 
to be the foundational [legitimist] account. I choose the simplest account to examine 
problems attached to legitimacy, because it makes no difference to my argument which is 
chosen--my claim is that no act of violence can be justified). 
Legitimist 
Legitimist ideologies justify political violence when it is aimed at protecting or restoring a single 
normative order which the ideologist deems legitimate, or at disrupting an order which he deems 
illegitimate. For example, many people claim that the state is justified in using protective violence 
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to quell disruptive violence, and others claim that the violence of revolutionary groups is justified 
when it aims at restoring a traditional normative order. Legitimist ideologies are related to narrow 
definitions of violence, because they are apt to define violence as an attack on the normative order 
which they are defending. 
Expansionist 
In expansionist ideologies political violence is justified as a means of imposing a normative order 
deemed superior on "alien groups." For example, an ideologist defending racial inequality may 
defend the imposition of a political order by force on a racial group s/he deems inferior. The 
imposition of the supposedly superior normative order may be carried out by a dominant power 
group occupying the same territory as the subordinate group. 
Pluralist 
Diametrically opposed to expansionist ideologies are pluralist ideologies of political violence. In 
pluralist ideologies political violence is justified as a means of winning the right of a group to have 
its own normative order. For example, an ideologist defending the rights of an ethnic group to 
political and national self-determination may defend rebellion against established authorities as a 
means to attain these rights. The aim of the ideologist here is not to show why one group should 
dominate another, but why a group should escape from domination. This ideology of violence is 
called "pluralist" because it usually explicitly or implicitly recognizes the rights of all national or 
ethnic groups to self-determination. This use of the term "pluralist" should be distinguished from 
other popular meanings such as philosophical pluralism (the rejection of a single principle for 
explaining the universe), pluralist democracy (the competition of diverse interest groups within the 
institutions of representative government), and social pluralism (the presence of two or more 
relatively autonomous ethnic or national groups within a single society). Both expansionist and 
pluralist ideologies of violence are related to operational and behavioral definitions of "violence" 
because they defend acts of violence beyond those merely involved with protecting a given 
nonnative order. However, this relation is not logically necessary and pluralists, especially, 
frequently use broad and ethical definitions of "violence." 
Intrinsic 
The fourth major justification of political violence is intrinsic. In intrinsic ideologies political 
violence is justified by its direct contributions to the development of personal character, 
commitment to cause, and quality of social structure. For example, a revolutionary ideologist 
may argue that if oppressed individuals undertake violent acts against the ruling classes, they will 
be purged of their feelings of inferiority and become new persons, opposed to the dominant social 
structure and firmly committed to the society of the future. Similarly, other ideologists of social 
change may argue that if oppressed individuals undertake nonviolent resistance, important and 
direct psychological benefits will ensue. The term "intrinsic" is used to describe such ideologies 
because they tend to justify violent acts in terms of the experiences which they evoke rather than 
in terms of ulterior aims. Intrinsic ideologies of political violence are related to expansive and 
ethical definitions of violence because they focus on attaining personal liberation from all forms 
of oppression. As was the case with the other ideologies, however, this relation is not logically 
necessary, and intrinsic ideologies will employ various definitions of violence depending upon the 
particular context. (Grundy & Weinstein 1974:14-17) 
91 
Of the justifications above, I will focus on the legitimist ideology to show how the process 
of defining "violence" is paramount for its attempted justification. As previously 
introduced, in an attempt to legitimise violent actions, paradigm coercers (like state 
governments and police forces) move the goal-posts to a position where violence is 
equated with force, but the game of legitimacy reflects a distinction between force 
exercised by the state and force exercised by people who are not agents of the state. The 
subtle and interesting shift results in the state by stipulation exercising actions labelled by 
the term "legitimate force" and the term "violence" attaches to the use of force by persons 
who are not agents of the state. 
The orthodox or narrow definition of "violence" emphasises this point: Grundy & 
Weinstein (1974:11) argue that the discourse of legitimacy now begins to reflect 
definitions of violence which include "only acts of violation in which physical force is 
applied and which are illegal." Sidney Hook (1974:12) argues in favour of defining 
"violence" this way. He states that violence is "the illegal employment of methods of 
physical coercion for personal or group ends." (1974:12) 
From this perspective, physical coercion employed by "duly constituted 
authorities" is legitimate and should be called "force", while the term violence 
should be applied only to acts of illegal physical coercion. (IBID) 
On this view, acts of violence are committed by agents operating outside of a legally 
constituted authority (say you or I), and exactly the same action undertaken by an agent 
operating within a legally constituted authority (the local police officer) is not, by 
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definition violent. While this appears contradictory, there must be some sense in which 
you or I would want to come under the protection of the law (law enforcement officer)--
as victims of a street mugging for example (we may want the officer to decide how much 
force is required to capture and restrain the mugger, and we may indeed be completely 
happy with his decision if it means that the mugger is punished for his crime against us, 
and we are protected from a similar occurrence in the future). 
To get to the bottom of this situation will require a detailed analysis: First we need to 
examine how violence is seen to interfere with "normal" events and the structure 
employed by legitimate government to control this aberration. Second, I will show how 
the concept of harm is sanitised to the point where it does not even enter the discourse of 
legitimacy engaged in by government (this strengthens the definition of "legitimate force." 
After all, if there's no harm done, then the action can't be violent). After reaching this 
point, I will take stock before progressing the discussion to show how the focus on action 
(as force or violence) conveniently bypasses the important issue of the agent undertaking 
that action. If we can avoid talking about agents then it is not a complicated move to 
misplace the important issue of human rights in the process of legitimate government. 
Restoring this issue to prominence leads naturally to show how respect for persons is 
implicated in the discourse of legitimacy and how therefore the exercise of power through 
violence can never be legitimate. 
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I return the reader to the first step in this process: Alongside the narrow interpretation is 
the idea that violence is an aberration--an unexpected interruption in the normal course of 
events. Sheldon Wolin (1994:25) has advanced this point of view. He states that 
"violence denotes an intensification of what we 'normally' expect a particular power to 
be." He argues that we designate "acts as violent because the amount or degree of force 
does not seem commensurate with the circumstances or with what we have come to 
accept as the characteristic style." Wolin concludes: "violence implies that an unusual 
amount of destruction will accompany a designated act." Before further comment, I will 
highlight a similar view held by E.V. Walter. Walter (1964:354) remarks that violence is 
"generally understood as immeasurable or exaggerated harm to individuals, either not 
socially prescribed at all or else beyond the limits established for its use." He states that 
when violence is "socially prescribed and defined as a legitimate means of control or 
punishment, according to the practices familiar to us, the destructive harm is measured 
and the limits made clear (IBID). The basis of the narrow approach to defining 
"violence" is, according to Grundy & Weinstein (1974:12) therefore, neither the 
experience of violation nor the experience of harmful force, but "the experience of having 
one's expectations in interpersonal relations disrupted by acts of force." 
We need to look more closely at what is happening here. The authors argue that the 
narrow definition is based on the grounds that the "official use of force" functions to 
support a system of stable expectations, while the use of violence by those who are not 
agents of the state functions to disrupt such expectations. Underlying this position is the 
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assertion that the use of force is inevitable in human affairs (we can add the further move 
that what is accepted as inevitable becomes seen as normal daily practice). Joseph Mayer 
has presented the narrow interpretation with clarity. Mayer (1926:123) states: 
Organization, off hand, is of many forms—cultural, scientific, religious. But 
underneath them all there is just one type, namely, the organization of force. This 
is basic. It is the tap root from which all other forms of organization spring and 
upon which they rest for their ultimate sanction. 
Grundy and Weinstein note that "the socialization of force allows the function of 
protection to take precedence over the function of defense in human affairs." (Grundy & 
Weinstein 1974:12) Adopting a Hobbesian position, Mayer (1926:123) adds: 
"Protection is the string upon which the social beads are threaded. Take away 
community protection, and nothing but personal fighting and general anarchy can result." 
Here we see some important implications of the narrow definition: legitimate government 
utilises force to protect society from bad people who use violence. On this reading, it is 
possible to arrive at completely different sets of consequences for the very same action-- 
'government agents can feasibly claim legitimacy by virtue of their title ("I am a police 
officer upholding the law") and escape with little or no recriminations for action which 
may in fact be violent. And this is made acceptable because the agent using violence 
(illegitimate force) is violating the right to stable expectations of orderly interpersonal 
relations [action which may gain her rough handling followed by a penalty or 
incarceration (or as we will see in chapter 5 from Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
testimony, even torture or loss of life)]. For the same action, one agent escapes "Scott 
free" and the other is punished or may even forfeit life. 
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The definition of "violence" as illegal use of force and the idea advanced by Sidney Hook 
(in Ogle 1950:115), that power "which has legal sanction and which expresses itself in the 
imposition of physical constraint as well as in the use of less conspicuous but more 
effective social pressures, such as discriminatory economic, cultural and administrative 
measures, should not be considered violence" provides important supports for a basically 
conservative interpretation of a political morality. They allow the defender of established 
institutions to claim that the use of force by officials of the state is justified, while the use 
of force by others is illegitimate, and hence not justifiable. However this moral argument 
is made valid simply by narrowing the definition of the term "violence" and begs 
important questions about its proper definition. I will use the examples below to unpack 
the components of violent action, and to determine which actions look violent but are 
not, and which actions look legitimate, but are illegitimate. In order to do so, it will be 
useful to not only examine the particular actions, but the moral assumptions behind the 
actions. I will begin by constructing a picture of society in which a range of actions take 
place. In chapter one, de Jouvenel, Foucault, Airaksinen and Mann present a view of 
society where violence is an inevitable part of daily lives: 
Recall how de Jouvenel (1945:95) foreshadows Foucault in his analysis of command and 
the state apparatus. He announces that the "spectacle presented by modern society is that 
of an immense state apparatus--a veritable complex of moral and material controls by 
which individual actions are conditioned and around which private lives take shape." We 
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see (through the work of Foucault) how implicit violence is used as a tool, a means to the 
political end of maintaining structures to normalise and thereby control citizens. He 
views this orderly structure as a mask for the implicitly violent and dominating coercive 
apparatus to which we are all subjected. The former view locates power at the top of an 
imaginary societal pyramid, while the latter locates countless sites within power relations 
--neither view offers any chance of escape from an oppressive power structure. 
Airaksinen's analysis only serves to confirm this view. He argues that although the topic 
of coercion, power and violence is not a pleasant one, it is unavoidable in the present 
world and examines typical interactions within legitimate and illegitimate structures. He 
is particularly interested in how this effects human action, and examines street violence, 
organised crime, terrorism, guerilla warfare, sectarian vendettas, state fascism, war and 
"legitimate" threats issued by "just" states. On Airaksinen's analysis, coercion is 
unavoidable. The whole structure of a formal coercive institution is typically based on the 
idea that any social order has the right to protect its members and to guarantee its own 
continued existence as a necessary condition of the well being of citizens: "The 
normative characteristics of society and the social order are the most necessary general 
elements of the argument a rational coercive agent needs." (Airaksinen 1988:108) "Now 
the ultimate question is this: Who are the state agents who wield its power and how can 
they justify what they are doing? If one cannot understand these agents rational 
motivation, the state itself cannot be just and justified." (1988: viii) 
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We are left with the context for human action that is bleak, violent and unavoidable, but 
one that stands in need of justification. It becomes hardly surprising that while 
undertaking all of this violent activity, agents attempt to legitimate their actions. But are 
we correct in accepting the view of the three theorists? Is any of the legitimate action, 
violence? 
We can usefully explore the idea this way: Theorists in chapter one, fleshed out a bleak 
landscape depicting power relations between a host of agents. If it were possible to 
arrive at a certain point and take a vertical slice through the landscape of social power 
relations depicted above we might plausibly find a range of actions which are 
representative. We might see political actors using ideologies of violence which are 
instrumental in accomplishing their general aims (take as an example the apartheid regime 
in South Africa). This helps to make sense of the ways in which definitions of violence 
are manipulated by political actors, where violence is not attributed to state agents who 
only act to maintain social order, but to those non-state agents (in this example, usually 
black South African citizens) who seek to disrupt that order. In exactly the same way, 
the Nazi persecution of Jewish citizens fits the same pattern--ideologists tend to 
manipulate these definitions in accordance with their broader political aims. Here, 
defenders of constitutional authority deliberately use restrictive definitions of violence so 
that their actions based on moral assumptions of racial supremacy can be justified. We 
have little trouble in seeing that the Nazi and Apartheid South African claim to supremacy 
is morally wrong, and the actions which follow (imprisonment, torture and death of large 
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numbers of black South Africans at the hands of the white apartheid regime) are violent 
and can never be justified. It is clear that at least causing harm and suffering is prima 
facie wrong and that any causing of suffering must require a heavy justification. This 
leaves government agents who argue for any alternative and theorists who support them, 
with the burden of proof. 
An act of violence in the Nazi and South African case is more than just action, it is also 
representational and what it represents is falsity and error. In the previous South 
African example, (in an imposed division based on the colour line) those who are not 
white Aryans, are not persons. They are not persons, therefore they are not entitled to 
dignity and respect, they are not entitled to human rights [a point I will shortly clarify]. 
Treatment of them is not subject to moral scrutiny. Violence in this case objectifies the 
person creating the false status distinction between self and other and the very act of 
violating denies personal agency. When theorists argue for necessary connections 
between power and violence (and I have shown in chapter one, that this is a view which 
has informed the philosophical landscape) they are failing to notice the important 
representational character of violent action. This will require a detailed explanation 
below: 
In the domain of action, if we are to interpret other agents, we must assign both content 
to their beliefs or intentions, and meaning to their actions (there is no explanation for 
what the actor is doing or what the effects of his actions are unless we represent them 
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with meaning). Remaining with the apartheid example, the white policeman is an agent in 
relation and in order to extract meaning from his actions we must consider the context of 
the action which includes the speaker, the hearer and also aspects of the speaker's 
intentions. Again, we are not considering the agent in glorious isolation, but the agent 
involved in discourse. His intentions are to produce certain effects in his hearers. In this 
respect, I am interested in the fact that the action is undertaken with an audience in mind 
and the audience is meant to extract a lesson from the actions (sometimes the audience is 
just the person to whom the action is directed, say in the case of child abuse or spouse 
abuse. In this case the action often occurs in a private context and carries the 
accompanying message: "you are worthless." In the apartheid example, the audience is 
located in the public domain). The important feature to note with respect to the 
apartheid policeman's violent action is the ideology of supremacy, and demonstrated in 
this subtle aspect of coercive action is the fact that what violence represents is erroneous: 
It's one thing to use explicit threats and say "See what I can do to you if you rebel," (with 
the intention of following the threat with violent action if required) but quite another to 
say "See what makes us different?" I will use another example of the colour line to spell 
this out. Consider Example 1 - The Playground Parent: 
It is the North American deep south in the late 1950's. The new public 
playground looks inviting with it's colourful state-of-the-art play equipment set 
out on the lush green grass which has been groomed to define a beautifully 
geometric border. It's a hot day and the new water fountain receives constant 
attention from the children playing happily behind the large security gates. The 
sign on the gate displays the message: "White children only." A small African 
American boy hangs onto the gate and looks longingly at the water fountain and 
the children playing happily inside. A parent arrives to pick up his child. He 
pushes the boy aside: "Go home. You don't belong here. Can't you read? White 
children only." The boy, totally humiliated, picks himself up and returns home. 
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Across the street an upturned rubbish bin on a patch of dirt provides a target for a 
ball game which is underway involving a few of his friends. 
What meaning can be extracted from the actions of the parent? If a speaker's meaning is 
explained in terms of certain propositional attitudes, namely the speaker's intentions to 
produce certain effects in the hearer, then the nonlinguistic action together with the 
words: "You don't belong here. Cant you read? White children only" (call this [a]) 
provide a litany of evidence for the claim that the action is violent and what it represents 
is (1.) false and (2.) morally wrong for the following reason: Interpreting the parent 
means making the best possible sense of the parent. This means assigning meaning so as 
to maximise the overall coherence and rationality of the parent's utterances, including 
nonverbal "utterances" or semiotic actions, as well as the implicatures of those utterances 
and actions. The parent wants the African American child to take away the following 
message from the encounter: 
Black children and white children are different in more ways than external skin 
colour signifies. Black children are inferior to white children. They are not good 
enough; they are not entitled to play on the same nice playground equipment. If it is 
a hot day, they shouldn't expect to have cool water to drink like white children do. 
White children are persons and should be treated with respect. Black children are 
not persons. They do not have dignity and they do not have feelings. 
The parent's claim can be evaluated as true or false. But, what the parent is saying is true 
if and only if black children are inferior to white children. This in turn presupposes the 
truth of the following: the white child is a person, and every person deserves to be 
treated in a way that reflects equality, protects dignity, natural rights and so on; but the 
black child is not entitled to such treatment... so the black child is not a person. The 
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ideology is very neat and the whole package with all of its lessons can be folded down 
into the following tidy sentence: "White agents are persons and black agents are not 
persons." These beliefs drive intentions and these intentions result in actions in the public 
domain. We can now see both how the actions in question are representational and that 
the actions represent something totally false. The sentences the actors assert are false 
and the actions which result are violent (they result in suffering and harm, they deny 
personhood) and are morally wrong. I will offer below, two more examples in order to 
clearly identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for violent actions. They are both 
police scenarios. The first is a straightforward case and the second, a difficult, fuzzy 
case: 
Example 2 - Police Case I: 
A policeman from `Vlaak Plas" [`the farm'] loads his weapons and sets off on a mission 
to murder as many dissidents as possible on that week's political hit list. Lists like this 
are constructed based on information from informants, or comprise individuals known to 
police as leaders of "dangerous liberation groups." Testimony by unit members at 
Amnesty Hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [to be examined in 
chapter five] paint a picture of motive for such action--the agent is filled with a sense of 
national duty and complete hatred for black Africans, whom they often called animals. 
Vlaak Plas, operating under the apartheid regime comprised a unit of mostly white Afrikaner policeman 
(mostly, because they also utilised the services of Askaris, black South Africans turned informants as a 
trade-off for their lives). Members of this unit were renowned for their specialisation in techniques of 
unspeakable cruelty inflicted on the black citizens. 
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With this motivation, the agent goes to the area where he knows that a number of 
"targets" may be found. He then, with the intention of murdering them, opens fire and 
guns them down where they stand. An analysis to determine whether this action 
constitutes violence will be fairly expedient: Borrowing a quote from Airaksinen 
(1988:62) "The key to action is always the will." 
Now in this first case of police action, the will (or put another way, the intention) of the 
agent is to inflict harm, indeed, to take delight in reducing the black population by a few 
more. There is an object of the action (members on the hit list) and completion of the 
action--this is in fact a real life case and three university students were murdered that 
night. These three conditions are going to be critical to an understanding of what 
constitutes violence. Before concluding the analysis of police case 1, I will compare it 
with police case 2 below: 
The police agent is a member of the Australian Federal Police. She receives an urgent 
message to say that a gunman has laid siege to a Middle East Embassy nearby. The 
hostage-taker sends out an embassy official with a message to say that his "actions 
represent holy liberation against the oppressors," and he subsequently begins to shoot 
hostages. The police agent speaks to the gunman by phone and attempts mediation. The 
gunman is clearly distraught and is not responding rationally. He puts down the phone 
and threatens another hostage. She scales the rear fence, secures an advantage point with 
the gunman in sight. She can see the two hostages motionless on the floor. The police 
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agent, now within audible range of the gunman shouts that he "must put the gun down 
and come out with [(his) hands up, or I will shoot." This threat does nothing to deter the 
gunman. She shoots the gunman who falls (it makes no difference to this example 
whether the gunman is dead or merely superficially injured). Now this example is exactly 
the same as the one above in some respects, but in other critical respects it is completely 
different--and it is this critical difference that determines whether the act is violent, or not 
and in this important respect, whether or not it can be considered legitimate. I will argue 
below that this act is not violent, and therefore can be legitimated. 
Police Case 2 is different from Police Case 1 in the following respect: 
In this second case, the police agent did not set out with the primary motive of intention 
to cause harm but the hostage-taker was hurt in the police action which placed a high 
value on the lives of the hostages. An attempt at mediation demonstrates her intention to 
treat the hostage-taker as a person. The usual mediation line is to recognise that the 
agent at the centre of the conflict is upset, to try a calming intervention in order to 
exercise control, to insist that he stop his present course of action. All of this behaviour 
by the police agent treats the hostage-taker as a rational autonomous being, an equal 
participant in the discourse. The gunman refuses this approach and continues the 
unacceptable behaviour. In order to protect the lives of the hostages, the police agent 
takes the only step left--to immobilise the gunman. 
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However, the two cases are the same in the following way: in each case, there is an agent 
who undertakes the action, there is an object of the action, there is intention to act in a 
certain way and there is completion of the action. Note the danger in examining violence 
on the grounds of the act of physical force alone. Such a narrow analysis runs the risk of 
taking surface similarities to show that the acts are in all relevant senses the same. 
However my claim is that in the all important sense, they are entirely different. By way of 
previewing an extended argument in chapters four and five--if we view violence merely as 
an act of force, one of the most interesting (and crucial) aspects remains occluded. On 
this view it is possible to imagine acts of violence free-floating like strange satellites. 
Airaksinen offers a thought-provoking analysis of threats and coercion, but frames the 
activity in the form of utilities and disutilities--again the sense of separation or orbiting 
actions comes across. The separation I have in mind, is that of the agent from the action. 
When we speak about violence what we are referring to is the violent action of one agent 
against another agent--the act of intentional harm of one person against another person 2 
And it is precisely in this respect that the two cases above are very different. 
In the first case the intention of the agent is to cause harm. Motivated both by a sense of 
duty and a sense of racial hatred, the police agent objectifies the other—this is confirmed 
both by the referrential language "targets to be taken out," "animals"--and the action itself 
which denies personhood, bypasses dignity and respect, seeks out and murders with a 
sense of satisfaction. There is no sense in which this situation can be seen as a conflict 
between fellow citizens with an aim at resolution. But in the second case there is. The 
2 The analysis in chapter 4 will show how this definition also broadens to include all sentient beings. 
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intention of the agent is to resolve the conflict situation. There is a concern to protect 
fellow citizens, whose lives are valued, and an attempt at mediation. Persons are treated 
as rational agents capable of conflict resolution through discourse. When the attempt at 
resolution fails and the agent continues to display irrational behaviour by an attempt to 
further harm hostages, he forfeits his right to be treated in this way. The officer shoots. 
The hostages are taken to hospital, trauma counselling begins. The gunman dies on the 
way to hospital. 
Both cases involve police agents causing critical injury to victims, but the all important 
aspect to note about the scenarios is that in the first, the agent set out to commit 
intentional harm against another person; in the second the agent did not. The gunman 
was hurt—in fact died--but this was not the aim of the action. The officer may later talk 
about "doing her duty," but that duty, captured in her intention was remediation, 
protection and valuing persons. The aspect of intentional harm, as I will argue in chapter 
four is a necessary and sufficient condition for an act to qualify as violent. This reading 
will expand the domain of violence to include not only physical action, but the additional 
two aspects of action--the mental and speech. I will return to the representational aspect 
of violent action below recalling Airaksinen's key points on coercion: 
It is useful to analyse the examples from another perspective: the difference between 
coercion and authority. Airaksinen correctly points out that there is a difference between 
coercion and authority, and that both represent power relations. Building on the work of 
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Raz (1979), he reveals several important facets of coercion and authority and several 
junctures where the distinction become confused: 
It seems to me to be a rather shady proposition to suggest that a mere distinction 
between the desirable and the undesirable uses of power could constitute the 
definitive difference between coercion and authority. For example, the abuse of 
authority is not desirable, but it is not coercion just because of that. Undesirable 
pseudoauthority is not coercion; it is authoritarianism, blind obedience, or the 
manifestation of some kind of personality disorder. Coercion, on the contrary, is an 
understandable form of social interaction. (Ai raks Men 1988:144) 
The Playground Parent example does constitute coercion in the following important way: 
In Example 1, we can search all day long and we won't find anyone with a whip or a gun 
[unlike Examples 2 & 3]; nobody is hitting anybody but very clearly there is harm and 
injury going on. Great suffering is inflicted on the African American child by the white 
parent. In the Foucaultian sense, from this one [un]truth (white agents are persons and 
black agents are not persons) flows enormous systems of [un]truths and the coercive 
apparatus required to sustain them. The actions of the agent and the systems within which 
he operates are coercive, violent and unjustifiable. I have also shown that by virtue of 
being untruths they are erroneous or false and in addition, their complete disregard for 
personhood and focus on injustice makes them morally wrong. 
I am interested in examining Examples 2 and 3 against Airalcsinen's findings on coercion 
and authority, but prior to that analysis it will be useful to pause and take stock: 
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Many theorists writing on power conclude that as individuals, we live in a violent society. 
We are trapped within a coercive structure, where a few who have clawed their way to a 
superior position in society dominate the rest. Social order is maintained by paradigm 
coercers like the police force and the army, who practice the legitimate use of violence to 
maintain order against others who seek to destabilise society through illegitimate violent 
action. The philosophical landscape becomes informed by a range of descriptive accounts 
of power through violence. For the moral or political philosopher, power is legitimate 
when the rules governing it are justifiable according to rationally defensive normative 
principles. There is an attempt at justification of violent action by employing a narrow 
definition of the term. Defenders of established institutions claim that the use of force by 
officials of the state is justified, while the use of force by others is illegitimate and 
unjustifiable... but surely the interpretations of violent action can never be this simple. I 
proposed a litmus test using three realistic examples: 
At first glance example 1 does not look violent at all, but deeper analysis reveals a number 
of hidden issues which relate to violent action. The action of the white playground parent 
looks rational when in fact, it is a mask for coercion of the subtlest and cruelest kind: In 
order to interpret actions we must represent them with meaning. The agent acting intends 
to leave the hearer with a particular message or lesson to be taken from the exchange. 
The intended lesson here is that white agents are persons and black agents are not persons. 
This example demonstrates two important points: (1) That the ideology of violence is not 
only the property of irrational dictators heading up military juntas (2) That violent action 
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is representative and in this case what it represents (an agent can only qualify to run in the 
human race if s/he is white) is clearlyfalse. 
If Example 1 represents the ideology of violence masked, then in Example 2 it is 
unmasked and explicit: We all agree that the action of the white apartheid policeman is 
violent and unjustified when he takes delight in shooting as many black civilians as 
possible. This example illustrates the danger of adopting an unquestioning approach to 
stipulating as legitimate the actions of state authorities and narrowing the definition of 
"violence" until it applies only to non-state agents. This begs important questions about 
its proper definition. If Example 2 warns against the narrowing of definitions, Example 3 
points to the danger in adopting a definition of violence which only refers to physical 
action. Why? Because if we do this then the physical action of the agent in police 
scenario 2 appears the same in every important respect to the physical action in police 
scenario 1: the agent wears a state uniform; caries a weapon; points the weapon at a 
citizen; and the citizen dies. We need an account of violence that respects this moral 
distinction. 
Perhaps a closer look at Airaksinen's account of coercion and authority will point to the 
missing links. Recall that Airaksinen correctly points to the difference between coercion 
and authority, and that both represent power relations. He reveals several important 
facets of coercion and authority and several junctures where the distinction becomes 
confused: 
It seems to me to be a rather shady proposition to suggest that a mere distinction 
between the desirable and the undesirable uses of power could constitute the 
definitive difference between coercion and authority. For example, the abuse of 
authority is not desirable, but it is not coercion just because of that. Undesirable 
pseudoauthority is not coercion; it is authoritarianism, blind obedience, or the 
manifestation of some kind of personality disorder. Coercion, on the contrary, is an 
understandable form of social interaction. (Airaksinen 1988:144) 
I have shown how Example 1 (the playground parent) is masked implicit coercion. On 
Airaksinen's reading this is undesirable and reasonably straightforward. Consider the 
remaining two examples: If we overlay a straightforward interpretation of Airaksinen's 
findings about coercion and authority onto Examples 2 (white apartheid officer) and 3 
(officer with hostage-taker), it is tempting to conclude that example 3 demonstrates 
authority because "Authority does not entail subjective harm, like coercion does." On 
Airaksinen's terms (1988:144) "authority is the same as other-regarding." It looks 
plausible to argue that the agent in example 3, demonstrates a number of desirable 
attributes. She is correctly performing her role as an agent in authority, her intention to 
act is other-regarding but when acting from a position of authority on Airaksinen's view it 
is reasonable to expect that power is exercised because commands are obeyed. The 
gunman in this example does not obey the command to cease his destructive behaviour. 
The police agent withdraws to a fall-back position of threats, and when the behaviour still 
does not change, she realises those threats through force (in turn authorised as legitimate 
action by the formal coercive institution of which she is a member). 
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There seems to be some reasonable grounds on which to argue that in some 
circumstances, a distinction between the two states is not clear. The police agent in 
example 3 does seem to move freely from the position at one end of the spectrum where 
commands are issued as an authority (this is desirable) to a central coercive position with 
the issue of threats (which is still desirable) to the realisation of those threats through the 
action of force (which still appears to be desirable and fair in the given context--the police 
agent after all remains "other regarding" but has simply exhausted all available options). 
Perhaps to be more precise, she has exhausted all available options except one--she could 
refrain from action, let the gunman kill all of the hostages and make another attempt at 
mediation, this time from a different position as the gunman has expended all of his 
bargaining chips. Not only is the desirability of this option deeply counter-intuitive, but if 
we look to Airaksinen-inspired counterfactuals we run the risk of completely bypassing 
what appear to be basic moral explanations of why the police agent would not act in this 
last respect. Airaksinen asks why an agent (from a formal coercive institution like the 
police force or army) would stay in a position that is impossibly demanding. The 
alternative is to abandon responsibilities (that is, to desert the army, or fail to undertake 
required police duties). What happens as a result? Airaksinen argues that as an agent in 
this position we no longer have a frame of reference, the crushing burden of having failed 
to undertake our duty would have disastrous consequences (after all reports would be 
required, superiors would demand to know why I failed to act and allowed the death of 
hostages to result, and so on). "From a formal institution there is no escape route after a 
person has broken the rules central to its functioning." (1998:166) Airaksinen adds: 
I do not think that social philosophy has always seen clearly enough the restricted 
nature of our institutionalized lives and the purposes served by our specialist 
positions. Our commitments, if broken, may leave us without a place to go; at least 
this is true of a number of the most important and demanding cases. (1988:167) 
Against this position, it seems reasonable to expect that the police agent in example 3, 
(minus the motive of intentional harm) would have acted for reasons other than 
institutionally induced fear of failure to do so. And this is where it is important to bring 
the discussion back to acknowledgment of real issues. To understand violence we need to 
bring the satellites of violent action down to earth and to remember that we are talking 
about the action of one person in relation to another person. The police agent in the third 
example did not shoot from a motive to cause harm; she did not shoot from fear of reprisal 
from superiors in the organisation for failing to act; but it is plausible to think she knows 
that shooting innocent victims is prima facie wrong, and ought to be stopped. When 
ought means can she acts from that moral consideration--the value of human life, of 
dignity, the protection of rights. In this case, I would urge a return to Grafstein's 
(1981:456) approach to legitimacy (which I endorse): "Legitimacy should represent the 
evaluation of a regime, the correctness of its procedures, the justification for its decisions 
and the fairness with which it treats its subjects." With consideration of this moral 
framework, the actions of the police agent in example 3 are legitimate, and in example 2, 
they are not. 
One further point before we leave the police examples: In a puzzling twist, Airaksinen 
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states on the one hand that "coercion rests on violence" (1988:43), and in the same 
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discussion "coercion and violence are not one and the same thing. Sometimes they have 
nothing to do with each other." (1988: 62) What seems to be a contradiction, might turn 
out to be plausibly correct. If we allow that the categories of coercion and authority may 
be fluid rather than rigidly fixed (there might be a sliding scale like the one demonstrated 
by example 3), then this leaves an escape hatch for Airaksinen. The type of coercion 
based on intention to harm demonstrated by the police agent in example 2 definitely rests 
on violence. But the type of slide-from-authority-to-coercive-action demonstrated in 
example 3 indeed appears to have nothing to do with violence. But paramount to this 
disentanglement is the intention of the agent undertaking the action--an issue on which 
Airaksinen is silent. 
I will return the reader to my original concern with the narrow definition of violence used 
in an attempt to legitimate the actions of some state agents. From the comparison of these 
examples it can be seen that by distinguishing legitimate force (the action of state agents) 
from illegitimate force (the action of non-state agents), and attaching the term "violence" 
only to illegitimate force so defined, it becomes possible to act within the law, and still 
cause harm to an agent. On this view (and on Weber's view outlined at the beginning of 
--) 
the chapter) it is indeed possible for the police agent in example 2 to exercise power 
through violence legitimately, merely because the police force is considered part of a 
legitimate government (and enough people believe it to be so). 
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I began this chapter by suggesting that Beetham is right to be concerned by the treatment 
of legitimacy as relatively unproblematic. I do not question the legitimacy of government 
as such, but I am deeply concerned by techniques like the selective use of definitions (in 
the sense used above) employed to render opaque morally important issues. To conclude 
this section of the discussion, if we judge legitimacy from rational, objective standards the 
exercise of power through violence can never be legitimate. 
Earlier in the discussion, I referred to the implications stemming from the narrow 
definition which presents a context whereby violence is neither experience of violation nor 
the experience of harmful force, but the experience of "expectations in interpersonal 
relations disrupted by acts of force. Official use of force functions to support a system of 
stable expectations, while the use of violence by those who are not agents of the state 
functions to disrupt such expectations."3 The discourse of legitimacy based on the narrow 
definition of violence deliberately employs the rather vague terms about systems of stable 
expectations. It is a discourse in which persons and the urgent requirements for human 
rights are absent. But in an analytical move that gives a nod of acknowledgment to 
Foucault (and shortly, to Habermas) what we really should be examining is the critical 
factor beneath the smokescreen--that violence is about the action of agents. It is about 
intentional harm toward others. 
3 Underlying this position is the assertion that the use of force is inevitable in human affairs - inevitable 
becomes normal. In this way, agents exercising power through implicit or explicit violence attempt to 
pass these actions of as normal. Power connected to violence becomes the description of a vast majority of 
cases, which leads to a kind of universality. This in turn, takes on a prescriptive life of its own. In 
response to this clearly ethical dilemma, contemporary philosophy is remarkably silent. 
114 
The accuracy of this position, Habermas (1970) would point out, can be verified through 
the expository devise of the ideal speech situation. Following a more detailed look at the 
issue of human rights (below) I support this argument with reference to Habermas' 
discourse model of practical reason by showing that power exercised through violence 
"could not be justified in a general and unrestricted discussion of what, in the light of 
present and possible circumstances, is in the best interests of all affected by them." 
(McCarthy 1978:358) I will support this important philosophical point by reference to 
Hannah Arendt's insights on the relationship between violence, speech, action and 
personal agency. 
The analysis of examples 1 and 2 (playground parent and white South African police 
agent) demonstrates that violence is representational, and I argued that based on the truth 
claims raised, what it represents is falsity and error; it also represents action which is 
morally wrong. (a reminder before proceeding further, that I will bring forward elements 
for use in this discussion that will be argued for at length in chapter 4). I will extend this 
analysis by examining below how respect for persons comes to be excluded from the 
discourse of legitimacy based on the narrow definition of violence, and how a more 
accurate understanding of violence and legitimacy implicates respect for persons. At the 
conclusion of this section, I will return to move the discussion away from Weber's deeply 
internalist stance to the externalist position of what ought to be the case independent of 
possible false beliefs. 
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One way that the claim for the representational status of violence might be reinforced is to 
examine the subject of human rights . But this becomes problematic, as Jay Garfield 
(1996) points out: 
The general duty to respect the rights of others requires justification. Or to look at 
the other side of the coin, the claim that persons have natural rights at all must be 
justified, antecedent to the task which often occupies most of a liberal's attention, 
that of specifying exactly what our duties are. (Garfield 1996:183) 
Garfield in his paper "Human Rights and Compassion: Towards a Unified Moral 
Framework" (1996:183) correctly points out that we cannot simply appeal to a right to 
have one's rights respected, or a duty to do one's duty, on pain of infinite regress. He 
recognises on the one hand that the demand for the recognition of human rights is 
universal in scope; that the culture depriving its citizenry of fundamental human rights is 
morally deficient; and that to demand of a society that it respect some fundamental set of 
rights, is an instance of mandatory moral criticism. On the other hand he acknowledges 
the fundamental importance of a the view that moral life should be grounded in the 
cultivation and exercise of compassion. (1996:172) 
He cites influential moral theorists4 who argue that these two persuasive views appear to 
be fundamentally incompatible with one another: Either the focus on rights and duties 
impoverishes our moral discourse and distorts our moral vision where rather, a morality 
grounded exclusively in compassion and attention to interpersonal relations should prevail; 
4 Baier (1994, 1992), Tronto (1993), Noddings (1984) and Garner (1994), Care (1987), Kohlberg (1981, 
1984) as well as Flanagan and Jackson (1987). 
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or, liberal theories are adequate to a full range of moral questions, and the compassion 
theories to the extent that they are correct are no more than restatements of liberal 
theories (1996:172-173). The deep and seemingly incompatible divide is given concrete 
form by returning to our police agent in example 2: 
The problem can be restated as the incapacity to scrutinise something important about 
action in the public sphere (recall that in example 2, the behaviour of the police agent in 
the public sphere succumbs to the slippery slope effect--the separation of self from other; 
the other as a dangerous enemy set to destabilise society; requiring only a short step to 
eliminate the enemy and an attempt to justify abhorrent acts of violence [explicit examples 
are provided in chapter 5]). Now in an attempt to show police agent 2 the error of his 
ways, we need to identify the problem with the moral dimension of his actions. This 
points to the following difficulty : Pursued from the perspective of liberal theory, this part 
of the moral landscape lies in the private domain, while the actions under examination take 
place in the public domain. 
Garfield correctly highlights the most important limitation of liberal moral discourse: "It is 
in an important sense silent about character." (1996:182) Implied in his work is the fact 
that a discourse grounded in compassion allows moral scrutiny of the intentions and 
actions of the agent as a person operating in the world (incorporating both the public and 
the private spheres). The critical issue raised by Garfield and important to this chapter on 
legitimacy is that our moral sensibilities, even though they are often played out on a more 
public stage, are cultivated in the private domain (1996:184)--and recall my foundational 
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claim: it is the intention of the agent that determines whether an act is violent and 
illegitimate, or whether it is not, 5 and can be legitimised. Garfield argues that regarding 
our moral life in this way allows us to talk about a broad range of choices we make 
regarding morally significant behaviour about which liberalism is silent simply because of 
its focus on rights and duties: "My choice to give or not to give to a beggar or to a 
temple, or my choice to treat my fellows with patience or courtesy, becomes matters--as 
they ought to be--of moral evaluation."(1996:184) The relevance of this can be directly 
seen when we remember that for Grafstein, legitimacy entails action which reflects fair 
treatment of other agents. Whether an agent's action reflects fair treatment of others 
seems to have a great deal to do with the type of person they are and whether they choose 
to undertake violent action or not. From this standpoint Garfield's argument for the 
platform of moral development based on compassion makes a good deal of sense: 
"Children brought up compassionately learn to be compassionate. And it is these children 
who grow to moral maturity by any standards. They are precisely the individuals who 
respect the rights of others and who discharge their duties. Grounding that moral maturity 
in their compassion makes moral development comprehensible." (1996:185) 
On this view, "the same questions can be asked about my behaviour in the home, that can 
be asked about my behaviour in the street" (IBID) and the same questions can be asked 
about my actions undertaken when I have a police uniform on, as are asked when I am out 
of uniform and dealing with my children. So here at last is the crux of the matter about 
5 By this remark, I definitely do not mean that the action because it can be legitimate is therefore 
nonviolent. This will be clearly explored in chapters 3 & 4. 
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violence and legitimacy: My affiliation with a legitimate state institution does not 
legitimate all of my actions. The narrow definition of violence seeks to make the actions 
of state uniform-wearing agents fall outside of the domain of violence by virtue of that 
affiliation regardless of what those actions represent. But this is clearly irrational. 
Garfield's unified theory places the emphasis correctly on reviewing each action of each 
agent on its own merits, and the scope now encompasses actions within the public sphere 
and the private sphere. I will argue in chapter 4 that the moral evaluation of an action will 
justifiably focus on the intention of the agent, and the agent as a person in relation with 
others. 
Here again, Garfield reminds us of the limits of rights in moral discourse: 
Liberal theory, in sum, gets us ... security of thought and conscience, security in 
planning our lives, access to the good ideas and beautiful works of others, and a 
platform for moral criticism - simply by restricting the zone of such criticism to 
the public, and establishing the sanctity of the private. (Garfield 1996:180). 6 
But there is an important respect in which we want the discussion of violence to point to 
the actions and intentions of the agent, and it would not be as meaningful for this example 
to restrict such a discussion to the public domain only 7 Attempting to construct a unified 
moral framework, Garfield undertakes a new approach--he seeks to strengthen liberal 
6 j  am selectively quoting to emphasise a point, but Garfield's extended discussion is fairer to liberalism 
than this implies. 
7 I must be careful here, that I don't open the flood gates. I have stated that this project remains within 
the confines of the public sphere with chosen examples, because to incorporate the issue of power within 
the private sphere would take the discussion much too far afield and well beyond the scope of the project. 
But this is an important single point, so I will pursue it nevertheless. I extend this point on the last page 
of this chapter. 
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theory by pouring a new foundation of compassion at its base level;. Now recall that we 
become decidedly entrenched in moral discourse with the police agent in example 3--her 
actions represent respect for persons and the value of life, she attempts mediation and 
adopts a respectful or compassionate attitude even toward the hostage-taker. There is 
certainly some sense in which we need to discuss compassion and respect in order to 
extract meaning from her actions. But by restricting the discussion to, for example, rights 
and duties (contained in the liberal theoretical discourse) too much becomes morally 
permissible: 
Since, for instance, nobody to whom I have no particular contractual arrangement 
has any right to my generosity, I am in no way obligated to be generous. Since no 
one has a claim on my concern, I need not be concerned for anyone else. 
Compassion is hence, on this view, strictly optional—one of the many permissible 
ways to address the world. (1996:181) 
An important factor to be developed in this project will be a shift away from the moral 
agent in isolation and toward a moral agent in relation with others. Garfield's argument 
is compatible with this view and does not endorse a shift to acknowledge others at our 
own expense, or at the expense of our privacy. He argues that privacy is indeed a good 
which is essential to many kinds of flourishing and that much of what we do in life requires 
the kinds of protection comprised by the general right to privacy "including freedom of 
speech, association, religious practice and so forth." (1996:195) He continues--the 
security that allows us to order our lives, to develop our talents and to express our views, 
deserves protection "and its protection is a matter of primary concern to morality as it is 
articulated in public policy." (IBID) but they are not goods that we should jealously guard 
in isolation. They are goods that a compassionate society grants to its citizens, and that 
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compassion leads us to grant to one another. He notes that the failure to do so is a kind of 
cruelty. 
There is a subtle, but important difference in the privacy supported by compassion, and 
that promoted by a liberal democracy. The latter is a freedom from constraints while the 
former is freedom to pursue ends, to express views and to develop talents--on this view 
our mutual responsibility is fundamental, not our personal rights. Personal rights emerge 
only as goods we extend to one another as a consequence of our concern. (1996:193-195) 
He concludes that "the very rights that liberals properly advance and protect so vigorously 
are reconstructed and protected with equal vigor on a new basis when they are grounded 
not in individual autonomy but rather in collective responsibility." (1996:196) 
This brings me to the point in the discussion where the isolation of the self and the 
objectification of the other become relevant not only to highlight the failed legitimacy of 
violent action in examples 1 and 2, but to relegate the attempts to legitimise the violent 
actions of "just wars" to the same fate. 
In a sense, it would be relatively easy to muster community support for the view that the 
actions of the police agent in example 2 are violent and illegitimate. Perhaps it is a more 
difficult (but nevertheless necessary task) to appeal to rational consensus for the 
legitimacy of the action in example 3. But some would think it impossible to argue against 
the intuitively plausible view of the liberation of oppressed peoples through "just wars" or 
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"organised liberation action." But the illegitimacy and violent nature of this action is in 
fact what will need to be shown for the claim "violent action is neither legitimate, nor a 
legitimator of power" to be established. The requirement for brevity does not allow a 
detailed discussion of a wide range of interesting problem cases, but the principles 
examined in the three chosen examples should suffice for a broad application. I will argue 
below that with regard to "just wars," "freedom fighters" and "liberationists," the problem 
is not with the cause. Releasing the suffering from oppression is indeed a noble sentiment 
and should rightly be pursued, but the problem is and always will be with the 
methodology. The methodology refers to the action of the agent whether s/he is a 
uniformed police officer or a heroic liberation fighter. The agent is still, and always will 
be, a person acting in relation with other person/s. 
Consider example 4: 
Dictator Fred heads up a cruel military junta. Dictator Fred and his cronies enjoy life to 
the full by virtue of the fact that through a reign of terror the citizens are made to slave 
night and day to produce all of the commodities to satisfy the needs of the junta. The 
needs of the citizens are entirely neglected. Many die of starvation; others are beaten 
cruelly to maintain the work output. The Oatlands Liberation Army comes to hear about 
this situation. They determine that the actions of Dictator Fred and his cronies, are 
abhorrent, immoral and intolerable and must be stopped immediately. It would be fairly 
safe to say that most readers would agree with this verdict. The heroes decide to do what 
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they do best, and undertake to liberate the citizens from unthinkable oppression. With no 
further ado, the Oatlands Liberation Army acting on sound military intelligence arrive 
under the cover of dark at the hall where a banquet (in honour of the wedding of Dictator 
Fred's daughter) is underway. Dictator Fred and his cronies are inside. Utilising the best 
in modern warfare technology the Oatlands Liberation Army within only a matter of 
minutes, successfully achieves its goal. Not one member of the cruel regime remains alive. 
Many readers may urge that this action is both just and justified. But there are two 
particular issues about which I would like the reader to become concerned: 
First, an agent who uses violence to redress grievances or to further a moral cause will 
necessarily end up copying the enemy, and sanctioning as right those aspects which only 
moments before were considered morally wrong, intolerable and abhorrent [call this 
conclusion (a)]. What we see here, is a different spin placed on the same result from 
example 2--"I am using violence legally, and you are using violence illegally"--in order to 
gain a different ruling from exactly the same action of violence and cruelty (this is what 
Hocking 1958, calls "double-morality"). In the same way that the uniform of the police 
officer from a legitimate institution did not entitle him to extend the claim for legitimacy to 
his actions; neither does the banner of a "just or legitimate cause" entitle the Oatlands 
Liberation Army (OLA) to extend the claim for legitimacy to its actions. The OLA might 
argue that any action pursuant of a just end will itself be just. This turns out to be false. 
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The second issue of importance to this example is again, the (false) moral distinction 
between self and other--where the other is the enemy. Opposed to Garfield's idea above 
with regard to a sense of "mutual responsibility," and respect for persons (and all persons, 
required in virtue of the attributes that make each of us a person) the Oatlands Liberation 
Army demonises Fred and his cronies and views them as the enemy. The fundamental 
problem with this view is that the OLA is required to distinguish morally between the 
violent acts of friends and the violent acts of enemies. The aim then becomes not to 
determine in the abstract which acts are morally praiseworthy and which ones are 
blameworthy, but to justify acts of violence committed by friends and condemn acts of 
violence committed by enemies. Further, if this is to be effective, it must be accomplished 
while appearing to use universal moral standards. It is hard to see how the requisite 
distinctions can be drawn in a principled manner. 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to take stock. Chapter one reveals that the 
contemporary philosophical landscape has been informed by a descriptive analysis of the 
violent exercise of power. The agent is faced with two unsatisfactory choices--either 
exercise power through violence (and participate in the moral landscape that this entails) 
or reject violence and remain powerless. This chapter argues that violent action is also 
representational, and what it represents is false or erroneous and morally wrong. On these 
terms, violence can never be legitimate, nor a legitimator of power. But some action, 
while appearing to be violent, is not in fact violent and can be legitimised. 
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There are many attempts to justify and legitimate violent action: by narrowing the 
definition of violence to confer legitimacy to actions of state agents, ruling as violent, 
illegal and illegitimate actions of non-state agents, by conflating means and ends and 
seeking to legitimise violent actions by virtue of pursuing just ends; by constructing a 
barrier between self and other which effectively objectifies and demonises the other and 
rules the other outside of moral consideration. Many of these views present a picture of 
the agent in glorious isolation staunchly defending or protecting her rights. But this view 
is skewed, which leads to the final point: If we are interested in the actions of the agent, it 
doesn't make sense to talk about actions in glorious isolation; in a vacuum so to speak. 
This point is emphasised with great clarity by the Xhosa proverb: "People are people 
through other people." It is this important aspect of human plurality, or moral agents in 
relation that motivates Garfield's paper and calls for mutual responsibility and actions 
driven by compassion. The views of Hannah Arendt (1958) lend weight to this position 
and her insights on discourse along with those of Habermas (1970) will provide the final 
move required to complete this chapter. Weber's view (legitimacy is "belief in 
legitimacy") becomes problematic (just because a group of Nazis believed in the genocide 
of Jews doesn't make it legitimate or morally right)--and is deeply intemalist. The work 
left to this chapter is to briefly examine the way in which discourse ethics can provide a 
view of how we ought to act; this will allow us to reach an extemalist framework. 
Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition (1958) argues that speech and action are the 
modes in which human beings appear to each other, not as physical objects, but qua 
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persons. (1958:176) Speech corresponds to the "actualisation of the human condition of 
plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals." (1958:178) 
This insight lends important weight to Grafstein's work on legitimacy and Garfield's work 
on morality as mutual responsibility. Taken together, and mindful of our three examples it 
is possible to show why the discourse of legitimacy implicates respect for persons as 
members of a community of subjects in dialogue. Consider HaberMas below: 
What Habermas (1970) calls "communicative ethics" is grounded in the "fundamental 
norms of rational speech." (McCarthy 1978:325) Communication that is oriented toward 
reaching understanding inevitably involves the reciprocal raising and recognition of 
validity claims. The important aspect of Habermas' work for this project is that claims to 
truth and rightness, if radically challenged, can be redeemed only through argumentative 
discourse leading to rationally motivated consensus: 
Universal pragmatic analysis of the conditions of discourse and rational consensus 
show these to rest on the supposition of an "ideal speech situation" characterized by 
an effective equality of chances to assume dialogue roles. (McCarthy 1978:326) 
In Habermas' discourse model we see the shift in frames of reference from the solitary 
reflecting moral consciousness (found in Kantian ethics) to the community of subjects in 
dialogue. Against Kantian ethics, Habermas argues that the rationality and universality of 
maxims of action cannot be decided monologically--within the horizon of the solitary, 
reflecting moral consciousness. Whether a norm is universalizable, capable of rational 
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consensus (ie legitimated), can be ascertained only dialogically in unrestricted and 
unrestrained discourse. McCarthy argues that from this point of view, Haberrnas' 
discourse model represents a procedural reinterpretation of Kant's categorical imperative: 
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, 
I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claim to 
universality (we can see how problematic this idea will be for the playground parent and 
the white Afrikaner police agent in examples 1 and 2--we can reasonably expect that in the 
ideal speech situation, not only black Africans (and African Americans) but many others 
would have something to say about his claims to the truth and his attempt to legitimise his 
actions). The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a 
general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm. 
The ideal speech situation defines how we ought to act, as partners in dialogue. And this 
is why respect for persons is implicated in the discourse of legitimacy: the way we ought 
to act with partners in dialogue is to respect their points of view and their equal status. 
My actions, to be legitimate need to "treat the other fairly" (Grafstein), where "speech and 
action are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not as physical objects, 
but qua persons... equals" (Arendt, 1958:176) where we recognise and put into practice 
compassion and mutual responsibility entailing respect (Garfield); where the principle is 
open to all participants when problems of understanding arise (Habermas). 
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And this composite picture of legitimacy shows how the agent acting violently is involved 
in a performative contradiction when she attempts to legitimate that action: On the one 
hand she says "As a fellow human being your interests are important to me" and at the 
same time, her violent action represents the complete opposite: "Your interests are not 
important to me. In fact, I don't believe you are entitled to interests because you are not a 
person. I can treat you in any way I wish and my actions do not warrant moral scrutiny. 
Because you are an object, I feel no compulsion to treat you with dignity and respect. 
You are merely instrumental in assisting me to achieve my ends, and in the same way that 
I can smash a cup when it is no longer of use, I can smash you." In objectifying the 
person and seeing him/her as a fit target for violent action the agent denies personhood, 
while at the same time entering into a dialogue which necessarily demands personhood. 
If, from the preceding arguments, it is plausible to conclude that violence is not legitimate; 
and further, that illegitimacy will not do the work required of a good general theory of 
power, where does this leave the agent in the moral landscape? I will argue in following 
chapters that it is possible to exercise power in other than violent ways, and that this 
nonviolent action is both representative and legitimate. The building blocks for this new 
metaphysics will be contained in the next chapter. Before making a fresh start, I would 
like to conclude this chapter with a response to two further anticipated objections: 
128 
I. I am only dealing with aspects of political or state power. You can't extrapolate 
out and make conclusions which are relevant for all aspects of power relations in 
the private as well as the public domain. 
The scope of this dissertation cannot possibly hope to include all of the important issues 
across both the public and private domains. In order to argue to a satisfactory conclusion, 
I have set the parameters of the problem to focus on the individual as a citizen in the 
public domain. 8 Recall the questions I have raised so far: Do the majority of theories of 
power which inform the philosophical landscape implicate violence? Can power in this 
sense be legitimate? Does this tell the whole story about power? Which aspect is 
missing? Given this consideration what should an alternative metaphysics of power look 
like?. All of these can in principle be answered from evidence in the public domain. I 
recognise the limitations incurred by drawing such a boundary, and particularly that many 
feminist philosophers argue that important areas of morality fall outside the boundary. 
The distinction recognised between the concept of justice (in the public domain) and care 
(in the private domain) will be partly addressed in Chapter Four with the discussion on 
nonviolent action as compassionate and "other-directed" . In one sense this chapter has 
touched on some of the important areas of morality: Habermas through the ideal speech 
situation defines how we ought to act as partners in dialogue and this is why respect for 
persons is implicated in the discourse of legitimacy. Arendt reinforces this point: "Speech 
8 But at the same time, I have incorporated a side discussion on Garfield's (1996) work to show how 
compassion crosses the boundary between the public and private spheres. This will play an important role 
in the development of a new metaphysics of nonviolence which leans heavily on the work of S. Rinpoche, 
and the core of Buddhist action theory built around the principle of compassion. 
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and action are the modes in which human beings appear to each other not as physical 
objects, but qua persons...equals." (1958:176) And I have also referred to Garfield's 
(1996) work on compassionate action entailing mutual respect. These concepts will be 
further developed in Chapter Four. Here, the concept of fusion philosophy will provide a 
blend of Western philosophical thought (including nonviolence, justice and reconciliation 
proposed by King, Mandela, Tutu and Boraine) with philosophical insights 
(interdependence, tolerance, compassion and truth insistence) from Gandhi and socially 
engaged Buddhists like the Dalai Lama, S. Rinpoche, Naht Hanh, Sivaraksa and Suu Kyi. 
Moreover, while "power" is often a word that political analysts use, I am not simply 
writing about government. Modern theorists like Lukes (1974), and Isaac (1987), claim 
that we use ascriptions of power to fix the responsibility of actions and their outcomes. 
Ascriptions of power are ascriptions of responsibility. As Isaac puts it, "to locate the 
sources of power in society is to locate the enablements and constraints that operate on all 
of us...to locate power is to fix moral responsibility." (Isaac 1987:5). But why is this so? 
Simply because power is an ability or capacity concept (Emmett, 1954:19-20; Morriss, 
1987:480. That is, to impute power to someone (or even to some thing) is tantamount to 
saying that that person (or thing) has the ability or capacity to cause results or outcomes 
or effects that affect the existence and/or interests of those things or persons. A powerful 
storm or earthquake, for example, is one that has the capacity for causing widespread 
destruction. But storms and earthquakes, unlike political agents, cannot form intentions 
or act according to some purpose or design. And while natural disasters can certainly 
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affect the interests of human beings, we do not hold them morally responsible or culpable 
for their actions since, strictly speaking, they do not act at all; they just happen. They are 
causally effective but not morally responsible. It is of course, quite a different matter with 
moral and political agents or agencies. They, unlike storms or earthquakes, have a 
repertoire of peculiarly human powers or capacities: the power to reason, to reflect, to 
communicate, to foresee (some) results of their actions and practices, to understand and 
assess the consequences, and to alter their actions or practices in light of those 
understandings or assessments. (Ball, 1995:549) While I have chosen paradigm cases 
from the political or public arena, I am less interested in governments as such, and more 
interested in the individual as a moral citizen in the public domain. 
2. . All power is not about violence and domination. Consider persuasion and the 
"power to" as opposed to "power over" 
The short answer to this objection is that the body of work on power does implicate 
violence. It may not all be explicit, but implicit violence also counts . In fact it is an 
aspect which should concern us even more, because it is quietly working away in the 
background (see chapter one for a fill discussion of this point, with specific reference to 
Airaksinen and Foucault). In Chapter Six I will show that some theorists do provide an 
analysis of the exercise of power which does move beyond coercion. Thomas Wartenberg 
(1990) in Forms of Power, considers the " dynamic" conception of power but concludes 
that even the "power to" is built on systems of domination. (Wartenberg 1990:221) For 
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the sake of brevity, I will respond to this charge by considering the positive framework for 
the exercise of power provided by Terence Ball. 
The optimism offered by Ball (1995:551) in his analysis of power is refreshing. He wants 
us to realise that power is not just about domination, coercion force and violence (power 
over) but is equally about the enabling aspect of "power to." He frowns on Lukes for his 
reluctancy to include locutions like "the power to persuade" or the "power to benefit 
another" and accuses him of failing to recognise the good that power can do through the 
exercise of influence and the like. All of this seems fine until he cites his surprising 
Presidential example to illustrate one of his key points: 
...political analysts are more apt to speak about political actors' power to 
do things than their power over someone. Few can doubt, for example that 
the American President is a powerful political actor. And yet, as Richard 
Neustdt observes 'presidential power' is pre-eminently the 'power to 
persuade', adding that 'persuasion is a two-way street' and that the 'power 
to persuade is the power to bargain.' (Neustadt, 1964:41, 44-5) (Ball, 
1995:551) 
Ball appears to completely miss the point that in his Presidential example such persuasions 
are the smiling theatrical front which rests solely on the backstage crew of violence, force, 
sanctions, threats and coercion. I will show in the following chapters how the action 
theoretic framework for the exercise of power through nonviolence does demonstrate the 
enabling and legitimate exercise of power. In order to reach this stage of the discussion, it 
will be necessary to consider how nonviolence as a topic for philosophical discussion has 
been excluded from philosophical discourse. I will show in the following chapters how 
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one may take the inherited categories of exclusion (Western nonviolence and the insights 
of non-Western philosophers) and turn them into critical categories of inclusion. 
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Chapter Three 
- Changing the Campaign Strategy - 
(or why nonviolence as a candidate for power needs a new theoretical base) 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the current body of work on power should be 
viewed as inadequate when it only offers a range of accounts implicating violence 
(coercion, threats, force and so on). An analysis which shows that violence cannot be 
legitimate fuels even deeper concern. It would appear that the individual is left facing two 
rather unsatisfactory choices: either pursue power through violent means, or don't, and 
remain powerless. For some, this situation will be deeply counter-intuitive requiring an 
alternative solution. The nature of this dilemma and the problems it poses, warrants a 
more detailed explanation before moving on. So what makes the two alternative choices 
unsatisfactory to the individual in the above account? 
This chapter will point to a number of moral principles which are either specifically stated 
or implied within the current body of work on nonviolence. At the centre of pacifist 
thought lies the moral principle that violence is wrong. On A.J Muste's terms (in Ryan 
1996:8): "Violence itself is an evil, a poison which corrupts whatever it touches." On this 
view, to pursue power which necessarily implicates violence, would be out of- the 
question. We could reasonably expect that any individual who participates in daily power 
relations, who intends to fulfil his/her potential, to pursue happiness, to instigate change 
and to live a meaningful life would at the very least be dissatisfied with the option of 
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remaining powerless. We could imagine the situation in which some individuals might 
genuinely fail to see a problem (moral or otherwise) with pursuing power through violence 
(I will refer to these as the "gun-slinging, bandit-slaying" types). On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that many will (a) sympathise with Muste's view (b) may in addition 
view violence (and therefore power pursued in this way) as illegitimate but (c) observe the 
very real connections between power and material well-being or power and safety and 
pursue action based on the following reasoning: Were there any other alternative, I would 
not participate in a way that implicates violence, coercion or control. But my safety and 
material wellbeing and that of my family come first, and even though my position is 
compromised I will knowingly take the lesser of two evils. The dilemma is that this 
response does appear to be rational, even reasonable, but if we accept an analysis of 
power based on violence, it is still the morally wrong choice. Any alternative metaphysics 
of power will need to provide a satisfactory response to this more difficult position. I'll 
call those who adopt this position the "sensible" group. 
It will become clear that the current body of work on nonviolence does not satisfactorily 
answer the sensible group. In proposing an alternative metaphysics of power based on 
nonviolence, I am not proposing that we simply abandon the theories of power based on 
violence and change boats mid stream, adopting the current body of work on nonviolence. 
To do so, would be leaping out of a boat full of holes, so to speak, merely into another in 
a similar condition; these limitations will be examined below. The previous chapters have 
demonstrated the need for nonviolence to share the domain of power. The purpose of this 
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chapter is to draw a range of insights from the current body of work on nonviolence; to 
identify the problematic or puzzling areas, before developing a metaphysics with a 
different theoretical base. We will see that the current body of work on nonviolence 
contains three principal elements: protoarguments that look incomplete (but are capable 
of being built upon); bad arguments that are an inadequate basis for a theory of 
nonviolence; and important challenges to nonviolence that should be considered before 
progressing further. The challengers will begin to ask questions relevant to the sensible 
group, but will fail to provide answers. 
A literature search on nonviolence will also produce the following concerns: the current 
literature predominantly relates to Western nonviolence, reflecting a theistic foundation 
and thereby excluding a large group of people who do not share this perspective. More 
specifically, it is often presented in the form of a chronological series of nonviolent actions 
from a 300 year period of North American history. This demonstrates a particular 
weakness in the literature comprising the body of knowledge on nonviolence to date: It is 
difficult, if not impossible to comprehend a theoretical base for nonviolence when people 
confuse the "telling of a good story" with nonviolence theory. And it is implausible that a 
viable theory of nonviolence might stem from a foundation reflecting only a 300 year 
North American perspective. Discussions structured in this way often fall into the trap of 
providing an entertaining and captivating view of nonviolence activists from the Quakers 
through to the contemporary anti-nuclear movement at the expense of a theoretical 
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account'; but entertainment is not a substitute for an answer to serious challengers of 
nonviolence theory. 
Of the eight to ten major works that appear to comprise such a history of nonviolence, 
each brings with it a set of accounts to support underlying conclusions. Some (while they 
are great stories) are of no theoretical interest, but others are. My aim in the first section 
of this chapter is to focus on those which generate enough controversy for there to have 
been an attempt at justification. I intend to review the ideas of the Quaker movement and 
individuals like Henry D. Thoreau, William James, Elihu Burritt, Reinhold Niebuhr and 
A.J Muste in this regard. From this assessment I will highlight protoarguments that while 
incomplete, are capable of being built upon. Before beginning, it is important to restate 
that while I will use a documentary style narrative to highlight important events and 
contexts relating to the emergence of nonviolence ideals, and from these, explore the 
beginnings of good theoretical arguments. I do not endorse the mere compilation of 
historical accounts as a substitute for a good theoretical foundation. 
Quaker Ideals 
Before the Revolution of 1776, nonviolence was peculiarly identified with members of the 
Society of Friends, also known as `Quakers' 2 . It is noted that there were other pacifist 
Examples might include S & A Lynd, Nonviolence in America 1995, and J. Fahey & R. Armstrong A 
Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non - Violence and World Order, 1992. I am 
particularly indebted to the insights of Prof. JL Garfield and grateful for lively discussion regarding the 
distinction between good stories and good theory. 
2 This paper cannot possibly hope to do justice to the history of the Society of Friends. The best that can 
be hoped for is to make observations from research and draw inference to theory. It should be noted that 
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sects (John Woolman recorded in his Journal the case of a Mennonite who slept in the 
woods rather than receive hospitality from a slaveholder), but the Quakers were more 
numerous, and being English, they were more in touch with the English majority in the 
colonies than Continental pietists could hope to be. The Quakers, moreover, insisted 
stubbornly on defying what Roger Williams called "that body-killing, soule-killing, and 
State-killing doctrine of not permitting, but persecuting all other consciences and wayes of 
worship..." (Williams 1866:328) (an underlying belief which characterises the Quaker 
movement, is to seek the divine manifestation in everyone, leading inevitably to the 
conclusion that persecution of others cannot be tolerated). 
When Quakerism began in the middle of the Seventeenth Century, England was in a state 
of political and religious turmoil that left many feeling that they no longer knew where 
they might find the truth by which to live. They had come to trust the outward authority 
of neither state nor church. Ritual had lost its meaning and creeds their relevance. A 
gap had opened up between profession and practice. 
The appearance of George Fox had a catalytic effect upon those who were called 
"Seekers." Under this name were grouped those who were dissatisfied with the religious 
sects of their day and who were awaiting expectantly new light and guidance. George 
Fox crystallised for them what many had felt but could not formulate. Seekers became 
the underlying beliefs of the Quakers went through a process of Reformation and development which 
began in 1748 and that this has been taken into consideration prior to comment. 
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finders'. For Fox himself the revelation came when he discovered that the answer to his 
searching lay, not in priests or professors, but in the discovery of an inward voice which 
said, "There is one, even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition." For Fox this was 
a rediscovery of what he felt had happened to the first Christians, who went out filled 
with the Holy Spirit. He used metaphors of "seed" and "light" to communicate his 
experience. The light of Christ was within the heart of every human being: it was 
universal (we must be constantly mindful that Quakers, for all intents and purposes 
carrying the legacy of nonviolence, do so within this strongly theological framework). 
This theological framework will present as a limitation to a theory of nonviolence with 
global application. 4 On Pendle Hill in Yorkshire Fox had a vision of "a great people to 
be gathered." "He saw people," said William Penn, "as thick as motes in the sun, that 
should in time be brought to the Lord, that there might be but one shepherd and one 
sheepfold in all the earth." (Oats 1985:4) The vision, it has been said, caught on like a 
brushfire; Indeed, fired by Fox's assurance, the early Quakers made a profound 
3 The original name by which the followers of George Fox were known as early as 1652 was "Friends in 
the Truth". They did not look upon themselves as a separate sect. The term "Quaker" was a nickname, 
coined as the result of a courtroom rejoinder by Fox to the judge, Gervase Bennett, who was examining 
him on a charge of blasphemy. Fox said that justice Bennett "first called us Quakers because we bid them 
tremble at the word of God, and this was in the year 1650". The term 'Society of Friends' began to be 
used towards the end of the Eighteenth Century. Until the end of the Eighteenth Century the term 'People 
called Quakers' was in general use. The full descriptive term used now is 'The Religious Society of 
Friends (Quakers)'. [J. Nickalls, (ed.) The Journal of George Fox p.58. 
4 It will also become apparent that this framework is maintained by heavily coercive tactics. Again, while 
this may be perfectly reasonable to the group in question, it is possible to imagine objections to a global 
theory of nonviolence where individuals undertake nonviolent actions as a result of punishment for failing 
to do so. 
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impression on many thousands of people as they spread their message through the 
villages and towns of England with something of a revolutionary ecstasy. 
Puritan and Anglican alike, seeing their authority threatened, reacted with persecution 
and imprisonment. Thousands of Quakers, men and women, were imprisoned and many 
died in dungeons. The violence of the reaction of church and civil authorities was largely 
the result of the Quakers' determination to translate their vision into practice in their 
daily lives. They were nothing if not thorough in their attempt to make practice cohere 
with principle. The core of that vision was that God was present in every human being, 
that thereby, direct communion between God and man was possible without the 
intervention of a priest, that the knowledge of this presence and a turning to this light of 
Christ in the heart could transform one's life and indeed could so transform a community. 
In the context of the religious outlook of the seventeenth century, George Fox's 
proclamation that "Christ has come to teach his people himself' was seen as blasphemy. 
To the onlooker the Quaker presented a negative and therefore a threatening image--no 
priest, no liturgy, no sacrament (and therefore no baptism), no creed. 
To the Quaker each of these negatives was the result of a positive affirmation: no priest, 
because all believers were priests and could commune direct in the heart with the Holy 
Spirit; no liturgy, because to worship was to listen in silence to the voice of God within--a 
spontaneous, not a predetermined, prepared, other-person-directed activity; no 
sacrament, because the whole of life was sacramental, and therefore no day, nor act, nor 
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moment should be separated from its potential for revealing the presence of God; no 
baptism with water but baptism with the Holy Spirit, for all were birthright children of 
God; no creed, because truth cannot be confined within the limits of any fixed man-made 
form of words [Here we begin to see the foundations of a belief in "truth" which was to 
drive their nonviolent actions. The meaning of truth for Quakers however will require 
detailed explication and will be dealt with further in the chapter. 
John Wilhelm Rowntree summed up the positive basis of the Quaker reliance on the reality 
of the inward experience and not on the outward form or symbol: 
To the soul that feeds upon the bread of life the outward conventions of religion are 
no longer needful. Hid with Christ in God, there is for him small place for outward 
rites for all experience is a holy baptism, a perpetual supper with the Lord, and all 
life a sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God. This hidden life, this inward vision, 
this immediate and intimate union between the soul and God, this, as revealed in 
Jesus Christ, is the basis of the Quaker faith. (Oats 1985:3-18) 
These beliefs began to provoke hostile reactions: a 1660 act of Virginia referred to the 
Friends as an: 
...unreasonable and turbulent sort of people.. .teaching and publishing lies, miracles, 
false visions, prophecies and doctrines, which have influence upon the communities 
of men both ecclesiastical and civil endeavouring and attempting thereby to destroy 
religion, lawes, communities and all bonds of civil societies, leaveing it arbitrarie to 
everie vaine and vitious person whether men shall be safe, lawes established, 
offenders punished, and Govemours rule, hereby disturbing the publique peace and 
interest. (Henning 1823:532-533) 
This disturbing of the public peace, from the Quaker perspective was intended to stimulate 
rather than work against the public interest at the time. Another key plank in their 
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theoretical base is expressed in the form of the "Peace Testimony" which stems from the 
belief that any form of violence is violence against "that of God within." They therefore 
became actively involved in peace-making, whether in actual conflict situations, or in 
attempting to address the underlying social, economic and political causes of those 
conflicts, spurring them on to even greater action: 
While this 1660 act delivered a damning indictment in Virginia, Quakers were mounting a 
nonviolent invasion of Massachusetts Bay. 5 In July 1656, Mary Fisher and Ann Austin 
arrived in Boston. They were deported, but two days after their ship sailed out eight more 
Friends sailed in. As described by George Lakey: 
These formidable zealots carried the battle to the Puritans, avoiding devious means 
of spreading their message. They attempted to speak after the sermon in church, 
made speeches during trials and from jail windows during imprisonments, issued 
pamphlets and tracts, held illegal public meetings, refused to pay fines, and 
refused to work in prison even though it meant going without food. (Lynd 
1995:xiii) 
Again and again Quakers returned to the Bay Colony, despite whippings and executions. 
While William Leddra was being considered for the death penalty, Wenlock Christison, 
who had already been banished on pain of death, calmly walked into the courtroom. And 
while Christison was being tried, Edward Wharton, who also had been ordered to leave 
the colony or lose his life, wrote to the authorities from his home that he was still there. 
5 This description of the Quaker encounter with Massachusetts Bay quoted by Lynd is drawn from George 
Lalcey, Nonviolent Action: How It Works, Pendle Hill Pamphlet No. 129 (Wallingford, Pa.: Pencile Hill, 
1963), pp. 11-12. Lakey cites Harvey Joseph Daniel Seifert, "The Use by American Quakers of 
Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Boston University, 
1940). 
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This sort of action is a direct reflection of "Speaking Truth to Power"--"A living Concern 
for the Good of all, and the prosperity of Truth upon the Earth " (Marietta 1984:65) It is 
somewhat difficult to come to a precise understanding of what this truth represented for 
Quakers, as it is not directly spelled out, but appears to call on the commandments 
appearing in the Old Testament (this aspect will be investigated in more detail later in the 
chapter because an insistence on "the truth" we will see, is a common factor among those 
groups proposing the practice of nonviolence). 
The public attitude toward Quakers began to change, enlisting more support: the jailer's 
fees were often paid by sympathetic citizens and food was brought to the prisoners 
through the jail window at night. A number of colonists were converted to Quakerism by 
witnessing this suffering. Edward Wanton, an officer of the guard at the execution of 
Robinson and Stephenson was so impressed that he came home saying "Alas, mother! we 
have been murdering the Lord's people." When Hored Gardener prayed for her 
persecutors after her whipping, a woman spectator was so affected that she said, "Surely if 
she had not the support of the Lord she could not do this thing." 6 
It was argued that through suffering, and the practice of love and compassion toward 
others, Quakers demonstrated their belief in the worth of every person, and the faith in the 
power of love to overcome violence and injustice. Governor Endicott, however, was not 
so easily moved. When Catherine Scott indicated her willingness to die for her faith, the 
6 While examples like this are plentiful in our Judaic-Christian history, it is important to note that 
examples of profound change brought about by witness to suffering also abound in a non-theistic setting - 
I find such examples noticeable by their absence and will seek to redress this shortfall in chapter 4. 
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Governor replied, "And we shall be as ready to take away your lives, as ye shall be to lay 
them down." (Lynd 1995:xvi) 
The available literature on nonviolence provides a great array of historical anecdotes in 
order to bring to life the relationship between these nonviolence activists and their 
oppressors before recording what can be viewed as a significant shift in public reaction: 
After William Brend had been so cruelly beaten that he seemed about to die, even 
Governor Endicott became so alarmed at the attitude of the people that he announced that 
the jailer would be prosecuted. (Ibid) The later execution of a woman, Mary Dyer, added 
to the discontent, and even the General Court began to weaken. Virtual abolition of the 
death penalty followed and there were problems in getting the constables to enforce the 
law which became even milder (a theme we will see later repeated in the Bus Boycotts in 
Alabama and street protests in South Africa). "By 1675," Lakey's account concludes, 
Quakers were regularly meeting undisturbed in Boston." 
I have somewhat swiftly led the reader from the beginnings of Quakerism to the present 
point, where we see evidence of meetings becoming commonplace, because it is within the 
framework of the "Meeting" that we see both the underpinning theory of Quaker 
nonviolence and the measures used to maintain it. It is here that we gain an insight into 
precisely what it means to be a Quaker, and how easily this privilege can be lost. Quaker 
discipline governed a Friend's life from birth to death: The Society registered his birth, 
oversaw his religious and secular education, approved his choice of spouse, and buried 
144 
him "decently, orderly and pubfickly." To assure that the Society could effectively 
oversee the lives of its members, the Quaker discipline required that Friends live within the 
physical confines of a monthly meeting... "they showed... that within their monthly 
meetings they could very effectively inspect the lives of the members." "A Friend did have 
to live within the confines of a meeting; living beyond them exposed him to possible 
disownment." (Marietta 1984:5) 
Meetings focussed on the "Inward Light of Christ in the heart" and led Quakers to affirm 
in their personal living the need for speaking the truth in their relations with others, for 
honesty in business dealings, for recognition of the equality of all in the sight of God, and 
for simplicity in personal and family life. Speaking the truth in all circumstances led to the 
refusal to swear an oath. By Act of Parliament in 1749 Quakers were granted the 
concession of affirmation except in criminal cases, or service on juries, or for bearing any 
office or place of profit in government. Quakers quoted scriptural justification for this 
testimony, for, they said, did not Jesus command, "I say unto you: swear not at all." (Oats 
1985:6, quoting Matthew 5:34) 
The application of honesty to business dealings gained for Quakers not only a reputation 
for trustworthiness and a recognition that a Quaker's "fair price" did not admit of 
bargaining, but also notable success in trading. As they prospered and as honesty proved 
to make very good business sense, they jealously guarded this reputation for straight and 
honourable dealing. For this reason they maintained in their Meetings a watchful eye 
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over the financial health of their members and reacted very sternly to any evidence of 
malpractice or failure to pay just debts. But research shows that this watchful eye turned 
itself to more than just financial affairs. Initially however, if any member was said to be 
in financial difficulties, visitors were appointed to enquire into the state of his affairs. If 
it could be shown that the reasons for failure might have been beyond his control, and if 
he showed unmistakable intention of repaying creditors to the limit of his ability, no 
disownment would be pursued by the Meeting. If, however, the Meeting was not 
satisfied on these two points, the minute of disownment made it clear that the offender 
had damaged not only his own reputation but also that of the Society in the eyes of the 
community. 
It is an interesting interpretation of freedom and autonomy which appears to be espoused 
for all members of society, including those outside of the Friends group, while those 
within are seemingly crushed by constraints imposed on the group in relation to its own 
behaviour. The following table (in Marietta 1984:6-8) places the watchful eye in more 
of an Orwellian light, highlighting the level of intolerance of any activity (viewed as 
disciplinary violations) or occasion when the individual showed contempt for the 
Society's authority of his/her conduct: 
Table I 
Varieties of °maker Delinquency 
(N = 12,998) 
Offense Number Percentage Percentage 
of Total Disowned 
Marriage delinquency 4925 37.4 45.8 
Sectarian delinquency 
Drunkenness 1034 7.8 60.9 
Military activity 504 3.8 71.0 
inattendance 497 3.8 70.8 
Disciplinary' 408 3.2 77.1 
Loose conduct 359 2.7 54.3 
Profanity 231 1.8 68.9 
Attending irregular 
marriage 217 1.6 27.4 
Quarrelling 214 1.6 41.1 
Entertainments 178 1.4 39.9 
Neglecting family 
responsibilities 142 1.1 49.6 
Use of law' 129 1.0 31.7 
Gambling 107 0.8 48.1 
Disapproved company 81 0.6 75.0 
Business ethics 64 0.5 70.3 
Schism 54 0.4 28.8 
"Gospel Order" 38 0.3 56.8 
Oaths 35 0.3 60.0 
Voluntary withdrawal 35 0.3 94.3 
Courting and 
fraternizing 23 0.2 54.5 
Public activity' 22 0.2 50.0 
Lying 21 0.2 76.2 
Disobeying parents 21 0.2 81.0 
Dispensing liquor 21 0.2 23.8 
Theology, 15 0'l 20.0 
Dress and speech 11 10. 68.8 
Printing 7 10. 71.4 
Sabbath breaking 5 0 0. 60.0 
Miscellaneous 42 0.4 31.7 
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Offense Number Percentage Percentage 
of Total Disowned 
Sexual delinquency 
Fornication with 
fiance(e) 1311 9.9 39.6 
Fornication 727 5.5 70.6 
Incest 174 1.3 75.7 
Adultery 46 0.3 87.0 
Delinquency with victims 
Debt 613 4.6 51.4 
Assault 391 3.0 41.3 
Slander 124 0.9 35.2 
Slaveholding 123 0.9 22.0 
Fraud 118 0.9 58.1 
Theft 61 0.5 60.0 
Violating laws 17 0.1 17.6 
Destroying property 11 0.0 36.4 
Fleeing master 9 0.0 76.2 
Counterfeiting 7 0.0 57.1 
Smuggling 6 0.0 50.0 
*figures are three year moving averages, 1682-1776. 
(While unconventional to include tables in a philosophical work, I believe that 
doing so in this case demonstrates a more accurate picture of what it meant to be a 
Quaker at that time, and leads to some understanding of the framework within 
which the members operated. Research of this detail is required if we are to gain 
an accurate picture of the motivation behind individual and collective nonviolent 
actions). 
147 
When a delinquent Friend was reported to a monthly meeting the meeting appointed 
several Friends to visit the delinquent to inform him of the allegation against him and to 
ascertain his disposition. In most cases it appears that the meeting was already certain of 
the guilt of the accused before visitors were appointed, and their primary task was usually 
to learn whether the delinquent was disposed to admit and condemn his breach of 
discipline or would refuse to condemn it and be disowned. To condemn his breach, he 
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had to prepare a written statement for the meeting confessing his guilt and attesting to his 
contrition. He had to attend the monthly meeting with this paper, have it checked for its 
adequacy, and later attend his own meeting for worship when the paper was read to his 
brethren. If he chose disownment, the monthly meeting prepared a statement of his 
transgressions and a declaration of its disunity with him. A copy was given to him for his 
inspection. If he did not object, the statement would be published among Friends. The 
procedures were strictly observed. (Marietta 1984: 6-8) 
An examination of discipline reveals the historic importance of correct conduct to 
Friends--by, among other things, their use of evidence to prove a member's deviance, 
their anxiety that deviants be publicised, their willingness to diminish their membership 
and create tensions within families and meetings, all to uphold their standards of ethics. 
With a sense of their concern for their corporate record or character, we may better 
understand their extraordinary refusal to assimilate the "world's ways" or to go along 
pragmatically with the prevailing social and political customs of their day. The secular 
world, including Christianity outside the Society, was described as alien, dangerous, and 
sinful, whereas discipline or the life of Quakerism was sanctioned by God. To obey the 
discipline was to refuse to act like others, and acting like others was to sin, degenerate, 
and resign oneself to spiritual death... Straightforwardly as well as metaphorically the 
reformers insisted upon sectarianism or tribalism, the separation of Friends from others. 
(Marietta 1984:85) We can see here quite clearly, the extent of the problem facing a 
researcher with the task of constructing a new metaphysics of power based on 
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nonviolence, when the foundations of the present body of work on nonviolence stems 
from a view which excludes a large percentage of society who do not have membership to 
that group. A particular theory of nonviolence which is so jealously guarded as belonging 
only to the chosen few, cannot hope to do the work we would expect from a general 
theory. 
Ignatieffs comments (1978:150) on the disownment of Friends for dishonesty in business 
and in certain cases for insolvency are relevant here. "By expelling any Friend found guilty 
of dis- honest business practice," he said, "they gained a reputation of probity that served 
them well as bankers." (It was no accident, therefore, that some of the pioneers of banking 
such as the Barclays and Lloyds were Quakers). The more successful Quakers became in 
business, the more jealously they guarded this reputation for honesty, it became part of the 
image of the Nineteenth-Century Quaker. Failure to live up to this image had a stigmatic 
effect on the defaulter, even if he had failed through the operation of market forces beyond 
his immediate control. It is understandable therefore that not a few Quakers, faced with 
the social effect of disownment by their Meetings, sought escape from alienation by 
migration. When a structure is maintained by such self-regulating vigilance and reprisal, it 
is not unreasonable to question the motives for individuals behaving the way they do. At 
the very least, it would be awkward to rely on a theory of nonviolence, where individual 
members might be perceived as acting nonviolently through fear of doing otherwise. This 
notwithstanding, some members of the Quaker community did successfully demonstrate 
nonviolence theory into action, evidenced by the peace treaty with the Delaware Indians, 
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the partial abolition of slavery and changes resulting from the refusal to pay war taxes. I 
will deal with each of these in turn: 
William Penn (who came into contact with, and joined the Quakers while he was a student 
at Oxford University) was arrested and jailed several times under Restoration laws that 
restricted nonconformity (one of these cases, in 1670, settled the legal precedent that a 
jury's verdict of "not guilty" shall prevail despite a contrary instruction from the judge). 
His radicalism notwithstanding, in 1681 Penn was given Pennsylvania as a proprietary 
province. Penn wrote a letter on October 18 1671, which he gave to the commissioners 
who preceded him to Pennsylvania to read to the Indians on their arrival. The letter 
outlined his theistic beliefs and a desire to live a just and peaceable life with a focus on 
dialogue and friendship. The result was the famous peace treaty between Penn and the 
Delaware Indians. 
No reliable account of the treaty exists; apparently there may have been several accounts 
remembered as one event. According to the Indian tradition which carefully preserved the 
memory of the treaty, the principal points of the 'agreement included an open and free 
exchange between Indians and Christians, making each other welcome as friends; that 
neither side should believe false rumours about the other, but should use the process of 
inquiry to determine the truth. Penn's nonviolence approach (which had prudential as well 
as idealistic motives) was a resounding success. Not only did it keep the peace in 
Pennsylvania for two generations; it seems to be true that when in the mid Eighteenth 
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Century, warfare between the colony and the Indians began, Quaker families were spared. 
The influential Quaker of the early Nineteenth-Century Jonathan Dymond, passed on to 
abolitionist readers the tradition that Friends who refused to arm themselves or to retire to 
garrisons were left unharmed by the Indians.' 
Pennsylvania's decision to arm against the Indians prompted another form of nonviolent 
action: the refusal to pay taxes for military purposes. The issue pitted John Woolman and 
Anthony Benezet, arguably the best remembered Quakers in the British colonies, against 
Benjamin Franldin, who led the non-Quakers of Pennsylvania in insisting on military 
preparations. Woolman's best known work, his Journal (first published in 1774), 
illustrates the development of his thought in response to encounters in daily life: his 
objection to slavery sprang from occasions on which neighbours asked him to write legal 
documents relating to their human chattels. The French and Indian War led Woolman as 
well as Anthony Benezet and other Quakers to refuse to pay taxes in support of war. 
Woolman's account of his tax refusal reveals how new a practice it was, even among 
Friends. Believing that "conduct is more convincing than language," Woolman also 
refused free hospitality from slaveholders and gave up the use of commodities, such as 
cotton cloth and sugar, which were made with slave labor. Friends argued that that the 
dominion of master over slave was no model for Quaker children to imitate. Households 
7 Jonathan Dymond, Essays on the Principles of Morality and on the Private and Political Rights and 
Obligations ofMankind (New York: Collins, Brother & Co., 1845) pp.558-559. In 1849 Charles Sumner 
cited Dymond as the exemplar of absolute pacifism in the "War systems of the Commonwealth of 
Nations", Charles Sumner; his complete works, (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1900), p. 335. 
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with slaves contradicted the lessons on humility, modesty, temperance, and reserve; these 
Quaker virtues were impaired by the mastery of slaves... "a practice so evidently contrary 
to our Christian profession, and principles and common rights of mankind." The Yearly 
Meeting resolved in 1774 to completely disown any Friend who bought, sold or 
transferred slaves." (Ibid) 
"A Plea for the Poor," first published in 1793, expresses the full scope of Woolman's 
social philosophy: If only human beings would regard their daily bread as a gift from God, 
and be content with necessities, then wars caused by the strife for luxuries would end, and 
exploitation would give way to universal love. In Woolman's work, like that of other 
Quakers, we see nonviolence theory inseparable from its theistic base, but we can also 
extract the principle that violence is renounced absolutely (and by-products of violence 
like slavery and war) because it denies the value of its victims' life. 8 
• "Woolman died on the eve of the Revolution, but Franklin and Benezet, antagonists over 
the French and Indian War, differed once more about the War for Independence...Franldin 
spoke for the majority...[with the] motto "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God".. [in 
contrast] Benezet expressed the feelings of the pacifist minority. (Lynd 1995:xvi) 
Symbolised by the confrontation of these leaders was the conflict between Quaker 
nonviolence and the dominant philosophy of Locke. Locke argued persuasively against 
8 This principle is espoused more recently by the feminist pacifist Janey Meyerding who supports this 
absolutist position: "Pacifism is opposed to violence in all forms, including physical, emotional, 
intellectual, and economic coercion, because violence denies the value of its victims' lives." 
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"those whose scruples over violence permitted tyranny to reign unchecked." In his 
Second Treatise of Government Locke declared: 
If the innocent honest Man must quietly quit all he has for Peace sake, to him who will 
lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of Peace there will 
be in the World, which consists only in Violence and Rapine; and which is to be 
maintained only for the benefit of Robbers and Oppressors. Who would not think it an 
admirable Peace betwixt the Mighty and the Mean, when the Lamb, without 
resistance, yielded his Throat to be torn by the imperious Wolf. 9 
Probably at no time in United States history was nonviolence so alien to the mainstream 
of the country's social thought as in this revolutionary generation. Many of those who 
challenged nonviolence would do so on these Lockean grounds: Any action which allows 
tyranny and oppression to continue unchecked, cannot be justified under the name of 
peace. The only beneficiaries of such a peace would be the violent, who continue to take 
that which is not due to them. Two individuals who stand out in support of this view are 
Frederick Douglass and Henry David Thoreau. 
A more dramatic case of conversion to violence was that of Frederick Douglass. As late 
as September 1849 Douglass could say: "I am willing at all times to be known as a 
9 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (ed.) Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1960), 
p.435. The attitude of radical Whigs toward nonviolence in the era of the American Revolution is 
suggested by the following examples: John Adams called it "the most mischievous of all doctrines"; John 
Cartwright spoke of "the dark regions of passive-obedience and non-resistance"; while Richard Price 
referred to "the odious doctrines of passive obedience, non- resistance, and the divine right of kings" ("A 
Dissertation On The Canon And Feudal Law," The Political Writings of John Adams: Representative 
Selections, ed. George A. Peek, Jr. [New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., The Liberal Arts Press, 
19541, p.10; John Cartwright, The Legislative Right Of The Commonalty Vindicated,- Or Take Your 
Choice! [London, 17771, p. xxvi; Richard Price, A Discourse On The Love Of Our Country [London, 
17901, p. 35). For nonviolence as a favourite theme of American Tories, see Leonard Labaree, 
Conservatism In Early American History (New York University Press, 1948), pp. 74-75, 126-130. 
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Garrisonian abolitionist." But earlier that same year Douglass had thrown Faneuil Hall 
into an uproar by declaring that he would welcome the news of a slave insurrection in the 
South. In 1854, his attitude hardened by the Fugitive Slave Law, Douglass posed the 
question, "Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?," and answered, "Yes." In 1856 
Douglass said of the slave system, "its peaceful annihilation is almost hopeless." In June 
1860 the former slave came fill circle, stating: 
I have little hope of the freedom of the slave by peaceful means. A long course of peaceful 
slaveholding has placed the slaveholders beyond the reach of moral and humane 
considerations .... The only penetrable point of a tyrant is the fear of death." (Lynd 
1995:284-289) 
In the work of Henry Thoreau we see the synthesis of the two previously divergent 
traditions: the Christian concept of civil disobedience, and John Locke's justification of 
revolution. Thoreau asked, in effect; "if violence was justified against a tax on tea, how 
much more would it be justified to emancipate the slaves?" Thoreau, like Roger Williams 
or William Penn, affirms the peril of coercion in spiritual matters: he refused to pay a tax 
for the support of the established church several years before this, his more celebrated 
refusal to pay the Massachusetts poll tax which earned him a night in jail. He argued that 
the war with Mexico, then going on, was intended to spread slavery; and that those who 
wished to do more than wish godspeed to the right as it went by them (as he put it) 
would have to put their bodies in the way. Thoreau's essay ("Civil Disobedience" written 
after he spent his night in jail) owed much to the Christian anarchism of Garrison and 
Ballou. But while Garrison and Ballou disavowed "Jacobinism" (violent revolution), 
Thoreau deliberately proclaimed the need for revolution, albeit a revolution of one. 
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In "Civil Disobedience" Thoreau (1886:123-151) concludes: "I cannot for an instant 
recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave 's government 
also," and proposed individual noncooperation with the state as "the definition of a 
peaceable revolution, if any such is possible." By 1854, under the hammer of the Fugitive 
Slave Law, Thoreau was prepared to say: "Show me a free state, and a court truly of 
justice, and I will fight for them, if need be." In 1859, speaking on the death of John 
Brown, Thoreau said: "I do not wish to kill nor to be killed, but I can foresee 
circumstances in which both these things would be by me unavoidable." He squarely 
supported Brown's violent raid: 
It was his [Brown's] peculiar doctrine that a man has a perfect right to interfere by 
force with the slaveholder, in order to rescue the slave. I agree with him.... I shall not 
be forward to think him mistaken in his method who quickest succeeds to liberate the 
slave. I speak for the slave, when I say, I prefer the philanthropy of Captain Brown to 
that philanthropy which neither shoots me nor liberates me. (Ibid) 
The collapse of Garrisonian nonviolence is the most striking failure of nonviolence in 
United States history to date. One can argue endlessly whether it might have been 
otherwise. Should Garrison have gone into the South, like Woolman, and tried to reason 
with slaveholders face-to-face rather than condenui them at a distance? The great and 
unavoidable fact is that the abolitionist movement, virtually unanimous in adhering to 
nonviolence in the 1830s, was almost equally united in supporting Lincoln when the war 
came. Violence became justified in the quest for freedom. 
Objectors to nonviolence came not only from those converted to violence, but 
surprisingly from within pacifist ranks; the most notable was William James. Next to 
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Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience, "The Moral Equivalent of War" by William James 
(1842-1910) is probably the most influential statement in the history of American 
nonviolence. The American Friends Service Committee, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, and the Peace Corps all derive from the central thought of James' argument. 
According to James, the pacifist will never succeed merely by preaching against war. 
Her task must be to find another mode whereby the energies can be elicited, involving 
risk, voluntary poverty, and service to the state. James suggested that young people be 
conscripted for a period of years in a war against nature rather than against each other. 
Such labor would redirect warlike impulses toward more constructive ends: "Great 
indeed is Fear; but it is not.. ,the only stimulus known for awakening the higher ranges of 
men's spiritual energy." James saw "how desperately hard it is to bring the peace-party 
and the war-party together, and I believe the difficulty is due to certain deficiencies in the 
program of pacifism which set the militarist imagination strongly, and to a certain extent 
justifiably against it." (Lynd 1995:68) He seems to suggest that the way pacifists argue 
against war is on the wrong track, and will never move the hearts of the military party. 
An argument which provides "only a counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and 
horror" won't do, for it is the horror which makes the thrill "and when the question is of 
getting the extremist and supretnist out of human nature, talk of expense sounds 
ignominious." (1995:71) 
The military party denies neither the bestiality, nor the horror, nor the expense. It only 
says that war is worth them; that taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best 
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protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to 
adopt a peace-economy. James wants pacifists to "enter more deeply the... ethical point 
of view of their opponents... do that first, he insists.., and then move the point, and your 
opponent will follow." James sees the primary problem as the lack of proposing a 
substitute for war. Pacifists should propose a moral equivalent of war analogous "to the 
mechanical equivalent of heat." He sees the "whole atmosphere of present-day utopian 
literature" as "dishwatery" and "suggests in truth ubiquitous inferiority." (Ibid) [James at 
this point comes closest to reflecting my own sentiments outlined at the start of this 
chapter, and the weakness in the literature which fails to offer any coherent theoretical 
underpinning for the nonviolence sentiment]. 
For all this criticism, James sees his own position "aspiring to the reign of peace" as 
utopian, placing him squarely in the anti-militarist party. By way of explanation, he finds 
it simply preposterous that the only force that could work ideals of honour and standards 
of efficiency into English or American natures should be the "fear of being killed by the 
Germans or the Japanese" (and hence exist in the military pursuit). It is not the only 
stimulus known for awakening the higher range of the individual's spiritual energy. 
James endorses the conception of order and discipline, the tradition of service and 
devotion, of universal responsibility and poverty, but he wants to inflame the civic rather 
than the military temper in order to achieve it. It is not difficult to see similarities here 
between James and Thoreau, where James advocates a revolution of the human spirit, 
Thoreau had defined individual civil disobedience as the method of peaceable revolution, 
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if such a revolution were possible. The Civil War came, seeming to disprove this 
possibility; but a generation later Gandhi discovered in South Africa how masses of 
people--without which no genuine revolution can occur--could use nonviolent action to 
achieve success. 
Before examining the theoretical foundation of Gandhian nonviolence, it will benefit the 
discussion to pause momentarily to take stock. I have argued that .a metaphysics of power 
based on violence is problematic and unsatisfactory. I have looked to the most obvious 
contender for a solution. The most obvious contender is the body of work on 
nonviolence. A literature review of this domain offers a handful of major works, each 
containing its own set of accounts to support underlying conclusions. While they are for 
the most part, great stories, only some are of theoretical interest. In beginning to analyse 
this smaller group, we cannot go past the enormous influence of the Quaker movement. 
For this group, nonviolence stems directly from a theological base and an insistence on 
truth. We have seen that this insistence appears to be taken in the most coercive and 
literal sense of the term, and barriers are immediately fixed in place in order to exclude 
those who do not belong and discipline those who do when they are delinquent. This 
aspect begins to make the theory problematic and restrictive and consequently it will not 
do the work we expect from a good theory of nonviolence. 
I° A good general theory should be explanatorily successful across all relevant domains. By drawing 
barriers, and excluding those outside of a particular group, the theory becomes closed and unavailable to a 
large number of people. 
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To this point, those who argue for nonviolence have done so from a theistic base. 
Standard readings of Gandhi would not open discussion to a wider (non-theistic) 
audience, but insightful readings of Gandhi by Bondurant (1965) provide a secular 
interpretation. She argues that Gandhi, aware of the exclusion entailed by a theistic 
doctrine, places Truth at the top of the pedestal of importance. For Christians, this truth is 
God. For others, truth can be represented by something outside of this framework." I will 
examine these issues below. 
Early in his public comments, Gandhi identifies God with Truth. Later (in 1925), Gandhi 
claims that for him "God and Truth are convertible terms." 12 The following year in an 
address at Wardha he declares: "...to me Truth is God and there is no way to find Truth 
except the way of non-violence." (Gandhi 1948:172) When he was later (in 1931) asked 
by a group of conscientious objectors in Switzerland why he regarded God as Truth, 
Gandhi explained how he had come to believe the phrase "God is Love" was inadequate 
and how he had further concluded that God is Truth. He then added that he had found it 
necessary to go a step further and to say that Truth is God. 
The fine distinction between the two statements has been taken by some commentators to 
be of substantial significance, and if they are right the satyagrahi is relieved from the 
"Some, for example, may prefer the preeminant position given to the interdependence of humanity rather 
than a godhead. Professor Fatima Meer, renowned Indian Gandhi expert, may not support this view; 
claiming rather that, for Gandhi "power is the manifestation of the supreme power. There is no other 
power than the divine, from God" [interview conducted by the author, with Prof. Meer in Durban South 
Africa, Nov. 1997]. 
'2 I 	Opinion (Phoenix, Natal); Young India (Ahmedabad); Harijan (Ahmendabad). 
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necessity of any theological belief. With his changed creed, Gandhi could easily 
accommodate as fellow-seekers those who looked on Humanity or any other object as 
their god, and for which they were prepared to sacrifice their all (N K Bose 1935). 
By enthroning Truth, Gandhi leaves the way open for an inclusive secular account of 
nonviolence. Unlike the Quakers, Gandhi holds that Truth is not something at which we 
can arrive in isolation, waiting for a moment of revelation. Truth is discovered by persons 
in relation with others. The individual agent can only use objective truth as an 
unattainable guiding principle--what is achievable is truth in relative terms; and in this 
respect, the individual searches for truth in terms of the community of which s/he is part. 
Through power relations with others, guided by the operation of reason, the agent comes 
to an understanding or "a measure of reality" which may be true at that time, but is open 
to modification and refinement. This allows the agent to participate in a creative or 
dynamic process in which s/he can move increasingly closer to the truth over a lifetime. It 
is this progressive sense of truth that best describes Gandhi's life as an ongoing 
"experiment." 
When conflict results, he resorts to the dynamics of human interrelationships for criteria to 
judge the truth, or its approximation in a given situation. This leads him, necessarily, back 
to the realm of ethics: "To an understanding of the ethical implications of his basic 
metaphysic, and to action based upon them, Gandhi dedicated his life." (Bondurant 
1965:23) But if truth is God, and God is understood in one way by some and other ways 
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by others, how can one "hold onto the truth?" The short answer is that satyagraha is not a 
dogma. It is neither static nor substantial. We discover that holding onto the truth is a 
dynamic concept and satyagraha a technique of action. How then can one proceed to 
know and hold onto the truth? How can confusion be avoided if striving after truth differs 
in every case? The answer Gandhi gives is that truth is inseparable from ahimsa. The 
word ahimsa expresses an ancient Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist ethical precept. The full 
force of ahimsa, explicitly stated, means "action based on the refu sal to do harm." (Ibid) 
Gandhi refines the meaning further: 
Ahimsa is not the crude thing it has been made to appear. Not to hurt any living 
thing is no doubt a part of ahimsa. But is its least expression. The principle of 
himsa is hurt by every evil thought, by undue haste, by lying, by hatred, by wishing 
ill to anybody. (Ibid) 
I accept Gandhi's interpretation of Ahimsa", namely that it is not merely a negative state 
of harmlessness but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer. But 
what it does not mean, is helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by 
passive acquiescence. On the contrary, love, the active state of ahimsa, requires the agent 
to resist the wrongdoer by dissociating from him, even though it may offend him or injure 
him physically." I will show in the analysis below that this element in satyagraha has 
13 But unlike Bondurant, I have had further benefit of analysis from the Buddhist perspective examined in 
teachings by Prof. S. Rinpoche, given as 'Buddhism Satyagraha and Nonviolence' at the University of 
Tasmania 1998. 
14 This aspect, while apparently paradoxical, is spelled out in detail in ch.4. 
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social implications expressed in service, requiring for every satyagraha movement a 
"constructive program." 
The inseparable combination of truth and love in the Gandhian position forms the nucleus 
of the Gandhian solution to the problem of means: 
...without ahimsa it is not possible to seek and find Truth. Ahimsa and truth are so 
intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They 
are like two sides of a coin, or rather a smooth unstamped metallic disc. Who can 
say which is the obverse and which is the reverse? Nevertheless ahimsa is the 
means; Truth is the end. (Bondurant 1965:84) 
It is in the area of relative truth, where we can see a clear interpretation of how truth and 
ahimsa work together. To proceed towards the goal of Truth--truth in the absolute sense 
--the . way must lead through the testing of relative truths as they appear to the individual 
agent. The testing of truth can only be performed by strict adherence to ahimsa—action 
based upon the refusal to do harm, or more accurately, upon love" (which I will use 
interchangeably with compassion: "compassion" is a term linked to a Mahayana Buddhist 
reading of satyagraha and is fully detailed in chapter 4): 
For truth, judged in terms of human needs, would be destroyed, on whichever side 
it lay, by the use of violence. Non-violence or ahimsa becomes the supreme value, 
the one cognizable standard by which true action can be determined. If there is 
dogma in Gandhian philosophy, it centres here: that the only test of truth is action 
based on the refusal to do harm. (Bondurant 1965:25) 
15 Gandhi uses the term "love" frequently. I will progressively use "compassion" to express the same 
meaning, in order to give the discussion a more secular turn. "Love" has a tendency to be trivialised at 
times, attracting either romance novel connotations or an impression of 'over-zealous' Christianity. 
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Gandhi makes preeminant the aspect of the truth of how things ought to be for clearly in 
this example reference is made directly to the ethical domain, and not merely to matters of 
fact about the world. At this ethical level it is straightforward to argue for common 
ground--agents are not heroes or enemies, but members of the human race who share 
common rights and depend upon one another in social relations. This point will become 
significant in the following two chapters, where I will examine the requirement of 
nonviolent action to dissolve the (false) moral distinction between self and other. This 
also provides a convincing rejoinder to John Brown, whose argument can only gain 
coherence by separating agents into heroes and enemies, where it becomes logical to 
remove the barriers to freedom by obliterating the enemies. But in doing so, Brown fails 
to note the common denominator of humanity--it is not rational to attain freedom as an 
end, by destroying the very freedom of others in order to achieve it. 
Gandhi accepted as his fellow "seekers after truth" persons who espoused various or no 
religions, and those who held vastly differing views as to the proper social structure or 
constructive programming in a nonviolent society. He admitted of error and indecision at 
many stages of his applied experiment, but the one principle to which he adhered to the
•end was this theme of ahimsa--the supreme and only means to the discovery of social 
Truths. "Those who join the Ashram have literally to accept that meaning," he insisted. 
And that meaning of ahimsa took him into the realm much higher than simply non-killing: 
Ahimsa really means that you may not offend anybody, you may not harbor an 
uncharitable thought even in connection with one who may consider himself to be 
your enemy.. .that does not mean that we practice the doctrine in its entirety. Far 
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from it. It is an ideal which we have to reach, and it is an ideal to be reached even at 
this very moment, if we are capable of doing so. (Gandhi 1920) 
Statements like this make it easy to see why some critics argue that this type of lifestyle is 
relevant to only a few exceptional individuals. But perhaps there is another way to think 
about ahimsa. Think about the North Star. Using the North Star as an accurate guide for 
those wishing to travel in that direction, does not entail a belief by the travellers that they 
will literally reach the star. Likewise the pursuit of ahimsa can (as I will show in the 
following two chapters) provide a very useful guideline for action based on an 
understanding of incremental improvement in the direction of tolerance, compassion and 
nonviolence. 
For Gandhi, the pursuit of truth will inevitably require the agent to endure suffering. Self-
suffering in satyagraha is directed first of all towards the moral persuasion of one because 
of whom it is undertaken. It is not a substitute for inability to use violent means to achieve 
victory over an opponent; it is not, that is, a "weapon of the weak." Bondurant notes that 
self-suffering in the Gandhian sense, "is clearly a different character from cowardice; nor 
is it to be exercised indiscriminately... [it] differs from violence in that violence consists of 
doing injury to another." (Bondurant 1965:27) I will discuss below how this is not as 
clear cut as it seems, but first in Gandhi's words: 
Suffering injury in one's own person is.. .of the essence of non-violence and is the 
chosen substitute for violence to others. It is not because I value life low that I can 
countenance with joy thousands voluntarily losing their lives for Satyagraha, but 
because I know that it results in the long run in the least loss of life, and, what is 
more, it ennobles those who lose their lives and morally enriches the world for their 
sacrifice. (Gandhi 1944:49) 
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It is clear from Gandhi's words and the standard interpretation of them, by Bondurant and 
others, that it is within the defining characteristics of satyagraha action taken to its 
extreme, that if required one will take on suffering to the extinguishment of life itself. We 
have learned that there can be no compromise in truth insistence, and if the issue warrants 
it, this insistence is taken to the last breath. This would, arguably, be the most difficult 
aspect of satyagraha for the Western reader to come to terms with--but not impossible to 
conceive within our community (we shall see below that Martin Luther King Jr. and his 
fellow African Americans in their struggle for civil rights in North America, utilised this 
technique in isolated cases). 16 
Self-suffering, if necessary, unto death is a key technique for Gandhi and his fellow 
satyagrahis in overcoming fear. If the individual is not afraid of dying, then she can "defy 
the whole might of an unjust empire." 17 
Just as one must learn the art of killing in the training for violence, so one must 
learn the art of dying in the training for non-violence.. the votary of non-violence 
has to cultivate the capacity for sacrifice of the highest type in order to be free from 
fear.. .He who has not overcome all fear cannot practise ahimsa to perfection. 
16 But it is not clear cut for the following reason: In chapter four, I will introduce the only contemporary 
exponents of Gandhian satyagraha, individuals within the Tibetan community in exile. The two key 
figures whose philosophical approach will be analysed are Professor Samdhong Rinpoche and the Dalai 
Lama. Now the Dalai Lama, as recently as May 1998 issued a press statement relating to the Tibetan 
hunger strikers unto death, suggesting that while he supported their stand, and could not insist that they 
cease the hunger strike because he could offer no viable alternative. However, what they were doing could 
not be sanctioned because the action constituted violence to the self. While this response appears to move 
away from one of the Gandhian foundational issues, analysis will show that it is based on a new and more 
precise definition of violence which includes intentional harm from the perspective of both thought and 
action. 
17 Gandhi Young India August 11, 1920. We shall see that the motivation (for overcoming the fear of 
death) works just as well in the Tibetan case, but stems from a different ontology (the commitment is to 
the doctrine of emptiness or 'no self). 
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To sum up the key points so far, Gandhi's contribution to a contemporary metaphysics of 
power through nonviolence requires a recognition of the equality and inherent rights of all 
humankind; and an insistence on the truth of equality, justice and compassion. The 
means/ends dichotomy must undergo a conceptual turn—the agent must realise that means 
and ends are one and the same, "there is no way to peace, peace is the way; there is no 
way to truth, truth is the way."(Naht Hanh 1993:5) This understanding requires a 
necessary commitment to nonviolence in thought and application during every minute of 
every day. Rather than operate as a useful technique to be used once or twice a year for 
the purpose of protest, it becomes the desirable way of life for a moral agent. As a 
framework for action, it is useful to note that Gandhi does not suggest that this approach 
is only relevant to a few exceptional individuals, but should be attempted by anybody 
seeking the truth. Every agent is fallible and anyone may be mistaken in what s/he holds to 
be the truth. As long as one adheres to nonviolence, then realisation of the truth can and 
should be adjusted in incremental steps throughout life. This important aspect, along with 
the more secular reading of truth outside of a theistic requirement, allows Gandhi's 
philosophy to be accessible to the sensible agent. 
With the foundational beliefs in the dignity and worth of all humankind, and an insistence 
on the truth of this, Gandhi shows how the moral agent can use nonviolent action, not 
only as a defence against violence, but as a positive and constructive force to bring about 
social change. By not only believing this, but demonstrating this belief through action, the 
agent can influence others seeking truth, and influence the oppressor in order that he may 
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correct his wrong views in a way that both may move to a new position of understanding 
as a result of the power relation. Power exercised in this way can be enormously 
successful but does not involve injury or harm. Neither does it involve cowardice or 
compromise: The moral agent acts from a position of strength, while always aware and 
empathetic to the needs of the interlocutor. From Gandhi's position, it is the power of the 
agent's will together with her reason which effects change in society. I will rehearse 
below an aspect of Bondurant's analysis of one particular satyagraha campaign; doing so 
will enable the reader to clearly see the difference between satyagraha as nonviolence in 
practice and how it differs from the account of say, Quaker nonviolence in practice, 
discussed above: 
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18The Vvkom Temple Road Satyagraha 
Dates, duration, and locale 
(1) Spring 1924 to autumn 1925 
(2) Pursued over sixteen months 
(3) The village Vykom, State of Travancore, at the southern tip of India 
Objectives 
(1) Immediate: To remove the prohibition upon the use by untouchables of 
roadways passing the temple. This was a serious disability inasmuch as it 
required untouchables to take a long, circuitous route to reach their dwellings. 
(2) Long Range: A step towards ridding Hinduism of the 'blot' of untouchability 
Satyagraha participants and leadership 
(1) Character of leadership: Among the initiators of the movement was a Syrian 
Christian. However, opinion favoured Hindu leaders because of the reform 
objective. Local Hindus took up the prominent leadership roles. Gandhi, 
who kept in touch with the campaign from the beginning, was not its leader 
and was not in Travancore until late in the movement, when he was 
instrumental in securing a concession from the State government. 
(2) Character of participants: Hindus, both untouchables and caste (including 
orthodox) Hindus provided the majority of participants. Sikhs from the 
Punjab offered direct support by opening a kitchen to feed satyagrahis, but 
upon Gandhi's recommendation they were replaced by local Hindus so that 
orthodox Hindu opponents might not be offended. 
(3) Number of participants: Active satyagrahis residing in the camp established 
for volunteers was about 50. many others cooperated, with estimates of 
total participants varying from 600 to 'thousands'. 
18 For ease of reading, I will retain Bondurant's reporting structure - Bondurant extracted the data in this 
example from the following sources: CF Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi 's Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 
1930). Andrews was present during the struggle and therefore writes as an eye witness. RR Diwalcar, 
Satyagraha: Its Technique and History (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), p. 115; Richard B Gregg, The 
Power of Nonviolence (rev. ed., London: George Routledge 1938): Files of Young India during the period 
of the movement; Correspondence exchanged between Bondurant and the following: The Hon. RR 
Diwakar, Richard R. Keithahn, and Pyarelal (Nayyar). 
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Participants and leadership of the opposition 
(1) Orthodox Hindus. An occasional untouchable was numbered among the 
opposition, but the majority were high caste Hindus, especially Brahmans. 
An orthodox Hindu society, the Savama Mahajana Sabha, supported the 
Brahman position throughout the struggle. 
(2) Police of the State of Travancore 
(3) Members of the Travancore Legislative Council. The majority of the 
Council supported the orthodox position. 
Organization and constructive program 
(1) Camp headquarters: A satyagraha ashram (camp) was established early in 
the campaign. 
(2) Constructive activity: Daily maintenance and camp routine were made an 
integral part of the movement, with satyagrahis assigned either maintenance 
duties or direct action duties. A high degree of self sufficiency was attained. 
Hand-spinning, building of a school, and other constructive efforts were 
continued during the movement. 
Preparation for action 
(1) Prayer: A religious tone was given to the movement, with prayer meetings an 
important part of ashram life. 
(2) Instruction in satyagraha: Participants in the campaign engaged in discussion 
of the principles underlying satyagraha. Emphasis was laid upon 
understanding the viewpoint of their orthodox opponents, and upon winning 
them over through persuasion. 
Preliminary action 
(I) Negotiation: Among the efforts made to negotiate a settlement was a 
deputation to State authorities. 
(2) Agitation: Efforts were made to attract public attention to the disabilities of 
the Vykom untouchables. 
Action 
First phase: 
(1) Procession of untouchables and caste Hindus taken along the forbidden 
road. Refusal to retaliate when attacked and beaten by Brahmans. 
(2) Submission to arrest. A second procession along the road led to the arrest 
of satyagrahi leaders. 
(3) Replacement of leaders. Upon the arrest of satyagrahis, others came 
forward to fill their Places. 
(4) Submission of secondary leadership to arrest. 
Second phase. 
(1) Opposition to police barricade. Upon the erection by police of a barricade 
on the road, caste Hindus alongside untouchables took up positions opposite 
the police and held them day after day. 
(2) Action during monsoon. When the monsoon flooded the road and the police 
occupied their positions in boats, satyagrahis continued to stand three-hour 
shifts, in some instances even up to shoulders in water. 
Third phase: 
(1) Persuasion of State authorities. Gandhi, visiting Travancore for the first 
time during the movement in April 1925, persuaded the authorities to 
remove the barricade. 
(2) Announcement of intention not to take advantage of removal of barricade. 
Satyagrahis refrained from entering the road even though the barricade and 
police cordon had been removed. They announced they would not enter upon 
the road until the Bralunans were fully persuaded, and the government 
declared acceptance of untouchable use of the road. 
(3) Persuasion of Brahman opponents. Through persistent reasoning supported 
by prayer, the opposition was won over. 
Reaction of opponents 
Violence against satyagrahis by personal physical attack. 
Imprisonment of satyagrahis following arrest. 
Cessation of arrests when prisons became over- crowded. 
Erection of barricade. Police built and manned barricade on the roadway 
upon an order to prevent entry. 
Support by State Legislative Council. Majority of the State Council upheld 
police action. 
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(6) Social ostracism of satyagraha organisers. Ostracism, accompanied by 
threats of depriving participants of family property and barring them from 
other family privileges, was especially serious. 
(7) Removal of barricades. Following Gandhi's talks (in April 1925) with State 
authorities, police were ordered to remove the barricades which they had 
manned daily. 
(8) Confilsion over satyagraha reaction. Brahmans, who had expected them to 
re-enter the roadway as soon as police cordon and barricade were removed, 
were thrown- off balance when satyagrahis refrained from entering the road. 
(9) Capitulation. In the autumn of 1925, the Brahmans declared: -We cannot 
any longer resist the prayers that have been made to us, and we are ready to 
receive the untouchables." 
Results 
(1) Roads opened to all comers. The immediate objective of the satyagraha had 
been fully achieved. 
(2) Brahman areas elsewhere opened. In other parts of India this campaign had 
repercussions, with the opening to untouchables of areas and temples 
formerly closed to them. 
(3) Conditions of untouchables improved. Through an extension of the 
constructive program, the general condition of untouchables was improved. 
• (4) Long-range results: The campaign constituted a major turning point in the 
fight against untouchability. 
Summary analysis of the Vykom Temple Road Satyagraha 
The Vykom satyagraha measures up to the greater part of the satyagraha ideal. The 
position of truth to which the participants clung was the right of every human individual to 
pass along a public road without discrimination on the basis of caste. The method 
employed in asserting this truth was that of nonviolent demonstration and contravention of 
the custom which they took to be unjust. The action appears to have been scrupulously 
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nonviolent although there were times when questionable action such as scaling the police 
barricades was urged on the part of supporters. 
Self-suffering was characteristic of the attitude of the satyagrahis. They persisted in 
courageous offering of satyagraha throughout the sixteen months, suffering physically 
both from attacks of their orthodox opponents and from the inclemency of the weather 
which, during the monsoon, forced them to stand waist and shoulder-deep in water. After 
the police cordon had been withdrawn, they persisted in peaceful satyagraha to bring 
about the persuasion of their opponents before entering upon the road in dispute. 
The constructive character of the effort and the exemplary conduct of the participants 
were. at all times in evidence. Members of the satyagraha camp not only maintained their 
own services, but by daily spinning contributed to the Congress khadi fund and to the All-
India Desbabandhu Memorial Fund. In this way they identified the Vykom movement 
with the independence struggle. They retained a flexible leadership and adapted their 
program to accord with the opinion of those who criticised the acceptance of support 
from non-Hindu communities, conceding the desirability of preserving the campaign's 
character of 'reform from within.' 
The emphasis on persuasion was never out of sight. Religious sensitivity of the opposition 
was scrupulously considered. It was this consideration which Gandhi expressed in Young 
India, May 1, 1924: 
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Satyagraha is a process of conversion. The reformers, I am sure, do not seek to 
force their views upon the community; they strive to touch its heart. Outside 
pecuniary help must interfere with the love process if I may so describe the method 
of Satyagraha. Thus viewed the proposed Sikh free kitchen, I can only regard as a 
menace to the frightened Hindus of Vykom. There is no doubt in my mind about it 
that the orthodox Hindus who still think that worship of God is inconsistent with 
touching a portion of their own co-religionists and that a religious life is summed 
up in ablutions and avoidance of physical pollutions merely are alarmed at the 
developments of the movement at Vykom. They believe that their religion is in 
danger. It behoves the organisers therefore, to set even the most orthodox and the 
most bigoted at ease and to assure them that they do not seek to bring about the 
reform by compulsion. 
Bondurant's analysis of the Gandhian satyagraha campaigns: 9 examine the reasons for 
success as well as reasons for failure (failure only in one case where violence breaks out 
and causes the campaign to be abandoned. Bondurant blames lack of preparation on the 
part of the satyagrahis). All of the campaigns however reflect the following themes: (1) 
The pursuit of the Truth or God was, for Gandhi, the search for realising the truth of 
human unity. (2) Satyagraha is a means for achieving this realisation. (3) Power is in the 
hands of the individual, and any individual can learn to have access to it. (4) The holding 
of a moral truth, insisted on by nonviolent action and supported by self-suffering, supplies 
a force which any individual can learn to wield against an opponent of any proportions 
with expectation of success in the struggle. (5) While apparent differences remain (each 
individual will have a different visual appearance; different hopes fears and desires), 
when the agent accepts nonviolence s/he ceases to be different to others (nonviolence 
calls on the feature common to all persons - humanity - and insists on the removal of the 
(false) distinction between self and others). 
19 One of the five is the famous Salt Satyagraha. I have focussed on the Vykom Satyagraha because the 
information may be 'fresher' to the reader if it is less well-known. 
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Nonviolence is inclusive; it can break down political and religious barriers, it provides a 
position of strength and optimism. 2° Perhaps the most persistent element in Gandhi's 
work is the recurring theme that nonviolence is truth-creating: 
Means and ends in Gandhian satyagraha are distinguishable only temporally. Satyagraha is 
not a means to an end--that is, it is not purely instrumental—rather, it is constitutive of a 
set of processes some of which may be means, some ends, some both; but all of which 
constitute the truth, by recognising and valuing the dignity of each person as the motivator 
for action. Truth-insistence is not thereby something which is given up at the end of a 
campaign. The action is truth-creating and continues as a way of life. Truth is inseparable 
from nonviolence, and the method of achieving and insisting on truth is nonviolence. 
Nonviolence becomes both the means and the end. Moreover, Gandhian satyagraha 
assumes the rationality of the agent. It requires simply, the assumption that an agent is 
endowed with reason, that s/he can utilise reason to direct actions, and that a technique for 
conducting conflict can appeal to the rational in all human beings. 
20 The challenge of Gandhian satyagraha centres upon the necessity of reconciling ends and means 
through a philosophy of action; therefore an integral part of Gandhian satyagraha is necessarily a 
philosophy of conflict. There have been few efforts to systematise that philosophy, though it lies implicit 
in Gandhi's experiments. Bondurant attempts the beginnings of what might constitute a theory of 
conflict, but is satisfied to flag the option for the future work of other academics. In this Gandhian 
development, (taken up on the contemporary scene by some South Africans, and members of the Tibetan 
community in exile) lies a contribution of great significance. The contribution centres upon the role of 
satyagraha as a technique of action, together with the philosophy of conflict which lies behind it. It is 
totally feasible that a new theory of conflict (and conflict resolution through nonviolence) which builds 
on the foundations set by Gandhi and includes understandings from contemporary cases mentioned 
above, can provide invaluable support to governments administering the change process from violent to 
nonviolent action. I can inunediately think of the pursuit of peace by a unified Ireland, still rocked by 
terrorist bombings; the transition to democracy by African and Asian countries. 
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Gandhi argues that the technique for conducting conflict cannot admit of compromise, and 
it is important for the work which follows in chapter 4, to note the difference: The 
satyagrahi's effort is to allow for the emergence of the best restructuring of the situation. 
A victory is sought, not over the opponent but over the situation in the best (in the sense 
of the total human needs of the situation) synthesis possible. As I shall show below this 
differs acutely from the notion of compromise. 
The satyagrahi is never prepared to yield any position which s/he holds to be the truth. 
S/he is however prepared--and this is essential--to be persuaded by the opponent that the 
opponent's position is the true, or the more nearly true, position. There is no sacrificing 
of position, no concession to the opponent with the idea of buying him over. Nonviolent 
resistance must continue until persuasion has carried the conflict into mutually agreeable 
adjustment. There is no victory in the sense of triumph of one side over the other. Yet 
there is no compromise, in the sense in which each side would concede parts of its 
previous position solely to effect a settlement. There is no "lowering of demands, but an 
aiming at higher level of adjustment, which creates a new, mutually satisfactory 
resolution." (my italics) (Bondurant 1965:197). 
In summary, it is perhaps the element of suffering in satyagraha which remains most 
obscure to the Western mind. Self-suffering in satyagraha is effective to the extent to 
which it demonstrates sincerity and cuts through the rationalised defenses of the opponent. 
Willingness to make the sacrifice of life is the ultimate in non-cooperation, just as it is the 
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ultimate price to be paid in violent conflict. The considered willingness to suffer--or to 
endure--in the satyagraha approach is the step beyond the appeal to reason which, though 
reason persists throughout, dominates the earlier steps of satyagraha. When the appeal to 
reason through the persistent efforts of rational argument have failed to persuade the 
opponent, where the conflict challenges the basic truth-concepts of the satyagraha 
position, the further course of satyagraha, including suffering, acts as a shock treatment--a 
dramatisation of the satyagrahi position. 
Inevitably conflict and the threat of uncontrolled violence are conditions of the human 
circumstance. It is not enough that the agent should take unreasoned flight from violence. 
"The Gandhian experiments suggest that if man is to fee himself from fear and threat alike, 
he pause in his flight from violence to set himself the task of its conquest." (Bondurant 
1965:233) 
The principal difference between Gandhian nonviolent action theory and that of Quakers 
can be drawn out in the following way: (1) Gandhi insists on sensitivity and respect for all 
alternate (including religious) views. In this respect, the Quaker discussion above, refers 
to a doctrine of peace and interdependence but becomes deeply pi1771ing when the 
attitude toward agents outside of the group is one of distrust, even dismissal as sinners, 
degenerates and those destined for spiritual death. (2) Gandhi insists on truth which turns 
out to be inexorably linked to a doctrine of compassion and non-harm in both mental and 
physical acts. Truth in the Quaker view appears to be linked with the value of honesty, 
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and to the "God within" (presumably within all people); highlighting as problematic the 
coercive treatment of delinquent members and dismissal of non-group agents. ( 3 ) 
Gandhian nonviolence highlights means and ends as an inseparable process, while the 
Quaker discussion above reveals love, peace and the absolute renunciation of violence as 
an end, with the apparent legitimacy of coercive structures framing the daily lives of 
members, and the apparently justified rule of fear, as a means. I will argue at the end of 
the chapter for the inclusion of Quaker insights, but the requirement to move beyond these 
limitations if we are to arrive at a global theory of nonviolence. 
Those who undertake a review of nonviolence, will discover the works examined above, 
noticing that primary attention is given to Penn, Woolman, James and so on, with Gandhi 
sitting awkwardly to the side--more of a separate category if you like. Non-Western 
philosophers are, quite simply, treated differently. Reasons for this will be explored in the 
following chapters, but to conclude this snapshot of Western nonviolence, I will undertake 
a brief examination of the well-known figure influenced by Gandhi--and indeed many of 
the authors mentioned above--the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Focussing on King's 
famous "Letter from Birmingham Jail," I will show how, with tireless persistence, he 
attempts to confront the myths used to justify violence, and one by one, attempts to 
demolish them. 
Like Gandhi, reason for King, is the measure of humanity. He argues that affirmative 
action is a reasonable policy to compensate against ongoing historical discrimination; 
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further, that American habits are stubbornly racist, even after the victories of the civil 
rights campaigns. He argues that racism is one mechanism of systematic oppression, 
bolstered by class conflict and violence. King seeks to purge violence from social relations 
in order to alleviate oppressive mechanisms and conditions. 
King draws distinctions between justice and injustice as he provides a philosophical 
justification for his militant involvement in the affairs of Birmingham: "I am in 
Birmingham because injustice is here." (King 1964: 77) In Birmingham, King finds three 
reasons to judge segregation laws as unjust: (1) They degrade personality; (2) they are 
inflicted upon a minority while the majority is unaffected and (3) they are enacted by a 
majority while the minority is prevented from participating in deliberations. Thus, King 
argues that he is obliged to present his body in protest. When Thoreau was asked why he 
was in jail, King replied by asking Thoureau why he was not. In the same manner, King 
defends the probity of his protest against the structure of Southern segregation. 
King routinely defends his philosophy of nonviolence for its unique ability to meet the 
demands of contemporary liberation [detailed below in his "six point plan"]. As the tide of 
optimism grew in the wake of successful campaigns in Montgomery and Birmingham, 
confidence in nonviolence also grew. During the "revolution of 1963," nonviolence 
attracted legions of followers. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to King in 1964. 
Then, again in Selma, in 1965, a Bloody Sunday of oppression was transformed 
nonviolently into a triumphant crusade for voting rights legislation. Reflecting upon the 
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glory days of the civil rights era, King once wrote that nonviolent resistance had become 
"the logical force in the greatest mass action crusade for freedom that ever occurred in 
American history." (King 1964: 25) 
King and his philosophy rose upon a tide of optimism. However, the fortunes of North 
American history did not rise accordingly, and King was left to withstand the groundswell 
of disappointment. In the summer of 1966, advocates for Black Power doctrines, 
reflecting their frustration with both King himself and the omnipresence of white power, 
staged an extended open protest against King's nonviolent theory of social change. In 
Chicago, King was booed by Black Power advocates. "They were now hostile because 
they were watching the dream that they had so readily accepted turn into a frustrating 
nightmare." (King 1967: 45) 
Although Martin Luther King Jr., lived a century after Frederick Douglass, the two 
reasoned in similar ways about the problems of America. Both confronted large white 
audiences, arguing that the Constitution challenged America to a higher destiny. Key 
clauses of the American creed affirmed self-evident truths such as equal rights, freedom 
and justice for all; yet these pronouncements in practice were applied with systematic 
double standards. Both asserted that human affairs should be guided by universal moral 
principles. Moreover, the difference between right and wrong could not be evaded 
because each bore different consequences: 
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In his recent work Revolution of Conscience: Martin Luther King Jr and the Philosophy 
of Nonviolence (1995), Greg Moses reminds us of further similarities between Douglass 
and King: In 1852, Douglass, stepped up to the podium on the occasion of the Fourth of 
July. On that day, in Rochester, New York, with slavery still the established way of life in 
the South, Douglass delivered a classic speech. "What have I to do with your 
independence? How dare you celebrate your freedoms in front of me!" This intellectual 
had escaped the worst, but he refused to join in celebrating freedoms his people could not 
share. It would be his chosen duty to mark the American distance between creeds and 
deeds. In the same way, King's classic "Letter from Birmingham Jail" also speaks to a 
white audience. Imprisoned for leading a civil rights demonstration without a permit in 
April 1963, he sent a reply to eight Alabama clergymen who found his tactics too extreme. 
"In a reply abounding in references to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures and to 
philosophers ancient and modern, Dr. King met his critics head on, and left a written 
legacy of his nonviolent approach to oppression." (Fahey & Armstrong 1992:113) 
The letter begins with the praise for the good will of his detractors and a patient rebuttal 
of the charge that the writer is an "outside agitator." Not only was he invited by the local 
chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, he says, but as a minister of the 
Gospel he declares his obligation to carry the Christian message wherever injustice still 
exists. 
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Dr King reminds the ministers that the demonstration he led may be unfortunate, but that 
"the white power structure of this city left the Negro community with no other 
alternative." Reviewing the long record of police brutality and unsolved bombings of 
churches in Birmingham, the author instructs his critics in the "four steps of any 
nonviolent campaign": (1) collection of the facts; (2) negotiation; (3) self-purification; (4) 
direct action. Focussing on these points, he denies that he acted irresponsibly. In the 
crisis created by direct action, King sees hope for "creative tension"--through the 
tolerance of beatings and other suffering—which as we have seen in Gandhi's project, can 
change an enemy into an ally [in this King echoes Gandhi's appeal to self-suffering]. He 
replies to the charge of being in too much of a hurry by recounting the long centuries of 
slavery and segregation and their effects on African Americans, especially the children. "I 
hope, sirs.. .you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience." 
Quoting Thomas Aquinas, King distinguishes between just laws and unjust ones, insisting 
all the while, that his followers accept the penalties of even unjust legislation. He 
expresses his impatience with the "white moderate" who is "more devoted to order than to 
justice." As to the charge of extremism, King places his movement midway between black 
nationalist groups which have lost faith in America and segregationists who play into their 
hands "If his (the African American's) repressed emotions do not come out in these non-
violent ways.. .they will come out in ominous expressions of violence," [a prediction made 
true after his own assassination in 1968]. 
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King turned to the issue of equality: "if white Americans would not accept equality for 
black Americans, then what might be their excuse?" King's answer was direct: white 
America had calculated the cost of equality and had decided it would not pay. Even 
though the country had been founded upon the principle that "all men are created equal," 
white America still reserved the right to interpret the principle in its own interest. As he 
explained elsewhere21 "Jefferson's majestic words, 'all men are created equal' meant for 
him, as for many others, that all white men are created equal." 
This concept of equality outlined by King was foundational to his later writings on 
nonviolence. Here again, King echoes Gandhi: 
. When compared to other philosophies of power - white or black - nonviolence 
alone insisted upon a single meaning for equality. Under the terms of the logic of 
nonviolence, opponents also were considered equal. (Moses 1997:29) 
But in the work of King, we not only see the success, but also the failure of nonviolent 
campaigns. During the final years of his life, King's quest for equality was neither winning 
friends nor influencing enemies. Both sides found King dismaying. Everyone agreed that 
the nation was in crisis, but white America could blame trouble on the "troublemakers" 
who led protest marches. White neighbourhoods of Chicago flung their hatred directly at 
King; meanwhile black voices questioned whether nonviolence alone could be expected to 
achieve their goals. After Chicago it seemed that nonviolence had reached its limits - 
Whites were no longer responsible with moderate compromises, and African Americans 
21 in his 1967 book Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? 
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were no longer volunteering to be punched. "At the same time, black aspirations for 
change remained undiminished, and so the impulse to confront white America at this 
particular time, jumped the track of nonviolence, literally took up arms, and openly called 
for revolution as a kind of colonial liberation." (Ibid) 
This reaction from both sides, represented division in place of the hoped-for unity. 
Evident in King's writing we see the call to dissolve barriers and realise a common 
structure. He refers to a type of occlusion whereby a privileged (white) version of reality 
obstructs the value of marginalised (black) persons "as if there were no ethical 
considerations it [is] bound to respect." (King in Moses 1997:57). By resisting this view, 
individuals assert their value and point to a common structure, in order to "reassert the 
regulatory value of ethical imperatives that favour the development of each and every 
personality." (Ibid.) (In Chapter Five, I will show how King's philosophy - to confront 
racial inequality with nonviolent resistance--has come full circle in the contemporary 
example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission) King states: 
Soon the doctrine of white supremacy was embedded in every textbook and 
preached in practically every pulpit. It became a structural part of the culture. 
And men then embraced this philosophy not as the rationalisation of a lie, but as the 
expression of a final truth. (King 1967: 75) 
Given the dream of equality and the reality of inequality, some kind of confrontation is 
inevitable. With respect to the beginnings of the African American civil rights campaign 
confrontation was not launched with fireworks and gusto, but came in the form of Rosa 
Parks, a quietly spoken seamstress. 
The Montgomery Bus Boycott 
Of all the facets of the segregation in Montgomery, the most degrading were the rules of 
the Montgomery City Bus Line. Although seventy percent of its passengers were black, 
it treated them like cattle - worse than that for nobody insults a cow. The first seats on 
all buses were reserved for whites. Even if they were unoccupied and the rear seats 
crowded. Negroes would have to stand at the back in case some whites might get aboard; 
and if the front seats happened to be occupied and more white people boarded the bus, 
black people seated in the rear were forced to get up and give them their seats. 
Furthermore.. Negroes had to pay their fares at the front of the bus, get off, and walk to 
the rear door to board again. Sometimes the bus would drive off without them after they 
had paid their fare. This would happen to elderly people or pregnant women, in bad 
weather or in good, and was considered a great joke by the drivers. Frequently the white 
bus drivers abused their passengers, called them niggers, black cows or black apes. 
Imagine what it was like for example, for a black man to get on a bus with his son and 
be subjected to such treatment. 
On December the first 1955, Mrs Rosa Parks, a forty-two ycar old seamstress boarded a 
bus to go home after a long day.. .the driver ordered Mrs Parkes to give her seat to a 
white man who boarded; this meant that she would have to stand all the way home. 
Rosa Parkes was not in a revolutionary frame of mind. She had not planned to do what 
she did...(1 was just plain tired and my feet hurt'). so she sat there, refusing to get up. 
The driver called a policeman who arrested her and took her to the courthouse.. .it 
seemed almost every Negro in Montgomery had had enough.... it was time to boycott the 
buses (King 1969:125) 
Coretta Scott King in My Life With Martin Luther King Jr. (1969) provides a moving 
rendition of this period of nonviolent action: 
...He [Dr King] recalled Thoreau's words "We can no longer lend our cooperation 
to an evil system". From this moment on, I conceived of our movement as an act 
of massive noncooperation. From then on, I rarely used the word 'boycott'.. .We 
stood together waiting for the next bus. It was empty too.. .we were so excited we 
could hardly speak [thousands were walking, riding mules, taking any means that 
they could]...As I watched them, I knew that there is nothing more majestic than 
the determined courage of individuals willing to suffer and sacrifice for their 
freedom and dignity... Our methods must be persuasion, not coercion., future 
historians will say "There lived a great people - a black people - who injected new 
meaning and dignity into the veins of civilization"... On December 9, city officials 
informed the Negro taxi companies that mass rides were illegal and that they 
would be put out of business [this led to a car pool and 'Freedom Rides']. ..the 
names of the sponsoring churches were painted on the car doors, and as they drove 
along filled to capacity, the people sang hymns. But with all we could do, 
thousands of people still had to walk. They walked magnificently and proudly.. .by 
now he [MLK] was consciously emulating the Gandhian technique, and many 
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people outside of the South were beginning to realise that something new was 
taking place in Montgomery. (King 1969:128-9, 134-5) 
It is apparent from the example discussed above, that King deliberately drew on Gandhian 
theory and practice. He began to closely align his Christian theory and the pursuit of civil 
rights with the Gandhian concept of struggle and self-suffering: 
Moses usefully draws out of King's collected works six aspects of nonviolent theory 
which provide a means for organising power along a broad front of struggle. This can be 
seen as a practical guide for conduct and the motivator for critical reflection. In summary, 
King argues that nonviolent campaigns are but one important act of struggle, and other 
aspects are equally important. King outlines the following six facets of a complete 
struggle: (1) "somebodyness;" (2) "group identity;" (3) "full and constructive use of the 
freedom we already have;" (4) "powerful action programs;" (5) "a continuing job of 
organization;" and (6) "giving society a new sense of values (King 1967: 122, 123, 126, 
128, 132). His analysis proposes a context for nonviolent direct action, which, as part of a 
dialectic of liberation, includes moments of self realisation, group solidarity, personal 
achievement, mass confrontation, mass organisation and a revaluation of values. I will 
briefly refer to each of these points below to show how, from King's perspective, 
nonviolent direct action is an organic element in a complex vision of social change, not an 
ultimate goal or panacea. 
In the first moment of struggle--the aspect of "somebodyness," the demoralised agent 
overcomes "a disastrous sense of his own worthlessness"--"a terrible feeling of being less 
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than human." (King 1967:122) King refers to the need to discard the "thingification" of 
the past, before the second important step: "to work passionately for group identity." 
(King 1967:123) This is the social realisation of "somebodyness." The African American 
not only affirms her worth, but the "worth of her own kind." She recognises that African 
Americans can unite around common goals. King is not forgetting that many problems of 
black life are structurally imposed, nor that solutions will require the common energies of 
black and white; but insists "We have been oppressed as a group and we must overcome 
that oppression as a group." (King 1967: 125) 
Building upon the needs of "somebodyness" and "group identity," there is a third aspect to 
King's program for nonviolent reconstruction, making constructive use of the freedom 
agents already possess. As they are Inwardly free, so must they act outwardly free, 
regardless of the menial tasks they may be forced to undertake. He argues that this is true 
for stars as well as laborers. "All labor that uplifts humanity has dignity and worth and 
should be pursued with respect for excellence." (King 1967: 127-128) What does it mean 
to sweep streets with pride? King at this stage does not know that he will be called to 
assist Memphis garbage collectors, but he fights against the common notion that there are 
some places for excellence, and some places excellence never visits. He wants to affirm 
the dignity of every useful act. The Memphis garbage collectors will come to wear signs 
that declare "I am a man." Having been relegated to the category of non-person, they were 
given the jobs that no person would want to do. Nevertheless, when King speaks of 
making the most of the opportunity, he is not saying that everyone should be happy 
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collecting garbage. On his view, the economic pressure to keep black America at the level 
of menial labor is a pressure worth fighting. 
Having worked his way from individual dignity, to group unity, then to individual 
opportunities already available, only now does King call upon nonviolent campaigns to 
confront the collective structure of injustice in the larger oppressive society: 
We will be greatly misled if we feel that the problem will work itself out. 
Structures of evil do not crumble by passive waiting... Evil must be attacked by a 
counteracting persistence, by the day to day assault of the battering rams of 
justice. (King 1967 : 128)22  
In this fourth moment of King's nonviolence project--the moment of direct action--a 
"structure of evil" is assaulted, "and a system is coerced into change." Now here we run 
into a few problems. This is King's moral equivalent of war. Up to this point it has been 
indeed possible to maintain a secular analysis of his work, but here we cannot avoid the 
hellfire and brimstone approach where those who are good are the winners and the sinners 
are definitely the losers. This stands in stark contrast to the works of Gandhi in the 
analysis above, where we see that nonviolence is not about winners at the expense of 
losers, nor about systems coerced into change. While there is no doubt about the 
enormous legacy left by King with respect to Western nonviolence, it is worth noting here 
two areas of concern: 
22 I will discuss shortly, the limitations of such an approach. 
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There is no escaping the fact that King is a minister of religion. His doctrine of love is 
informed by his theistic base--he has a profound faith in the reality of God and the cosmic 
imperative of justice; there is indeed an alternative to violence and oppression for him, 
and that alternative can .be found through Jesus Christ. Now this will be enormously 
helpful to the Christian readers seeking power through nonviolence, but limiting to those 
who do not share this view. Many of his influential words are delivered from the pulpit, 
and the message is love and forgiveness "for they know not what they do." There is a 
danger here for any theoretical account of power through nonviolence, where individual 
accountability is dismissed through this ignorance. One critical aspect of an action theory 
of power through nonviolence [developed further in the following two chapters] is the 
central role of the moral agent. An agent with choices, performing actions in the world, 
for which s/he must stand fully accountable. We will see for example in chapter 5 that it is 
acknowledgment of this accountability which becomes truth-creating and assists in the 
healing process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. It is useful 
to see the link here to later arguments in this project, but for now, I return the reader to 
the final categories of King's nonviolent program, organisation and the larger society: 
Recognition of the need to be organised in order to successfully accomplish nonviolent 
action is not startlingly original, but King sees the role of organisation cast within a 
systematic logic of struggle. "More and more the civil rights movement will have to 
engage in the task of organizing people into permanent groups to protect their interests 
and produce change in their behalf. This task is tedious, and lacks the drama of 
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demonstrations, but it is necessary for meaningful results." (King 1967:131) At this level 
King is insistent on middle class responsibility. He calls for the "haves" to join hands with 
the "have nots," to move away from a position of indifference and bring their "full 
resources (heart, mind and chequebook) to the aid of the less fortunate brother." (King 
1967:132) This aspect relates directly to King's "final challenge" of nonviolent social 
change, the revaluation of values. 
To be mindful of enlarging the whole society, and giving it a new sense of values as 
we seek to solve our particular problem (King 1967:132)...As we work to get rid of 
the economic strangulation that we face as a result of poverty, we must not 
overlook the fact that millions of Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Indians and 
Appalachian whites are also poverty-stricken. Any serious war against poverty 
must of necessity include them. As we work to end the educational stagnation that 
we face as a result of inadequate segregated schools, we must not be unmindful of 
the fact, as Dr James Conant has said, the whole public school system is using 
nineteenth-century educational methods in conditions of twentieth century 
' urbanization. (King 1967:132-133) 
For King then, if the evils of racism, poverty and militarism are to be defeated, a new set 
of values must emerge. The economy must become more person-centred than property-
and-profit-centred; and the government must depend more on its moral power than its 
military power. Within the six aspects of social empowerment, King has provided 
significant grounds for thought and action. 
"More white people learned about the shame of America, and finally faced some aspects 
of it, during the years of nonviolent protest than during the century before. Nonviolent 
direct action will continue to be a significant source of power until it is made irrelevant by 
the presence of justice." (King 1967: 139) Insistently, King recasts oppressive power in 
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terms of a common corruption that diminishes everyone's humanity. Injustice concerns 
every person imaginable [a sentiment to be echoed in chapters 4 and 5 by Professors 
Unger and Rinpoche]. 
After so much discussion, it is important to stop once again and take stock: I have argued 
that the current theoretical foundations of power through violence only represent part of 
the story about power, with the more interesting or constructive aspect of power [through 
nonviolence] hidden from view. Moreover, in order to reveal this hidden layer, I have 
claimed that simply adopting the present work on nonviolence will not be satisfactory 
either because: Western nonviolence theory comprises an anthology of stories from a 300 
year period of North American history. This collection contains three principal elements: 
protoarguments that look incomplete, (but are capable of being built upon); bad 
arguments that are an inadequate basis for a theory of nonviolence; and important 
challenges to nonviolence that should be considered before progressing further. I 
suggested that these challengers will begin to ask questions relevant to the sensible group, 
but will fail to provide answers. In this category we can call to mind Locke's compelling 
argument that nonviolence at that time offered only the capacity for the "throat of the 
lamb" to be "torn by the imperious wolf," and what sort of sensible agent would prefer to 
live in a society where the practice of nonviolence merely allowed open-slather for the 
benefit of robbers and oppressors? If this is all nonviolence has to offer, then he has a 
point--but it turns into a quarrel solved by more violence, and, I will argue in the following 
chapter that this is no solution at all. 
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We are faced at this point with making a choice. Work from the current foundations of 
nonviolence, limitations and all, or look elsewhere. Consider the current foundations: 
Some aspects of Quaker theory are not useful for a general theory of nonviolence, but 
other aspects are. So, if we are to use any of them, we must also take the necessary 
condition for Quakerism--its theological connection to nonviolence. But a review of the 
entire corpus of nonviolence seems to suggest that this is not just something we should 
take from Quakerism, but that: 
(1) If all significant practitioners of nonviolence work from a theological base [I can 
readily call to mind William Penn, John Woolman, William James, Henry David 
Thoureau, Martin Luther King Jr, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu and a number of Popes]. 
(2) Perhaps nonviolence naturally falls out of theology, and any contemporary theory 
of nonviolence should incorporate this. 
(3) This is supported by the body of work on nonviolence. Research in this area will 
repeatedly reveal the above names and the thing they have in common is a 
theological view. 
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(4) The current body of work on nonviolence is not limited to a Western view because 
it includes figures like MK Gandhi and terms like Satyagraha; this would allow for 
a widespread application and perhaps a global theory. 
and, 
(5) Philosophical interest in this area is relatively new, so you wouldn't expect to find 
an elegant, cohesive theoretical foundation already in place. 
But, 
(6) By searching out false starts and challengers and beginnings of theories, it is 
possible to build on them and articulate a strong theoretical base for nonviolence, 
which can contribute to the philosophical landscape. 
(7) If this conclusion is reasonable, then those individuals who are not prepared to 
take the whole theological package, may have no valid claims to interest in its 
component parts (like nonviolence) (After all, wouldn't it be the same as a person 
wanting to cool off by dipping their feet into a river but not wanting to get wet 
feet?). If you want the benefits of nonviolence, then surely on this view, you must 
take the theological ethical foundations which accompany it. 
So far, so good. In constructing a new global theory of nonviolence, then, a 
contemporary philosopher should already have access to all the relevant conceptual 
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foundations required for a good theory (on the standard terms, one that is explanatorily 
successful). 
There is only one small problem with proceeding from this perspective: 	Two 
contemporary examples of nonviolence fall outside of this explanatory domain, and one of 
them offers a discourse which completely defies the "Rivers are Always Wet" argument-- 
an entire metaphysics grounded in nonviolence with no theistic base whatsoever. 
In the following chapter I will argue that a contemporary theory of nonviolence with 
global application must take account of this compelling metaphysics. This will call for a 
completely different process, and I will discuss the need for "fusion philosophy" or the 
joining of Western and non-Western ideas. This broadening of the discourse will enable 
the theory to provide answers to the sensible agent unavailable in the present Western 
framework. It will also allow a consideration of new definitions for foundational terms 
like violence, nonviolence and power. 
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Chapter Four 
- A Non-Western Solution: stepping out of the river of violence - 
(a serious look at fusion philosophy) 
We are going through a period of transition in many parts of the world. By definition a period of 
transition generates much anxiety and uncertainty because familiar landmarks have shifted or have 
been removed, leading to a sense of disorientation, possible lack of direction and apparent lack of 
purpose. 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1995) 
When power implicates violence, and violence cannot be legitimate the result is 
disorientation and a problematic framework for philosophy, with no clear solution. 
When the rate of change in society is so swift and the conceptual scaffolding to support 
that change is inadequate, disorientation is a natural consequence. Take as an example 
a recent seven day period on the global scene. During a single week we have been 
witness to a change of government after 32 years and the freeing of political prisoners 
in Indonesia, a National Day of Regret focussing on reconciliation with indigenous 
Australians, and a vote for lasting peace in Ireland. All of these examples define the 
point of reconciliation where theory meets practise. My claim is that as a discipline, 
philosophy is underprepared to provide an adequate conceptual scaffolding to support 
individuals or larger groups in society to make the change from actions of violence to 
actions of nonviolence. 
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At the beginning of this dissertation, I referred to the utility of selecting individuals 
from an imaginary "top 10 philosophers" chart, and extracting insights relating to 
power in a general sense. Though ethical insights from Western Greats like Luther, 
Spinoza and Russell will be useful to any research on nonviolence this does not in any 
satisfactory sense, constitute a separate theoretical framework for nonviolence. On 
offer are useful fragments to strengthen a case for right action, but when we turn to 
nonviolence as a concept within the domain of philosophy (as the obvious candidate to 
provide a solution to the problem of power and violence) the result is disappointing. 
Dissatisfaction with the core body of work on nonviolence is not only my concern. But 
it is evident that nonviolence is not treated seriously as a subject worthy of 
philosophical investigation. This becomes the first and most obvious problem for 
anyone interested in the area. How nonviolence came to be so constituted becomes the 
second problem. 
It can be concluded from the analysis below that from a Western perspective 
nonviolence is (a) accorded the strange status of an absence of something;' further, it is 
identified as (b) an aspect of religious belief, and therefore does not belong in the 
separate (and important) realm of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, nonviolence is 
viewed as (c) a political tactic and again, not a philosophical issue, but rather belonging 
under the auspices of media theory, political science, or something of that nature. 
There is an explanation for these conclusions: 
'In this case an absence of violence—see definitions p.199. 
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Nonviolence is (historically) a commitment of particular religious communities 
[Western anthologies of nonviolence cite Christian theology, 2 Quakerism and 
Hinduism' as the place where nonviolence has been theorised] Investigation proves 
this to be correct: 
The derivation of "violence" stems from the Aristotelian notion of violating the natural 
order. On this view violence entails desecrating, defiling or showing disrespect for ( ie 
doing violence to) something valued, sacred or cherished. For philosophers of ancient 
Greece, it was human nature, usually conceived teleologically that fixed the content of 
this flourishing. Medieval Christian writers interpreted this as entailing that human 
flourishing is not merely the fulfilment of capacities and tendencies inherent in human 
nature, but is the realisation of the Divine plan. From a theistic perspective, then, the 
natural order refers to the work of God the creator, set into motion, by the Divine will. 
Violating this order can be seen as contrary to fundamental beliefs, and to be avoided at 
all costs. This standpoint leads to a foundational concern for nonviolence (in chapter 3 
this idea can be seen in the foundations of Quaker theory). 
Within this legacy of nonviolence lies another problem: if nonviolence is in effect the 
property of theistic communities, this immediately excludes a vast number of people 
who do not share this view (we can think Of Buddhists, agnostics and secular atheists). 
Continuing analysis points to the conclusion that nonviolence falls prey to an even more 
2 Particularly with reference to the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
3  Usually a narrow reference to Hinduism as a legacy from MK Gandhi. 
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entangling set of problems: As an aspect of religion, nonviolence is dismissed from the 
corpus of philosophy, but this exclusive access to the "truth of nonviolence" through 
religions like Quakerism buries it even deeper for the following reason: Such groups 
have insisted on segregation, 4  deliberately withdrawing themselves from the wider 
community, with the result that mainstream society [and mainstream philosophy] have 
not treated the legacy from such groups [in this case nonviolence] as a serious subject 
for philosophical analysis. In effect, to access nonviolence we must open not one, but 
two locked doors. 
Combine this religious association with (c) (nonviolent action as a political tactic or 
strategy) and it is not difficult to see why the subject is largely dismissed by 
contemporary Western philosophers: Even if we bracket for a moment, the view that 
nonviolence as a tactic looks like it should belong to political science or media studies, 
it begins to founder upon the rocks of logical analysis, leading to its dismissal (for an 
altogether different reason) from serious philosophical concern: As a means to an end, 
something is gained at the expense of another; there are winners and losers (befitting 
the context where strategy is often applied to a situation of war); and in many cases the 
appearance of intentional harm is the result (Sharp discusses nonviolent action or 
noncooperation as both a strategy and weapon to "paralyze and disintegrate" 
oppressive systems through "nonviolent coercion"). In this way, nonviolent action can 
be readily shown to cause harm, and appears to reflect the language of violence when it 
engages in paralyzing and disintegrating oppressive systems. When it even more 
4 see p.142 Chapter 3, for a detailed explanation of why Quakers insist on segregation. 
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surprisingly adds the term "coercion" to its description it is not difficult to see why no 
staunch opponents are required when a view is so apparently self-defeating. Hence its 
dismissal becomes hardly surprising. And so we find the lack of any cohesive 
theoretical foundation for nonviolence in available literature. 
However, it is not the case that contemporary philosophy fails to pay attention to 
ethics: After all we can call upon virtue ethics, the theory of war, the theory of justice 
and ethics of care to name only a few from an increasingly extended list. It is amazing 
though despite all of this ethical activity, on the foundational issue of the legitimacy and 
illegitimacy of violence, contemporary ethics is remarkably silent. If we begin to 
undertake an analysis of nonviolence from a starting point within philosophy, we 
encounter the strange tensions introduced earlier, made even stranger by this relative 
silence about something which seems so important. I propose that we step for a 
moment outside of the profession, and take an ordinary, common sense, pre-reflective 
view. From this standpoint, a possible list of important concerns for living a meaningful 
life on the planet would give a reasonably significant position to how violence could 
possibly be justified. From this simple vantage point, violence and nonviolence rate as 
important issues, and it is from this common sense position, that I will continue piecing 
together an argument for an alternative metaphysics of power based on nonviolence. 
For an alternative metaphysics to be successful, I will need to provide a convincing 
rejoinder to the current grounds for dismissal of the subject by mainstream philosophy. 
In so doing, I will propose a solution through fusion philosophy (or the joining together 
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of a Western and non-Western philosophical perspective to produce a result which is 
more informative than the sum of its parts). 
This solution will provide an alternative to what I see as the fourth significant problem: 
the nepotism of Western philosophy, where it looks only to its own ranks for the truth; 
where the interlocutors remain silent on the illegitimacy of violence and appear even 
conceptually impaired when it comes to recognising solutions proposed by their non-
Western counterparts (it is, after all philosophy in precisely the same sense when the 
same Tibetan philosophers are interested in the same ontological and epistemological 
distinctions that occupy their Australian, British or North American colleagues). While 
some objectors might take exception to the tone of this introductory section and 
dismiss its content as an overly harsh criticism of Western philosophy, this is not the 
case. I have mentioned ethical insights of a general nature which can be drawn from 
philosophers like Russell, Spinoza and Luther; I have focussed on the enormous legacy 
of nonviolence left by early Quakers and Christians, with views of prominent members 
like William Penn and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. I do however, hold firm on 
what I consider justified criticism of Western philosophy when it looks to its own ranks 
for the truth, where the interlocutors remain silent on the illegitimacy of violence and 
appear conceptually impaired when it comes to solutions proposed by members of the 
non-Western philosophical community. 
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I return our discussion to the first issue raised by the introduction, and a reasonable 
starting point for a new metaphysics of nonviolence--its definition: 
The definition of nonviolence found in The Concise Oxford Dictionary [hence common 
Western usage] stipulates "the avoidance of violence" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
1990:808). If we refer to "violence" to find out what it is that we are avoiding in the 
same source, it is "involving or using great physical force." (1990:1370) This 
apparently is the end of the story and the only interesting thing to say on the matter. If 
we defer to the discipline of philosophy to take another look at the definitions of 
"violence" and "nonviolence," the story is not so different: nonviolence is the 
"renunciation of violence" (The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995:538); and 
what we are renouncing is "the use of force to cause harm, death or destruction." 
(1995:839) 
In either case, the agent is undertaking (the renunciation or application of) a physical 
act. This particular source makes passing reference to the fact that violence may also 
be considered as "emotional," and institutionalised, and that it can be an act against 
persons, animals or property. This broadening of the understanding of the meaning of 
violence is a definite improvement on the lack of depth given by the common sense 
definition of the term, but it does nothing to assist our analysis, for this reason: these 
definitions of violence and nonviolence, from a common sense (every day use) and 
philosophical understanding, are conceptually weaker than definitions required to 
201 
construct a new metaphysics of power incorporating the terms. They refer only to the 
action and have nothing to say about the agent undertaking the action, nor the 
germination of violence and can consequently have nothing to say about the antidote to 
violence. I offer a new and more comprehensive definition of "violence" and 
"nonviolence" for consideration, definitions which reflect the root of the problem and 
the pathway to the antidote. 
Violence is like a disease. It is crucial to know as much about the disease as possible in 
order to identify it, to contain it, and eventually to provide an antidote against it. It is 
at this point, that the concept of fusion philosophy referred to earlier will now be taken 
seriously and begin to emerge in a new action theory for power and nonviolence. The 
new definitions of violence and nonviolence taken from non-Western philosophy sit 
within the context of this broader domain and will be introduced below, following a 
brief review of our position: 
My concern to this point has grown out of an analysis which describes power in a way 
that implicates violence. Decision-makers in positions of power at a global level, or 
individuals wielding power in their own lives encounter problems when we invoke the 
argument that violence cannot be legitimate. This tightens the screw a little further, and 
further still when we turn to nonviolence as the obvious candidate to provide a solution 
to this dilemma. We find that nonviolence has limited credibility within the framework 
of philosophy--rather, it is simply "religion" or one small aspect of media studies or 
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political science. This view is supported by definitions of the terms where nonviolence 
is merely a "lack" of violence, and violence is force. As a lack of force the subtext 
reads "nonviolence is a weakness"; as a weakness and something to do with religion, it 
is certainly not a candidate for serious philosophical analysis. Any remaining doubt is 
put to rest by reference to nonviolence strategy which--when characterised by terms 
like "coercion," "obliterate" and "paralyse"--can be readily shown to cause harm. But 
before we rush to accept this as the truth of the matter, we should be mindful of the fact 
that Western philosophy looks only to its own ranks for truth. Yet while engaging 
itself in all of this ethical activity, when it comes to the foundational issue of the 
legitimacy and illegitimacy of violence, contemporary philosophy is remarkably silent. 
Based on this observation, we are justified in calling contemporary philosophy to 
account for its silence, for where it seeks truth, for what it chooses to treat seriously 
and for the grounds upon which it is prepared to dismiss hopeful candidates. 
I previously stressed the need for more considered definitions of "violence" and 
"nonviolence" on the basis of which to build a new metaphysics of power. These have 
been imported from a non-Western perspective and the exponent of the view and 
practitioner of nonviolence is Professor Samdhong Rinpoche. I will also consider 
supporting views proposed by the Dalai Lama. 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of S. Rinpoche's view on nonviolence, 
it will be necessary from time to time to expand upon foundations of that view which 
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arise out of Mahayana Buddhism. I will detail in an abridged way, concepts like 
interdependent origination, conventional and ultimate truth (Satyagraha, as an 
insistence on this truth), and the combination of means and ends as they relate to the 
principles and practice of nonviolence. I will confine discussion to those areas that 
relate in a crucial way to nonviolence or those which highlight particularly important 
philosophical points. This criterion (as it relates to my limited dissertation discussion) 
should not lead the reader to understand that these few points are the only interesting 
aspects of Mahayana Buddhism in relation to nonviolence. 5 Having made reference to 
this non-theistic doctrine, it is crucial to note that the following definitions of "violence" 
and "nonviolence" withstand scrutiny from a secular perspective, and I endorse 
Rinpoche's view, that the definitions and resulting philosophical implications can be 
accessed by all, regardless of their religious commitments. This point will become 
increasingly important as a rejoinder to those who recognise nonviolence in the West as 
a purely theistic legacy, and correctly view the exclusion which entails, as problematic. 
In order to present a detailed analysis of nonviolence from the perspective of S. 
Rinpoche and the Dalai Lama, we must first understand what is entailed by violence and 
nonviolence on their terms6 : 
5 Further analysis in this area can be made by reference to Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and 
Emptiness; Guy Newland, The Two Truths; the Oxford translation of Santideva's Bodhicarayavatara,; 
Jay L. Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way; Thich Nhat Hanh, Fourteen Guidelines for 
Engaged Buddhism; and by the same author, Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent Social Change. 
6 The English translation is at times unsatisfactory due to the separation of an action, from the agent 
performing that action. Where this occurs, the Sanskrit definition (which is much richer, 
encompassing the inner emotional state of the agent), is given in addition to the English. 
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(Definition 1): 
Violence 
Any action, cause of action or intention of action which is born out of hatred (Sanskrit: 
dvish - a term with connotations of malice and hostility) or greed (raga - term with 
visceral connotations of possessiveness, selfishness, lust, grasping) by a will to harm 
others or an indifferent attitude; or lack of caring for others, is violence. 
(Definition 2): 
Nonviolence 
Wilfully refraining from any action, cause of action or intention of action which is born 
out of hatred (Sanskrit: dvish) or greed (raga) accompanied by a will to refrain from 
harming others or from an indifferent attitude; or lack of caring for others, is 
nonviolence. 
From the Western perspective, nonviolence is understood to be a lack of violence (read 
into "lack" a position of "weakness"). The Mahayana perspective outlined above on 
the other hand, frames nonviolence, not as a lack but a "strength"; a positive action 
accompanied by compassion. Appropriate accompanying terms would include araga & 
advish (meaning the opposite of those things, not a lack of those negative attributes, 
but a full replacement with positive attributes' with a focus on action in every aspect of 
This particular idea of positive attributes is encapsulated in the term kushala mula (Sanskrit term for 
the root of that which is beneficial, virtuous or proper; the foundation of goodness, where goodness in 
this sense relates on the one hand to beneficial things, and to the moral perspective, on the other.) 
From this term we can see that it is not intended that nonviolence merely be a lack of something. 
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daily life, rather than no action or merely refraining from causing harm). Of special 
note is the important focus on action in each definition. For an act to be nonviolent, the 
agent must "wilfully refrain from" violence. Such an act must be a deliberate exertion 
on the part of the agent, in thought, in speech and in physical action to refrain from 
violence. On this criterion an action is not nonviolent if one merely refrains from 
violence because one thinks it strategically superior to act in a way that harms nobody. 
In Such a case because the intention is not nonviolent even if the subsequent action has 
all of the obvious hallmarks of nonviolence--the action is not nonviolent. For the same 
reason, if an agent, recognising overwhelming odds against her, refrained from acting, 
this would not be nonviolence but cowardice. Again because the intention is not 
nonviolent, simply doing nothing doesn't count. The action, both in mind and body 
needs to be wilftil and to be completed. s 
In arriving at the new definitions, we have bridged a considerable gap by increasing the 
scope and naming the more subtle extensions of violence. To this we have added the 
intention of the agent undertaking the act, but it is important to note the following 
technical point: the definition still refers to nonviolence as "refraining from" something. 
Objectors might challenge the extent to which this represents any progress on the 
original definition of nonviolence (where my criticism is directed at the urgent need to 
replace "a lack of' with an affirmative statement). S. Rinpoche's new definition does 
8 Consider another example: If the agent is witness to violence (she is across the street when a mugger 
approaches the victim and carries out an act . of violence) from the Western vievvpoint, the agent is 
merely an observer who has nothing to do with the violent act taking place, and therefore is in no way 
culpable; but from this Mahayana viewpoint, since that agent saw the violence taking place, and in no 
way denounced that violence or attempted to intervene she is party to that act of violence. 
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move beyond the original criticism. The 'a' particle (advish or araga) does not 
represent a word which is negative (an absence or lack of something) but represents a 
full replacement with positive qualities and strengths. For clarity of meaning, I have 
recast S. Rinpoche's definition of nonviolence in the affirmative context (this is an aide 
to analysis only, and is not be seen as a replacement of the new definition which is 
stronger left in its original form). A Mahayana Buddhist analysing these terms takes 
away an immediate understanding of S. Rinpoche's definition of nonviolence in the 
following context: 
Nonviolence demonstrates (in every action from intention to completion of 
action) genuine concern and compassion for the self and all things outside 
the self (other agents, the environment and so on). Nonviolence typically 
demonstrates compassion, tolerance and an understanding of the principle 
of interdependence, an insistence on the truth of human dignity, equality 
and justice. 
The components of this definition--the intention of the agent, completing an action, 
interdependence, compassion for others and an analysis of the truth of nonviolence--
will form the basis of discussion for the remainder of this chapter. I return the reader to 
a focus on the intention of the action. There is another important respect in which we 
should consider the current common sense definition of "violence" to be deficient when 
it fails to refer to intention: 
Mackenzie (1897:133-135) correctly points out that the Mill's Utilitarianism legacy of 
insisting that "the motive of an action has nothing to do with the morality of the action" 
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is wrong. Mackenzie argues that Mill's position is erroneous to suppose that moral 
judgement must be passed on things done: 
The moral judgement is not properly passed on things done, but upon a person doing. 
If it were not so, we should pass moral judgements on the instinctive acts of animals, 
and even on the movements of rocks, clouds and avalanches. What we judge instead is 
conduct; and this means not merely an overt act, but the attitude of a person in acting; 
and his attitude must include his motive." (Mackenzie 1897:135) 
If when making moral judgements, what we judge is conduct (not merely an overt act, 
but the attitude including motive or intention of the person acting) then intention should 
be part of the analysis of violence and nonviolence. But, it isn't found in any Western 
analysis. As we have seen, current definitions of "violence" focus on the action, and 
often limit that action to physical force (and nonviolence by default to absence of 
force). The strength of S. Rinpoche's new definitions of "violence" and "nonviolence" 
is the distinguishing feature of intention. 
Before analysing the implications of S. Rinpoche's new work 9 on nonviolence, it is 
important to acknowledge and respond to, what would almost certainly be a challenge 
to the practicality of considering nonviolence in the first place. It is in response to this 
charge of impracticality, that S. Rinpoche's work is directed: 
Surely, violence is everywhere. Modern society not only comprises institutionalised 
violence, but sanctions and seeks to legitimise the use of force and coercion. 
Individuals emerge from this society apparently determined to wreak destruction and 
9 S. Rinpoche, work in progress May 1998. 
208 
harm. We are faced with such an overwhelmingly powerful tidal wave of violence that 
it is pointless to try and resist—attempting to swim against the current is futile. This 
seems to be a rational observation, and becomes a common lament in contemporary 
society with no apparent solution. S. Rinpoche offers the following rejoinder: 
"The choice need not be, to be swept along with the current of violence or to try in vain 
to swim against the tide. The individual who recognises this violence for what it is i° 
should oppose it and step out of the river, choosing instead, actively and 
compassionately to pursue a life of nonviolence. One will step out, and then another, 
and then another and then perhaps, many.. .with the result that by this action, the tide of 
violence is reduced and the one or many may return with the strength of nonviolence, 
realistically to oppose it." 
This view, grounded in Buddhist action theory is different from that of many Western 
practitioners (included below) who offer nonviolence as a way of resolving conflict 
purely on the argument that the means influence the ends. We find this sentiment in the 
historic Quaker community, and would also find its reflection in the Christian 
Commandments. It encompasses the adage that "violence begets violence" and 
therefore an end to the violence between individuals, groups and states is only possible 
through change instigated by nonviolent means. However, from this religious 
perspective alone, the truth of nonviolence is conditional on the truth of religious 
10 See definition p.203. 
"Prof. S. Rinpoche Teachings on 'Buddhism, Satyagraha and Nonviolence', April 22, 1998. 
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claims about the will, and the nature of God the Creator, and violence as the violation 
of this God-given order. While Mahayana Buddhism will certainly also consider means 
and ends, nonviolence is not purely instrumental (in the sense that it is a means to attain 
some goal, a practice which can then cease upon attainment). Rather, from the 
Mahayana perspective nonviolence is both the way to the goal, and the goal itself. It is 
in this sense a means and end combined. I2 
From this Buddhist perspective violence is the cause of and the perpetuation of 
suffering, and therefore nonviolence must be considered from the viewpoint of freeing 
both oneself and others from the causes of suffering, and by implication, from the roots 
out of which violence arises. In this respect, the Buddhist concept of nonviolence 
includes refraining from that which is born out of hatred, malice, hostility, greed, 
possessiveness, selfishness, lust and so on; as well as the wilful refraining from harming, 
having an indifferent attitude to, or lacking in care for others. In this way, it not only 
eliminates the rational cause of violence, but also the irrational causes, both from within 
oneself and from within power relations with others. 
It is reasonable for objectors to ask whether it is possible for anyone to actualise this 
and yet still participate in the everyday world. S. Rinpoche answers in the affirmative, 
and offers an account of individual nonviolent action as a means to social nonviolent 
action, and as a rational way to live in its own right. This account begins as an 
individual progression along a path toward an ideal, during which one recognises the 
12 Well summarised by Thich Nhat Hanh's "there is not 'a way to peace', peace is the way." (1993:5) 
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truth about the self; and the truth about external reality [detailed below]. If the 
individual can achieve this for one hour, then why not one day? if one day, then with 
effort, why not one week? if one week, then with commitment, hard work and 
mindfulness, why not a lifetime? The interesting thing about the notion of "think 
globally, act locally" on this view is that when one individual can achieve this, it 
changes from a hypothetical ideal, to a real possibility for others to do the same; to 
exercise power through nonviolent means and to make a positive change by stepping 
out of the river of violence. 13 
Before addressing the theoretical foundations which make this action possible, it will be 
necessary to gain an understanding of the Mahayana Buddhist metaphysical and ethical 
framework. I will explore below why ignorance is perceived to be the seed from which 
violence and suffering grow, and the Buddhist conception of reality, involving 
conventional and ultimate truth. 14 . 
According to Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, ignorance lies at the root of our 
difficulties and suffering. This ignorance is not merely a lack of understanding, but a 
13 Rather than take the view that it would require a "moral saint" to achieve this, ordinary actions that 
we may view on the surface as violent, under this description become permissible depending on 
intention. Later in the chapter this will be made clear through the discussion on the difference 
between hurt and harm and the all important intention behind the action. 
14 This is not a dissertation on Buddhist philosophy. If it were so, the four principal schools of 
Buddhist philosophy would need to be discussed along with a detailed analysis of technical terms and 
closely connected philosophical points, the tantric system, the path to enlightenment, and a detailed 
exposition of emptiness would all be expected and required I restate here, for the sake of clarity, that I 
will call upon a small number of key premises from Mahayana Buddhist philosophy which have 
something to say about nonviolence; aspects which also have useful application in a secular sense. 
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misconception of how things exist and, most importantly, how the self exists. 
"Although the self is merely attributed to the combination of body and mind, our 
misconception fabricates a self which is an exaggeration of what actually exists. We 
cling to this and seek the kind of friends, possessions and surroundings that we imagine 
will ensure happiness of this fabricated self" (Powers 1995:8) This ignorance drives our 
actions, and Powers (1995) reminds us of the detailed analytical treatment action 
receives in Buddhist theory: When one speaks with a good motivation, a friendly 
atmosphere is created as an immediate result; in turn, the action makes an imprint on 
the mind, inducing pleasure in the future. With a bad motivation, a hostile atmosphere is 
created immediately, and pain is induced for the speaker in the future. Buddhist 
philosophy points to the fact that the individual is fully accountable for his/her own 
actions. This means that pleasure and pain arise from virtuous and non-virtuous actions 
which come not from outside but from within the agent. "We are buffeted by desire and 
anger and experience the effects of the actions we perform under the influence of these 
turbulent emotions." (Ibid) This places the accountability for violence and nonviolence 
squarely on the shoulders of the individual. 
Since Buddhism holds that the problem of violence is a cognitive one (as harmful 
negative emotions drive intention and subsequent action), the solution requires the agent 
to work from within; to reduce the level of violence and increase the level of tolerance, 
compassion and mindfulness of others [the Dalai Lama refers to this as "internal 
disarmament"" and insists that it is just as useful as the more commonly known term of 
15 See full context of discussion in Appendix 2, extract of interview p. 350. 
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"external disarmament"]. This is not an activity in which one should just indulge in on 
Sundays. Nor should the individual wait until such a time that violence presents itself 
before calling upon the principle of nonviolence--it should rather be seen as a way of life 
and the focus of effort every minute of every day. Recognition however, is given to the 
fact that this is not an easy task: 
"One of the greatest obstacles to this (practise of nonviolence) lies in the fact that 
worldly existence is full of traps that beguile the unwary and blind them to the harsh 
realities of the world. The world is full of suffering, aging, and death, but most of 
us overlook these and focus on momentary pleasures. Those who view cyclic 
existence in accordance with reality, however, understand that all who are caught up 
in it must inevitably suffer over and over again. This truth was recognised with full 
existential clarity by the Buddha on the night of his enlightenment, and he expressed 
it in a set of propositions that are referred to by Buddhists as the four noble truths." 
(Powers 1995:56) 
Before expanding this discussion to examine the Four Noble Truths and the 
requirement for nonviolence, it will be worthwhile to consider an example of the typical 
agent acting in the world. For the purpose of this example, I will recall an individual 
from our sensible group introduced in chapter three, and to whom, any alternate 
metaphysics of power through nonviolence, would be answerable (you will recall that 
this person is not one we might label extreme in any sense; not a member of the gun-
slinging, bandit-slaying brigade, nor over religiously zealous, but rather just a typical, 
citizen, who could be you or me). This person recognises that violence is not a 
preferred choice, but cannot see any viable alternative and therefore accepts the lesser 
of two evils--allowing violence in self-defence, protection of family, livelihood and so 
on: 
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The world is a vicious and often cutthroat place. If, as a permanent fixture in it, I 
must defend my 'lot', fighting off the enemy, shouting down detractors...I am just 
acting rationally. The biblical adage "an eye for an eye" looks perfectly reasonable. 
Anyway, it's not my fault, I didn't create the problems of poverty, sickness and 
unemployment; I am a pawn in a society of systematised, state-run violence and 
coercion, and therefore will do what little I can to retain the small gains I have made. 
Such an example needn't be seen as an exaggerated fiction; it could be any one of a 
dozen people we know. 
From the Mahayana perspective, this person has an incorrect view. With respect to the 
first point, that the world is a vicious and often cutthroat place, there may be little 
disagreement (after all everything is suffering. This is the first of the Four Noble 
Truths), but this the extent of the similarity of outlook. That the individual (mistakenly) 
sees herself as a permanent fixture defending her lot in life, is simply an incorrect view 
stemming from ignorance--wrong belief about the way the world is, and about the self 
in particular. 
On the sensible view the agent is a permanent entity and can justify clinging and 
grasping attachment to hard-earned material goods, justifying violence required to 
protect him/herself against known or unknown enemies. On this view, each individual 
agent can be understood as an independent island. At the micro level, interaction with, 
and subsequent action toward others could be motivated by suspicion or paranoia, with 
efforts to protect one's investments (whether family or property) leading to "justified 
violence," or falling prey as victim to the violence of others. At the macro level of 
institutionalised violence, the commands given to subordinates, by generals to 
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"neutralise targets" often appear clean and simple and justified in the national interest 
with little or no accountability. The subtext reads: "Human life is cheap when there is 
a choice between someone else's life and protecting, our interests." Violence is made 
easier still by abstracting or dehumanising our victims or treating them as statistical 
phenomena. Fighter pilots by following a scenario more reminiscent of a computer 
game can, by pressing buttons, and only in a matter of seconds discharge a missile and 
murder thousands of people; returning in due course for dinner with the family. 
But from the Mahayana Buddhist perspective, a strong belief in the truth of interbeing 
or interdependence (The Dalai Lama once said that if he had to sum up his Buddhist 
perspective in one word it would be "interbeing") deposes the inclusive-exclusive 
dichotomy of the self and other; resulting in a radically different world view to that of 
Western culture, which holds independence and a strong sense of identity in high 
regard. Mahayana Buddhist philosophy insists that a more accurate awareness of self 
recognises the dependence on everything around it, and in this way values interaction 
with others and with the environment: 
Life is one. We do not need to slice it into pieces and call this or that piece a 
"self'. What we call a self is made only of non-self elements. When we look at 
a flower, for example, we may think that it is different from "non-flower" 
things. But when we look more deeply, we see that everything in the cosmos is 
in that flower. Without all of the non-flower elements—sunshine, clouds, earth, 
minerals, heat rivers and consciousness--a flower cannot be. That is why the 
Buddha teaches that the self does not exist. We have to discard all distinctions 
between self and non-self " (Naht Hanh 1993:33) 
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Suddenly the agent becomes much more accountable. Following instructions to 
dispatch bombs becomes irrational on a view which places equal value on all fife; a 
view which insists that the agent is totally accountable for all intentions and actions; a 
view which promotes the practice of compassion and altruism. In order to practice 
altruistic nonviolence, we are asked to love our enemies. To do this, one is required to 
subvert the label "enemy" and to understand that "enemy" is a situation-dependent 
convention, not an absolute; that the enemy is responding to a situation from the 
backdrop of his experience; that at different times, the labels "friend," "enemy" and 
"stranger", may all denote the same person. Our attitude and response are altered by 
this different perspective. One is more inclined to respond with understanding and 
deference (Archbishop Desmond Tutu, as we shall see in the next chapter, picks up 
this point and refers to an enemy as a "friend one has not yet made"). 
The sensible agent in this example is indeed leading a difficult life. But clinging, 
grasping attachment will only lead to negative emotions like fear, hatred and greed, 
perpetuating the cycle of violence. Mahayana Buddhists argue that there is a way out 
of this suffering. It is impossible to remove obstacles and difficulties; they will always 
be present in life. But through a changed world view, through practise and effort, the 
agent can become mindful and compassionate; actions will then generate peace and 
16 The Dalai Lama in The Spirit of Tibet: Vision for Human Liberation (1996:190-191) emphasises 
that merely thinking that compassion and patience are good, will not be enough to develop them. We 
must wait for difficulties to arise and then attempt to practice them "and who creates such 
opportunities? Not our friends of course, but our enemies. They are the ones who truly give us the 
most trouble. So if we truly wish to learn, we should consider our enemies our best teachers!" 
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happiness for the self and others, and the individual will be equipped with mental 
strength to tackle injustice and oppression. 
The Dalai Lama urges a clear stand against oppression and injustice and argues that this 
should be carried out with confidence based on the Principles of the Four Noble Truths: 
The truth concerning the unjust situation should be fully exposed (the first truth: 
suffering). The various causes of injustice should be enumerated (the second truth: the 
cause of suffering). The purpose and desire for removing the injustices should be made 
obvious (the third truth: the removal of suffering). The measure for removing the 
injustice should be proposed (the fourth truth: the way to end suffering). The way to 
end suffering is by pursuing the eightfold path and leading a compassionate and 
nonviolent life. 
For the Mahayana Buddhist, the truth of suffering is that all of conventional existence is 
inevitably connected with suffering. It is important to note that the term "suffering" has 
a wide range of connotations. Powers refers to Duhkha, or suffering, as not only 
physical pain, but also to emotional turmoil, discomfort, dissatisfaction, and sorrow. 
The truth of suffering is a recognition that these things are found in the lives of ordinary 
beings and that they generally view them as being unpleasant. 
We have to understand our circumstances and know that, given the nature of cause and 
effect ... we can look forward to nothing but suffering; we are enmeshed in the various 
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factors of cause and effect which lead first to one state of suffering and on that basis to 
another, and so on. When we have seen the inherent limitations of this situation, we can 
begin to consider getting out of it. 
It is at this point, that the previously introduced sensible individual runs out of options 
on the Western view. S/He is enmeshed, the tidal wave of violence is too strong. S/He 
cannot begin to imagine how to change the unsatisfactory circumstances--s/he feels, 
and will testify to being powerless [this problem is analysed in the final chapter of the 
dissertation]. From the Mahayana Buddhist perspective, while this sensible individual 
maintains an incorrect view and a lack of understanding about the causes of violence 
and displeasure, s/he cannot be released from the destructive social web of desire, 
attachment and violence. 
Before examining one course of action available to the sensible agent it will be helpful 
to pause and take stock: There is no escaping the fact that at the close of the 
Twentieth Century suffering and violence are aspects of life encountered by all of us on 
a daily basis. Many describe an "overwhelming tidal wave of violence" the effects of 
which appear to be inescapable. But such pessimism may seem premature when we 
consider the rapid pace of change in a global community. 
The Western philosophical tradition sees violence as physical force, adds a definition to 
this effect and with little or no further comment turns to more important issues. In so 
218 
doing, it misses the following important features of violence: Violence is inseparable 
from all three components of action: intention, speech and physical action. When 
violence is understood in this action-theoretic framework the mind of the agent 
becomes central to any understanding of violence. Violence is similar to a disease in 
that it is insidious and complex and requires careful analysis in order to identify, contain 
and finally improve the agent by way of a specific antidote. It appears that there is, 
after all, enormous scope for philosophical interest. As it happens [outlined below] 
individual action can either perpetuate the cycle of violence, or actively reduce it, and 
on this view it is possible to exercise power and achieve change through nonviolence in 
order to increase one's own sense of happiness and well-being and that of others. By 
examining an account of action based on the Buddhist moral framework, it is possible 
to offer a realistic alternative to the sensible agent who feels trapped in the cycle of 
violence. This will require a careful analysis drawing on examples of action that look 
rational, but are in fact violent (illustrating by reference to the new definitions, why they 
are violent) and considering the same examples, but this time from the perspective of 
nonviolence. 
I will provide an account of action below based on the Buddhist moral framework. I 
will begin by examining the nature of action on its own (this account will reflect a rich 
texture--incorporating the mind of the agent with regard to intention, and action as 
speech in addition to the more conventionally understood physical action); this 
theoretical foundation will be put to work to give an analysis of violence. I will then 
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show how it can give an account of nonviolent action and will examine the ways in 
which this account is an improvement (by way of being more useful and more 
illuminating) than any theory that attends only to the physical component. 
Mahayana Buddhist Action Theory offers a fcnindation for the ethics of nonviolence: 
A Mahayana perspective of course outlines a Buddhist philosophy: a philosophy of 
individual action, parts of which however, have particularly useful secular application. 
While it is nowhere described and packaged as Buddhist action theory: 7 this will be a 
useful description for the theoretical construc't below: 
On the Mahayana Buddhist view, all action results from causes and conditions. At the 
micro level these arise in the individual and can be analysed on three interrelated but 
distinct levels--thought, speech and physical action. With respect to these "three doors 
of action," the mind is primary because every action stems from an intention prior to its 
manifestation as speech, or physical action. For this reason, the most coherent way to 
tackle social violence on the Buddhist account, is to tackle the roots or inception of the 
problem--the mind of the individual. In one way, this can be seen as an inversion of the 
familiar Western view of social violence and requires further explanation below: 
Many commentaries on violence (consider any of the accounts offered in chapter one as 
an adequate example) focus on the "sea of violence" as a metaphor for a range of 
17 I thank Professor Jay Garfield for creating this term. 
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disturbing social trends. On any of these views, widespread violence in society may be 
caused by economic disparity, coercive institutions or political parties. Such a view 
(outlined in Chapter Two) puts violence very much at arms length from the individual 
(remember the fighter pilot who follows a political order, pushing a button to neutralise 
targets in a just war. He arguably faces no accountability for individual deaths of real 
persons; nor does the person at the top issuing those political orders). In a further 
move, if we consider this to be legitimate force we do not even enter the discourse of 
violence. 
The Buddhist view appears inverted for the following reason: Violent action is defined 
(on page 199) and widely understood to be the intention to harm others born out of 
negative emotions. Now intentions cannot float around by themselves, but are 
necessarily attached to the agents having those intentions. Against the commonly held 
Western view above, violence cannot simply exist as an external social phenomenon, 
but exists in the agent through his/her intentions. On this Buddhist view, the bomber 
scenario (which can be imagined as a standard Airaksinian pyramid of power: the 
superior agent at the top of the pyramid issues orders to the fighter pilot at the mid 
point in the pyramid whose actions have something to do with a broad range of targets 
at the base of the pyramid) is completely turned upside down. The targets at the base 
of the pyramid are identified as persons--moral agents who are the recipients of violent 
action. What is the cause of the violence? The actions of the fighter pilot and the 
intentions of the General issuing the orders. Here we see that by inverting the pyramid, 
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the effects of violence cannot remain at a comfortable distance, but point directly 
toward individual actions and intentions. 
On the Buddhist view, right action reflects compassion and a sense of mutual 
responsibility toward sentient beings and towards the environment. The moral agent 
strives to develop a calm mind leading to intentions and action in the form of spoken 
and physical demonstrations which produce benefits of peace and happiness for oneself 
and others. I will extract from this understanding a more detailed analysis of violent 
action below: 
Recall that on the Buddhist account, violence begins in the mind with thoughts of 
greed, anger or hatred and is realised through actions of killing, stealing and so on. 
Hence the most obvious place to begin the reduction of social violence is in the 
individual mind. 
The roots of violence are embedded in ignorance [ignorance ma rig pa, avidya, from 
the Buddhist perspective "literally means `non-lmowing'...not just lack of knowledge in 
general, but the opposite of knowledge; and not just any knowledge, but knowledge of 
reality." (Napper 1989:79)] Feelings of anger, hatred or greed arise out of an incorrect 
view or ignorance about the way the world is and in particular the way the self is. The 
view of the self as a being that can be conceived in and by itself independently of others 
is to be refuted on the Buddhist view. 
If something (that exists) is empty of inherent existence, it must be 
dependently arisen. If something is dependently arisen, it must be empty of 
inherent existence. The wisdom understanding emptiness does not remove the 
consciousness that knows dependent arisings; it removes the ignorance that 
misconceives dependent arisings to inherently exist." (Klein 1994:57) 
When the individual (erroneously) believes him/herself to be a substantial self, 
independent of others a number of events naturally follow: egoism leads her to 
consider her own needs more important than the needs of others; hatred and greed 
easily set in, plausibly leading to self-satisfaction as a primary goal driving individual 
thoughts and actions. This can easily lead to the (false) moral distinction between self 
and other. The other is seen as the "enemy," and the agent is led to an attempt to 
legitimise the actions toward others that cause harm and are in fact violent (outlined in 
detail in chapter 2). 
From the Buddhist point of view these attitudes are mental defilements and their 
propositional content is false. They lead to injustice and to the denial of human dignity. 
In the same way that the earlier example pointed to the fact that a flower appears to be 
substantially existent when in fact it comprises non-flower things like sunshine and 
water and so on, we cannot make sense of the self without alluding to non-self elements 
like blood and water and relations with others. It makes sense to talk about a 
conventionally existent self I am a self who writes these words; but if we take the self 
apart and take away the components, there is no inherently existing thing which I can 
hold up for the world to see. In the same way that we can understand what a wooden 
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chair is--a useful item on which to sit--when we take away the arms, and the legs and 
the wood, there is nothing left that expresses chairness as such. In this way, in an 
ultimate sense the chair, like the self is empty of inherent existence. 
Ignorance is the failure to notice this. If one does notice, one sees that one is not an 
agent in glorious isolation but a person in relation with others. A person is an 
intentional agent and acts in the world through speech and physical engagement with 
other intentional agents. I am reliant upon others for my well-being in the same way 
that others are reliant upon me. This view entails mutual responsibility: The individual 
will only be peaceful and happy when those with whom s/he interacts feel likewise. On 
this view, all agents are entitled to dignity and respect. 
Those who act from ignorance erect and maintain barriers between themselves and 
others leading to an endless cycle of injustice where poverty, hatred and greed thrive. 
The antidote to ignorance is to confront erroneous views with the truth; to confront 
violent action with nonviolence. In the same way that violence can be seen as false or 
erroneous, and violent action represents falsity or error and is morally wrong (explained 
in detail in chapter 2), nonviolence represents the truth: Nonviolent action insists on the 
truth in a compassionate but uncompromising manner and represents how one ought to 
think and act. I will provide a detailed explanation of nonviolent action from the 
Mahayana Buddhist perspective below. 
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I will begin with the re-telling of a story where nonviolent action produced the most 
unexpected results: a story is told of a high ranking military officer's encounter with a 
senior monk, during the Younghusband campaign in Tibet: The British invaded Tibet 
with the intention of quelling all resistance and occupying the country. Many accounts 
describe the rivers running red with the blood of slain monks and villagers who fell 
before the superior weaponry of the British soldiers. A senior officer approached a 
large monastery; those who were not killed ran away. Upon entering the building, he 
found the Abbott seated on a chair not far from the entrance. Infuriated by this 
insolence, the officer demanded that the monk kneel: 'Don't you know that I can run 
you through with a sword without blinking an eye?" The monk completely disarmed 
the officer by calmly replying 'Don't you know that I can be run through with a sword, 
without blinking an eye?" After thinking about this extraordinary response for a few 
minutes, the officer turned and left. 
Embodied in this story are the central features of the Buddhist account of nonviolent 
action. The monk did not feel fear before the officer. In undertaking violent action, 
the officer is acting from a position of ignorance. The monk is prepared to confront 
him and demonstrate the strength of his nonviolent position, and insist that violence 
has no strength: 
The aim of any nonviolent endeavour is the establishment of truth and the 
removal of injustice. It does not aim to eliminate or defeat someone. For a 
true nonviolent activist there is no enemy. It aims to end injustice by making 
the perpetrator of injustice see reason and undo the wrong done by him. In 
the end, the nonviolent activist and the wrong doer should have no bitterness 
left between them.. .uprooting or weakening violence is the ultimate aim of 
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nonviolent action. It does not aim to eliminate the wrong doer. (S. Rinpoche 
1997) 
The practitioner of nonviolence is not aiming to win at the expense of another. For 
this reason, it is inappropriate to refer to terms like "nonviolent strategy" (a term 
commonly found in the West) because: 
...nonviolence is neither a matter of strategy nor does it contain any strategic 
dimension, because it has no battles to wage or no wars to win. The word 
"strategy" belongs to the vocabulary of generals, armed forces and defence 
establishments. In it's classical sense "strategy" means the art of the general 
or generalship. Strategy aims at winning a war, and hence it implies defeat of 
the enemy and victory for one's own side. It also implies the use of all 
possible means to gain victory without any consideration for right or 
wrong... Sometimes I wonder how the word "strategy" came to be associated 
with nonviolent praxis. (Ibid.) 
Rather than talk about nonviolence as a strategy, S. Rinpoche prefers to work on 
finding means through which the principle of nonviolence can be put to practice in 
different situations: "Practice is the test of the efficacy of the principle. It is also the 
test of the steadfastness and skill of those who claim to uphold the ideal of 
nonviolence." (Ibid.) 
In this context it is important to keep two general principles in mind. These principles 
are not only first and foremost, but are not to be forsaken in any event: First, the unity 
and purity of means and ends--the means employed for the application of nonviolence 
in concrete situations should be chosen very carefully. If the end to be achieved is 
truthful and just, then without exception, the means should be pure and unassailable. 
S. Rinpoche sees this as an imperative. Second is skilfulness in the choice of means 
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and methods: the practitioner of nonviolence must use his/her skills to determine the 
best and most effective way or ways of action. Skilfulness in choosing and using the 
right means is a rare quality, and the reason for a highly principled as well as a highly 
skilled cadre or leadership. 
Returning to the sensible agent, I will show how an account of Buddhist action theory, 
correctly places emphasis on the relationship between means and ends. 
Our sensible agent (introduced in chapter three) Megan, finds herself at the 
crossroads, deliberating a course of action. She is a member of the Senior School 
Class. Another class member is a real bully who intimidates the rest in a variety of 
ways - all unpleasant. The specialist technique of the bully is to tear up the 
homework of anyone refusing to cooperate with his request. Megan is frustrated 
with the injustice of a world that contains such awful people and a system that lets 
him get away with his actions. She is on her way to class, walking behind him. 
-Today is the final day of term and the last chance to hand in a take-home exam 
paper. The bully sees a victim he has been after for days and darts into the 
corridor to exact a degree of suffering. He doesn't notice that his take home exam 
paper falls to the floor. Megan sees her chance. Finally she is in a position to 
teach the bully a lesson. She picks up the paper from the floor and darts into the 
bathroom where she tears it into tiny pieces. No one will know. She returns to 
class to find the bully searching everywhere for his paper. He shouts at the teacher 
angrily that he did spend a week on the paper, and it must be here somewhere. His 
discomfort grows. The sensible agent along with the rest of the class enjoy the 
spectacle. He receives a failure grade for not handing in the paper. 
How does this example stand up to Buddhist action theory in relation to means and 
ends? The sensible agent wanted to put an end to injustice. She felt great sympathy 
for classmates who received unfair treatment by the bully. These may be noble 
sentiments, but the means she chooses to achieve the end reflects ignorance or mental 
defilement. She empathises with the victims of intimidation, they are her equals but the 
bully is the enemy entitled to different treatment. Her intention is to harm the bully in 
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retaliation for his behaviour toward others. On the one hand she abhors the action of 
the bully and decides that it is wrong, but chooses exactly the same behaviour as a 
means to fix the problem. Her intention to harm produces exactly the same type of 
violent action undertaken by the bully. In order to act nonviolently, Megan will be 
required to overcome her ignorant view and change the actions which follow. I will 
return to this analysis following a more detailed discussion of the elements that 
constitute nonviolent action: 
Nonviolent action on S. Rinpoche's view must be transparent, and it must represent 
the truth. Professor Gene Sharp (1973) the most well known authority in the field of 
studies relating to nonviolent action has in his two volume series The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action and The Methods of Nonviolent Action identified almost two 
hundred methods of action. While appreciating the importance of Gene Sharp's work, 
S. Rinpoche accepts only a small number of these categories as truly nonviolent (based 
on the new definitions discussed previously). 
Which methods are to be employed, when and where can only be decided by 
practitioners on the basis of the nature and needs of the actual situation, which differs 
from case to case. In many cases the well tried methods like noncooperation or civil 
disobedience can be easily adopted but there may also be situations where it is 
difficult to use these methods. Existing or old methods may have to be suitably 
revised or new methods evolved. Therefore, the choice of methods depends upon the 
nature of the specific situation. (S. Rinpoche 1997) 
Included below are important factors and issues that should be considered before 
deciding about the adoption of a particular method of nonviolent action. It will be 
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relevant to examine these factors important to Buddhist nonviolent theory and then to 
examine how Satyagraha differs in important respects from Duragraha (before 
returning to an analysis of how Megan ought to have behaved with the bully). 
1. Time & Duration 
2. Place: 
3. Level & Scale of Action: 
4. Tempo of Action: 
5. Tackling Violence: 
6. Facing Suppression: 
7. Degree of Assertiveness: 
One has to carefully choose the appropriate time for 
starting, withdrawing or resuming the nonviolent 
action. In addition to this it is also necessary to decide 
about the duration of the action. It could be a short-
duration action or it may continue for a longer period. 
One has thoughtfully to take a decision about the 
suitable place or site for starting, carrying or 
continuing the action. 
One has to carefully find out whether it will be fruitful 
to start the action at the individual level or at the 
group level or at both levels simultaneously or even 
alternately. At the same time it will also be necessary 
to determine the scale of action ie. whether the action 
is to be started on a wide and mass scale or is to be 
carried on a limited scale. 
One will also have to determine whether the action 
has to be escalated gradually until it reaches its limits 
or has to be undertaken as a quick action at a high 
pitched tempo. 
One has to find out ways by which the sources as well 
as the props of violence are either eliminated or 
weakened. 
In face of possible or actual suppression of nonviolent 
action one has to strike proper balance between (a) 
degree of toleration of physical and psychological 
suffering or torture and (b) degree of avoidance of 
such suffering. 
One should also give thought to the degree or amount 
of assertiveness of the action. Either the pressure can 
be continuously mounted to the maximum point or it 
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can be undertaken in a moderate and phased manner. 
(Mid ) 
These seven factors demonstrate the extent of vigilance and analysis required for 
nonviolent action and provide a convincing refutation to objectors who view 
nonviolence in the shallow sense as merely another way of protesting against a position 
with which one disagrees [the latter is known as Duragraha or stubborn resistance for a 
cause. It will assist with clarification of the meaning of satyagraha to contrast it with 
Duragraha. This distinction can be put to work when the discussion returns to consider 
how Megan ought to have acted in the bully case]. 
This investigation (but now from a Hindu perspective) is taken up by Mahatma Gandhi. 
For Gandhi "satyagraha" (literally "truth insistence"): 
...is gentle, it never wounds. It must not be the result of anger or malice. It 
is never fussy, never impatient, never vociferous. It is the direct opposite of 
compulsion. It was conceived as a complete substitute for violence (1995:6) 
Joan Bondurant (1994:95) highlights the theoretical aspects of Satyagraha's truth 
insistence by contrasting them to the concepts of passive resistance defined by the 
Indian term Duragraha. Duragraha may be said to be stubborn resistance for a cause. 
While this term also designates the concept of direct social action it is usually a process 
of applying pressure with skill and sufficient strength to make the opponent stand 
down. Duragraha approaches the conflict (usually unjust policies) with a set of 
prejudgments: The opponent is wrong. The objective is to overcome the opponent and 
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destroy his opposition. Pressure is understood in Duragraha as a steady pushing or 
thrusting to create a burden, and usually results in distress. Strike action might be used 
as straightforward application of economic pressure, intended to hurt businesses or to 
strain relationships so that normal functions are brought to a halt. Normal functioning 
cannot be resumed until policy changes are instituted; Duragraha in its most common 
forms amounts to the intensification of pressure or the shifting of points of attack until 
a settlement is reached through capitulation or compromise. There is no intention to 
discover solutions which will satisfy the opponent. In complete contrast, Satyagraha 
sets out to develop alternatives which will satisfy antagonists on all sides: 
Creativity is essential in Satyagraha - not only in division techniques adapted to given 
instances of conflict, but also an inherent part of the philosophy which underlies 
Satyagraha. Satyag,raha may be likened to the thought process objectified. One can 
draw upon Dewey's analysis of purposive action to suggest the process in operation. 
(Bondurant 1994:98) 
Against the harassment commonly effected in Duragraha is set the fundamentally 
supportive nature of Satyagraha. As the Satyagrahi moves to bring about change in the 
situation through persuading her opponent to modify or alter the position under attack, 
she seeks to strengthen the interpersonal relationships through acts of support and, 
where appropriate, through service to the opponent. This approach goes well beyond 
the nebulous and often platitudinous insistence that all men are brothers and that love 
for the opponent dominates the feeling and dictates the action. It is based upon a 
psychologically sound understanding of suffering and the capacity of the individual to 
change. The discovery that fundamental change is accompanied by suffering can be 
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understood by introspection. The more rigid or fixed the attitude, or the more habitual 
the behaviour, the more painful is the process of change. Gandhi's Hindu doctrine and 
that of the Mahayana Buddhists reveal that persisting obstinate attitudes are not 
without their cause. They perform a function which has its origin in personal history 
and they are part of an intrapersonal economy, any disruption of which will be 
experienced as distress or even a major personal threat. Gandhi argues that it follows 
from this that change can best be effected in the context of reassurance and through 
efforts to delimit the area of attack. Some form of destruction is involved in all change. 
In Satyagraha the more serious the expected change (and therefore, the more radical 
the destruction of established patterns), the more essential it is to undertake counter 
and parallel constructive efforts of a high order. 
It is incumbent upon the Satyagrahi actively to concern himself/herself with the 
problems s/he is presenting to his opponent. His/her recognition of the burden the 
demands place upon his opponent is prerequisite to action. He is expecting his 
opponent to renounce or reject patterns of behaviour to which he has long been 
accustomed. When conscious decision is forced upon others, it becomes all the more 
important that guilt be dispelled, fear abated and passions controlled. The forcing of 
new choices is a tactic for effecting change in a static situation. At the critical juncture 
when choice is forced, the Satyagrahi must shoulder his greatest burdens. S/He will be 
confronted by persons seized with doubts and uncertainties and it is his/her obligation 
to tolerate their abuse, should it be offered, and to find ways in which to strengthen and 
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reassure his opponents. His own strength at such times is put to the greatest test, and 
his own capacity for creative thought and imaginative act is taxed to the fullest. But 
the foundation from which he works is the truth of suffering, the truth of the 
interdependence of all things, the truth of human worth and dignity and the truth of 
justice to uphold human rights. This must be insisted upon even in the face of violence 
and oppression; even at the time of the greatest suffering for the Satyagrahi, who must 
stay fast to his/her resolve for compassion. He insists on the higher moral standards 
which ought to be upheld regardless of the current ignorance or wrong view of the 
oppressor. 
The open-ended nature of the satyagrahi's objectives and the transforming function of 
the.process require that he extend to his opponent not only the respect implied by these 
humanistic values, but also a measure of trust which goes well beyond that tolerated by 
proponents of Duragraha. S/He not only claims that power can be effected through 
nonviolence, but more importantly, he demonstrates the fact, by exercising the very 
power that in some cases, the oppressor attempts to deny him. But in a practical sense, 
how can an understanding of nonviolence frame appropriate action against the bully in 
our previous example? 
From the vantage point of Buddhist action theory the behaviour of the bully is wrong, 
and is motivated by ignorance. He sees himself as separate from (and superior to) 
others in his class. For the purpose of personal gain, he intends to commit harm toward 
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other agents and sees this action through to completion with tactics of intimidation. 
Coercion and threats constitute emotional harm, and he has no hesitation in resorting to 
the destruction of an agent's work and causing physical injury. For this agent, all 
"three doors of action"--the mental, the spoken and the physical—reflect violence. 
Recall that Megan saw her opportunity and destroyed the bully's term paper. The 
outcome of this action of intentional harm saw the bully distressed; he received a failing 
grade for the non-appearance of his paper. After class he took his temper out on all of 
the class suspects. Martin ended up with a black eye; Phillip who defended him, with a 
bleeding nose, the bully's rage increased and Megan racked with guilt, could only 
watch as her friends were made to endure more suffering and humiliation. The bully 
had learned nothing as a result of Megan's retaliation. The whole point was to show 
the bully that his behaviour was morally wrong, unacceptable and to convince him that 
he should stop immediately. Megan's action was cowardly. She did not intervene 
when she saw the bully intimidating her friends. She did not confront him with the 
truth: that his actions are wrong and violent. She did not ask him to stop. We have 
learned from S. Rinpoche and M.K. Gandhi that nonviolence is an insistence on the 
truth, it takes courage and firm commitment: "It is easy to be nonviolent when the sun 
is shining and things are going well.., it is much more difficult to maintain this view in 
the face of anger, oppression, injustice or torture." (S. Rinpoche 1997) But that is 
exactly what we expect her to do. 
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Given another chance, Megan can respond in the following way: 
(a 1) She can intervene, opposing the bully's intimidation. She can confront him by 
describing the violent behaviour and the consequences entailed. She can insist that he 
stop, or face the consequences (now she would hope that he sees reason as a result of 
being directly confronted, because following through with the consequences means 
following due process. She would have to inform the School Principal and insist that 
action be taken to stop the bully; victims would be called to testify as witnesses. If 
they are terrified enough, it is unlikely that they would voluntarily come forward to 
point the finger at the bully, and even if they did, she would have to wear the label of 
"tell-tale" probably earning her ostracism from her collegial group). 
(a 2) The bully could see reason and stop, or (a 3) He could utilise the same tactics of 
violence against Megan. We will assume that he is a slow learner. He pins Megan to 
the corridor wall. 
(b 1) Megan sticks to her resolve. Even pinned against the wall she yells that violence 
is wrong, that this action makes him look ridiculous and is embarrassing. She insists 
that the bully must recognise what he is doing and stop. It is clear that Megan will not 
back off from her moral position. It is likely by this stage that she is bruised and 
shaken; but she is not powerless, in fact she is acting from a position of strength 
(outlined below). Consider the remaining responses left open to the bully: 
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(b 2) His power is totally reliant on his capacity to instil fear in his victims. He may 
pursue intimidation and physical violence as a wish to feel important, to feel in control. 
But he is not controlling this. In order to exercise control, his victims must quietly fold 
to his demands. Megan is not folding to his demands and she is not being quiet. In fact 
she is being embarrassingly loud about it, and her volume is attracting unwanted 
attention to the bully and risks undermining his position totally on discovery by the 
School Principal. There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this example: 
The bully may find it prudent to give in, in order to fight another day. But if he does he 
will now need to consider how he will react to this response when undoubtedly it 
occurs again. On the other hand, the bully may be so unbalanced by the unexpected 
response of Megan's willingness, indeed insistence on suffering instead of backing 
down, that he does seriously contemplate his behaviour (and perhaps he will seriously 
think about Megan's previously offered [but undocumented] response to assist him 
with school work. Either way, nobody can make him change his views; in accordance 
with the best behaviour management guidelines, it is only the agent can choose to 
change his/her behaviour. We can speculate at length about possible outcomes, but 
regardless of whether either of these responses by the bully obtain there is something 
interesting to be said about Megan as a moral agent. 
In the first scenario, Megan is frustrated. She has no theoretical scaffolding to support 
any appropriate responses to bullying behaviour. She responds with violent behaviour 
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toward the bully. This doesn't stop the bully; in fact it makes things much worse. She 
feels powerless. In the second scenario, Megan acts from a position of strength even 
though she realises that at its worst, this could involve suffering on her part. Nobody 
else suffers, but she is prepared to suffer to make her point. She does not lose the 
respect of (nor is she ostracised by) her peers. Her actions demonstrate the strength of 
her moral position. It is unnecessary to make the claim that she "has power to act": her 
actions demonstrate that she does. She may feel bruised, but she does feel powerful. 
In fact there is nothing the bully can do to change that. He may be able to kill her, but 
it is likely that she has resolved herself to the fact that the one certain thing in life is 
death, and that she would prefer to end hers fully espousing her moral principles. 
It will be useful to pause for a moment and consolidate the discussion. By treating 
fusion philosophy seriously, it is possible to join together Western and non-Western 
philosophical insights to realise an informed position on violence, nonviolence and 
implications for the moral agent. Continuing endeavour from religious communities to 
promote the doctrine of nonviolence and reconciliation, and to raise global awareness 
through inter-faith forums, is to be acknowledged and highly commended. However, 
dismissal of the praxis of nonviolence by the Western philosophical community is short-
sighted and unacceptable when we consider issues of importance raised by Mahayana 
Buddhist action theory. This theory seeks to define violence in terms of three aspects 
of action: the physical, the spoken and the mental, with the last of these holding the 
seed of all violent action. 
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Far from falling prey to charges of impracticality, a theory of nonviolence grounded in 
Mahayana Buddhist action theory directs itself to the everyday common sense world of 
suffering and violence, provides a multi-layered definition of key terms and an analysis 
resulting in an account of action and ethics that can guide political action. Rather than 
being seen as a doctrine of pessimism (for all its talk of suffering), it seeks to offer hope 
and encouragement on a practical level, moving beyond the entrapment illustrated by 
members of the sensible group to an understanding of the causes and effects of violence 
and the pathway to compassion, peace and well-being through nonviolence. 
Moreover, nonviolent action does not merely reflect passive withdrawal, cowardice or 
weakness. Rather it requires a full replacement with positive attributes, and operates 
from a position of inner strength, power and accountability. Interdependence demands 
that the agent include in her domain of nonviolent action all with whom she comes in 
contact on a daily basis, even those misconstrued to be enemies; and through purity of 
ends and means and skilful choice of means and methods she should adhere to 
nonviolent action even in the face of harm. In so doing, such a person can never claim 
to be powerless at the hands of the coercer (a point to which we will return in the final 
chapter). 
Such an account offers a distinct improvement on any theory that attends only to the 
physical component of an agent's behaviour. A nonviolent action theory based on the 
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fusion of Western and non-Western views takes us beyond a mere description of the 
overwhelming tide of violence. A rich and complex analysis provides an account that 
moves beyond an explanation of what is going on to how we ought to behave. In so 
doing, such an account has a lot more to offer ethics than one which merely describes 
the physical acts, or the way things are. On the new view, the individual is offered a 
detailed framework to assist in self-reflection. I can adopt a critical attitude to my own 
moral judgements and decisions, and by understanding the seeds of violence and how 
they grow into violent actions, I can choose to act nonviolently toward others. In 
addition to a focus on myself, the new action theory allows me to better understand 
others and to separate issues of injustice from the agents undertaking the action. It 
allows me to take control of my actions in relation with others and demonstrate a 
position of power. Utilising such a framework, I do not feel powerless. I can choose 
to confront violence with nonviolence, even unto death. I can always act from a 
morally strong position refuting the weaker wrong action, and attempting conflict 
resolution from a position of strength. 
Before moving to a discussion of truth and its relation to nonviolence, I will conclude 
this section on nonviolent action with a fitting contemporary example of theory into 
practice. It is important to demonstrate that nonviolent action theory is not just a 
conceptual tool to apply to elaborate fictions, but that it is relevant, and in fact has been 
documented as a foundation for contemporary practice. Because Western philosophy 
at times fails to consider non-Western examples, it is likely that S. Rinpoche's book 
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Satyagraha:(Trzith Insistence) on the Tibetan Satyagraha action is relatively unknown 
in Western philosophical circles. Information utilised in this chapter stems from this 
source in addition to the following interview material obtained in Varanassi, India, July 
1997: 
S. Rinpoche argues that violence can never be legitimate because it: 
- harms both the mind and body of the victim and the perpetrator 
- denies personal dignity and worth 
- perpetuates a negative and destructive cycle of suffering 
- denies truth and perpetuates oppression and injustice [to be expanded below] 
For this reason he proposes to undertake a satyagraha campaign against the Chinese 
Government (we will recall from discussion in chapter three that MK Gandhi coined the 
term Satyagraha in South Africa to literally mean, "truth insistence"--the satyagrahi or 
practitioner of nonviolence must adhere to nonviolence in thought, speech and physical 
action; and even at the hands of violence and oppression should attempt to reduce the 
level of suffering and demerit to the perpetrator). Such an action has not been 
proposed since Gandhi's time; this can therefore be seen as a unique contemporary 
example of how Satyagraha can be used to confront ideological and physical violence: 
China is showing the wrong conduct inside Tibet particularly in relation to the 
spiritual and cultural heritage. It is improper and unjust. This is violence and it is 
not based on truth, and we are witness to it. Therefore we must express our 
disagreement, our opposition. We must do so with love and compassion. Unless and 
until we do so in the face of China, in a very close contact manner, it is not sufficient 
for us to sit idly in India in our facilities, our air-conditioned rooms and to simply say 
that China is doing wrong. It is not sufficient. We should go to the Chinese people 
inside Tibet and tell them what they are doing is wrong, we do not agree and we will 
insist that they stop. That is our duty. 
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Unless we do this, we just sit as witnesses. This amounts to approval. If that 
message reflects approval, then we are part of that wrongdoing, and history will 
judge later that we have played a part in that. Therefore we cannot, or I at least 
should not be a party to that. The Satyagraha action then, is also necessary in this 
regard, and therefore I began the thought to commence the Satyagraha - at least 
individual Satyagraha. It is not collective but individual Satyagraha and this in no 
way clashes with the dialogue. 
One of my demands in my Satyagraha is that I would not only welcome meaningful 
dialogue with China, but I will insist that China resumes meaningful dialogue with 
His Holiness. Therefore it is not a diversion or a shift away from dialogue, one is not 
against the other, merely different. 
O. 	Do you have thoughts about what you may encounter when you return to Tibet? 
A. 	Yes, of course. I think it is 99% certain that as soon as I enter the land of Tibet, the 
Chinese will arrest and imprison me. There is no doubt - unless the Chinese adopt 
some other violent strategy. In the context of our discussion, theirs is only strategy. 
I heard that the peace march which was proposed last year from Delhi to Lhasa and 
denied by the Chinese officials was the source of much discussion between the 
Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Autonomous Region authorities on how best to 
react to this action. Many people suggested that all marchers should be shot at the 
border, further, that this was the most effective method to be adopted. As soon as 
these people cross the Tibetan border, machine guns should be used, and they should 
all be shot. A small moderate faction spoke against this, saying that this would 
reflect negatively on the Chinese Government and enlist support for the separatists, 
allowing them an international focus. Instead it was proposed that they should be 
imprisoned or sent back to India. A few people even disagreed and proposed that the 
best strategy would be to control the local people, instruct them very strictly not to 
receive the marchers with any enthusiasm or welcome, maintaining absolute 
indifference and let them come. They should be allowed freedom to go where they 
want to go, and demonstrate to the world that there is no response for them inside 
Tibet. The Tibetan people would be seen to be happy with no atrocities or torture 
going on, and these would be viewed as just a few separatists who were not 
suppressed, but were unsupported, and they returned of their own accord. This 
would be good for propaganda. In this way it would discourage people from coming 
from the outside. They would be broken-hearted when they are rejected by their local 
people. This would then be the end of the matter and the best strategy. Others 
involved in the discussion group suggest, that while this sounds feasible, it would fail 
because the local Tibetans could never be controlled to that extent. Regardless of the 
amount of pressure applied, there could be no guarantee that a reception would not 
take place. In light of this, there is a very small chance that the Chinese might try to 
ignore the Satyagraha, because I don't think a large group of people would 
accompany me. 
Otherwise we must consider the 99% chance of being killed or imprisoned. The 
third possibility of course is that the Chinese may intercept us before reaching Tibet, 
and prevent the arrival by influencing the Indian Government. These are the 
possibilities and whatever may come, we must accept it. We must face the 
consequences as much as possible with love and compassion. 
Q. 	This preparation bears a similarity to the campaign conducted by the Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. One difference would appear to be the judgement he made 
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to rally vast numbers of supporters across large geographic areas in part, to gain an 
international media exposure. Your response in contrast appears to focus on a more 
gentle, personal Satyagraha moment without deliberately attracting attention to the 
action. Would this interpretation be correct? 
A. 	Yes, this is right. My basic thinking is that Satyagraha is not aimed at giving the 
opportunity for international attention. This may, or may not result. That is not the 
focus of my Satyagraha. Second, in my Satyagraha. I do not care about the end 
results. Of course we wish for the freedom of people inside Tibet. This will either 
occur or not, as a result. But that is a different issue. 
The actions of Martin Luther King and Gandhi involved an entirely different 
situation. There was a rule of law, both of them participated in a democratic society, 
an environment wherein that particular Satyagraha can become effective. China, in 
contrast is completely totalitarian. There is no concern for moral rules, and what 
they have done in Tiananrnen Square, is very fresh in our memory. Knowing all 
this, some feel that our Satyagraha is nothing more than suicide. This view may be 
correct, but suicide would be preferable to remaining silent in the active. If I do not 
undertake a Satyagraha, that death may be only two or three years early which won't 
make much difference to my life.. .So from this angle we have judged the execution of 
the Satyagraha, not on its effectiveness and what will result, nor on whether the 
Chinese will yield or not yield. These are different questions' 8 . 
Satyagraha as a concept used both by Gandhi and S. Rinpoche is an insistence on the 
truth of nonviolence. We return below to an analysis of the relevant conception of 
truth. 
When nonviolence insists on truth, it exercises a power which confronts violence rather 
than constitutes it. In the following discussion I will pay attention to the 
epistemological underpinning of the theory of nonviolence and make the distinction 
between truth as a matter of fact about what is (and in this sense where violence 
represents an error); and the truth of higher moral principles, the truth of what ought to 
be the case. I will call on a number of examples which draw attention to the problem of 
an unquestioning acceptance of the truth as a matter of fact about what is. First I will 
18  The full interview appears as Appendix 1, at the end of the dissertation. 
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do this by reminding the reader of Foucault's revealing analysis: As a member of 
society the agent operates within a coercive framework where "truths" are 
"manufactured." This framework looks rational. I will point to a timely reminder by 
William James that serious differences among candidates for belief must entail serious 
differences for practice. Why? Because agents from coercive social structures who 
make an attempt to legitimise their actions and purport to maintain rational operating 
principles can and do in fact engage in actions which are morally wrong. I will recall 
the South African apartheid example and show how this regime legislated a truth. But 
regardless of the extent to which this regime upholds its view as true, the violent 
actions which followed represents falsity or error when seen from a more acceptable 
perspective. (recall the discussion from chapter 2) 
Objectors might argue that this is an extreme case and a well-informed sensible agent 
would see through the charade of rationality manufactured by such a group. I will 
respond to this reasonable objection by calling on the work of Peter Unger who 
provides by way of contrast, a compellingly simple example. He investigates the 
relations among morality, truth and rationality, and wants us to see that much of the 
behaviour we commonly regard as rational and morally acceptable, is in fact neither. 
Taken together, this group of theorists will provide the machinery required to complete 
the final stage of analysis for this chapter. I will conclude the chapter by extending the 
examination of nonviolent action through truth insistence from a Gandhian perspective 
to show how a theory of nonviolence has better prescriptive claims on the agent. 
243 
I return the reader to Foucault's work on truth (analysed in chapter one) which 
continues to be relevant to the discussion. Recall that in chapter one Foucault 
distinguishes between "Truth" and "truths." The latter on his view come into being, are 
constructed by, regimes of power that perpetuate truths by means of a coercive state 
apparatus. Each society has a regime of truth or a general politics of truth. This is the 
type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true. By the word "Truth" 
Foucault says "I do not mean the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and 
accepted, but rather the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are 
separated and specific effects of power attached to the true." (Foucault 1980:131-132) 
It is here that we glimpse what is indispensable to the production of truth on his 
account: "the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true." (Ibid.) Now the point to note is that in nonviolence, we 
want truth to be accorded a different status than merely that of something which is 
manufactured and maintained by coercive institutions--something which is made to look 
rational. Foucault's insights here serve to highlight the falsity involved in the following 
example: 
In the South African and North American examples outlined below, the statement that 
"blacks are non-persons" was assigned the value of truth, and perpetuated by those 
who seem to have the authority to say what counts as true when it is in fact, simply 
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false (recall the arguments in Chapter Two pp. 97-108 highlighting the failure to raise 
valid truth claims by the playground parent and the apartheid police officer). I call 
upon two immediate examples in recent history to highlight how the discourse which is 
made to function as true has nothing at all to do with what is morally right: 
Legislation and processes of government are regimes of Truth in Foucault's sense. 
Both in South Africa during the apartheid era, and the North American deep south, 
segregation was a rule of law. It was legally deemed to be true that people of colour 
are inferior to those who are white. This belief became the catalyst for murder, torture, 
rape and other forms of endless suffering which denied African Americans, and Black 
South Africans (as well as the racial divide referred to as Indians and Coloureds) the 
basic right to be treated as persons. Consequently they were treated as non-persons 
with the ensuing behaviour deemed by some, to be perfectly acceptable. This is a 
matter of undisputed fact about what is, but in every conceivable sense violence, here, 
as in the chapter 2 playground parent and the white apartheid police officer represents 
an error. Recall how the violent actions of the playground parent are representational: 
He is an agent in relation and in order to extract meaning from his actions we must 
examine his intentions to produce an effect in the hearer. Interpreting the parent means 
making the best possible sense of the parent, and this means assigning meaning so as to 
maximise the overall truth of the parent's utterances. The parent wanted the African 
American child to take the following message away from the encounter: Black children 
and white children are different in more ways than external skin colour signifies. Black 
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children are inferior to white children.. .white children are persons and should be treated 
with respect. Black children are not persons. They do not have dignity and they do not 
have feelings. But recall that what the parent is saying is true if and only if black 
children are inferior to white children. On this reading an agent is only entitled to enter 
the human race if (in the same way as the legislation example above) s/he is white. In 
both [the North American and South African legislation] cases, the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr, and (the now President) Nelson Mandela presented in elegant 
exposition 19 a rational argument against what is, and for a replacement with what ought 
to be. 
But objectors might correctly point out that these are extreme examples, and the 
contemporary (well-informed) sensible agent would not be so easily misled. It is surely 
better to examine the realm of action and analyse rational (morally appropriate) 
behaviour there. By calling upon the work of a diverse range of theorists like S. 
Rinpoche, MK Gandhi and Foucault; and by introducing examples like the bully and 
recalling examples like the playground parent and the police agent the discussion takes 
on a richer analysis. I have shown how some actions looks violent when in fact they are 
not and how some actions looks rational when they are in fact violent. But there still 
remains one further problem to tackle. There is another subtle yet important layer 
relating to moral behaviour to be examined. We often refer to our moral intuitions, or 
general moral common sense to guide our actions and the discussion to this point has 
19 Among the most famous pieces of writing MLK's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" and Mandela's 
speech at the Rivonia Trial. 
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proceeded as if this area is unproblematic. The work of Peter Unger (1996) outlined 
below will serve as a warning that there are some cases in which our intuition cannot be 
trusted. In the same way that the actions of the playground parent may have appeared 
to be rational when in fact they were acts of masked coercion and morally wrong, 
Unger raises an interesting point about the inconsistency of the moral agent. He argues 
that there is an important sense in which we fail to demonstrate appropriate moral 
behaviour based entirely on the fact that we respond differently to cases which are 
"conspicuous" than to those which are "unobvious" when we ought to respond in the 
same way to both. The discussion below will present the following puzzle: for many of 
us who hold to the idea that causing harm and suffering is prima facie wrong--the 
central position of this thesis--several alarming Unger cases show how our actions do 
not accord with our values. I return the reader to a discussion of his work. 
In his recent metaethical study: Living High and letting Die, Unger (1996) reveals a 
number of problems with what might be considered by the sensible agent to be rational 
behaviour. In addition to the philosophical importance of investigating the relations 
among morality, truth and rationality, Unger insists that the moral agent investigate 
his/her moral behaviour by an analysis of individual values. By more accurately 
reflecting one's values, and the true nature of morality, Unger argues that one's 
responses to problematic cases can liberate (hence his Liberationist theory) the 
individual from misleading appearances flowing from distortional work and allow 
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engagement in "more decent behaviour." (Unger 1996:23) He wants us to see that 
what we regard as rational and morally acceptable is.in  fact neither. 
Unger begins his discussion by noticing that the motivation behind arguments for a 
metaethical position range from intellectual impulses to religious convictions. But 
what, he asks, would happen if the agent believed there weren't any substantial moral 
truths? He considers a scenario if this were true: Perhaps all hell would break loose if 
feelings weren't constrained by one's deepest moral commitments, and agents would be 
free to do just as they pleased or whatever suited their advantage. "If Values don't 
point to some reality beyond themselves, then there's nothing to have us comport with 
them rather than even our most self-centred desires. And then there won't be much 
point to learning about our values than, say, our most refined preferences in food." 
(1996:22) He outlines a scenario involving a young child who becomes a rival for an 
enormous family inheritance, and argues that an outcome which would be personally 
rationally advantageous would be to simply walk by if he were drowning in a shallow 
pool, and do nothing. He argues that to say that to not intervene and save the child 
from drowning is morally unacceptable, preposterous and totally counter-intuitive. So 
even against what is personally advantageous there is a certain way that the agent 
ought to act. This is not the world of lofty ideals or Airaksinen's "City of God," but 
what is normally expected of rational agents in the sensible world. 
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I will highlight Unger's two principal examples which elicit vastly different intuitive 
responses. I will use these to draw on his main points: 
The Vintage Sedan: Not truly rich, your one luxury in life is a vintage Mercedes 
sedan that, with much time, attention and money, you've restored to mint 
condition. In particular you are pleased by the auto's fine leather seating. One 
day you stop at the intersection of two small country roads, both lightly travelled. 
Hearing a voice screaming for help, you get out and see a man who is wounded 
and covered in blood. Assuring you that his wound is confined to one of his legs, 
the man also informs you that he was a medical student for two full years. And, 
despite his expulsion for cheating on his second year final exams, which explains 
his indigent status since, he has knowledgeably tied his shirt near the wound so as 
to stop the flow. So there is no urgent danger of losing his life you are informed, 
but there is great danger of him losing his limb. This can be prevented however, if 
you drive him to a rural hospital fifty miles away. "How did the wound occur?" 
you ask. An avid bird-watcher, he admits that he trespassed on a nearby field and, 
in carelessly leaving, cut himself on rusty barbed wire. Now if you would aid this 
trespasser, you must lay him across your fine back seat. But then your fine 
upholstery will be soaked through with blood, and restoring the car will cost over 
five thousand dollars. So you drive away. Picked up the next day by another 
driver, he survives but loses the wounded leg. 
Except for the behaviour of theindividual the example is as realistic as it is simple (so 
too, the next example). 
The Envelope: In your mailbox there is something from (the US Committee for) 
UNICEF. After reading it through, you correctly believe that, unless you soon 
send in a cheque for $100, then, instead of each living many more years, over 
thirty more children will die soon. But, you throw the material in your trash 
basket, including the convenient return envelope provided, you send nothing, and 
instead of living many years, over thirty more children soon die than would have 
had you sent in the requested $100. 
The point Unger makes is that the motivation and behaviour in both cases is very 
similar: The envelope moves the agent to donate nothing and the sedan moves the 
agent to offer no aid; in both the individual protects a convenient asset position. He 
then asks for an intuitive moral assessment of the behaviour in each case, and concludes 
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that an agent most likely would find that the Sedan behaviour was seriously morally 
wrong, and that the envelope wasn't even mildly wrong. (1996:22-28) 
Unger spends the rest of his project reeling the reader deeper into the analysis of this 
and other cases until he persuades fairly convincingly, that the envelope is at least as 
morally damning as the sedan. In fact, he argues, it's worse. In consideration of both 
examples [the Sedan and the Envelope], we refer to our moral intuitions on particular 
cases and also the deliverance of what he calls general moral common sense (the 
second sensibility is directed at matters at, least somewhat more general than the first's 
proper objects). He concludes that because the dire needs of a group are not 
conspicuous, the intuitive response is that there is not a worthwhile moral case 
requiring action. In contrast, Unger outlines at least five obvious factors which favour 
the proposition that the Envelope 's conduct was worse than the Sedan: 
First, even just financially, in the Vintage Sedan, the cost to the agent is over fifty times 
that in the Envelope; and with non-financial cost also considered, the difference is 
greater still. In the Sedan, both the reasonably expected consequences of the agent's 
conduct, and the actual consequences were that only one person suffered a serious loss; 
but in the Envelope, over thirty people suffered seriously. In the Sedan, the greatest 
loss suffered by anybody was the loss of a leg; but in the Envelope the least loss 
suffered was far greater than that. Because he was a mature and well-educated 
individual, the Sedan's serious loser was largely responsible for his own serious 
250 
situation; but being little children, none of the Envelope's serious losers was at all 
responsible for her bad situation. Last, the Sedan's man suffered his loss owing to his 
objectionable trespassing behaviour, but there was nothing like this in the Envelope. 
Unger concludes that "Even while the imperilled folks peopling certain cases have 
absolutely vital needs to be met, since their dire needs aren't conspicuous the intuitive 
response views the conduct as quite all right." (Unger 1996:28) He goes on to argue 
that rather than anything with much moral weight, it is this factor that largely promotes 
the lenient response the Envelope's behaviour. 
Expanding this point, we can begin to make connections with the moral requirement of 
nonviolent actions: At times, people's great needs may be highly conspicuous, and 
partly for that reason, it becomes obvious that people can be saved from suffering 
serious loss. At that point, it may be very obvious that letting them suffer conflicts very 
sharply with basic moral values (and so with the very heart of morality). This provides, 
on Unger's terms an obvious sharp conflict, and (because we are generally decent 
people) it will be difficult  psychologically, not to help meet people's great needs, even 
if there is a considerable cost incurred. Usually, this would not prompt a response in 
the manner indicated in the Sedan, but rather, would prompt helpful action. In sharp 
contrast, when the agent allows there to be more people who suffer serious loss, by 
failing to contribute to the likes of UNICEF, then, even to the individual, it is far from 
obvious that the conduct sharply conflicts with values, and with much of morality. 
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Indeed, it usually appears that there isn't such a conflict, and generally it will be all too 
easy to behave in the unhelpful way stipulated by the Envelope. 
Unger's work turns out to be very useful to this project. Whereas the analysis I 
presented earlier looked like it was posing a completely unreasonable moral standard 
for people and appeared counter-intuitive, we learn from Unger that our moral 
intuitions can't always be trusted. Often we fail to live up to our own moral standards. 
This is the place in the work of Unger where the analysis shows that sensible agents in 
the everyday world are prone to this type of failure. 
We have arrived at a point where we can consider two final examples. The first 
example involves Hamish and the final analysis from a Mahayana Buddhist perspective 
to highlight how acts of =mission are just as important as acts of commission. This is 
a small but important point for to be considered in a comprehensive action theory. I 
have argued that Western definitions of violence only attend to physical action (at their 
peril) but as we shall see, acts of onunission are still actions and have important ethical 
consequences. After this brief discussion I will put to work the theoretical machinery 
contained in this chapter by considering the final baseball bat example. Here the central 
actor will feel the full effects of fusion philosophy at work: I will call upon the 
representational thesis alongside the practical and theoretical aspects of Satyagraha; 
Unger, S. Rinpoche, Airaksinen, Foucault, and the South Africans. 
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But first, consider how it is possible to see an act of omission involving no physical 
force as an act of violence on the Mahayana Buddhist view--Consider Hamish: 
He is a public servant who wants a promotion. He is desperately unhappy in 
his present 'paper shuffling' position. The grapevine warns that his 
department is soon to fall prey to the sharp knife of the economic rationalists. 
Hatnish wants out, and waits desperately to hear if he has been successful in 
his application to a more promising department. His stress levels are not 
helped by the fact that the only other applicant from his department, George, 
is more experienced in the required skill level and presents an outgoing and 
confident persona. Hamish's resentment grows, when with only one week to 
go before the decision is to be made, (while seeing his aunt off at the weekend, 
on her trip to Hawaii) he sees George in the airport lounge carefree and 
presenting his first class boarding pass to take a week's vacation while he 
waits for the promotion decision. The following Monday is made all the more 
miserable by looking at George's vacant chair. On Tuesday an emergency 
staff meeting is called. Several thousand dollars left in the petty cash drawer 
on Sunday has been stolen. The General Manager puts it to the assembled 
staff that it could only have been one of them. Frantically searching their 
minds, many of the assembled do not have strong alibis. One of the staff 
members says he thinks he saw George's car in the carpark on that day and 
intimates that several thousand dollars would come in handy on any holiday. 
Margaret says that she was playing Golf with Hamish all day Sunday and that 
this can be verified by the Club. Now Hamish knows that it wasn't George 
but says nothing. Hamish also knows that the GM will enter this into the 
report and it will not be able to be verified until after George's return. He also 
thinks it is fairly likely that the GM will mention this to his friends on the 
interview panel. Hamish gets the promotion. 
Assessing Hamish's action on the Mahayana Buddhist criterion we find the following: 
(1) There is an object as the target of the action (George); (2) also present is the 
intention of harm (Hamish knew that by not speaking up and saying that he saw George 
leaving on Saturday, it was likely that George's reputation would be tarnished and he 
would look less of a strong candidate for the promotion); (3) mental defilements of 
jealousy and hatred are present to motivate the action; (4) the action is completed 
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(aspersions are cast and reports made which influences the decision of the selection 
panel—George is overlooked). 
Now this is not a life and death situation, but it does qualify as an act of violence 
because of the intention to cause harm. On the same analysis, Unger's Envelope 
example becomes an act of violence. This aspect is as relevant for acts of omission as it 
is for acts of commission, a point completely missed in the "old" definitions of violence 
where violence equates to a physical act of illegitimate force. This theoretical support 
was the final piece required to allow the fusion philosophy machinery to move into 
action. Consider the final Baseball Bat example: 
Helen enjoys a cup of tea and reads the local newspaper before leaving for 
baseball practice. The lead article refers to the shocking increase in suburban 
crime and makes particular note of the brutal crime committed by a gang of 
teenagers. The reporter suspects they are affiliated with the highly fashionable 
Nazi Youth. They wear black leather jackets emblazoned with swazstickers 
and if the report is to be believed they have taken to killing pets in the 
neighbourhood. The article includes a plea for help from Neighbourhood 
Watch and underlines the contact telephone number. Helen moves on to read 
another article and then leaves for baseball practice. 
As usual, she is walking home after another gruelling session of over 30's 
baseball practice. She takes a shortcut through an abandoned rail yard and 
hears yelping coming from the other side of the empty station. Quietly 
rounding the comer she sees a small puppy being held down by a strong male 
teenager with his back to her. He has a knife held above his head [now this 
youth is wearing a jacket emblazoned with a swazsticker. 
Helen in an instant takes a decision (but like all reported moments of crisis, 
time seems to stretch endlessly—she feels compassionately for the tiny puppy 
who looks set to join the newspaper victims, she feels appalled with the boy 
who could even contemplate let alone do such a thing, and then feels sorry for 
him, for his ignorance, for the amount of hate he must have stored up—and then 
she acts) in one swift movement she wacks the boy across the head with the 
baseball bat knocking him unconscious. She takes her mobile phone out of her 
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pocket and calls the police. The dog is taken to the RSPCA and boy is taken 
away with concussion. 
If we were to refer to the readily available definitions of violence as physical force to 
conduct an analysis of this final example the following conclusions might be drawn: 
The boy hadn't actually killed the puppy due to Helen's intervention, so he becomes a 
minor player in this scenario. We want to look at violence, so let's look at Helen's 
behaviour. She had the bat, she knocked the boy unconscious. It seems to be clear cut. 
Helen's actions are violent. But enlisting the services of a good lawyer she could 
probably justify her behaviour and escape without too much of a penalty. Not the most 
dazzling philosophical case. 
Analysis by the machinery of fusion philosophy makes all the difference: 
Unger points out that Helen is misguided right from the start. Her response to the 
newspaper article is all too common--no response at all. A plea for help is issued by 
Neighbourhood Watch. She could ring to offer assistance, but why should she? The 
issue is about some Nazis somewhere and something to do with pets. Unger reminds 
us that Helen's lack of appropriate moral response--she does have the phone number 
and she can ring to offer help in order to reduce the suffering of pets and pet owners in 
her neighbourhood--results from the fact that the dire needs of the group are not 
conspicuous. Helen's intuitive response is that there is not a worthwhile moral case 
requiring action. This is an act of violence. 
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The next stage of the scenario finds Helen arriving at the scene. Now at this point, 
Helen is faced with a number of choices. She could attempt to maintain her "it's 
nothing to do with me" stance from above, pretend not to see the event taking place 
and walk on. It's lucky for Helen that she made another choice because S. Rinpoche 
reminds us that even acts of omission count as proper objects of moral analysis, and we 
can remember the verdict on Hamish. Had she chosen to walk on, Helen would have 
continued to be implicated in the violence. Helen could have pursued another path--she 
could have decided to join in with the violence underway. While this choice is 
reasonably implausible and counter-intuitive, it is worthwhile pausing and considering 
the implications in the last part of the sentence. Violence was indeed underway. The 
teenager was a member of the newly formed Nazi Youth gang, and he had clear 
intentions to kill the puppy. Mahayana Buddhist action theory reveals that violence 
begins in the mind of the individual. Intention and speech constitute violence in 
addition to the physical action. 
On this analysis we already have a clear case for violence before Helen intervenes. 
Now if Helen had intervened because she made the association between the youth and 
the newspaper article, and acting from the fact that she hates Nazis, knocked him 
unconscious with the baseball bat--this would have been an act of violence. In such a 
situation, she acts from ignorance (she makes the false moral distinction between the 
self and other, the other as the enemy and as such a justified object of hate). But 
instead, she assesses the situation. She acts from the motivation of protecting and 
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valuing life. She feels great compassion for the helpless puppy. She even feels 
compassion and pity for a boy who is so full of hate and anger that he could consider 
such violence. She hits the boy with the baseball bat and certainly injures him. But, 
borrowing from Airaksinen, she is "other-regarding" every step of the way. Her 
intentions are not to cause harm but to protect and value life. Her -actions are 
nonviolent. But note that the physical action is the same here as it is in the Nazi-hating 
option above which is violent. A physical account of violence will not do the work 
required for accurate assessment. 
Finally it will be revealing to consider the representational status of the actions of the 
Nazi youth and of Helen. Recall that to extract meaning, we need to consider the 
message to be understood by each agent. The Nazi youth demonstrates that he 
devalues life. This is a puppy and not a person, but the puppy is fully capable of feeling 
pain and the Nazi youth fully intends to inflict as much as possible. His message is that 
"it doesn't matter if I inflict pain and suffering on you, your needs are unimportant. I 
have no moral obligations toward you. You are not entitled to respect, nor to life." 
These are the truth claims being raised. But causing pain and suffering is prima facie 
wrong. His actions represent falsity and are morally wrong. Helen acts to protect life. 
Her actions of intervention demonstrate the value she places on all living things. She 
refuses to compromise her principles. The truth claims raised by her actions involve the 
right to respect of all living things. The claims to truth (or falsity) appeal to the 
normative principles held by other members of society who uphold that causing pain 
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and suffering is morally reprehensible while extending respect, care and compassion to 
sentient beings is morally praiseworthy behaviour. 
From this chapter it is apparent that a richly textured ethical account can be provided by 
fusion philosophy which moves well beyond the present account of violence and 
nonviolence informing the contemporary philosophical discourse. For Gandhi, as for S. 
Rinpoche and the Dalai Lama the action theoretic framework of nonviolence contains 
the components required by a moral agent to live a life of compassion; a life better 
aligned with how we ought to behave. It highlights how examples like Hamish and the 
Envelope while they don't appear on the surface to be violent (after all it just looks like 
Hamish is not doing anything wrong, he's only keeping quiet; and in Envelope the 
agent only appears to be unresponsive) are in fact as violent as the Sedan example and 
they are morally wrong. The framework is also practical in that it has the capacity to 
successfully effect change in the world. The subtle layers of intention, speech and 
physical action frame the definitions of violence and nonviolence, insisting that the 
agent be fully accountable for his or her actions. Framing action in this way 
demonstrates the requirement for compassion and mutual responsibility because it 
dissolves the barrier between self and other, highlights the seeds of violence and 
provides for a more morally acceptable course of action which has better prescriptive 
claims on the agent. This account of violent and nonviolent action as representation 
can be coherently framed within a secular context, making it more inclusive than 
accounts which rely solely on power through violence, where violence attends only to 
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the physical action; or accounts of nonviolence which rely heavily on commitment to a 
theistic doctrine. 
In light of the exemplary example and adherence to the belief of power through 
nonviolence, I have chosen the Tibetan government in exile as my first argument for 
nonviolence. The second argument [developed in the following chapter] will focus on 
the philosophy of President Nelson Mandela, the insistence on truth in the face of the 
crippling oppression of apartheid and the adherence to the process of reconciliation 
offered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Both arguments have something 
unique to offer a metaphysics of power based on nonviolence. 
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Chapter Five 
- Truth & Reconciliation in the South African Context - 
(or adding scaffolding to the revisionary metaphysics of nonviolence) 
The nonviolent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It first does something 
to the heart and souls of those committed to it. It gives them new self-respect; it calls up resources of 
strength and courage that they did not know they had. Finally it reaches the opponent and so stirs his 
conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality. 
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr (King 1991) 
Our philosophically sensible agent puzzles over how the pursuit of nonviolence can 
possibly be realistic and practical in a modern (manifestly violent) world. The intention of 
this chapter is to offer two more necessary pieces to solve the puzzle. This is not an 
idealised utopian view, rather a secular approach which, by taking everyday aspects of 
violence and suffering and examining them in a slightly different light will bring to the 
surface important elements which may have been previously hidden to the sensible agent, 
and apparently, to a large percentage of the philosophical community. 
In reviewing the story so far, the individual sensible agent who is interested in living a life 
with access to power is confronted by a limited range of choices - pursue power through 
violence, or refrain from violence and remain powerless. If he pursues the first choice, it 
looks on the current understanding of power like it is possible to operate in a hard-edged 
world of violence with relative impunity. But in reality, the situation is becoming more 
problematic. Contemporary philosophy is required to become increasingly accountable. 
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"Violence" is shown to be too narrowly defined. The yardstick of permissibility is 
desperately in need of an overhaul. Violence (whether obvious and bloody or subtle and 
insidious) cannot be justified; the individual agent needs to have the sanctuary of 
ignorance replaced with the mirror of accountability. 
Moreover, contemporary philosophy as a discipline cannot on the one hand claim to 
address important ethical issues and, on the other, ignore an increa sing number of success 
stories reflecting the change from violent to nonviolent action. This is the practical 
philosophy of Mandela's South Africa and the pursuit of peace for a unified Ireland where 
the discourse focuses on truth, violence as error, and how we ought to act. Several high 
profile agents demonstrate power by doing things differently. These individuals have 
learned from the promising beginnings of like-minded members of a global audience and 
have fine-tuned the arguments for truth, action and accountability through a nonviolent 
approach. An understanding of this new approach to action is gained by detailed new 
definitions of "violence," "nonviolence," an understanding of harm and (as we will see 
shortly) the need to dissolve the barriers between self and other. The outlook is positive. 
If we are indeed responsible, intentional agents acting in the world, by recognising the root 
causes of violence, it is possible to change. This chapter will take our sensible agent 
armed with the benefit of these understandings, to see how (through the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission) the effects of nonviolent insistence on truth 
eradicate untruth. By taking our sensible agent to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in post-apartheid South Africa, she will examine the following two pieces of 
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the puzzle: the disequilibrium which follows from the social carve-up of self and other, 
and how "truth-telling" and restorative justice can facilitate unity and social cohesion--a 
job that 50 years of violence failed to do. She will witness the horrific testimony to 
violence; the anger of victims; denial by those who refuse to participate in the spirit of 
the process; the power of nonviolence; and testimony to the powerlessness of 
oppression--through human suffering and indignities of the worst kind--to pathways of 
healing and reconciliation. 
Chapter four demonstrates how Professor Rinpoche and Mahayana Buddhists stress that 
"violence begins with discrimination between self and others." (1998:15) This chapter will 
extend the insight and investigate what happens to truth when the sensible agent accepting 
this distinction, actively maintains it, leading to a world view which sees the other as less 
than human. Violent intentions and actions which follow, attempt to gain legitimacy by 
labelling the other "the enemy." During the apartheid years in South Africa, for many 
white South Africans, this other wore a black mask; for many black South Africans, this 
other usually, but not always wore a white mask (Askaris--or black South Africans turned 
undercover police informants--also meant that the enemy could now be black). 
I will argue that part of the success of nonviolence is the process of deconstructing this 
(false) distinction between the self and other and by utilising Susan Kapeller's recent work 
The Will to Violence (1995) will highlight what is most destructive in this distinction. It 
will be useful to observe a process which lays bare the damage resulting from the day to 
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day application, and the deep division which becomes entrenched over the years when we 
see the world through the fundamental dichotomy of "self" and "other." A clear example 
is provided by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I will now briefly 
sketch the background to the TRC and proceed to unpack its theoretical foundations. 
Dr Alex Boraine (Deputy Chair of the TRC) suggests that in order to understand the 
nature and implications of the TRC it is important to see the Commission both in the 
national and international context (1997). He points out that South Africa has 
experienced racism and oppression in one form or another ever since the earliest days of 
colonialism, and that some are of the opinion that the period under review should have 
started as far back as the arrival of the white settlers in 1652. Others are of the view that 
at the very least one should look at the period which began with South Africa's first 
constitution in 1910. There are also many who maintain that the starting point should be 
1948 when the National Party came to power. The Standing Committee on Justice in 
South Africa's Parliament decided to recommend that the period to be covered would be 
march 1960 to December 1993: 
The first date coincides with the banning of political organisations, severe oppression 
of any resistance to apartheid and the Sharpville massacre. The end date was 
arbitrarily chosen as the date when the negotiation teams decided on an amnesty 
provision in the Interim Constitution (this date was later changed to May 10 1994, 
largely to include a number of rightwing Afrikaners who engaged in violent acts 
immediately prior to the election in April 1994). (1997:1) 
Boraine reminds us that In 1910 when the first South African constitution was 
promulgated, it characterised white hegemony and was fundamentally undemocratic, 
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excluding as it did the vast majority of the population. It was also structurally racist, 
because the exclusion of the majority was in terms of skin colour. This undemocratic and 
racist constitution was further entrenched when the National Party came into power in 
1948. Under the National Party, through its policy of apartheid, a policy of domination 
was enforced which was not only a denial of basic political rights but a systematic piece of 
social engineering which embraced every area of life from birth to death: 
In other words, apartheid was a system of minority domination of statutorily defined 
colour groups on a territorial, residential, political, social and economic basis. It was 
a system which was entrenched for almost 50 years. (1997:2) 
This system produced arguably the world's most famous political prisoner. With the 
following statement, Nelson Mandela then human rights activist and leader of the banned 
ANC movement was sentenced to incarceration on Robben Island for 28 years. 
My ideal is a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony 
and with equal opportunity. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and achieve, but, if 
needs be, an ideal for which I am prepared to die.' 
In his autobiography Long Walk to Freedom (1995) Mandela talks about apartheid as a 
new term, but an old idea: 
It literally means "apartness" and it represents the codification in one oppressive system 
of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to whites for 
centuries. What had been more or less de facto was to become relentlessly de jour. The 
often haphazard segregation of the past three hundred years was to be consolidated into a 
monolithic system that was diabolical in its detail, inescapable in its reach and 
overwhelming in its power. 
Statement by Mandela at the Rivonia trial 12th of June 1964. 
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The premise of apartheid is that whites are superior to Africans, Coloureds and Indians, 
and the function of it was to entrench white supremacy forever. The policy was supported 
by the Dutch Reform Church, which furnished apartheid with its religious underpinnings 
by suggesting that "Afrikaners were God's chosen people and that blacks were a 
subservient species." 
Lionel Davis indicates an alternative way of viewing apartheid: 
For me, having been on Robben Island was a most positive experience. You see we 
come from a society which is very divided. It has been divided for centuries, this is 
how apartheid kept its power base, by the factions and division of our people. Each 
faction learned to be suspicious of the other, through education they inculcated the 
message that each is better and different from the other. Whites were elevated, then 
coloureds and then black peoples (further divided by Xhosa and Zulu and so on) until 
it became a kind of chess game for the rulers over the centuries; perfected by apartheid 
rule. 
Here on the island, we had all of these classifications (without women or white people) 
which included Xhosa, Zulu, people classified as Asiatic and the like; and for the first 
time we are thrown together in this cauldron. But here, they discriminated on the basis 
of coloureds and Asiatics getting better food than Black people, hoping that this would 
again perpetuate this wedge, this chasm. But what they forgot is that we are political 
beings with a vision for change. We believe in equality, in the humanity of people - 
that is what we were fighting for. So here in jail, you have these very different 
ideologies, very different cultures, different language groups, different personalities; 
but all united against the immediate injustices. The atrocities that are committed in the 
name of justice, in the name of Christianity; all of these on the island, wanting to 
dehumanise us, wanting to destroy our dignity, to deface us. It was against these 
injustices that we were fighting. But in the face of this, we learned about each others' 
cultures it was a unique experience. (Davis 1997) 
In South Africa after the 1994 elections there was a compelling need to restore moral 
order which was jeopardised by the abdication of this rule of law, and gross violations of 
fundamental human rights. As a result, we see the birth of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). 
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Because of its recency very little at this time has been published outside of South Africa 
relating to the TRC. The Commission itself, and its many officers are extremely generous 
about free access and circulation of information with a view to making the process as 
transparent and accessible as possible. I choose specific examples relating to power and 
nonviolence; and in doing so, will canvass the views of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (TRC 
Chair), Dr Alex Boraine (Deputy Chair), and President Nelson Mandela. Through an 
examination of nonviolent responses to extraordinary acts of violence and gross human 
rights abuse in a contemporary context, it will be possible to see how the new theoretical 
framework for power through nonviolence can be put to work. This is not a biography of 
Mandela or Tutu, nor is it an analysis of the political transition from colonialism to 
democracy--a task better served by other sources 2--it is an exposition of the contemporary 
confrontation between violence and nonviolence. A large proportion of the information to 
be found in this chapter is derived from interviews conducted in South Africa in November 
1997, and attendance at two TRC hearings (Amnesty hearing for those involved in the 
murder of the Guguletu 7 [Cape Town], and a special hearing for Winnie Mandikezela-
Mandela and the Mandela United Football team in relation to the murder of Stompi Sepei 
and the imprisonment of Katiza Cebalculu [Johannesburg]). 
2 See Mandela, N. Long Walk to Freedom, Abacus 1994; 
Tutu, D The Rainbow People of God: South Africa's victory over apartheid, Bantam 1995; 
Waldmeir, P Anatomy of a Miracle: the end of apartheid and the birth of a new South Africa, Viking 
1997; 
Sparkes, A Tomorrow is another Country: the inside story of South Africa's negotiated revolution, 
Heinneman 1995; 
Bridgland, F Katiza's Journey: beneath the surface of South Africa's shame, Sidgewick and Jackson 
1997. 
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I will start to unpack the theoretical foundations of the TRC, by an examination of truth-
telling and the role of truth in reconstruction and reconciliation. But before doing so, I 
would like the reader to be mindful of the way I intend to go about this. The task of 
philosophy in part, is to "get at the truth" through clean-cut, hopefully elegant and 
certainly rational analysis. Professor Airaksinen's work on coercion referred to in the first 
chapter of this dissertation satisfies this criterion, but also serves as a timely reminder here, 
of the potential risk of detachment by academic analysis to the subject area of violence 
which is the container of raw nerves and the package of human suffering. 
Violence against the person (particularly in the form of gross human rights violations) can 
never be adequately treated as a sanitised academic exercise. Such an exercise can render 
opaque, or even invisible the critical elements of pain and suffering at the human level. In 
such an exercise it would be reasonably simple to propose a few appropriate thought 
experiments and to craft an argument dismissing nonviolence as an idealistic and 
ineffective solution to a somewhat hygienically presented moral dilemma. What I intend 
to do throughout this chapter, is to stay in touch with the driving principles of this project, 
even if doing so is painful. I will recount below the recollections of two Commissioners 
from the TRC in South Africa and the testimony of a Tibetan nun. The stories bring to life 
intense suffering, the capacity of human beings to commit abhorrent acts of violence, the 
many levels of pain, the reality of living with that pain on a daily basis. In the face of all of 
this it is a process of nonviolence, reconciliation, compassion, forgiveness that has been 
the chosen response by South Africans and Tibetans alike. Philosophy is about important 
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real life issues, and the close of the Twentieth Century provides ample opportunity for 
contemporary philosophers to be exposed to the testimonies of victims of human rights 
abuse, and the process of nonviolence as part of a solution. In order to bring the issues to 
life, I will recount below two testimonies by Commissioners from the TRC 3 . 
Richard Lyster, Durban: A story we heard in Port Shepstone last year involved a 
woman and her children who were attacked in their house by a group of men. They 
locked her in a room next door to her four children and then murdered her children, one 
by one. She described in the most tragic and pitiful way how she heard her children 
screaming, how she heard shots, and as each one died the screaming diminished until 
there was only one person left screaming, a final shot and then silence. Her story 
epitomised the brutality of the war in KwaZulu-Natal in stark terms as well as the deep 
personal tragedy of this conflict. The six young men convicted of these murders were 
members of the ANC. 
Wendy Orr, Cape Town: I remember Mr Mkhabile, a man in his late 70's a member 
of POQO who was imprisoned and abused on Robben Island. Now almost deaf, 
incredibly 'high' about being invited to a public TRC hearing, when he was asked what 
he wanted from the TRC he took a crumpled piece of paper out of his pocket and read 
us the names of his comrades who had been sentenced to death and hanged. All he 
wanted was that we remember them. 
We should be mindful of the extent to which nonviolence as a massive effort is being 
applied at this moment, by so many people in the Republic of South Africa, when dealing 
with the more theoretical underpinnings which follow in this chapter. Likewise, the efforts 
of the Tibetans in exile are not thought experiments, but the daily real life application of 
nonviolent theory and practise as a powerful and serious response to acts of violence. 
Consider the following extract from a testimony by a Tibetan nun who adheres to 
nonviolence in the face of unthinkable brutality: 
3 Members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were asked in a "Truth Talk" survey (mav7ine 
published by TRC for general circulation to the community) to give details of the most memorable stories 
that came before them during the public hearings of the Commission. 
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We slept with our robes on in case we were taken away in the night. When we went to 
demonstrate we expected nothing but death. We are fighting for truth, and for this we 
must be ready to die.. .They (the Chinese) started shooting. They were firing from all 
sides. All the streets were blocked and we were trapped in the middle. This way many 
people were killed. So many people were killed; a small child was shot in the stomach, 
his intestines were falling out. He was watching from a crack in the wall. The guns 
didn't make any noise, we just saw red flashes and people fell down around us. They 
threw us into trucks and took us to Gutsa prison. For a month and ten days, they did 
not let me see the sky; I did not know night from day. 
When the guards had passed, I listened for a whisper - any sign that I am not alone. 
They wanted to know who was behind us, but noone was behind us. Then they stripped 
me completely naked, they stood me up and kicked me in the groin. They made me 
stick out my tongue and pushed an electric cattle prod in my mouth. They hit me again 
and again.. .They wrapped wires around my fingers then they turned on the electric 
current. The shock was unbearable. My whole body contracted and sharp pains shot 
up through my feet. It was more painful than the cattle prod. I was shaking and 
screaming. They tortured me every day, and then they set my sentence. They gave me 
only two years because I was just sixteen. 
The one who tortures me is made to believe that what he is doing is right. He must stay 
blind to my pain in order to carry on. With arms that beat me, he embraces his woman; 
wraps loving arms around his child, protecting her with his strength. No-one can 
escape the consequences of their actions. 
Our enemy is our greatest teacher, teacher of patience and compassion.. .Through the 
force of our prayers, I ask that those who imprison us be freed from the darkness of 
ignorance; that the clouds which obscure the truth give way to clarity.. After our 
release they sent us back to our villages. They made our home a prison; we were 
forbidden from wearing our robes 
After my release, I returned to the nunnery.. .there were many Chinese policemen there. 
They told me I couldn't stay; they didn't let me stay in my room or even stay with my 
friends. So I had to leave that night. I was a long way from my home. The Chinese 
office was down the road, and there were some drunken men there. I didn't expect 
anything. They grabbed me by the chest and carried me off. I shouted and screamed 
but noone heard me. They carried me to a hidden place. They held me down by my 
arms and legs and stuffed cloth in my mouth so I couldn't scream. Then they raped me. 
...The teachings of Buddha are deep like an ocean. As anger and hatred arise, I pray 
that the Chinese become gentle and calm; that through love and compassion those who 
are drunk with delusions, lost in the darkness of ignorance, acquire the wisdom eye to 
see what is right and what is wrong. May all living beings be free from suffering. 4 
4  The full transcription appears as Appendix 6. Because the film footage was smuggled out of Tibet and 
shows explicit detail of Chinese brutality, the identity of the Tibetan nun giving the testimony has been 
concealed. The 1993 documentary film by Ellen Bruno is called `Satya: a prayer for the enemy' and is 
distributed by the Australia-Tibet Council. 
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Testimonies like this, and the opportunity to attend truth commission hearings, make it far 
more difficult for contemporary philosophers to sit back comfortably and conduct a 
sanitised analysis of violence that dodges the important difficult issues like legitimacy and 
dismiss nonviolence as a solution to gross human rights abuse. It is in such a world as 
this, that an increasing number of people seriously choose to face violence with 
nonviolence, and insist on the importance of truth, forgiveness and healing rather than 
retribution.: 
No government can forgive. No commission can forgive. They don't know my pain. 
Only I can forgive and I must know before I can forgive." (widow testifying to a TRC 
amnesty hearing in 1997). (Boraine 1997:9) 
The South African example underlines the role of truth in reconstruction and healing. 
Within the SA context the need for truth should be seen against the background of the 
secrecy and distortion that the public have been subjected to for decades: 
Families need to know what exactly happened to their loved ones, and the public needs 
to know what happened to the trust it granted its leaders. It is inconceivable that 
reconciliation can take place if this need for truth has not been met sufficiently. 
Reconciliation cannot be built on a lie or a cover-up of truth. (Odendaal 1997:2) 
Boraine extends this point and recalls that South Africa's experience is very similar to 
many other countries in the following way: witness after witness at the Human Rights 
Violations Committee hearings have emphasised their deep fimdamental need to know the 
truth surrounding the loss of a loved one. It is significant that almost exactly the same set 
of words is used by witnesses whether they are in South America, Northern Ireland or 
South Africa: "I want to forgive but I must know who to forgive and for what." 
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Boraine includes in the title of his paper a reference to "the Third Way." The context of 
discussion involves a choice between blanket amnesty for all perpetrators of violence 
(proposed by the former de Klerk government), trial and punishment of all perpetrators 
"catch the bastards and hang them," 5 or the establishment of a truth commission (later 
modified as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission). These sentiments reflect three 
different approaches to violence (1) To ignore it and hope that it goes away, or at least 
that it doesn't affect you. (2) To adopt a retributive "Nuremberg" approach where 
punishment is the focus of justice being seen to be done; or (3) To confront perpetrators 
and victims with matters of fact about what occurred for what reason and to whom, 
allowing the victims access to knowledge formerly suppressed, to grieve, to begin a 
process of healing; and to confront the perpetrators with the accountability for their 
actions, a platform for potential forgiveness and sometimes a second chance. 
In the past, the first two options of denial and retribution have been the predominant 
methods of dealing with gross human rights abuse, but the claim to ignorance while 
common, is, according to President Patricio Aylwin of Chile the response with the greatest 
potential for destruction: 
To close our eyes and pretend none of this ever happened would be to maintain at the 
core of our society a source of pain, division, hatred and violence. Only the disclosure 
of truth and the search for justice can create the moral climate in which reconciliation 
and peace will flourish.. (Boraine 1997:14) 
5 Thabo Mbeld, Deputy President of South expressing the sentiment of the ANC prior to 1994. 
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This third way is increasingly informing the framework for conflict resolution on a global 
scale regarding matters in the present, and providing a more desirable method for the 
future. The important thing to notice here, is that ignorance or amnesia only maintains the 
pain and division. Simply to do nothing, on Unger's terms, and on Aylwin's (above) is 
actively to perpetuate violence (it is becoming increasingly difficult for sensible agents to 
wriggle out of accountability and responsibility for violent actions). Boraine reflects this 
sentiment regarding amnesia and the TRC: 
It is impossible for white South Africans in particular to hold onto their view that 'They 
didn't know." I think we have shattered that illusion; because if they didn't know, they 
do know now. They may not like the Commission, but they have joined the debate, it is 
public. 6 
Increasingly, evidence like this highlights the fact that action other than denial or 
retributive treatment of violence is required to create a desirable moral climate for human 
flourishing. But where are the answers to come from? Where are the contemporary 
philosophers who will provide the analysis and importantly, elevate the discourse of 
nonviolence to the mainstream arena to ensure access for an increasing number of 
countries moving through transition? Where silence on violence and dismissal of 
nonviolence posed at the start of this project ran the risk of looking somewhat 
insignificant, the repercussions for the domain of philosophy are now 'coming home to 
roost.' Philosophy is underprepared to provide an adequate conceptual scaffolding to 
6  Interview conducted in Cape Town, November 1997 - full extract appears as Appendix 3. The issue of 
truth made public is an echo of Gandhi's satya + graha. The truth must be made visible, and then insisted 
upon, confronting the perpetrators of violence and forcing a choice. The relative comfort of 'amnesia' is 
made impossible. For a full discussion see chapter 3, p. 134. 
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support individuals or larger groups in society to make the change from actions of 
violence to actions of nonviolence and this must be seen as a disciplinary failure. 
South Africa as a strong contemporary candidate for unprecedented transition, flags a 
number of ethical issues of interest to philosophy. It realised a relatively peaceful 
transition—described as "miraculous" by many--from oppression, exclusivity and resistance 
to a new, negotiated democratic order. After the election in April 1994, Minister for 
Justice, Dullah Omar, articulated some of the ethical issues in the following way: 
I have the privilege and responsibility to introduce today a Bill which provides a 
pathway, a stepping stone, towards the historic bridge of which the Constitution speaks 
whereby our society can leave behind the past of a deeply divided society characterised 
• by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and commence the journey towards a 
future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence, and development opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, 
race, class, belief or sex. 
Its substance is the very essence of the constitutional commitment to reconciliation and 
the reconstruction of society, Its purpose is to provide that secure foundation which the 
Constitution enjoins: 
"...for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which 
generated gross human rights violations.. and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and 
revenge" (Hansard 1995:1339-40). 
Wilhelm Verwoerd (1997) reminds us that with these words the Minister of Justice, 
introduced the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (no. 34 of 1995) in the 
South African National Assembly. He reflects that Omar's introductory remarks, based 
largely on the Postamble to the Interim Constitution (Act 200, 1993), articulate a 
widespread recognition that this "miracle" can only be sustained if Apartheid's unfinished 
business is tackled, that the future of democracy and development in South Africa requires 
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the past to be dealt with, ie the legacies of a deeply entrenched system of white minority 
domination of statutorily defined "Africans," "Coloureds" and "Indians" on a territorial, 
residential, political, social and economic basis (cf. Boraine 1996:1-2). 
The Minister of Justice's introduction also makes it clear that the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act, which provides specifically for the establishment of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), is but "a pathway," "a stepping stone." The main 
pathway towards the "historic bridge" away from Apartheid injustices and towards a 
democratic South Africa "with development opportunities for all" is the comprehensive 
(and according to Verwoerd, rather ambitious) Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). Other stepping stones are provided by the Land Claims Court and a 
number of institutions supporting constitutional democracy, such as the Public Protector, 
the Human Rights, Gender, Youth and Electoral Commissions, and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (Verwoerd for some reason omits NGO's who have in the past, 
and continue to play an enormous role supporting constitutional democracy at a street 
level'. 
7 A few with whom I have had direct contact are the Black Sash movement (with sincere gratitude to Val, 
& Anne Greenwell) - working on dissemination of information, clothing and projects for autonomy 
within the townships; the Quaker Peace Centre with youth support schemes, garden project - vegetable 
growing, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (with thanks to Prof. Ampie Muller), the Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation (with thanks to Tlhoki & Hugo) - trauma crisis centre, youth projects in 
coloured high schools, educational multi media Truth and Reconciliation Unit, justice projects 
(comnumity policing) and research on transitional issues; UMAC Urban Monitoring Awareness 
Commission (provide training for police sensitivity in statement taking and handling of trauma victims; 
and Philani (similar to Red Cross) - all participate in this supportive structure aimed at redevelopment. 
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Within this package of responses to the injustices of the past, the TRC has been given the 
specific tasks of getting as "complete a picture as possible" of the "nature, causes and 
extent" of gross human rights violations 8 during the period 1960-1993; restoring the 
human and civil dignity of victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own 
accounts of the violations of which they are victims; facilitating the granting of amnesty to 
those giving full disclosure of politically motivated crimes during this period of resistance 
to/defence of Apartheid; and making recommendations to Parliament on reparation and 
rehabilitation measures to be taken, including measures in order to prevent the future 
commission of human rights violations. These tasks were to have been completed in two 
years, by the end of 1997, with a comprehensive report to be handed to the President after 
a further three months. The period for hearing backlogged cases has been extended into 
1998.. 
Verwoerd and others see this as a huge, almost impossible undertaking, but argues that 
the TRC in action has also confirmed its potential to make a uniquely important 
contribution to democratisation and development in South Africa, ie helping to strengthen 
the (moral) basis of an emerging democracy and deepening the foundations of the RDP. 
Michelle Parlevliet (1996) outlines the background issues to official commissions of 
inquiry set up to investigate gross human rights violations and considers that the moral 
8  This is defined as the violation of human rights through (i) the killing abduction, torture or severe ill-
treatment of any person; or (ii) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to conunit an act referred to in para (i), which emanated from the conflicts of the past.. .by 
any person acting with a political motive (Act no 34 of 1995, section 1). 
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base of an emerging democracy is strengthened by the fact that "truth" in the context of 
Truth Commissions is an absolute value that cannot be compromised: 
They are generally labelled truth commissions because of their mandate to prepare a 
comprehensive report about past violations. They are... "to tell the truth" about the 
period of violence and repression.. .over and over again it is emphasised that, while the 
pursuit of justice may be negotiable depending on the political circtunstances 9, the truth 
is not. Truth is regarded to be an absolute value, one that cannot be renounced under 
any circumstances. 
Alex Boraine insists that truth is not just about knowledge, but acknowledgment. We will 
see in the discussion below that truth is not only about hearing facts, but requires an act by 
the agent of recognising violence and owning up to the responsibility for violent action. `° 
With acts of violence, come victims/or survivors, and the Act that brought the commission 
into being, charges the TRC with particular responsibility towards the care of these 
survivors. The commission appointed briefers and debriefers to assist survivors at public 
hearings" and to refer deponents for additional support. Trudy de Ridder (1997) raises 
concern about the public discourse surrounding the TRC in this respect - in particular, the 
9 Boraine recounts that in a private interview with President Mandela, Mr Mandela made it quite clear 
that senior generals of the apartheid security forces had personally warned him of the bloody and dire 
consequences which would ensue, if members of the security forces faced compulsory trials and 
prosecutions following the election. According to Mandela, they threatened to make a peaceful election 
totally impossible. Some compromise had to be made and in the postamble of the Interim Constitution, 
provision was made for the granting of amnesty to advance reconciliation. Amnesty was the price paid for 
a free and fair election and a relatively peaceful transition (some continue to question whether the price 
was too high). Boraine leaves us with the question: are the needs and objectives of the state synonymous 
with those of the violated individual? 
I° See Cape Town interview Appendix 3. 
I The first thing that I noticed as an observer at the hearings was the incredibly supportive presence of 
these TRC staff. Through each testimony to unspeakable horrors, they were, as it seemed everywhere at 
once comforting all needy parties—a caring hand, an arm around the shoulder, assistance with 
interpretation and helping victims/survivors out of the room when it all became too much, to bring them 
in again later when they were ready. 
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use of pejorative terms such as "victim" and "perpetrator"--which she sees as complicating 
the process for participants. "Very few people enjoy being labelled 'victims' of gross 
human rights violations - for the word 'victim' implies passivity, lack of personal agency, 
and lack of control. The term 'survivor', however, connotes a sense of recovery, control 
and empowerment." The additional danger in utilising these labels is a very real one of 
creating, rather than a proud nation of survivors who are breaking new ground and 
moving forward, a nation of victims, which is at best unhelpful, and at worst profoundly 
disempowering. 
Regardless of the extraordinary success I would attribute to the TRC based on my own 
observations over the past year, it would be unbalanced to present only one view of the 
"truth at work." Some public criticism of both the process and the TRC itself, appears to 
focus on a perceived "lack of justice." For many people the main ethical issue is justice, 
not truth and reconciliation. At the time the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act was debated and in particular since the TRC started with the uniquely 
public process of human rights violations and amnesty hearings, tensions between "justice" 
and the TRC have been highlighted in various ways: 
Verwoerd recounts that the vivid portrayal in the mass media of witnesses' painfilled 
accounts of death, torture and various forms of severe ill-treatment during the hearings of 
the Human Rights Violations Committee, combined with court challenges by prominent 
victims (such as the Biko, Mxenge and Robeiro families) to the removal of their right to 
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seek civil redress as a result of amnesty being granted, are highlighting with renewed 
intensity the thorny questions: Why only a Truth Commission? Why amnesty? What about 
justice? Why are the perpetrators not being (severely) punished? Verwoerd claims that it 
is "difficult not to feel like a sell-out when one is faced with this demand for justice by 
victims/survivors/victors of human rights violations under Apartheid," °BID) and the 
primary purpose of his paper is an attempt to answer these justice-driven criticisms. 
He argues that many victims are not only using "justice" in the relatively narrow sense of 
prosecution and punishment of individual perpetrators through the formal justice system. 
When someone says: "How can I forgive, because my life has not changed... I am still 
poor, I live in shack, I don't have money to send my children to school," or "real 
reconciliation is only possible after (socioeconomic) transformation," (Track Two 
1997:V16 3&4) or when representatives of communities who have been impoverished 
through forced removals are asking the TRC "why are you excluding us, we are also 
victims of Apartheid?", or when the allocation of very scarce resources to the TRC are 
challenged--"just think how many houses could have been built with the R150 million 
(about $70 million) the state is spending on the TRC!," we are also faced with demands 
for "social justice" 12 
12  Generally speaking 'justice' can be taken to refer to the principles used to guide the adjudication of 
conflicting claims to more of the benefit and less of the of the burdens that result from the life that a group 
of individuals share together in a specific society (Rawls 1973, Lotter 1993). legal justice mainly involves 
the fair allotment of the burdens of penalties and punishment, while 'social justice' is typically more 
concerned with the equitable distribution of socio-economic opportunities and goods (Goodwin 1987, 
Raphael, 1976). 
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Supporting this point, Boraine argues that the process of the TRC alone and policy change 
alone will not produce the required result in South Africa, but that: "Economic justice and 
the restoration of the moral order should be seen as two sides of a single coin.. .any serious 
attempt at dealing with the legacy of the past will include at least a strong commitment to 
transformation in the economic and social life of the majority of South Africa's citizens." 
(Boraine 1997:2) 
We need to take a closer look at the kind of criticism which demands: "No amnesty, no 
amnesia, just justice" (Verwoerd 1997:3) some people continue to think that the 
knowledge of what went on in the past, if paid for with pardons, is bought at too high a 
price. 
Odendaal (1997) reminds us that an alternative to the TRC process which has been 
propagated with some vigour is that of general amnesty. For example, the Afrikaans daily 
Die Burger has from the start of the process argued in favour of a general amnesty and 
has been scathing in its criticism of the TRC. General amnesty, however, means an 
exclusive emphasis on mercy, with a disregard for both truth and justice. The argument 
that this will best serve peace and thus ensure reconciliation is unconvincing. It is based 
either on the assumption that amnesia and a cover-up are the most effective cure for 
trauma and deep-seated anger, or on a denial of the extent of that trauma and anger. The 
only way to build a positive future that all groups can be part of is to know what happened 
and fully to understand why it happened. As Professor Ampie Muller succinctly puts it: 
279 
This predicates a need for Afrikaners (and others) to fully understand the flaws in their 
political philosophy, in their theology, in their ideas on race and ethnicity and in the myths 
surrounding their own group and its destiny - which enabled the excesses of the last 40 
years. This is difficult material because it means confronting our shadow side. If this is 
not done, however, there is no guarantee of `nunca mas!' (never again!). (Muller 1997) 
But what conclusions can be drawn from all this truth-telling? Choosing a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission process in South Africa, indicates a politics that presupposes 
peoples' ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behaviour. This is not an 
acceptance of violence but rather an examination of violence with the intention of 
progressing the moral order--confronting violence with nonviolence and moving forward. 
This is important for the following reason: I am interested in action, the intention of the 
agent to act and the choices an agent makes in acting. The previous chapter highlights the 
determining role of intention in acts of violence and nonviolence--part of the focus of the 
TRC is to get at the intention behind the acts of violence in order to reveal the truth in the 
same way that nonviolence in the Gandhian sense aims to confront and change the heart of 
the oppressor. For this to become a reality, there is a requirement for victims and 
perpetrators alike to acknowledge the violent action--and by definition, the violent 
intention--and to understand the matters of fact. Only this prepares the way for 
forgiveness and reconciliation. 13 Here we see the importance both of knowledge and 
acknowledgment. 
13 Objectors might point to the potential for sentimentality in a process awash with 'forgiveness', 'love' 
'nonviolence' and other terms which might have had their heyday in the 6o's'. However, spending almost 
10 full days at TRC hearings, I feel well-equipped to confirm the tangible results and genuine sense of 
healing which can (but not always does) take place between victims and oppressors. It is not 
sentimentality at this level of human engagement, it is rather, a very moving serious moment when the 
oppressor, confronted with the requirement to recount every small detail of the horrific act he has 
committed, and to take responsibility for those actions in front of the openly suffering victims (usually 
family members) who recount their moments (sometimes years) of unending trauma, up to the present 
moment of speaking. The oppressor is confronted by the harm he has caused, and through this process of 
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So far, we have uncovered four significant factors required to change violent action. I will 
recall them together before putting them to work in the final TRC example: First, there 
must be a presupposition that people have the capacity to change (that life in general, 
power relations in particular and agents as conductors of those power relations are not 
confined to a predetermined and rigidly fixed social grid of hatred, violence and suffering 
from which there is no escape). Second, that violence is about the action of the agent, 
not a set of circumstances. Third, that each individual is accountable for his or her 
actions (including intentions). And fourth, that we must recognise the false moral 
distinction between self and other (which so frequently leads to regarding the other is the 
enemy, the enemy as inhuman, and on that basis, to an attempted justification for the most 
abhorrent acts of violence). 
For Archbishop Tutu, as for the Dalai Lama, this last aspect is one of the most 
fundamental insights an individual can grasp in pursuing a happy and meaningful life: 
The power of nonviolence is the belief in the worth of 'The other," in the worth of 
"your enemy," you don't demonise your enemy—rather you say that "my enemy is 
just a friend I am still to make." (Tutu 1997) 
This also becomes the principle task of the TRC: In acknowledging acts of violence and 
applying for amnesty, the perpetrator must accept responsibility for her actions; with the 
benefit of a level playing field and equal power relations (a context provided by the TRC), 
"truth telling" on an "even playing field" the previously unequal power relations are balanced, proper 
grieving is (sometimes for the first time in decades) made possible and forgiveness with a view to moving 
forward can take place. 
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the perpetrator faces the victim/survivor of the violence. There is no longer the 
convenient category of "enemy" or "other"--only one person facing another person. For 
reconciliation to take place, it requires acknowledgment and forgiveness at this, the most 
basic of levels. When this dissolving of barriers fails to emerge, reconciliation is not 
possible--the most public example of this occurred in Johannesburg during the Winnie 
Mandikizela-Mandela hearing. Granted, the image of people opening their emotional 
wounds in front of literally hundreds of international television cameras is not a comforting 
one. The coverage of this case was more like a media feeding frenzy. The temperature 
inside the hearing room (devoid of air conditioning for the first few days) was almost 
unbearable. But still, in the midst of all of this one of the key witnesses Bishop Paul 
Verryn managed to calmly give evidence and express his need for reconciliation with 
Winnie Mandikizela-Mandela. This may be surprising as it was she who had almost 
completely destroyed his life by false accusations. He asked through his counsel, 
permission to speak freely which Archbishop Tutu willingly accepted. Verryn expressed 
profound remorse that he had been unable to take better care of the child who was 
eventually murdered. (He was in charge of a Methodist manse, and of sheltered homeless 
youth). At the time of the murder, Stompie Sepei (14) was in Mrs Mandela's care, not his 
own. He expressed his anguish to the boys family who were at the hearing, and asked 
their forgiveness for failing to be more vigilant. He then turned to WM-M, and restated 
that although he could not understand why she had given false testimony and attempted to 
destroy his life for so many years, he genuinely wished to move ahead by building bridges 
through love and forgiveness. He said that he forgave her for her past actions and asked 
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that she also forgive him. There was no reply. Archbishop Tutu, like every other person 
of the eight or nine hundred strong crowd was visibly moved and gently encouraged 
Winnie to respond. She just laughed. In the end Tutu recognising the enormous personal 
effort by Bishop Verryn, and wanting to see some good come out of the horrific accounts 
of violence which had been heard over the week, implored her to respond. She said she 
had nothing to say, and wouldn't be party to "this circus." Clearly, one willing party is not 
enough for reconciliation. To her, Verryn was still "the other," "the enemy." She still 
operated from ignorance, maintaining the false moral distinction. This operated as a 
barrier to the healing process. Truth insistence and the desire for healing in this case is the 
same as the satyagraha action pursued by the Mahayana Buddhists and by Gandhi in the 
previous chapter. In this example, the process satisfies the criteria of transparency, but 
demonstrates the critical role of both parties in the transaction--even if the hearts of 
everyone in the room were moved to compassion--if the oppressor fails to acknowledge 
the truth, then healing cannot take place. 
The TRC as a transparent process to analyse and understand the true facts about the 
violent act of another, is only one side of the coin - in the very act of revealing the truth, 
the coin is turned by an almost imperceptible sleight-of-hand, revealing the truth of 
equality and the right to dignity, of compassion and forgiveness; one agent is given the 
opportunity to acknowledge the wrongness of action and express remorse, and the other, 
having heard the truth is given the opportunity to forgive and to begin reconstructing a 
life. The power of nonviolence to achieve what decades of violence could not achieve is 
clearly demonstrated in this way: 
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I don't think power can unlock the possibility of a peaceful and reconciled society by force 
or coercion. I think you're actually empowering people by not using power. It seems a 
fairly obvious thing to say, but I think it's terribly important and these people don't seem to 
understand that. People say "this is a demonstration of weakness, that you're not actually 
punishing people" but I actually think it is a sign of power. It is a different kind of power, it 
is a moral kind but it is a power that I have seen working in the Commission - I've actually 
seen people freed.. .to say to someone that actually killed their daughter "I forgive you" and 
went so far as to say to the very one that killed their loved one "And I would like you to 
forgive me because I was part of a system that created you" this is publicly! publicly'. .that 
is devastating.. .it is so powerful.. that is what can change the equation, and is changing it. I 
don't think people are aware yet of that force within the Commission that empowers people 
to stop seeing themselves as victims, and to live as survivors.. .or even those who are 
victorious. And not only did they pay a very heavy price for a new South Africa, but this 
has now been acknowledged, and they can really say that "the burden rolls from their 
shoulder down the hill, and is seen no more." 14 
As an observer at the end of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, one is left 
with the sense of healing, the potential for moral growth and an optimistic vision. Part of 
this is captured in the words of Lionel Davis: 
My vision of nonviolence is of a society where we are all equals. A society where no 
person would ever have to go hungry. There would be food and education; there would be 
a home we could all call home, and enjoy the comforts of a decent living., three meals 
every day, a place for our children to do their schooling. To see them grow up into fruitful 
young people in society, part of a democratic order. Those are the things we wished for, 
we worked for. Because by improving yourself, by keeping your spirit alive you kept your 
vision alive.. ibis is how ultimately we became the conquerors, instead of the 
vanquished.. the vision. 
It is this positive vision for achieving human potential and constructing a framework for a 
powerful, meaningful life through nonviolence which will fall to the task of the final 
chapter. 
14  Taken from an interview on power and nonviolence, Cape Town Nov. 1997 - appearing in full in 
Appendix 3. 
284 
Chapter Six 
- A Contemporary View of Power - 
(the exercise of power through nonviolence) 
Humanity is waiting for something other than blind imitation of the past. If we want truly to advance a 
step further.. .we must begin to turn mankind away from the long and desolate night of violence. May it 
not be that the new man the world needs is the nonviolent man? Longfellow said, "In this world a man 
must either be an anvil or a hammer.: We must be hammers shaping a new society rather than the anvils 
molded by the old. This not only will make us new men, but will give us a new kind of power. It will not 
be Lord Acton's image of power that tends to corrupt or absolute power that tends to corrupt absolutely. It 
will be power infused with love and justice, that will change dark yesterdays into bright tomorrows, and 
lift us from the fatigue of despair to the buoyancy of hope. 
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr (King 1967:66) 
I began this project with a concern about the position of power within contemporary 
philosophical discourse, and with the view that the following question, though attracting 
widespread interest is simply the wrong question: "Which definition is the most accurate 
description of power?" While this question fuels discussion which is interesting enough, it 
ignores and submerges more important questions relating to power. When the only 
philosophically interesting thing to say about power is that it is a constitutive element of 
relations based on force, coercion, influence and control, the result is competing accounts 
of the anatomy of power, where power either: 
- belongs to a few, usually operating at the peak of hierarchical state-run 
structures, leaving the majority as powerless victims (Airaksinen); or, 
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explicitly rests on violence (through coup or revolution) with the only 
meaningful change in the expansion of power is that someone else seizes the 
reins (de Jouvenel) or, 
has no reins, rather, power rests on violence which is insidious and implicit 
where coercive exercises of power are regulated and maintained by social 
control, or at its most efficient, even by the agent him/herself (Foucault) or, 
domination of one agent over another agent's "action environment." 
(Wartenberg) 
Such an analysis sidetracks the reader into examining the many exercises of power but acts 
as an ideological cloaking device obscuring the more ethically interesting and important 
question: "Is it reasonable for the epistemological foundations of power to reflect only 
violence?" It becomes apparent that contemporary philosophers, educators, lawyers, 
psychologists and other interested parties offer analyses of power relations that take for 
granted the probity of what they are describing. By failing to question the legitimacy of 
violence on the one hand, and bypassing the accountability of the oppressor for her 
actions, on the other, they deliver a set of weakened accounts about power which 
postpone engagement with philosophically important issues. 
The task of this final chapter is to show how the action theoretic framework for the 
exercise of power through nonviolence can (1) be useful to the contemporary moral agent 
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and (2) assist in the provision of conceptual scaffolding to support individuals or larger 
groups in society with the transition from actions of violence to actions of nonviolence. 
Previous chapters examined influential views of power and the problems of legitimacy and 
argued for nonviolence as an appropriate topic for the domain of philosophical discussion. 
I have highlighted the requirement for fusion philosophy--an approach which combines 
both Western and non-Western philosophical views--to create a new theoretical structure. 
This new framework draws on the ideas of Foucault, Airaksinen, Habermas and Arendt as 
well as socially engaged Buddhists like the Dalai Lama, S. Rinpoche, Naht Hanh and 
nonviolence activists like King and Gandhi. The result is a theoretical framework which: 
( I) reveals action as multi-layered (intentions, speech and physical action)--an 
improvement on the current single layered approach to violent action as physical 
force. 
(2) demonstrates that some actions are representative and reinscribe beliefs about the 
world. The analysis shows that with violent action (the Playground Parent, the 
Oatlands Liberation Army, Hamish, the bully and the Apartheid Police Agent) the 
beliefs are false and actions which follow are morally wrong. But these actions are 
not merely representative--they have a role in legitimising power structures based on 
violence. 
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(3 ) provides a morally acceptable account of the exercise of power by effecting change 
through nonviolent action. This account describes an entirely different moral 
framework from one focussing on the exercise of power through violent action. 
The task of this final chapter is to consider the practical application of this action theoretic 
framework for analysis of the exercise of power through nonviolence. This framework 
provides a rich, deeply textured analysis grounding application in the everyday world of 
the sensible agent--an agent not in glorious isolation, but the self in relation with other 
selves. I will bring forward our sensible agent for the last time to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the new action theoretic framework. Consider Joe: 
Joe is generally thought of as a "nice guy" he helps out at the Home for the Aged 
along the street, he always does what he can to help his friends. He recently gave an 
address on nonviolence to the local Neighbourhood Watch meeting. But life is 
difficult for Joe at the moment. The rental property next door has new tenants—he's 
stuck with a "bad lot" and feels totally powerless to do anything about it. The 
younger children just last week were hiding behind bushes and throwing stones at an 
elderly neighbour walking past. He saw the older children a few days later throwing 
matches into the Red Cross clothing donation bin in the supermarket carpark. Joe is 
woken in the middle of the night to the sound of rocks hitting his roof. He races 
outside but fails to see the culprit. He is a patient person but enough is enough. 
Luckily Joe has a friend who is friends with the Director of Public Housing. He 
calls in a favour. "I don't care where they are moved to, just get them out of my 
neighbourhood." The friend persuades the Director. The only available house is on 
the outskirts of town where there is no bus service and no medical centre. The 
family are moved the following week. The mother who is expecting her seventh 
child goes into labour. There are complications. By the time the ambulance finally 
arrives and she reaches the nearest hospital the child has died. 
If we put to work the analytical tools presently available (I'll call these the "old tools") it 
is possible to draw the following conclusions from this story: Joe is a nice guy in a bad 
situation. He is stuck in a neighbourhood with violent kids. But that's what society is 
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like; you only need to listen to the news broadcast to confirm this. He is totally powerless 
to do anything until he remembers his friend-who-knows-a-friend. The fate of the family? 
Well they probably got their lust desserts." Anyway if the Department of Public Housing 
is under-resourced that's not Joe's fault. Society needs more people like him who believe 
in nonviolence. This appears to be a plausible story with a rational response until we call 
into play the new theoretical framework This new framework will offer Joe a wider range 
of options and better equip him to deal with situations of conflict: 
Recall that this framework (complete with detailed definitions of violence and 
nonviolence) allows the moral agent to utilise the principles of nonviolence as an 
evaluative tool as well as a guide for practice. Consider the following evaluation of the 
above scenario: 
Joe apparently talks about nonviolence, and is thoughtful toward his friends, and even to 
those who are not his friends but are still agents in need (the elderly people in the 
residential care home along the road). But his application of nonviolent principles appears 
to be very selective. Even when he (1) refrains from violent reaction (he does not get 
angry when the violent children are throwing stones at the neighbour and setting fire to the 
clothing bin) his actions are not nonviolent. Passive nonresistence (merely abstaining from 
violence) does nothing constructive. In fact, it is actively unhelpful. By doing nothing, 
Joe allows the violence to continue (the elderly neighbour is hurt by the stones and the 
needy people do not receive the clothing burnt inside the Red Cross donation bin). He is 
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implicated in this violent action. He was aware that the violence was going on, and chose 
to do nothing. Had he chosen to pursue nonviolence, he could have confronted the 
children with the fact that their actions were wrong and asked them to stop. By utilising 
nonviolent action there is a chance that he will stop the violence. By doing nothing there 
is no chance at all. This positive action presupposes the capacity for agents to change for 
the better and separates the violent action from the agent. 
(2) In seeking to act nonviolently, Joe should not have made a distinction between action 
towards friends and action toward those causing him trouble. Joe runs into exactly the 
same problem encountered by the Oatlands Liberation Army. Other agents are treated as 
means to an end: The way to create a peaceful neighbourhood is to get rid of the problem 
people "any way you can." 
(3) Joe is not powerless to act in this situation. There is in fact a great deal he can do 
prior to contacting his friend. But he chooses the Airaksinian view: Give in or join the 
coercers. Joe joins the coercers and instigates forcible removal of the family. Now this 
action is harmful. He might claim to be undertaking action which is "other-directed"--
after all he just wants a peaceful neighbourhood for all to enjoy; but he is instead creating 
the false moral distinction between self and other. The rental family as "the other" 
becomes a viable target to receive different treatment. Real harm is done--the pregnant 
mother is placed in a position with no medical support and the child dies. Joe's actions at 
every stage are violent. 
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With respect to Joe as a moral agent, there is a great deal of room for improvement. An 
understanding of the exercise of power through nonviolence provided by the new 
theoretical framework can be utilised by Joe (and any agent) to guide his practice to a 
beneficial end--both for himself (he has a wider range of choices, and does not feel 
powerless) and for the benefit of others. Rather than the familiar action of removing the 
problem through coercion and violence, nonviolence provides the practical tools for other-
directed conflict resolution. The plan for peace in Ireland reflects moral progress in this 
way. Conflict resolution through nonviolence has proved successful where seeking to 
remove the problem' through acts of violence failed. 
Engaging in power relations every day presents us with the opportunity for choice. It is 
entirely up to the individual whether s/he will respond to other agents with violent action 
or nonviolent action. The purpose of this project has been to highlight the fact that a 
choice does exist, and that power can be exercised in both ways. King, S. Rinpoche and 
Gandhi see nonviolence as the pathway to power, not because one refrains from violence, 
but because one rejects the entire outlook that assumes the legitimacy of violence and its 
necessary implication for power. Through truth insistence they demonstrate the very 
power which is often apparently being withheld. 
There are benefits for the agent who exercises power through nonviolence both for 
him/herself and those with whom he/she interacts. But there will be costs as well. 
Removing the problem known as the "Troubles" has been attempted in the past by "obliterating the 
problem." As the Catholics and the Protestants saw each other in this light pursuing this method to its 
inevitable conclusion would mean that the problem wasn't resolved until both parties had been obliterated. 
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Nonviolence may bring suffering to the agent. The potential for suffering is greatly 
reduced in a liberal democracy, where freedom of speech and confrontation of opposing 
views are protected. Heie, suffering may take the form of having to endure violent 
speech. But we must remain mindful that the very aspect which makes nonviolent action 
successful is an uncompromising insistence on the truth. The agent confronts violence, 
and the full effect of the violent action. Within more coercive regimes, the cost of truth 
insistence incurred by say, prisoners of conscience, may be physical assault or even death. 
It is evident then, that power through nonviolence is not about avoiding harm and 
disengaging from the social framework, but applying compassion and engaging with the 
other agents in an effective way: "Compassionate dialogue is the essence of nonviolent 
action (ahimsa). Ahimsa begins with tolerance and loving kindness which will be 
expressed in gentle, compassionate, intelligent speech." (Naht Hanh, 1993:25) It then 
moves into the field of action to create moral and social pressure for people to change. 
It is important to notice the costs incurred by pursuing violent action: Violence renders 
the agent's own environment more dangerous and hostile for him/herself. An additional 
cost is incurred in relation to the agent's mental states: a happy life cannot supervene on 
negative states like fear, greed, hate, depression and anxiety. Rather, these conditions 
usually lead to physical and psychological illness. S. Rinpoche reminds us that violence 
harms the body and mind of victim and the perpetrator--violence thus becomes a two-way 
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rather than just a one-way action of harm. Nonviolence seeks to change this by 
recognising and restoring the balance in self and others: 
This approach goes well beyond the nebulous and often platitudinous insistence that all men are 
brothers and that love for the opponent dominates the feeling and dictates the action. It is based 
upon the psychologically sound understanding about suffering and the capacity of man to change." 
(Bondurant 1994:98) 
This represents an optimistic view of the intrinsic worth and goodness in all agents 
irrespective of the mistakes they may make motivated by ignorance and anger. The 
activity is other-directed because the agent is not the target. Rather the wrong view or 
injustice is the target of nonviolence action. Joe misunderstood this fundamental point. 
Instead of seeing the rental tenants as other agents like himself, differing from himself with 
respect to their holding wrong views (it's fun to throw rocks at people; it's entertaining to 
set charity bins on fire) and seeking to change those views, he decided they were bad 
people and set about removing them. I discussed earlier his selective use of nonviolence 
(acting one way toward friends and another way toward those perceived as enemies). 
This contradiction also highlights the fact that nonviolence has an epistemological as well 
as a moral and ethical role. Truth insistence does more than satisfy the condition of 
"telling the truth"--the truth in satyagraha in this respect is not just the opposite of 
falsehood. The action seeks to end violence through the agent as embodiment of truth 
confronting violence. In this sense the truth is not passive, not only causal, but 
constitutive or active. Joe might well have been talking about nonviolence to the 
Neighbourhood Watch group, but his actions (intentions, speech and physical action) 
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toward the rental family had nothing to do with "truth insistence," rather, they represented 
the false moral distinction and were morally wrong. 
It will be useful to pause here and take stock. The present theories of power through 
violence leave the moral agent with two unsatisfactory choices: to pursue power through 
violence, or to renounce violence and remain powerless. More than unsatisfactory, this 
view is also deeply puzzling because there are several contemporary examples of the 
successful exercise of power through nonviolence. We can call to mind (1) The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa, and the process of nonviolent 
transition to democracy (2) the Tibetan community in exile and (3) an agreement for peace 
in violence-torn Ireland. These examples leave the present theories of power (to the 
extent that they necessitate violence) looking explanatorily unsuccessful (If Airaksinen's 
view of the exercise of power is correct Nelson Mandela [who might be any sensible agent 
suffering under a coercive regime] should surely still be a victim of oppression on Robben 
Island, having no possible way to exercise power or play the role of anything but victim or 
oppressor). 
Not only are the present theories explanatorily unsuccessful, but they also come equipped 
with an ideological cloaking device which masks two important aspects of action. By 
focussing on the definition of violence as physical action, two important additional layers 
of action (intentions and speech) are occluded. This conveniently lifts the burden of 
accountability from agents choosing to exercise power through violence (the white 
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apartheid policeman was merely doing his duty) and seeks to confer legitimacy on the 
"appropriate use of force" when the action is in fact violent and illegitimate. This view 
does nothing to promote moral progress but rather, denies personal dignity and worth; 
perpetuates a negative and destructive cycle; and denies truth, perpetuating oppression 
and injustice. 
The new action theoretic framework for the exercise of power through nonviolence offers 
the moral agent an informed basis for decision-making. It makes clear the distinctions 
between hurt and harm and places value on all agents--even agents holding wrong views. 
It offers a comprehensive plan to guide action based on choice. Even within the context 
of constraint and limited choice (imprisonment for example) the option to exercise power 
through nonviolence can never be removed from the individual. So the individual cannot 
be powerless. The new framework provides a more comprehensive way to determine the 
legitimacy of an action and this theoretical structure provides an optimistic foundation 
from which to engage in daily power relations with others. It is explanatorily successful 
with respect to recent global trends toward reconciliation. 
Fusion philosophy sits within the context of a broader domain--joining together the 
theoretical underpinnings of a Western and non-Western approach to nonviolence-- and 
offers insights on power available to the individual (as an intentional agent with actions). 
It does so in the following way: 
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(i) By amending the definitions of "violence" and "nonviolence"--a move away from 
"physical force" or its "absence" to a focus on harm, placing accountability for 
violence within the domain of the agent and his/her actions (from intention to 
completion). It becomes apparent that violent action and nonviolent action are 
representational, and that present theorists of power (a) fail to notice what violence 
represents and (b) by excluding nonviolence altogether fail to notice what it 
represents. 
(ii) Through new definitions it is possible to gain an understanding on the origination of 
violence and the pathway to the antidote. 
(iii) This uncovers five significant factors required to change violent action: 
(a) the presupposition that people have the capacity to change (that 
. life in general, power relations in particular and agents as conductors 
of those power relations are not confined to a predetermined and 
rigidly fixed social grid of hatred, violence and suffering from which 
there is no escape); 
(b) that violence is about the action of the agent, not a set of 
circumstances; 
(c) that every individual is accountable for his/her actions (including 
intentions); 
(d) that we must recognise the false moral distinction between self 
and other (which so frequently leads to the slippery slope of the other 
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as enemy, the enemy as inhuman, and on that basis, attempted 
justification for acts of violence); 
(e) by disengaging from the false distinction and adhering to 
nonviolence, value is attributed to the other as a person, while still 
allowing opposition to injustice 
(iv) the agent not only claims power from an ethically sound position 
but, 
(v) Having power becomes not about domination or coercion, but the way one leads one's 
everyday life (insisting on the truth and skilfully dealing with the complexities of 
social interaction). 
We have seen throughout this project that nonviolence is not--as the common 
misconception would have it--a demonstration of weakness or ineffective passivity. A 
commitment to nonviolence demands a tough mind, constantly vigilant toward both 
intention and action; possessing compassion and strength and insisting on truth even at 
the risk of personal suffering. Where there was one pathway to power, through violence, 
there is now a choice. 
However, embracing an ethical commitment to nonviolence through this framework does 
not offer an illusion that we will be exempt from pain and suffering. Nor does it imbue us 
with the idea that life is a drama of comfort and untroubled ease; rather it equips the agent 
to face strains, burdens and fears that inevitably arise. 
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It is possible for the agent to make the transition from violence to nonviolence by 
changing his/her mental attitude. The analysis provided by fusion philosophy 
demonstrates how the mind of the individual is the starting point for violent or nonviolent 
action. Through concerted effort the agent can attempt to reduce feelings of anger, hatred 
and greed. A calmer mind will be a more fertile ground for recognising the presence of 
false beliefs (the false moral distinction between self and other) and slowly, by recognising 
him/herself not as an agent in isolation, but as an agent in relation, will come to understand 
the requirement for a sense of mutual responsibility. This is what Sulak Sivaraksa calls 
"self-awareness and social awareness in equal measure." (Savaraksa 1992:47) Martin 
Luther King Jr places importance on this view of interdependence; the view of "Life as a 
mirror in which we see only ourselves or as a window through which we see other selves." 
(King 1963:14) It is becoming increasingly difficult to evade the mirror King forces us to 
look into, and through, to see ourselves as agents in the moral community. Increasing 
awareness of this fact is now provided almost on a daily basis by public forums like the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and contemporary applications of 
nonviolence like S. Rinpoche's satyagraha. 
It is important to note here, that I do not feel that I am the only person who can arrive at 
an analysis of power that is not coercive. Thomas Wartenberg (1990) in The Forms of 
Power provides an analysis that seeks to move beyond coercion but he doesn't go far 
enough. He gives us an account of power as a social phenomenon that exists in different 
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forms with different uses. It is the exercise of power that is "dynamic" and "reciprocal" 
but it is still based on domination: 
I have shown that the transfonnative use of power is bath a crucial use of power in 
society and a difficult and problematic one. Although it may potentially benefit the 
agent over whom it is exercised it also has the potential to dominate him. As a 
result, the transfonnative use of power can take its place alongside the dominating 
use of power as a fundamental phenomenon that social theory needs to acknowledge. 
(Wartenberg 1990:221) 
Domination is violence. The defining difference for this project is the way in which it 
provides a choice for the moral agent to access and exercise power outside of the violence 
spectrum. The logic of nonviolence seeks power within a disciplined framework that 
views violence as harmful and inevitably short-sighted. "True nonviolence is more than 
the absence of violence. It is the persistent and determined application of peaceable power 
to offences against the community--in this case the world community." (King 1967:184) 
The aim of this project has been to show that access to this power is available to any 
individual. 
This project hopes to describe the limits of the present understanding of power through 
violence and shift the focus to the view beyond. Here we find a context for individual 
action, for effective change and a meaningful life; as philosophy compels us to know 
ourselves, nonviolence confronts others to know themselves as our fellow citizens. Fusion 
philosophy deserves to be taken seriously. This project seeks to provide an engagement 
with contemporary conditions and their melioration, more of a sense of philosophy as a 
lived human experience rather than a saintly faith or mere intellectual assent. It also seeks 
to demonstrate by example how one may take inherited categories of exclusion (insights of 
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non-Western philosophers) and turn them into critical categories of inclusion. And doing 
just that more often might ultimately begin to affect our conception of global philosophy-- 
we cannot on the one hand applaud integration in the arenas of justice and equality while 
on the other, we deny it in our philosophical practice 
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APPENDIX I 
Interview with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama 
Spiritual Leader of Tibet 
July 24 1997 
Dharamsala, India 
Question preparation conducted with Tenzin Geche, Private Secretary and interpreter to 
His Holiness 
Introduction: 
Your Holiness, the aim of my work is to join together the aspect of nonviolence from 
Satyagraha, the Tibetan Buddhist aspects of compassion, nonviolence and correct 
motivation and the issue of power. 
Often, the non-Buddhist side are not interested in Satyagraha and nonviolence, but those 
from the West are interested in the concept of power. It appears that any means are 
allowable to achieve their ends, including violence, suffering and incorrect motivation, and 
not one person writing about power in this context will offer an argument for 
compassionate and nonviolent aspects, focussing only on violence, coercion and control 
over individuals or groups. 
I intend to take these aspects of nonviolence and Satyagraha and frame them within the 
context of power to offer an alternative case for decision makers to consider. Your 
response along with that of the Most Ven. Professor S. Rinpoche, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu and others from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission alongside President 
Nelson Mandela, will allow me to build a strong case for the power of truth, nonviolence 
and compassion. 
O. 	With all of the violence in the world, what are your reasons for believing that 
human beings are basically altruistic and compassionate? 
I believe that one reason is that the more compassionate mind will bring us inner 
peace because the compassionate mind will strengthen our inner confidence. The 
more confidence, the less fear and increased peace of mind which is very good for 
health. Anger and hatred are very bad for health. The physical condition itself has 
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good relations with a compassionate or altruistic mind and a very bad relationship 
with anger and hatred. According to medical science, during and just after birth, 
the next few weeks, the physical touch (and of course by this I do not mean 
hitting!) is important for the development of the child's brain. During childhood it 
is extremely important to provide affection. Without this the physical development 
suffers and the mental development or education in every field (development of 
character) suffers. These children lacking the mother's affection, eventually find it 
very difficult to show their affection toward others. Therefore on the basis of the 
physical condition, peace of mind is more suitable. According to his physical 
condition, man should be more peaceful. If the physical body has the power to 
control the mind, this would make the mind peaceful because it is more suitable to 
the physical constitution. The agitated mind is very bad for health. 
Basically we know that bloodshed is something undesirable. When we see a drop 
of blood and a drop of milk. Our natural reaction will be different. Blood usually 
brings fear. Milk of course will not (unless somebody suffers from milk allergy or 
intolerance!). Why has violence become a dominant part of our life if it goes 
against our basic principles? I believe this is due to shortsightedness and lack of 
far sightedness. When emotion, anger and too much greed for power (war often 
results from greed for possession, wealth, acquisition of land and so on) become 
very strong or out of control, then other particular parts of human nature become 
overwhelmed. That is our fault. Education and training play a vital role. Without 
the potential for learning, you can't educate, without the potential for compassion 
you cannot train to increase compassion. All teaching and training should focus on 
this potential which can be developed. There are many different potentials. If one 
becomes prominent, others remain weak. This is the problem. In human nature, 
there are both good and bad things. What is the demarcation between good and 
bad? Those emotions, or motivations and actions which bring more long lasting 
happiness are positive. Those actions which bring pain and suffering are negative. 
The short-term consequences can sometimes bring satisfaction, but they are 
temporary. Take as an example, killing your enemy. This could bring short-term 
satisfaction, but in the long term you create more enemies. The person you killed 
naturally has friends and relatives, and these then become potential enemies. 
Therefore the act of killing while it may bring some sense of satisfaction, relief and 
happiness leads in the long run to more trouble. Therefore those emotions which 
bring short term relief reflect only lack of awareness of long-term consequences. 
The impatience or desire to realise things immediately are often the causes of 
violence. The negative emotions take over and dominate the basic altruistic, 
compassionate nature. 
Besides this compassionate and gentle nature, human nature has a social side. No 
matter how powerful or intelligent you are, by yourself you cannot survive. As 
part of human nature, companionship is very important. Altruism or a sense of 
caring for others is vital. Your interest, your happiness, your satisfaction, your 
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security very much depends on others who become the source of your happiness. 
Caring for others is one very important source for your own good future. 
O. 	How is it possible to have an ideal nonviolent society? Could this contain a 
police force or army? 
For almost three thousand years, India for example, has been built around a 
tradition of nonviolence or ahimsa. At the same time there has been a lot of war 
between kingdoms and religious sects; even after independence there has been a 
lot of killing and violence. In the past, the idea of nonviolence was a good idea 
and practical, but in today's world circumstances have changed. Through violence 
you cannot solve problems today. The economy knows no national boundaries, 
there is just one economy zone. Others might seem physically far away, but the 
economic field of other continents in today's world are also part of your own field. 
The modern weaponry is so powerful. If you start firing, the results are 
unpredictable. Your original intentional might be for limited violence, but it easily 
becomes a situation out of control. These weapons of destruction produce no 
winners in today's world.. Our future entirely depends on coexistence and 
nonviolence. The concept of 'us and them' is gone. The destruction of your 
neighbour, is the destruction of yourself. Disagreement, contradiction, differing 
opinions will always remain. Even in the mind of one single person there is 
contradiction, without this there is no progress. If the brain of a person remains 
dull, there is no contradiction. If you are intelligent, then you see and compare 
ideas, see the contradiction and change ideas resulting in progress. Heated 
discussion with differing opinion often produce progress. This is unlike 
Communism with total agreement and no differing opinion; there is no progress. 
A nonviolent society then is not one without contradiction or disagreement. 
In the case of war, you simply do not want to tolerate an opposing force or you 
seek to eliminate them. In ancient times, they used force to achieve this. But in 
today's world you cannot utilise the same method. Force means physical 
elimination, not the elimination of mind or ideas. The power of force is physical, 
but the real power of nonviolence is the strength of mind. Take as an example the 
elephant and the human being. Regardless of its physical power, the large sized 
head of the elephant is useless. The smaller size of the human brain is infinitely 
more powerful. The power of mind is much greater than physical power. 
How can we convince those in power that this nonviolent aspect is more 
productive, representing a greater strength? 
A 	One argument alone cannot convince them. Reality has changed a great deal, but 
their thinking has remained static, unchanged. Those making decisions still 
maintain that the concept of power based on force, is everything. The failure of 
the Vietnam War was based on the concept of the Pentagon that force will win, 
but the reality was that these people in the jungle area were very tough. The 
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reality is different, but the entrenched concepts remain. This degree of change in 
attitude will take time. 
During the First World War and the Second World War, the government of many 
countries mobilised the whole nation; there was great enthusiasm to join the war 
effort, and noone questioned this. Today if America tried to mobilise the nation, 
there would be a great deal of opposition, and the government would be defeated. 
I feel that the people's attitude towards violence is changing and there is a better 
awareness of reality. In addition to basic human nature, today's reality is very 
different therefore the only option for resolving conflict is dialogue. The concept 
of war is based on obtaining 100% victory on our side leading to 100% defeat for 
the opposing side. This attitude is no longer there, as I mentioned before, the 
destruction of your neighbour is the destruction of yourself, so the concept of 
100% victory or defeat is no longer relevant. Therefore compromise is more 
readily accepted through dialogue. This may not result in either side gaining 100% 
satisfaction, but at least both sides realise some degree of satisfaction. The use of 
force to defeat others of course would physically destroy but would increase the 
sense of revenge. 
This leads to an analysis of internal and external disarmament. 	External 
disarmament already exists by way of the reduction of nuclear weapons. This is 
the first step. The Chinese proposal of complete destruction of all nuclear 
weapons should be our target. Then elimination of offensive weapons should 
follow. There are already discussions underway worldwide for the restrictions on 
selling armaments to undemocratic countries. Take as example Iran. The Shah 
negotiated for many weapons to be sent there, and we later find that these 
weapons under the hand of the Ayatollah Khomeini were used against the 
democratic nations. Therefore it is better for there to be no arms exchange. This 
is the method of step by step external disarmament. Internal disarmament begins 
through education. Alongside any documentation of victory brought about by 
war, should also come the additional information that such and such number of 
people were killed. When the Western Allies bombed the factories in Germany 
bringing about the downfall of the Nazi regime, there was much celebrating. But 
the reality was that there was immense suffering on both sides. How would you 
feel if your mother was killed painfully? So you see acts of war and violence 
should not be glorified, and this is part of the education process. 
I heard recently that even in children's classes, school councils are elected 
reflecting democratic practice. At the same time they should be taught about 
conflict resolution through nonviolent means, dialogue replaces the need for 
physical action. Television and newspaper has the capacity to change the attitude 
of the population. This is the method for internal disarmament; explaining that 
basic human nature is good; a concept that can be understood by children. Even if 
a stranger smiles and acts kindly toward a child, they respond with trust and 
happiness, they have no discrimination as long as there is a smile they will 
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appreciate the good heart. General society today, I believe is fed up with violence. 
But even with this attitude, there remain some mischievous people. Even with 
many of the leaders becoming more peacefully minded, unfortunately some of the 
leaders or decision makers remain in this mischievous category. Some kind of 
police force is certainly necessary. Even collective multi-nation armed forces may 
be necessary, but should be on an equal representative basis, even with a rotational 
leadership (perhaps like UN forces). If this were to occur involving the region of 
Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia for example, there would be no conflict 
between these countries, operating in much the same way as the Franco-German 
Unified Forces. This provides one of the best guarantees against mobilised conflict 
between France and Germany. 
O. 	Nonviolent action of course involves no guns, no use of force or weapons, so why 
is nonviolent action (of the kind proposed by Martin Luther King; Mahatma 
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and the exiled Tibetan Government's response to 
China) seen as such a threat? 
A. 	I don't think the Chinese fear nonviolence. In today's world some fields of 
progress are very well developed. The concept of nonviolence, the value of self-
determination, importance of human rights, protection of the environment, 
negative attitudes toward the development of totalitarian regimes (for example, the 
reaction to China and Iran). But on the other hand, there exists a new nationalism 
(reflected at a government level in America and China). The Chinese Government 
views the Tibetan movement as the instrument of Western anti-Chinese forces 
(meaning the fear of mainly American nuclear weapons). In Gandhi's time, the 
British concern about Mahatma Gandhi was based on sheer population numbers. 
No matter how powerful the British empire was, India was a huge country; having 
all of the Indian population involved in an uprising, that is what they feared, not 
nonviolence. In the Nelson Mandela case, the South African white regime was not 
only concerned with the influence of Nelson Mandela, but the backing of the 
Western powers imposing economic sanctions. One aspect of power involved in 
our (Tibetan) nonviolent struggle is sympathy and the feeling of solidarity among 
the ordinary people. This is the power of truth (power of compassion, power of 
justice), which in the long run has great effect; but in the short term of course 
weapons are more forceful. 
O. 	Your Holiness this next question is of a very sensitive nature. The use of weapons 
is not only contained to the west, but also occurred here as recently as February 
this year, with the murder of Gen. Lobsang Gyatso and two of his disciples. How 
is it possible to respond to such an atrocity with only nonviolence? 
A. 	The culprits who were responsible for the murder had already escaped so there 
was nothing else to do (laughs). Of course at the time one side of me felt that I 
wished these people could be caught, but another side felt that if they were caught, 
under Indian law they would be subject to the death sentence, and it is better 
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therefore that they were not caught. When I heard of this incident, I lost my 
temper and felt fear, but in another side of my mind, I wondered how these people 
who claim to be Buddhists can carry out such work. Their emotions of anger, of 
such a one-sided view brought such a disaster, so then I felt pity and compassion 
for these poor people, it is very sad. So you see there is more reason to feel 
concern for these perpetrators than those who were killed. This view immediately 
brings peace of mind, dispelling fear and anger. This is the practical power of 
compassion. If we react calmly and continue to react in this way, those who 
committed such a violent act, do not have an excuse for what they have done, and 
become more uncomfortable. But if you do it with that intention of course it 
would be wrong (laughs).. .it is of course wrong to create more difficulties for 
them. 
Q. 	From this incident it seems that your people need protection, but how can this 
come about without the use of conventional protective weapons involving force 
and violence? 
A. 	Just to be more vigilant (laughs) and then try to look for some shelter where you 
can take protection. 
Q. 	In your book Beyond Dogma: the challenge of the modern world', you say: "I 
think we have come to a very propitious and important moment in the history of 
our world. We now have the opportunity to work together for the good of 
humanity. What is it about this particular moment which allows this altruism to 
be possible? 
A. 	I believe that the Twentieth Century is the most important of all our history. As a 
result of all the wars and natural disasters, the greatest number of human beings 
were killed with the maximum suffering. In the medical or technological field, on 
the other hand we have achieved immense progress. As a result of science and 
human mind research we are brought closer to the correct philosophy. Even with 
developed and prosperous nations there is crime and so on. During my recent visit 
to America there were many conferences about peacemaking and all speakers 
unanimously agreed that society needs more compassion to solve the many 
problems created by lack of compassion, environment and population problems. 
When humanity faces a really critical period, there are two possibilities; First, 
demoralisation and lack of hope resulting in war. The second possibility allows us 
to question what is wrong. Today we have reached the edge and so we must find 
a better solution if we want to survive, a solution based on compassion and 
nonviolence. 
APPENDIX 2 
Interview with The Most Ven. Prof Samdhong Rinpoche 
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Sarnath, India 
O. 	Rinpoche, I am interested in your view regarding the perceived shift from 
Dialogue with the Chinese Government to nonviolent direct action in the form of 
your proposed Satyagraha campaign. 
A. 	My perception about my thinking of Satyagraha is not a shift from the dialogue, 
but two totally different things. At the moment, I have postponed the 
implementation of the Satyagraha action because of the announcement by His 
Holiness of the referendum regarding the future course of action`. I do not mean 
that the outcome of the referendum would relate to my Satyagraha. That is not the 
case. Rather, if the Satyagraha moment is launched in between, then the course of 
the referendum might be slightly altered. Therefore I have postponed the action 
relating to the Satyagraha until the referendum is completed. 
A large proportion of people oppose the idea of conducting a referendum, and 
there are logical reasons for this. The parliament will give consideration to the 
views and make a decision at its next sitting in September. If the decision is to 
conduct a referendum, three or four months will be required to prepare. If the 
decision is to postpone the referendum, then I will begin three or four months of 
training to begin a small scale Satyagraha. 
O. 	You spoke earlier of the need to include a range of alternatives. Is it your 
intention to include those alternatives in the referendum? 
A. 	Yes. Either, to claim complete independence or to approach the United Nations 
for the peoples' right to self-determination or to begin a Satyagraha moment as 
policy. These are only tentative suggestions. It is left to the people as to what 
kind of choice will be offered in the final referendum. As this has been going on 
for quite a long time, we should now finalise the last stage. So whether the 
dialogue is going on or not, the Satyagraha moment is considered necessary for 
two reasons. First, the Chinese occupation and the suffering experienced by the 
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Tibetan people and second, the destruction of a considerable section of the 
environment. For all of this, we are responsible, not the Chinese. 
Q. 	Can you explain this responsibility fitrther? 
A. 	The Tibetans as a nation, a people, have certain unique responsibilities. We are 
carrying a unique spiritual heritage and a unique culture which is beneficial not 
only for the people of Tibet, but for all of mankind. Tibet is considered to be the 
particular spiritual field for the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (the Deity of 
Compassion). Choosing Tibet as his own field of work, therefore the Tibetans are 
supposed to be compassionate, tolerant and nonviolent. But this, we could not 
keep up. Tibetans have become violent, inconsiderate of each other, almost 
irreligious, and even the monks do not always observe the conducts, nor are the 
lay people observing the moral conducts. 
Q. 	Has this happened over a long period of time? 
A. 	Yes. Almost two hundred years. The general decay started around the end of the 
16th Century and beginning of the 17th Century. That time signals a period of 
gradual decline. The last hundred years was the worst period. After the seventh 
Dalai Lama, the eighth Dalai lama was not very powerful in governing the state. 
then the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth - none of them could rule, and passed at 
a very early age. Only the thirteenth Dalai Lama was able to rule Tibet for a 
number of years, but he was always involved in struggle. Soon after he took over 
the temporal powers, he has to face the Younghusband led British military invasion 
of 1904, and he had to spend a number of years in China. When he returned back 
to Tibet, he had to deal with the British government. It was only in 1913-1935, 
that he was able to rule. But at that time, he could not do things the way he 
wished, and then arrived the problems we face today. So therefore it is our 
mistake and we shall have to repent. This will continue unless and until the 
Tibetan people repent that mistake made on our part. 
The second issue is that China is showing the wrong conduct inside Tibet 
particularly in relation to the spiritual and cultural heritage. It is improper and 
unjust. This is violence and this is not based on truth, and we are witness to it. 
Therefore we must express our disagreement, our opposition. We must do so with 
love and compassion. Unless and until we do so in the face of China, in a very 
close contact manner, it is not sufficient for us to sit idly in India in our facilities, 
our air-conditioned rooms and to simply say that China is doing wrong. It is not 
sufficient. We should go to the Chinese people inside Tibet and tell them what 
they are doing is wrong, we do not agree and we will insist that they stop. That is 
our duty. 
Unless we do this, we just sit as witnesses. This amounts to approval. If that 
message reflects approval, then we are part of that wrongdoing, and history will 
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judge later that we have played a part in that. Therefore we cannot, or I at least 
should not be a party to that. The Satyagraha action then, is also necessary in this 
regard, and therefore I began the thought to commence the Satyagraha - at least 
individual Satyagraha. It is not collective but individual Satyagraha and this in no 
way clashes with the dialogue. 
One of my demands in my Satyagraha is that I would not only welcome meaningful 
dialogue with China, but I will insist that China resumes meaningful dialogue with 
His Holiness. Therefore it is not a diversion or a shift away from dialogue, one is 
not against the other, merely different. 
O. 	You discussed the pattern of decline commencing around the seventeenth century. 
Is it possible to identify any one reason or set of reasons which initiated this 
decline? 
A. 	The reason, I think is that the religious minded people became increasingly 
indifferent to state power or state management which had responsibility for most 
of the organisations including the monasteries. This was left in the hands of the 
lesser evolved people who were not fully spiritually inclined, instead they were 
politically minded or power hungry. These people were looking for self-
glorification, self power and the accumulation of wealth. In our times, all of the 
monasteries are managed by uneducated people who manage financial affairs and 
estates while the religious minded people hide themselves away in the monasteries. 
They have nothing to say in the management, and as a result, the management 
becomes very corrupt. The government is no longer interested in the needs of the 
people and in return, the people have lost faith in the government. When China 
entered Tibet, many Tibetan citizens asked "what is the difference for us?" we 
were suffering under the hand of the Tibetan authorities, and now we are suffering 
at the hands of the Chinese - we are the sufferers regardless. There is no better or 
worse, they are all still people who rule over us. 
The basic essence of the combination of religious and state power - we call it cho 
sid sun drel is unique for the Tibetans. It was lost and religion remained only in 
the individuals with the state and the organisations becoming irreligious. This was 
the basic weakness. 
Q. 	Rinpoche, what strategies have you considered for your campaign? 
A. 	The selection of the term 'strategy' is inappropriate. 	It originates from 
'generalship'. These strategists have nothing to do with nonviolence Nonviolence 
is neither a matter of strategy, nor does it count in any strategic direction, because 
it has no battle to wage and no wars to win. Strategy is used to win a war, and 
hence, it implies defeat of the enemy and victory for one's own side. It also 
implies the use of all possible means to gain victory without any consideration for 
right or wrong. 
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To replace this, the term that is required is `skillful means'. This Buddhist concept 
mandates that when you are planning the nonviolent action you must consider how 
best the skillful means can be adopted. In order to achieve this, I recommend two 
things which are indispensable. First, the unity or purity of ends and means. Many 
people propose that if the end is a good one, you can adopt any kind of means to 
get there. In this respect, I do not agree. For a Satyagrahi, it is essential that care 
must be taken to retain the purity of ends and means. The other essential 
requirement, is the skillfulness in the choice of means and ,methods. If you wish to 
call this strategy then I have no objection. In summary, time and duration are 
important points to be considered. Place is also important as is the level and skill 
of action. The tempo of action is yet another and it is important to consider the 
'taking of violence'. The choice involves the judgement of tolerating the suffering, 
or avoiding the suffering. By this, I mean, how to minimise the volume of violence 
while facing up to the violent reaction. Sometimes this requires more assertiveness 
and sometimes less. Rather than strategy it is much more an issue of judgement. 
Q. 	Do you have thoughts about what you may encounter when you return to Tibet? 
A. 	Yes, of course. I think it is 99% certain that as soon as I enter the land of Tibet, 
the Chinese will arrest and imprison me. There is no doubt - unless the Chinese 
adopt some other violent strategy. In the context of our discussion, theirs is only 
'strategy'. 
I heard that the peace march which was proposed last year from Delhi to Lhasa 
and denied by the Chinese officials was the source of much discussion between the 
Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Autonomous Region authorities on how best 
to react to this action. Many people suggested that all marchers should be shot at 
the boarder, further, that this was the most effective method to be adopted. As 
soon as these people cross the Tibetan boarder, machine guns should be used, and 
they should all be shot. A small moderate faction spoke against this, saying that 
this would reflect negatively on the Chinese Government and enlist support for the 
separatists, allowing them an international focus. Instead it was proposed that they 
should be imprisoned or sent back to India. A few people even disagreed and 
proposed that the best strategy would be to control the local people, instruct them 
very strictly not to receive the marchers with any enthusiasm or welcome, 
maintaining absolute indifference and let them come. They should be allowed 
freedom to go where they want to go, and demonstrate to the world that there is 
no response for them inside Tibet. The Tibetan people would be seen to be happy 
with no atrocities or torture going on, and these would be viewed as just a few 
separatists who were not suppressed, but were unsupported, and they returned of 
their own accord. This would be good for propaganda. In this way it would 
discourage people from coming from the outside. They would be broken-hearted 
when they are rejected by their local people. This would then be the end of the 
matter and the best strategy. Others involved in the discussion group suggest, that 
311 
while this sounds feasible, it would fail because the local Tibetans could never be 
controlled to that extent. Regardless of the amount of pressure applied, there 
could be no guarantee that a reception would not take place. In light of this, there 
is a very small chance that the Chinese might try to ignore the Satyagraha, because 
I don't think a large group of people would accompany me 
Otherwise we must consider the 99% chance of being killed or imprisoned. The 
third possibility of course is that the Chinese may intercept us before reaching 
Tibet, and prevent the arrival by influencing the Indian Government. These are the 
possibilities and whatever may come, we must accept it. We must face the 
consequences as much as possible with love and compassion. 
O. 	Do you consider that the best judgement would be to inform the Chinese 
Government of your arrival in advance, or to begin the nonviolent action 
unannounced and at a time of your choosing. 
A. 	I have not considered these details. I have yet to work out at which point I shall 
enter, the timing of that entry and whether this shall be conducted in secret or 
made by announcement. Before these details can be put in place, we need at least 
three or four months of self training and preparation. It is not easy for us. 
O. 	This preparation bears a similarity to the campaign conducted by the Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. One difference would appear to be the judgement he 
made to rally vast numbers of supports across large geographic areas in part, to 
gain an international media exposure. Your response in contrast appears to focus 
on a more gentle, personal Satyagraha moment without deliberately attracting 
attention to the action. Would this interpretation be correct? 
A. 	Yes, this is right. My basic thinking is that Satyagraha is not aimed at giving the 
opportunity for international attention. This may, or may not result. That is not 
the focus of my Satyagraha. Second, in my Satyagraha, I do not care about the 
end results. Of course we wish for the freedom of people inside Tibet. This will 
either occur or not, as a result. But that is a different issue. I must perform my 
duty, and if, in the performance of that duty there is a result for the people inside 
Tibet that would be very good. Even if I cannot give any results to them, or to us 
- still I must perform the duty. Duty is simply duty, and the result is entirely 
different. If you perform duty in the hope or desire for the result, then your duty 
cannot be a pure one, it becomes means to an end. Therefore our concern is the 
extent to which our Satyagraha is pure and perfect. This is of the utmost 
importance. We have no concern for the end result. If positive results are 
achieved, this is very good. If not, then we have no regrets. If our action goes 
wrong, then that would be a disaster. This must be taken care of 
The actions of Martin Luther King and Gandhi involved an entirely different 
situation. There was a rule of law, both of them participated in a democratic 
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society, an environment in where that particular Satyagraha can become effective. 
China, in contrast is completely totalitarian. There is no concern for moral rules, 
and what they have done in Tiananmen Square, is very fresh in our memory. 
Knowing all this, some feel that our Satyagraha is nothing more than suicide. This 
view may be correct, but suicide would be preferable to remaining silent in the 
active. If I do not undertake a Satyagraha, that death may be only two or three 
years early which won't make much difference to my life. But to live one's life 
with a basic duty given from birth - and my existence carries that duty - and then 
failing to perform that duty, means my existence will have no meaning. So from 
this angle we have judged the execution of the Satyagraha, not on its effectiveness 
and what will result, nor on whether the Chinese will yield or not yield. These are 
different questions. 
O. 	What of the Tibetan Government in Exile? 
A. 	The Government in Exile in my opinion should continue. On that I'm quite clear; 
and my participation in the Government in Exile is a very small proportion. I 
commenced responsibilities in 1991, only seven years ago, and before that the 
Government in Exile existed for more than 30 years. Even if my participation is 
absent, the Government in Exile will still exist. So therefore I do not want to 
dismantle the Government. My presence or absence will not make much 
difference. 
I have already mentioned in my writing" that if I am alone it will be an individual 
Satyagraha, if there are a few of us it will be a group Satyagraha. I will never go 
to the media; that is our side, but if the media comes to us, we will not hide. If 
they ask what we are doing then I must be transparent. We will speak the truth. 
This will be our approach. If any international support comes, I will accept and 
welcome it; but if there is no response from the international community, I have no 
regret and no claim over them to support us. Therefore my action will not seek 
publicity. 
Q. 	Your presentation of the power of truth through nonviolence is certainly a 
contrast to the variety of ways that the concept of power is understood from the 
non-Buddhist side. I am interested in finding those elements that can be utilised 
to create a better social structure of power relations. This involves analysis of 
whether armies, police forces and so on are legitimate. 
A. 	I have never considered armies to be legitimate or justified. Armies exist to fight 
wars, and for this reason armies can never be justified. In future if Tibet becomes 
free, His Holiness has proposed that it be a military free country (like Costa Rica, 
for example) and even then we need some kind of police force. This is necessary 
and I don't think it represents violence. Even in the Buddhist monk community, 
Sangha, by rotation, someone has to act in an administrative or disciplinary 
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capacity. If a monk breeches the rules of conduct, a number of punishments must 
be enforced and these are not considered to be violent. 
We have the presence to keep criminals away from the society. In that case the 
imprisonment would not be a violent one for they would be given good food, a 
small amount of personal freedom inside the prison, a great deal of teaching, 
persuasion and education to allow them to realise that they have committed some 
criminal act. After this, if you are certain that the prisoner has evolved his heart 
within say 10 days, then he can be released. The purpose of punishment or 
sanction must be to improve the individual and not to take revenge. 
I do not believe in revenge or compensatory justice. If something has been done, 
then you cannot be compensated. If someone has killed another, then the one who 
has died cannot be compensated. If you have tortured somebody, then torturing 
this person in return will never lead to compensation. Taking revenge will never 
lessen the amount of crime he has committed; instead, another crime is 
perpetrated. But, if an individual has committed a crime, then in his or her eyes as 
well as from the perspective of the larger society, there must be some imposition of 
punishment or sanction. The aim should be directed toward the improvement of 
the individual and in this case it is considered to be nonviolent. This is in accord 
with the Buddhist teachings. 
In relation to the teacher's imposition of sanctions toward students, my opinion is 
that if the teacher is angry or annoyed at the student, and out of that annoyance 
results action, then that is wrong and would not help the student. In contrast, out 
of compassion, if there are a number of students who can only be corrected by 
punishment or sanctions, then from the motivation of love and compassion for the 
improvement of the student a certain amount of sanction is justifiable. In this 
respect, the sacrifice of the teacher is most important. 
To illustrate this I often repeat the story of the robber and the Bodhisattva, where 
the Bodhisattva kills the robber, accumulating a great amount of merit for the 
Bodhisattva. This is a point of debate in the Canon. When the Bodhisattva 
sacrifices himself by taking on this amount of sin, he is going to commit by killing 
the robber, through this act, he could save the 500 people who are sure to perish at 
the hands of the robber. He also prevents the demerit which would be acquired as 
a result of the robber committing this act, then the Bodhisattva sacrifices himself 
by killing that man. It is still a point of debate whether the act of killing was 
violent or nonviolent. Many argue that the act of killing was violent, but the 
enormous compassion for that person was responsible for accumulating some 
merit but the act of killing did accumulate some demerit. From this symbolic story 
we can understand that even an act of killing can be nonviolent if the intention is 
very pure. 
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How can you ensure that individuals within legitimate structures will act for the 
right reasons and not abuse that power? 
This is very difficult. We have to take that risk. For example in our police force 
we shall have to conduct extensive training courses to ensure that they carry out 
their work to the highest possible standard. Even so, this will not ensure that 
individuals will always do the right thing. Even the monks whose lives are spent 
training in the monasteries, do a number of things which are wrong, but the 
philosophy behind the system and the general approach must be laid down in the 
policy. With regards the implementation of this in daily life, there are bound to be 
a number of errors and these will need correcting. These wrongdoings would be 
judged the illegitimate use of force. 
Most of the people who talk about nonviolence believe that it is possible for an 
individual life, but not possible to run a state or society to operate with complete 
nonviolence. I try to oppose that idea; only our conditioned thought leads us to 
accept that this is impossible. We have never experimented anywhere to determine 
whether it is possible. If such experiments were conducted I think would be 
possible. Every country maintains a huge military force often at the expense of 
expenditure on health and education, in the name of defence. Even if, over time, 
there has been no threat to warrant it, they still maintain this defence force. 
Consideration is never given to abolishing the defence force, particularly in relation 
to smaller countries. Take as an example the small country of Bhutan; they can 
never defend themselves from attack against the force of India on the one side and 
China on the other. This is a reality, but still they maintain a military force in the 
name of defence and teach the training of violence from generation to generation. 
This is quite stupid; if India abolished defence today, do you think that Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and China would immediately threaten? I feel that this would become 
morally more difficult if China, fully equipped with weaponry were to attack a 
weaponless India; the entire world would react claiming no sense to such an 
action. But noone is prepared to try, instead, taking it for granted that such a 
system would be impossible. 
In contrast, His Holiness wishes to make Tibet a zone of ahimsa or a zone of 
nonviolence, which of course means no military force or weapons. 
O. 	How would you maintain control and order, if not in this way, by the use of 
coercion and force? 
A. 	The term force is a vague term. If for example there is a quarrel among the 
people, then the police should attend and pacify or even arrest them; this is perhaps 
unavoidable and will happen unless the entire population is highly educated. There 
should be an agency tasked with maintaining harmony among the people. 
Therefore we do not rule out the necessity of a police force. Now that we propose 
complete nonviolence and as a consequence, a completely military-free zone, some 
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propose that the enforcement agency should be closed down. Two questions arise 
from this: the immediate question as to how we employ these people, and the 
long-range question: if Tibet becomes free, at the very least we must require a 
group of people to be vigilant regarding custom, maintenance of peace and the 
safeguarding of law and order, and so it is apparent that we require this type of 
agency for which Buddhist nonviolent force is necessary. We should initiate a 
long-range program to educate the people in order to reduce the need for such a 
requirement, but without trying, we cannot determine whether such a thing is 
possible. Perhaps after one or two thousand years, society will have evolved to the 
point where such an agency is no longer required but at the moment a certain use 
of force is necessary. 
Q. 	In an autonomous Tibet, for example, how could the gap between the ideals of a 
monastic order and the structure required to run a society(and protect the rights 
of citizens) be overcome? 
A 	According to the Buddhist Canon, there should be a gap between the monastic 
order and civil society. The monk community is considered to have renounced 
that society; the focus is on salvation. Within this life, they have no interest in day 
to day affairs and are therefore dependent on the civil society for their food, 
clothes and medicine in return for which, they contribute some small social work 
like painting, teaching or medicine. The gap therefore is quite obvious. In the past 
history of Tibet during the later stage, the monastic orders became very much 
entangled in state business and big monasteries became very powerful in running 
the government. There was an Assembly of Peoples' Representatives which was 
dominated by those who represented the three large monasteries. If they chose to 
combine on any issue, they carried the weight in the decision-making process. 
This has a two-way effect of corrupting both the monastery and the government. 
In a future free Tibet, the monasteries should be completely separate to the running 
of the state, that is they should not be represented in any government business; 
therefore I recommend that the government at that stage should be separate. This 
will keep the monastery pure. The rest of civil society should comprise the 
following: civil court; civil rule of law; police force; representative measures; and 
sanctions or punishment, and these must be based on the philosophy of 
nonviolence. At the same time, the monastic order should be a source of 
inspiration and an example for the civic society. 
Q. 	How do you view the concept of power? 
A. 	Power is a very vague term, and been interpreted and misinterpreted in many ways. 
I see only the sovereignty of the people. People have inbuilt rights and powers, 
and upon adopting the system of democracy, the sovereignty equally lies within 
each citizen, and each citizen is a shareholder of the sovereignty of the country. In 
the exercise of this, each person has a right to vote or not vote, to be chosen as a 
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representative or to choose a representative. These are the channels through 
which he or she exercises their sovereignty or power. 
There is also a different perception worth noting. In the Buddhist monastic order, 
the minority has the most powerful opinion, and the majority doesn't have the 
power in decision-making, whatever the Sangha decision. Suppose there are 100 
monks and 99 agree to one point, and one monk dissents; then that decision can 
never be carried out. Unless and until that one dissenting monk is persuaded, then 
if the Sangha decision is so important, after being exposed to all prevailing 
methods of persuasion if the monk maintains dissent, he must be expelled from that 
community. Unless and until he is made a non-member of that community, the 99 
people cannot override the one person's opinion. This can be seen as one extreme. 
At the other extreme, in today's democratic society, if there are 100, then the 
opinion of 51 can easily overrule the opinion of 49. The effective opinion then 
only belongs to two people. If two from the 51 side decide to change, then the 49 
side will win. This is a bit difficult to justify. So, in order to run a state or a 
country, the imposition of ideas is not the correct way but educating or promoting 
ideas is acceptable. This amounts to the explanation of an idea which everyone 
shares the right to do, but noone has the right to oppose it by any means. 
Promoting an idea doesn't involve power. It involves only wisdom and the use of 
argument to give reasons as to why you think this idea should prevail. 
Following on from teachings by Ven. Lobsang Norbu - la it has become apparent 
that the distinction should be made between 
• the exercise of power for political gain and power relations using force, coercion 
and violence, and 
• the power of truth which harnesses enormous energy for individual growth and 
societal change. This latter power of truth can be easily distinguished from the 
former by the pure motivation and the immense importance to aspire to apply this 
compassion, love and wisdom in a practical day to day way observing the 
interdependence of all things. From this, the truth will flow. The former exercise 
of power, if occurring within an environment which is not conducive to truth 
where the motivation of the individual or group is focussed on personal gain or 
some form of violence toward others can never lead to the truth. 
• In order to make a clear analysis one should first ask: What is the truth? and Why 
is nonviolence the truth? 
O. 	Rinpoche, your writings on Satyagraha list very specifically aspects of the truth to 
which Tibetans can lay claim. These are not hypothetical, but can be confirmed 
either through the senses or through indisputable evidence. Gandhi writes that 
through `Satya combined with Ahimsa you can bring the world to your feet' and 
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appears to discuss the power of truth in a more general sense. Is there a more 
fundamental truth which must be understood before claims can be laid to specific 
self evident truths? 
A. 	This is a bit complicated because religious traditions claim that that religious 
tradition is to help the people to realise the truth. Truth as a word is very 
commonly used by almost every tradition. There are many traditions which do not 
differentiate the two sides of truth. They always talk about the truth that means 
'the ultimate truth' and if the truth is only the ultimate truth there cannot be any 
experiment with the truth. From this viewpoint the only two positions possible are 
whether you see the truth or don't see the truth. We, as Buddhists perceive truth 
in from two different angles: absolute truth and convention or relative truth. The 
second is not an absolute truth, rather it is truth according to your understanding 
or perception or social or political.., or you can do an experiment with the truth 
and you will have your understanding at a number of levels. 
Initially I did not understand what Gandhi meant by giving the title of My 
Experiment with the Truth for his autobiography. But now I understand that he 
was always trying to discover or understand truth through his work. The 
understanding of truth is always either changing or progressing, mostly it is 
progressing higher and higher. According to that understanding, the effectiveness 
of work is also progressing, and so when I say that my insistence of truth is a 
. relative truth or conventional truth, it is one which is verifiable in day to day life. 
For example when I say that I claim the independence of Tibet, I do not claim that 
there was no independent good for Tibet rather claiming it afresh. It was 
independent that is true. I can't say it is the truth, but I can say that it is true, that 
truth is the basis for my insistence. So, I realise this is true, but then if someone 
convinces me through logic that Tibet has never been independent, upon that point 
of realisation I will no longer insist on the previous belief because now I 
understand that it was not true. 
Similarly, the way in which the Chines are governing the Tibetans politically, 
socially, culturally educationally - in all spheres what they are treating the Tibetan 
is not the right way. It is not the right way as a statement is true according to my 
perception and therefore I insist that this treatment should be stopped. And if my 
understanding of that truth is not true, but falsehood and I can discover this 
through reason, then I will give up my insistence. So whatever I insist must be 
true according to my understanding but this truth is not the level of absolute truth 
that is a part of conventional truth which is true according to common sense logic. 
This conventional truth can change at two levels: if my understanding is correct, 
the change would only take place when the situation changes. If my understanding 
is not correct then when I get the correct understanding my understanding changes 
this is subjective change and objective change. 
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Endnotes: 
His Holiness raised the issue of the referendum on several occasions, but outlined his proposal in his 
statement of March 10 1995. His pursuit of a meaningful dialogue with Chinese authorities for the past 
13 or 14 years has not led to a result. Meanwhile the situation inside Tibet is deteriorating day by day, 
and time is running out. It is time now for people to consider whether we should continue this Middle 
Path approach for dialogue with them, or we should choose some other course of action. On that matter, I 
would like to ask the people. 
I  Satyagraha: Truth Insistence Samdhong Losang Tenzin, Satyagrahi Community Pub!. Saranath 
Varanassi 1995 
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APPENDIX 3 
Interview with Dr Alex Boraine 
Deputy Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Cape Town 
South Africa 
November 18 1997 
O. 	Dr Boraine, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will soon complete its 
work Jam interested in your view of what has been achieved 
A. 	I must preface my remarks by saying that the 'jury is still out', we haven't finished 
our work and it is only when we reflect on the work that has been completed that 
one can make some honest assessment. Having said that, I think that there are a 
couple of points that I can make: 
First, the TRC has made it impossible for white South Africans in particular to 
hold onto their view that "they didn't know". I think we have shattered that 
illusion; because if they didn't know, they do know now. They may not like the 
Commission, but they have joined the debate, it is public. To consciously avoid 
the TRC you have to switch off your radio, you have to stop watching the 
television and stop reading the newspapers - most people don't do that. Even 
though many would argue still, that they don't know what the TRC are up to or 
they're not interested, when they get to a dinner party or BBQ or similar occasion, 
I'm told that the Commission is one of the major subjects discussed. I think that's 
important, very important. It is my view, and I think the view of my colleagues 
and many others that you can't really build a future without taking care of the past 
and coming to terms with it; I think the TRC has made a major contribution in 
helping South Africans to come face to face with that, something that a lot of other 
countries have declined to do - Switzerland is a brilliant contemporary example 
fifty years later they haven't come to terms with the fact that they turned a whole 
lot of Jews away from their borders, who then landed in concentration camps and 
gas chambers and the like. Second that they took a lot of the deposits (money 
jewellery and the like) and housed them in Swiss banks. Suddenly the whole 
nation is torn apart. I was there recently, and they just don't know how to come 
to terms with this. They didn't know it was true. South Africa won't have that 
problem. It won't have the problem that Germany has, to an extent I think it's a 
problem that Australia is battling with in terms of the stolen children. That is one 
major point. 
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Second it has publicised private grief. This is very important for victims and 
survivors who feel oppressed, who lost loved ones, whose whole human rights 
were violated; now suddenly its not something in a hole in the corner, it's there 
publicly for people to at least know about, acknowledge and admit and it seems to 
be very important for people who only knew a hostile state that even when they 
lost loved ones and went to prisons, hospitals and finally to morgues they were 
treated like dirt. Now the Commission treats them as human beings, with dignity 
and with compassion and we are there on behalf of President Mandela - so they 
feel that at last they have received acknowledgment. I think that is very important 
- not only intrinsically but also important to enable us to try and build a new life in 
South Africa. 
Third, we have made known a great deal of material that was shrouded in silence; 
and that is largely through the amnesty process. Out Investigative Unit has done a 
lot of good work but I think it is generally acknowledged that, were it not for the 
confessions of people who come pleading for amnesty, many many victims would 
never have known what really had happened to their loved ones who disappeared. 
I have found in my research in South America, Eastern Central Europe and 
Northern Ireland, (and certainly here in South Africa) - that people have a 
desperate need to know. It is not merely a question of limited justice taking place 
through truth, it is a very person thing: "I want to forgive" they say "but I must 
. know who to forgive, and for what". And that, funnily enough is a phrase I have 
heard in different languages, in Spanish, in Eastern European languages in an Irish 
brogue and in Xhosa, Utu and English and Afrikaans here. 
I think finally there has been a catharsis for a lot of people who have been carrying 
this burden of guilt on the one hand, perpetrators in other words, giving them a 
second chance which I think is important; and also for victims who in the telling of 
the story, however painful it has been, experience a kind of catharsis. Let me give 
you a graphic example: A man comes to the Commission, he is in his thirties, he's 
been blind since he was a teenager when he was shot by the police in the face, that 
he tells us politicised him. He wasn't political before that, he was just caught in 
the crossfire. Although it blinded him, it actually politicised him. He tells the story 
of his suffering and the loss of sight, his hardships, no chance of getting a job, the 
prospects are grim, he is poor... and then I thought he had finished. I was in the 
Chair at the time, and I thanked him warmly for being with us and offered him 
whatever comfort I could. I talked about reparation and rehabilitation and thanked 
him again, but he still didn't leave the platform; I thought that was because he 
couldn't see. There were people with him obviously, so I thanked him once again 
and said "you may go". He said "I can't go, I have to say one more thing" so I 
said "of course, what is it" he said "you know when I came to this hearing, I was 
blind and now I can see". He couldn't see physically, but something had happened 
for him which gave him a new insight. That was a very moving moment, and I can 
tell you of hundreds like that, of people who had some kind of catharsis; and if 
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you are interested in healing the country as we are, not merely going through a 
process, then I think it's a contribution that the TRC may have made in a small 
way to try and build for the future. 
0 	Dr Boraine, you are obviously a very strong person, but listening to this kind of 
testimony, must have some cumulative effect. How do you deal with that? 
A. 	It is very difficult. I have never known anything like it in my life and I've had 
some pretty tough jobs in the past. The problem of course is not only physical; 
long hours, lots of travel and dislocation - that sort of thing. That can happen to 
most of us; it's not being able to show your emotions. You can watch a film in 
the darkness of the cinema and weep a little bit, laugh a bit, or at your home with 
your radio or television in private. But when you're there and it is in public, you 
really have no right to detract from the victim. The focus must be on that person; 
so you have to bite the inside of your lip and you have to blink away the tears and 
its very difficult. Some have found it impossible and broken down. I think you've 
just got to find ways of dealing with it, but it comes back to you at three o' clock 
in the morning - that's the dilemma, and that I must say I have not been able to 
handle very well. Sleep patterns are the hardest; you are away when you are with 
your own family because you are not there, you are thinking about what you'd 
heard during the day, or last week, or are about to hear. What do you do? Well 
you try and walk, something physical, perhaps play a hell of a hard game of tennis 
. - which you don't have a lot of time for, but you try; occasionally a stiff whisky 
and soda I suppose helps! Even the journalists get hammered, we've often helped 
them; I think a lot of my colleagues go to counselling, I have done a lot of 
counselling myself in my past life, so I don't find it very easy to do that - that 
probably sounds very arrogant.. .perhaps it says something about me I 
suppose.. .but I don't find it very easy. 
Q. 	I think there is a big difference between arrogance and transparent honesty, and I 
thank you for your frankness because your comments paint a vivid picture that 
gives both a public and personal perspective - something not everyone is 
prepared to give. From the public perspective, what has been the reaction to a 
process which deals with such intense suffering through nonviolent rather than 
retributive means? One would expect that at least some of the victim's families 
would have an inclination towards retribution. 
A. 	Let me say very directly that the reaction of course has been very mixed. There 
are those who are enormously grateful and tell you that when they see you in 
public or in airports or by phone calls or letters, faxes and so on; but you also get 
very strong reactions from the Left if you like, who say "we demand trials, 
prosecutions, it's not good enough, it is not right that they should get amnesty and 
just walk away". I understand that view, and I would be surprised if there weren't 
people who felt that way. If you had lost your father - eight years ago he just 
walked out of your life and you never saw him again; now you hear that he had 
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been abducted, tortured and put to death and people are now telling that story 
publicly and will probably get amnesty for it and just walk away. There is a natural 
inclination to say I want my day in court - even if it is not in a spirit of revenge, I 
must say, the overwhelming majority of people (and I'm sure there are exceptions) 
are not looking for revenge, they are just looking for justice. There is a difference; 
and one finds it difficult to explain that amnesty is the price you pay for peaceful 
resolution to the problem. I think if we hadn't gone that route we might not have 
been able to hold a peaceful election and many, many people more would have 
died in the process than did. But to say that, it is not easy to bind their wounds. 
The other reaction has been that we shouldn't have this Commission at all. That 
all we are doing is stirring up trouble, opening up wounds. But of course what we 
have discovered is that the wounds have never closed; it's a lancing of a boil if 
you want to use a medical metaphor, rather than taking out the stitches in a 
wound. Noone has really given attention, noone has been present for these people 
who have been so badly damaged. And I think we all have been damaged you see, 
not just the obvious victims, and some people say . "I just switch off the radio, it's 
enough now, and we must stop now" so the reaction has been very, very mixed 
from those who say there ought to have been retribution rather than restorative 
justice and others who say there should have been amnesia, we should have just 
forgotten, turned the page. The reaction has been very mixed, and some people 
have been very violent, for example, threatening calls from people who don't like 
the process; and it's interesting that the ANC who supports the process very 
strongly has its reservations, the National Party has been very critical, the IFP has 
been very critical - as soon as you touch them; so long as you touch other people 
you get comments like "quite right too, right on" but as soon as it comes closer to 
home, which is understandable, many people say "well hold on a minute, not me, 
not us" 
Q. 	Does that have something to do with accountability and acknowledgment? 
A. 	Absolutely. We have tried to say that accountability is the absolute key to our 
work, it's not just knowledge, it's acknowledgment and that is very hard for proud 
people and particularly institutions or political parties; individuals may even find it 
a little easier although nobody finds it terribly easy. But when it becomes your 
institution, your Church, your political party, your group they say "We hate the 
Afrikaaner" You see almost every single one of the security police that has come 
before us has been a White Afrikaans, and there has been a lot of them and I keep 
saying to Mr de Klerk and others that we have not compelled them to come, it is 
voluntary, and the victims that have come, we haven't told them you've got to 
come. The only time we use compulsion is subpoena, where people we invite to 
come (and where we need the information), refuse to and we have to use the 
powers that are in the Act that all the parties agreed to. 
O. 	Is that the case with Winnie Mandikezela-Mandela? 
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A. 	Yes, we've subpoenaed her. This is going to be a very difficult one. I think the 
Commission largely stands or falls on how we deal with that one because the 
international community is going to be here, almost every major television 
company and lots of people demanding tickets and so. Many people in the White 
community are saying "Well let's see how you deal with her, you were pretty 
tough with others". A lot of people in the Black community say "Are you going to 
persecute her like she's been persecuted in the past?" and she certainly has been, 
she has suffered a great deal, to be the wife of a prominent man is always difficult, 
how much worse when he is the most celebrated political prisoner in the world? I 
think a lot of the mantle fell upon her shoulders and she was ill-equipped to deal 
with that. He chose that course of action, she didn't, it was forced upon her, and I 
feel great sympathy towards her. But we have to do our job, and our job is to get 
to the truth; victims have come to us, and said "This is what we think happened to 
our children, please help us find out the truth" We'll go through it but it's going 
to be very tough. I have great faith in the integrity of the Commission. Both 
Archbishop Tutu and I will be there for the full time. 
Q. 	Are there any different strategies required that wouldn't ordinarily be used? We 
are talking about someone who is well known, and on centre stage with the eyes of 
the world watching, which is probably the last thing you need. 
A. 	The Act doesn't allow for in-camera hearings of this kind, it has to be transparent. 
We tried; there is a section of the act that does allow in-camera hearings (Section 
29) but she insisted from day one that this should be public, and I think she's going 
to use the occasion ; she has very strong political ambitions. Others would like us 
to cut her down so to speak, but we are neither going to assist her political 
ambition nor denigrate her; our job is to say what occurred, to test it, to find out 
what people are saying, to find out what actually happened. It is going to be hard 
work. Pik Botha funny enough is the opposite - former President, Prime Minister, 
Minister of Defence, who says "I'm not going to perform for the circus". First he 
said he wasn't well enough, strong enough.. .now he's announcing his engagement 
which indicates he's pretty fit. So we're just going to go ahead, and we've 
subpoenaed him today and if he doesn't appear then he will face charges in a court 
of law - opposite extremes Pik Botha and Winnie Mandela. We have to be 
consistent. 
That kind of consistency brings us to the role of the TRC in the overall 
Government strategy; obviously there are documented guidelines and the 
position for the TRC in Mr Mandela 'S vision for the transition. 
A. 	I think it is very important to reinforce the point that he (Nelson Mandela) makes, 
and that is that the TRC is utterly independent of Government and he constantly 
tells us "You must maintain your independence; if it means that you have to 
criticise me, then you must do it". And we have valued that, we don't need him to 
tell us that in a sense, but it's nice to know that he sees it in that way, and we have 
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crossed swords occasionally, publicly and privately.. .but we just quote his own 
words back to him. He would never for example intervene in the hearing of 
Winnie Mandikezela-Mandela, and no Minister has tried to tell us what to do - 
they may be critical of us, that's fine. The vision was set up in the act, which was 
not an ANC Act, but a Parliamentary Act; that is a vision of building not on the 
basis of retribution or revenge, but on the basis of reconciliation, healing - that's 
actually stated in the act, this is what we must aspire to... and we've tried, but 
sometimes reconciliation gets confused with something quite cheap, a formula of 
religious words. Of course reconciliation is much more costly, much, much deeper 
than that. This is probably why we are so controversial - people would like to take 
the quick fix option. While I'm on that let me say that one of the things that we 
are well aware of is that no Commission on it's own will bring about reconciliation 
- the damage is too great, the wounds are too great, so we can make a 
contribution, but it's going to take a generation, and reconciliation doesn't only 
mean having public hearings, it also means economic justice, redistribution. It 
means that every time a woman or man reaches out and turns on a tap, they get 
clean water for the very first time in their lives, that is reconciliation as well; every 
time they switch on the light which they have never had before, enter a classroom 
with a child where they had no chance before; go to a clinic when they have never 
had it before, those are the concrete areas of reconciliation that I think this country 
has to deliver. I like to talk about the Commission as the restoration of the moral 
order and economic justice is the other side of the same coin - relax that tension 
and you're in trouble. And if the Government fails to deliver along the lines that 
I'm suggesting, then it will make the work of the Commission that much harder, 
because they will say don't give us words about reconciliation, forgiveness and so 
on.. .what about my life, what about my child, my water? 
Q. 	We are really talking directly to the last question about power based on 
nonviolence. What I'm trying to do in a very direct and practical way is to forge 
links between power and nonviolence, where research in the past reflects power 
based on coercion, control and violence. While there is certainly a core body of 
knowledge to the side, on nonviolence, it doesn't make this link While violence 
will always continue in one form or another, at least we should have a choice. I 
am interested in your reflection on power in this process. 
A. 	I think in a funny way, what the Commission is trying to do through a process 
which is not a court of law, where there is not punishment is to avoid that overt 
power.(and I understand and respect War Crimes Tribunals) The Hague, the 
Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda - there the last word is punishment. I don't think it 
can unlock the possibility of a peaceful and reconciled society by force or coercion. 
I think you're actually empowering people by not using power. It seems a fairly 
obvious thing to say, but I think it's terribly important and these people don't seem 
to understand that. People say "this is a demonstration of weakness, that you're 
not actually punishing people" but I actually think it is a sign of power. It is a 
different kind of power, it is a moral kind but it is a power that I have seen 
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working in the Commission - I've actually seen people freed.. .to say to someone 
that actually killed their daughter "I forgive you" and went so far as to say to the 
very one that killed their loved one "And I would like you to forgive me because I 
was part of a system that created you" this is publicly! publicly!. .that is 
devastating.. it is so powerful.. .that is what can change the equation, and is 
changing. I don't think people are aware yet of that force within the Commission 
that empowers people to stop seeing themselves as victims, and to live as 
survivors.., or even those who are victorious. And not only did they pay a very 
heavy price for a new South Africa, but this has now been acknowledged, and they 
can really say that 'the burden rolls from their shoulder down the hill, and is seen 
no more'. Their pilgrimage now is a much easier one, I don't mean to cheapen it, I 
don't want to underplay people's deep, deep held feelings of loss, but I've seen it 
happen over and over again. In public submissions. Recently, two or three weeks 
ago we had three men who had gone to jail facing life sentences. Three Black 
men, who very callously attacked a pub where people were celebrating New Year. 
One of them was a young woman. They shot and killed her and wounded others. 
The father of the daughter has phoned me many times and is an extremely harsh 
critic, demanding justice. I really understand. I have a daughter. His wife feels 
equally as much love and is devastated. But she publicly looks at these three guys 
where they describe what they tried to do, and why they did it and so on, and she 
looks at the youngest and says "I'm sorry that I'm part of the system that created 
the animosity and hatred which drove you to feel that you've got to strike at this 
• White power in some way. I loved her and I miss her terribly" and so on. She sat 
there next to her husband who was distraught, but it is very empowering and the 
whole of South Africa is benefiting when people are able to do that. 
In the Act there is no demand for contrition. Many people have said we should 
have demanded that. But the fact that the vast majority of people have come 
seeking amnesty, knowing that they don't have to say sorry, have said sorry. They 
say "I know you can't forgive me, but please try.. .1 thought what I was doing was 
the right thing, I was under orders, I was told this is where a lot of terrorists were, 
and I went there and tortured people because I thought these were Communists or 
terrorists and so on, but I was very young and I am sorry and I hope you will find 
it in your heart to forgive me, even though I know you can't". Some of them then 
are empowered to say "It's OK". It is a very powerful thing. At the Business 
hearing last week for the Chamber of Mines, they had done quite a lot of things 
which were wrong and so on, and they expressed very coldly some sort of regret, 
they had a chequered history over the last century of appalling conditions, labor 
relations, denial of basic rights, abysmal wages, construction of single sex hostels 
so families couldn't be with them; this of course led to all the social evils - 
alcoholism, prostitution, separation... all sorts of things... six grown men living in 
one tiny room, like a prison cell.... so I said to them, you know, don't you feel 
when you look back and see ...and the guy said well we can apologise, we can 
apologise six times if that makes you feel better. I tried to say, look you really are 
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treading on holy ground in a sense, it can change lives, change communities when 
you don't take the way of the powerful (business as well as police power etc) 
O. 	What is the role of the Commission at the end of the hearings? 
A. 	We have a report to write, which we will submit to Mr Mandela, and through him 
on to Parliament. It will be very extensive, about four volumes; and we also are 
enjoined to make recommendations as to what should happen as a consequence of 
our work, what we have discovered, uncovered and so on. That's one huge job 
that will have to be done. The amnesty hearings will have to continue because 
even though they should be finished, there are so many people that have 
applied.. .and when you get into court with lawyers, if they can delay things they 
will do so, instead of just taking a day or two days, it takes a week. We have 
thousands to hear, and we've got to hear them in terms of the Act, so they will go 
on, which means that we will have toThave support services for them and so on. 
At the end of July, the Commission is disbanded formally, will hand over the 
report; and in our recommendations, particularly in terms of reparation and 
rehabilitation we will be making a number of proposals, which then Government 
makes a decision on. Parliament decides whether to accept the recommendations 
of the Commission, to accept some of them, or reject all of them. I will be writing 
a book.. .It's not just the life of the Commission, but all of the major questions 
comes through, about life, about death about guilt, forgiveness, about power about 
weakness... all of these raise bigger questions with a reference that is much wider 
than the Commission itself. And how do you talk about other people who say that 
even a limited amnesty in South Africa is wrong, impunity can only encourage 
crime and violence; some jurists, judges and academics say that there can be no 
place for amnesty because people have committed serious crimes, and not to 
punish is to encourage. I understand that, but I think one needs to tease that out. 
In the book I am writing I want to look at all those issues. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Interview with Lionel Davis 
Ex political Prisoner with Mandela 
Robben Island 
Cape Town, South Africa 
November 19 1997 
O. 	After spending so long imprisoned on Robben Island, I would be interested to 
know your reasons for staying on as a tour guide 
A. 	For me, having been on Robben Island was a most positive experience. You see 
we come from a society which is very divided. It has been divided for centuries, 
this is how apartheid kept its power base, by the factions and division of our 
people. Each faction learned to be suspicious of the other, through education they 
inculcated the message that each is better and different from the other. Whites 
. were elevated, then coloureds and then black peoples (further divided by Xhosa 
and Zulu and so on) until it became a kind of chess game for the rulers over the 
centuries; perfected by apartheid rule. 
Here on the island, we had all of these classifications (without women or white 
people) which included Xhosa, Zulu, people classified as Asiatic and the like; and 
for the first time we are thrown together in this cauldron. But here, they 
discriminated on the basis of coloureds and Asiatics getting better food than Black 
people, hoping that this would again perpetuate this wedge, this chasm. But what 
they forgot is that we are political beings with a vision for change. We believe in 
equality, in the humanity of people - that is what we were fighting for. So here in 
jail, you have these very different ideologies, very different cultures, different 
language groups, different personalities; but all united against the immediate 
injustices. The atrocities that are committed in the name of justice, in the name of 
Christianity; all of these on the island, wanting to dehumanise us, wanting to 
destroy our dignity, to deface us. It was against these injustices that we were 
fighting. But in the face of this, we learned about each others' cultures it was a 
unique experience. Different ideologies began to be debated. It was healthy, and 
you learned to fine-tune your arguments, you learned about political debate. We 
discussed issues like sexism and different cultures of people. In jail we also had to 
face up to different personalities. Outside, you can walk away from people if you 
don't agree with them, but in jail, you have to see that person every day, so you 
learn to compromise, you learn to agree to disagree with the person. You learn to 
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be patient, you learn to be analytical, you give unselfishly of yourself. This is how 
people were actually brought nearer to each other. 
O. 	Obviously there were only white guards here? 
A. 	Yes. That's right. 
O. 	Did they see the benefits of engaged conversation in the way that you have 
described, and try to stop this? 
Initially, they tried to stop us. When I came here in 1964, we were not allowed to 
talk to one another. but unjust laws are meant to be broken, and we started 
breaking these laws right from the beginning. But with that kind of 'jack-boot' 
mentality, they tried to suppress us. Particularly when we were working in the 
lime quarry, we were singing and picking, shovelling and singing to rhythm. But 
to their liking, we were enjoying this so they stopped all singing. They forced us 
to sit in rows... rows upon rows upon rows... squatting and eating at lunchtime and 
in the evening.., rows upon rows of people coming from work, standing naked in 
the heart of winter, waiting to be strip-searched.., all forms of humiliating 
punishment was imposed on you. This is how they tried to cripple our spirit. 
O. 	How were you able to tolerate this at all, let alone for as long as you did? 
A. 	When we speak about nonviolence meeting violence, there is no way that you can 
react violently; it is counter-productive. Our strategy was... "well, fine.., our time 
will come to fight". And the way we fought back was to scheme and strategise. 
Usually there would be a system to deal with complaints and requests and so on. 
You would have half and hour for your section. I spent most of my time in B 
section with Mandela, and they would expect that each one of us would make a 
complaint - this way they would erode half an hour, and our scheme was that 
nobody talks... no questions, no complaints.. until they got to Mandela, or to one of 
our chosen spokespersons, and then that person would spend half an hour; this is 
how we would strategise. When lawyers came, when Amnesty International came, 
when the National Red Cross came, we did the same. Then in 1966 we went on 
our first hunger strike for 6 days, refused to eat any food. 1971, another hunger 
strike because conditions had once again become appalling. We were all studying. 
The person who came into the jail, they shared the same cell, studied the same 
course but were refused permission to share our textbooks; so although we were 
sitting next to each other and your textbook cost R300, I had to buy the same 
textbook for R300, this is how they tried to cripple you. Again they took away all 
the privileges; we were not allowed to play sport any more.. again, another hunger 
strike. 
O. 	How did you feel after 6 days on hunger strike? 
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A. 	You are weak but you are forced to go and work, some collapsed, some were 
hospitalised but we were determined; this was the only way that we could fight 
back. Of course there was also pressure from outside, from sympathetic 
governments. We used to smuggle out information from time to time.. this kept 
our spirit alive and led to a resounding victory against injustices. 
One guy was a Nazi, he had a swazsticker tattooed on his arm, and he came to 
look after us (as a jailer) and we had the opportunity to report him. He hated us, 
and we eventually got rid of him. We had to fight back without using physical 
violence, because they would kill you. They would destroy us. 
O. 	It sounds from what you have said, that although your did not have the chance to 
use physical violence, you are rather, valuing a different set of principles by 
saying that nonviolence leads to resounding victory, and this is the correct way to 
go about it. If you actually had the choice, would you still adhere to this set of 
values in the same way for example that Mahatma Gandhi did? 
A. 	The ideal situation would be to have a nonviolent situation, but we have come 
from a country in which every form of suppression was used against you and 
nonviolence was used by Gandhi. In the early days you look at the kind of 
struggle that was waged in South Africa...it was a nonviolent struggle, 1960 for 
example, when they (the apartheid regime) shot down sixty nine people - that was 
a nonviolent campaign so it was the ultimate resource (violence). You start off 
with a nonviolent campaign there had been commissions, partitions you know and 
it didn't work or help and this is why ultimately people resorted to violence, it was 
our last resort, not our first. In jail also it was good that you could not resort to 
violence, because it also taught us that you can resolve problems without violence. 
You don't have to resort to taking up a gun. 
Q. 	You spent a lot of your time in B Section? 
A. 	Most of my time 
O. 	How long were you here altogether? (the question relates to sitting within close 
proximity of that section during the interview) 
A. 	Seven years. 
Q. 	I hear from the tour (tours conducted for visitors to Robben Island) that you were 
in isolated cells. Were you allowed to talk to each other? Were you able to 
communicate in B Section with Nelson Mandela? 
A. 	Initially, it was only clandestine, whispering to each other because they had this 
'jackboot' on us. But unjust laws were meant to be broken so we started 
whispering and every gain we made through our hunger strikes, through partitions, 
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gave us greater strength. Our first real victory was in 1967 after our '66 hunger 
strike, when we were allowed to buy games for the first time, we were allowed to 
buy musical instruments for the first time. That in itself changed and uplifted us, 
changed the mood of prison.. .those are the things that are significant. Right from 
the start there was this campaign by us.. .they ordered us to walk fast, we walked 
slow deliberately. They force us to work, we would work slowly, this is how you 
start fighting back. 
O. 	And that produced change over time? 
A. 	Sure. It was not an instantaneous thing, but a progressive thing and in B Section 
you know, once you had music and games there was a hell of a lot of laughter. I 
remember sitting in my cell in the middle of the night.. everyone was sleeping and I 
was reading Pygmalion. I just burst out laughing in the scene where Eliza 
Doolittle saw the mouse running... she was at a very fancy do with her family, and 
the gutter snipe comes out in her.. .1 just burst out laughing in the middle of the 
night. This testifies to the change in mood that had already taken place; laughter, 
music, taking the mickey out of each other, competing against each other in sport. 
In 1967 you could see this manifested. .they couldn't suppress that. Every time 
there was a victory, this gave us a greater sense of spirit. By the time the guys 
came here in the '80's this prison was transformed. In these later years, the guys 
even played tennis, they had TV in B Section. 
Q. 	What is the criteria for being in B Section? 
A. 	B Section was the last to be completed in 1964. It was raw cement, very cold; 
they rushed to complete it to get the Rivonia people in there. Comprising 
Mandela, Sisulu, Kathrada; thereafter everybody else who was seen as a security 
risk to this prison, or seen as a political leader or a political troublemaker, they all 
went into that section. Only five of us landed up in that section simply because we 
were giving the authorities too many problems. We were considered to be 'hard 
nuts', they assaulted one of our guys and we said "we are all witnesses to this 
crime" and we all went off to report him as one group to report this assault, and 
about half an hour later when we were in our cells, we just heard "Lionel Davis, so 
and so " they rounded us all up and were told to take our blankets. We didn't 
know where the hell we were going. They brought us by force and brought us to 
B Section. Because we were defiant, and we were now influencing the rest of the 
prison population and they didn't like that. 
O. 	Would it be a correct view to say that the rest of the prison population were 
looking to the leaders for leadership even though they were isolated off in 
different sections? 
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A. 	Yes. Definitely. There had always been this respect for Mandela, and this group 
in here. But don't forget that this group was cut off from the rest of the prison 
population. What they regarded as leadership was kept in here. 
O. 	Did it therefore become more symbolic rather than actual leadership? 
A. 	Yes. More symbolic than anything else because the actual leadership in jail was in 
the general section; there was the leadership; where they were confronted day by 
day by very troublesome situations. They had committees to deal with the 
problems. There was a committee for discipline, a committee for culture, a 
committee for education, a committee for whatever you could think of ..and there 
would be consultation and decision-making; and this grouping in B Section had 
nothing to do with that. In fact the first hunger strike took place in the stone 
quarry, and we only got to know of it by the grapevine in our section later. And 
so in solidarity we went on a hunger strike too. It was not initiated by Mandela. 
O. 	But you mixed together in the stone quarry? 
A 	No. Mandela's section was never allowed to mix with the rest. Right from the 
time that they were sentenced in the Supreme Court in the Transvaal, to the old jail 
just over there and then into the newly completed B Section, they were never 
allowed to mix with the group. Initially we were only allowed out for half an hour 
in the morning for exercise and then later we were cutting stones, sitting down 
with our knees bent, using big hammers. We did this in the B Section yard, not 
with the general prisoners. After some time, they took us to the lime quarry, and 
that's where I worked for most of my seven years; that's where Nelson Mandela 
worked for thirteen years. So that group was always kept apart from the rest of 
the prison population. I had only a month's experience working in the stone 
quarry before we were forcefully brought over. We had come from the stone 
quarry where we saw this assault happen; we were going to testify against this 
warder from the stone quarry, that's how we landed up in this section. 
O. 	Would you say B Section was worse than the general section? How do they 
compare? 
A. 	B Section had its pluses and minuses. The pluses - you were not as harassed to the 
same extent as the general prison population. This grouping had an international 
focus. They (the apartheid regime) were wary about treating us too abjectly. The 
minus was the fact that we did not have access to all of those other prisoners; here 
we had to live day in, day out with this small grouping. In the general prison 
grouping you at least had the opportunity to work and talk to different ones about 
old times. Tomorrow you could plan to go and talk to that one there. The next 
day to work over there, and talk to someone else, you could also play sports, 
competing in soccer and rugby against each other; whereas we were kept 
together, no more than 30 people for years. 
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O. 	How would you describe Madiba? 
A. 	Mainly what you see, and what you hear about him is true. He is charismatic. He 
is an exceptionally warm person; a person that would welcome you to the island 
regardless of your political persuasions. A father figure, very dignified, very dry 
sense of humour, but humorous nevertheless, even now he is still fond of making 
jokes. He never raised his voice in anger; you could see the tone of his voice was 
angry. He never shouted. He could become very exceptionally stubborn, but 
never lost his sense of dignity. He is a very dignified person. 
Q. 	I come from the privileged position of never having had to endure the Ogle of 
indignities, suffering and gross human rights violations I hear about, read about, 
and the things you tell me about, and so I can't reconcile in my own mind how the 
perpetrators of such things - just as one human being to another - could possibly 
treated people in this way. The things I hear at the Amnesty Hearings, are 
impossible to come to terms with. What are your thoughts on this? 
A. 	Those atrocities hurt many of our people. Sometimes guys that were on the island 
• were taken off the island to face further charges. Those guys, some of them were 
hung. You see a guy here today, and the next thing you hear is that he has been 
sent to the gallows. 
Q. 	No doubt you were treated badly yourself while you were here. How do you 
withstand that? 
A. 	I think the difference between political prisoners and criminals is that criminals 
resort to violence, even among themselves, to take out their frustrations. We 
channelled our energies through debate, through sport, through education. Even 
those people who were not allowed to study smuggled in paper, pencils books; 
anything in order to help them study. It was that determination...you see we had a 
vision, and it was that vision that kept you alive. Whether you exercised in the 
morning in your cell, played games, studied, it was part of the building of the self. 
0. 	Can you describe that vision to me? 
A. 	The vision is of a society where we are all equals. A society where no person 
would ever have to go hungry. There would be food and education; there would 
be a home we could all call home, and enjoy the comforts of a decent living...three 
meals every day, a place for our children to do their schooling. To see them grow 
up into fruitful young people in society, part of a democratic order. Those are the 
things we wished for, we worked for. Because by improving yourself, by keeping 
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your spirit alive you kept your vision alive.. .this is how ultimately we became the 
conquerors, instead of the vanquished.. .the vision. 
O. 	What did you do with that vision when you were finally released from here? 
A. 	You are talking to me personally now? For me, I did not join a political 
organisation again because I do believe that any political organisation is sectarian. 
Unfortunately it is sectarian; they do have this talk about this egalitarian society; 
equality and all of that, but ultimately there is a difference. Jail was 
different.., outside there you have these people squaring up to each other with 
different agendas. Each one thinking that his ideology is the Alpha and the 
Omega. For me that was not on. I preferred to work in a place, in a space where I 
could be of benefit to everybody, I became an artist; a cultural activist. Somebody 
loves me up there. I worked in a place called the community arts project, a screen-
printing project. We did not have the communication or propaganda tools that the 
(white) government had - no TV, no radio, no access to the press. But we went 
on this campaign of t-shirt printing, poster printing and banner painting on a big 
scale. 
Q. 	How many people worked with you on that? 
A. 	. There were about four people in our department that worked on this project. Our 
focus was to teach people the skills, and that was wonderful. Whether it was the 
ANC aligned organisations, where it was Pan Africanist Congress aligned people, 
where it was the Black Consciousness Movement, where it was the Muslim Youth 
groupings or church progressive groupings or an organisation called the Unity 
Movement - whatever was progressive we were there to help and assist them. 
People used to go into the townships. You see there were curfews in the 
townships, so they would have relays of men and women, young people working 
throughout the night and the day, producing t-shirts and posters. All of this had to 
be smuggled into the townships. At every township entrance there were cops 
waiting. Women would wrap these posters around their bodies, everyone wearing 
ten t-shirts; this is how they smuggled them in. 
Q. 	How were these resources (the inks; paints, fabrics, paper) provided to make 
possible this project on a continuous basis? 
A. 	We were fortunate that by the eighties we had great support from the international 
communities. In the seventies you didn't see this support, but in the eighties as the 
campaign against oppression hotted up we then had the Scandinavians, the 
Germans, people in England sending money into the country. My organisation 
was sustained by the Dutch, by the Germans, by the Americans.. this is how we 
kept going. Non-Government Organisations were the oil that kept the struggle 
wheels turning. 
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O. 	For how long were you working in the cultural area, or do you continue today? 
A. 	I am a trained artist. I started my education at the Community Arts Project at the 
end of 1977. At the end of '76, my house arrest, my banning order (five years of a 
banning order) was a very traumatic experience, and I needed healing. 
O. 	Can you tell me about this banning order. Did it result from you being identified 
as a political activist? 
A. 	Once I left jail, you had to sign a form saying that you understood the conditions 
of your order. If you are a banned person, first of all you are confined to an area 
(geographical areas). If you go outside theses areas, they can arrest you and put 
you back in prison. If you wanted to leave an area, for example to go and look for 
a job, you had to ask permission from a magistrate and only with that letter could 
you leave that area and go and look for a job. You are confined in your home 
from seven in the evening until six in the morning. During that time you are not 
allowed any visitors. Visitors can come to your relatives, but you are not 
supposed to be in their company. From seven in the morning till six in the evening, 
you are allowed out in your area, but not allowed to talk to more than two people. 
If you are there and another person is there, and you talk to another, this 
constitutes a gathering, and is illegal. You are not allowed to go near a school, 
near a publishing house, near a printing works, near an airport or a shipping lane; 
You have to report once a week to the magistrate in your area. The same 
magistrate, to the police station, between seven in the morning and six in the 
evening once a week. Weekends, unless you have a job on Saturday, you are 
confined to your home until Monday morning. 
O. 	And this went on for five years? 
A. 	For five years.. .and it's nearly enough to make you go off. Most people can't 
stand it. They take a one way ticket out of the country into exile. I withstood it, 
but it had its consequences. This is where art helped me out of trauma.., at the end 
of '77 I founded this place, at the end of '78 I started my arts training. In '91 I 
quit my job finally and I went to Varsity. I did a degree in Fine Arts, so I'm an 
Arts teacher. 
O. 	What is your favoured medium? 
A. 	Painting and printmaking.. .those are the two areas that I love working in, but I'm 
open to all sorts of art. That is why I'm living on the island (Robben Island) now. 
Next week my family is coming, we're moving our car, furniture everything. I 
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have a studio here and I will start to produce my work in ernest. If you go to the 
District Six Museum or the Harbour, you'll see some of my work, lino cuts. I'm 
not a professional artist, but a practising artist 
O. 	Same thing in my book! What themes do you work through? 
A. 	I look at political issues, cultural historical issues, at the moment one of my 
concerns is the indigenous people. How to use their language in a glorified way. 
Their cultural identities have almost been destroyed, but there are some pockets of 
people in Africa who still speak the language. I try to recapture some of that 
glorious past of theirs. Language has an expressive way of making art. I work 
figuratively and abstractly. I also talk about things that bother me - culturally and 
politically. So you will see some of my work in the District Six Museum; I was 
born in that area. If you go there you will understand about forced removals. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Interview with His Holiness, Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
November 15 1997 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
O. Your Holiness, like the Dalai Lama your life has been dedicated to nonviolence. 
What for you constitutes the power of nonviolence? 
A. The power of nonviolence is the belief in the worth of" the other," in the worth of" 
your enemy;" you don't demonise your enemy-- rather you say that "my enemy is just 
a friend I am still to make." 
I pray that we can help to cultivate an atmosphere and culture of tolerance where 
people can hold and propagate any and every point of view as long as it is not 
injurious to the most vulnerable, the young, the elderly and the disabled and that we 
will all campaign for freedom of worship for all South Africans regardless of race, sex, 
culture or creed and that those who feel strongly about these things will be ready to 
stand up against the state when it becomes immoral and unjust and unChristian. 
APPENDIX 6 
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Transcription of Testimony by Tibetan Nun 
appearing in the 1993 documentary film by Ellen Bruno 
`Satya: a prayer for the enemy' 
(Distributed by the Australia-Tibet Council) 
We slept with our robes on in case we were taken away in the night. When we went to 
demonstrate we expected nothing but death. We are fighting for truth, and for this we 
must be ready to die. The truth will find its way - we never doubt this. I felt no fear; I got 
strength from all the people who were killed before me.. .we shouted "Freedom for Tibet!" 
"Human Rights for All Tibetans!" We called for all Tibetans to unite. By our second time 
around the temple many lay people had joined us. 
They (the Chinese) started shooting. They were firing from all sides. All the streets were 
blocked and we were trapped in the middle. This way many people were killed. So many 
people were killed; a small child was shot in the stomach, his intestines were falling out. 
He was watching from a crack in the wall. The guns didn't make any noise, we just saw 
red flashes and people fell down around us. They threw us into trucks and took us to 
Gutsa prison. For a month and ten days, they did not let me see the sky; I did not know 
night from day. 
When the guards had passed, I listened for a whisper - any sign that I am not alone. They 
wanted to know who was behind us, but noone was behind us. Then they stripped me 
completely naked, they stood me up and kicked me in the groin. They made me stick out 
my tongue and pushed an electric cattle prod in my mouth. They hit me again and 
again.., it is as though I am every Tibetan, the full wrath of China upon me. They tried to 
break us. It is our will against their might. 
Sometimes they give a drug which makes us dream and we can no longer hold our 
thoughts. They wrapped wires around my fingers then they turned on the electric current. 
The shock was unbearable. My whole body contracted and sharp pains shot up through 
my feet. It was more painful than the cattle prod. I was shaking and screaming. They 
tortured me every day, and then they set my sentence. They gave me only two years 
because I was just sixteen. 
The one who tortures me is made to believe that what he is doing is right. He must stay 
blind to my pain in order to carry on. With arms that beat me, he embraces his woman; 
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wraps loving arms around his child, protecting her with his strength. Noone can escape 
the consequences of their actions. 
This darkness will not last. Like all things, it too will change. In the solitude of our cell 
we imagine ourselves in meditation caves, high on the roof of the world - our enemy is our 
greatest teacher, teacher of patience and compassion; our imprisonment our greatest test 
of faith. Through the force of our prayers, I ask that those who imprison us be freed from 
the darkness of ignorance; that the clouds which obscure the truth give way to clarity. 
After such darkness it was painful to open my eyes to the sun. I was dizzy, for many days 
I was surrounded by fear. After our release they sent us back to our villages. They made 
our home a prison; we were forbidden from wearing our robes. They said only those who 
truly loved the country would remain as nuns. 
After my release, I returned to the nunnery... there were many Chinese policemen there. 
They told me I couldn't stay; they didn't let me stay in my room or even stay with my 
friends. So I had to leave that night. I was a long way from my home. The Chinese office 
was down the road, and there were some drunken men there. I didn't expect anything. 
They grabbed me by the chest and carried me off. I shouted and screamed but noone 
heard me. They carried me to a hidden place. They held me down by my arms and legs 
and stuffed cloth in my mouth so I couldn't scream. Then they raped me. 
After that, I decided to grow my hair and give up my robes. My vows were broken and I 
felt I couldn't remain a nun. At first, I was angry at all the plants and birds, all the 
animals; then my anger spread to all living beings in the six realms of existence. I tried to 
imagine what might happen if we fought a war with the Chinese - thinking something 
good might come of it. Such thoughts entered my mind. But in war, it is not only the 
humans that die; all living beings, all the animals and insects suffer along with the humans. 
The path of nonviolence may seem long and tiresome, but what is a single lifetime in this 
endless cycle of birth and death? 
The teachings of Buddha are deep like an ocean. As anger and hatred arise, I pray that the 
Chinese become gentle and calm; that through love and compassion those who are drunk 
with delusions, lost in the darkness of ignorance, acquire the wisdom eye to see what is 
right and what is wrong. May all living beings be free from suffering. 
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